draft-ietf-oauth-v2-23.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-v2-24.txt 
Network Working Group E. Hammer, Ed. Network Working Group E. Hammer, Ed.
Internet-Draft Internet-Draft
Obsoletes: 5849 (if approved) D. Recordon Obsoletes: 5849 (if approved) D. Recordon
Intended status: Standards Track Facebook Intended status: Standards Track Facebook
Expires: July 24, 2012 D. Hardt Expires: September 9, 2012 D. Hardt
Microsoft Microsoft
January 21, 2012 March 8, 2012
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-23 draft-ietf-oauth-v2-24
Abstract Abstract
The OAuth 2.0 authorization protocol enables a third-party The OAuth 2.0 authorization protocol enables a third-party
application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This
specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described
in RFC 5849. in RFC 5849.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 24, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.1. Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.2. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. Authorization Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.3. Authorization Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1. Authorization Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.3.1. Authorization Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.2. Implicit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.3.2. Implicit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.3. Resource Owner Password Credentials . . . . . . . . . 8 1.3.3. Resource Owner Password Credentials . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.4. Client Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.3.4. Client Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4. Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.4. Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.5. Refresh Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.5. Refresh Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.6. TLS Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.6. TLS Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.7. Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.7. Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.8. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.8. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2. Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1. Client Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.1. Client Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2. Client Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.2. Client Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.3. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.1. Client Password . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.3.1. Client Password . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.2. Other Authentication Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.3.2. Other Authentication Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4. Unregistered Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.4. Unregistered Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. Protocol Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3. Protocol Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1. Authorization Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.1. Authorization Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1.1. Response Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.1.1. Response Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.2. Redirection Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.1.2. Redirection Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2. Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.2. Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.1. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.2.1. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3. Access Token Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.3. Access Token Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4. Obtaining Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4. Obtaining Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1. Authorization Code Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.1. Authorization Code Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1.1. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.1.1. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.2. Authorization Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.1.2. Authorization Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1.3. Access Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.1.3. Access Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1.4. Access Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4.1.4. Access Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2. Implicit Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.2. Implicit Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2.1. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4.2.1. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2.2. Access Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.2.2. Access Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3. Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant . . . . . . . . 33 4.3. Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant . . . . . . . . 34
4.3.1. Authorization Request and Response . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.3.1. Authorization Request and Response . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3.2. Access Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.3.2. Access Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3.3. Access Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.3.3. Access Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4. Client Credentials Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.4. Client Credentials Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4.1. Authorization Request and Response . . . . . . . . . . 37 4.4.1. Authorization Request and Response . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.2. Access Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 4.4.2. Access Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.3. Access Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 4.4.3. Access Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.5. Extension Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4.5. Extension Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5. Issuing an Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5. Issuing an Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.1. Successful Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.1. Successful Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 5.2. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6. Refreshing an Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 6. Refreshing an Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7. Accessing Protected Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7. Accessing Protected Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.1. Access Token Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.1. Access Token Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 8. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.1. Defining Access Token Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 8.1. Defining Access Token Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.2. Defining New Endpoint Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 8.2. Defining New Endpoint Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.3. Defining New Authorization Grant Types . . . . . . . . . 45 8.3. Defining New Authorization Grant Types . . . . . . . . . 46
8.4. Defining New Authorization Endpoint Response Types . . . 45 8.4. Defining New Authorization Endpoint Response Types . . . 46
8.5. Defining Additional Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.5. Defining Additional Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
9. Native Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 9. Native Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.1. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 10.1. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.2. Client Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 10.2. Client Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10.3. Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 10.3. Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10.4. Refresh Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 10.4. Refresh Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
10.5. Authorization Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 10.5. Authorization Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
10.6. Authorization Code Redirection URI Manipulation . . . . . 50 10.6. Authorization Code Redirection URI Manipulation . . . . . 51
10.7. Resource Owner Password Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . 51 10.7. Resource Owner Password Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.8. Request Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 10.8. Request Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.9. Endpoints Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 10.9. Endpoints Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10.10. Credentials Guessing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 10.10. Credentials Guessing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10.11. Phishing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 10.11. Phishing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10.12. Cross-Site Request Forgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 10.12. Cross-Site Request Forgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10.13. Clickjacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 10.13. Clickjacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
10.14. Code Injection and Input Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 54 10.14. Code Injection and Input Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 55
10.15. Open Redirectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 10.15. Open Redirectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11.1. The OAuth Access Token Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . 55 11.1. The OAuth Access Token Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . 56
11.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 11.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
11.2. The OAuth Parameters Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 11.2. The OAuth Parameters Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
11.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 11.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 11.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.3. The OAuth Authorization Endpoint Response Type 11.3. The OAuth Authorization Endpoint Response Type
Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
11.3.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 11.3.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.3.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 11.3.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.4. The OAuth Extensions Error Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 60 11.4. The OAuth Extensions Error Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.4.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 11.4.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Appendix A. Editor's Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Appendix A. Editor's Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In the traditional client-server authentication model, the client In the traditional client-server authentication model, the client
requests an access restricted resource (protected resource) on the requests an access restricted resource (protected resource) on the
server by authenticating with the server using the resource owner's server by authenticating with the server using the resource owner's
credentials. In order to provide third-party applications access to credentials. In order to provide third-party applications access to
restricted resources, the resource owner shares its credentials with restricted resources, the resource owner shares its credentials with
the third-party. This creates several problems and limitations: the third-party. This creates several problems and limitations:
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o Servers are required to support password authentication, despite o Servers are required to support password authentication, despite
the security weaknesses created by passwords. the security weaknesses created by passwords.
o Third-party applications gain overly broad access to the resource o Third-party applications gain overly broad access to the resource
owner's protected resources, leaving resource owners without any owner's protected resources, leaving resource owners without any
ability to restrict duration or access to a limited subset of ability to restrict duration or access to a limited subset of
resources. resources.
o Resource owners cannot revoke access to an individual third-party o Resource owners cannot revoke access to an individual third-party
without revoking access to all third-parties, and must do so by without revoking access to all third-parties, and must do so by
changing their password. changing their password.
o Compromise of any third-party application results in compromise of o Compromise of any third-party application results in compromise of
the end-user s password and all of the data protected by that the end-user's password and all of the data protected by that
password. password.
OAuth addresses these issues by introducing an authorization layer OAuth addresses these issues by introducing an authorization layer
and separating the role of the client from that of the resource and separating the role of the client from that of the resource
owner. In OAuth, the client requests access to resources controlled owner. In OAuth, the client requests access to resources controlled
by the resource owner and hosted by the resource server, and is by the resource owner and hosted by the resource server, and is
issued a different set of credentials than those of the resource issued a different set of credentials than those of the resource
owner. owner.
Instead of using the resource owner's credentials to access protected Instead of using the resource owner's credentials to access protected
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specific credentials (access token). specific credentials (access token).
This specification is designed for use with HTTP [RFC2616]. The use This specification is designed for use with HTTP [RFC2616]. The use
of OAuth with any transport protocol other than HTTP is undefined. of OAuth with any transport protocol other than HTTP is undefined.
1.1. Roles 1.1. Roles
OAuth defines four roles: OAuth defines four roles:
resource owner resource owner
An entity capable of granting access to a protected resource (e.g. An entity capable of granting access to a protected resource.
end-user). When the resource owner is a person, it is refered to as an end-
user.
resource server resource server
The server hosting the protected resources, capable of accepting The server hosting the protected resources, capable of accepting
and responding to protected resource requests using access tokens. and responding to protected resource requests using access tokens.
client client
An application making protected resource requests on behalf of the An application making protected resource requests on behalf of the
resource owner and with its authorization. The term client does resource owner and with its authorization. The term client does
not imply any particular implementation characteristics (e.g. not imply any particular implementation characteristics (e.g.
whether the application executes on a server, a desktop, or other whether the application executes on a server, a desktop, or other
devices). devices).
authorization server authorization server
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the most widely deployed version, and will provide the broadest the most widely deployed version, and will provide the broadest
interoperability. interoperability.
Implementations MAY also support additional transport-layer Implementations MAY also support additional transport-layer
mechanisms that meet their security requirements. mechanisms that meet their security requirements.
1.7. Interoperability 1.7. Interoperability
OAuth 2.0 provides a rich authorization framework with well-defined OAuth 2.0 provides a rich authorization framework with well-defined
security properties. However, as a rich and highly extensible security properties. However, as a rich and highly extensible
framework with many optional components, this specification is likely framework with many optional components, on its own, this
to produce a wide range of non-interoperable implementations. In specification is likely to produce a wide range of non-interoperable
addition, this specification leaves a few required components implementations. In addition, this specification leaves a few
partially or fully undefined (e.g. client registration, authorization required components partially or fully undefined (e.g. client
server capabilities, endpoint discovery). registration, authorization server capabilities, endpoint discovery).
This protocol was design with the clear expectation that future work This protocol was designed with the clear expectation that future
will define prescriptive profiles and extensions necessary to achieve work will define prescriptive profiles and extensions necessary to
full web-scale interoperability. achieve full web-scale interoperability.
1.8. Notational Conventions 1.8. Notational Conventions
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
specification are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. specification are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
notation of [RFC5234]. notation of [RFC5234].
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Clients in possession of a client password MAY use the HTTP Basic Clients in possession of a client password MAY use the HTTP Basic
authentication scheme as defined in [RFC2617] to authenticate with authentication scheme as defined in [RFC2617] to authenticate with
the authorization server. The client identifier is used as the the authorization server. The client identifier is used as the
username, and the client password is used as the password. The username, and the client password is used as the password. The
authorization server MUST support the HTTP Basic authentication authorization server MUST support the HTTP Basic authentication
scheme for authenticating clients which were issued a client scheme for authenticating clients which were issued a client
password. password.
For example (extra line breaks are for display purposes only): For example (extra line breaks are for display purposes only):
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3
Alternatively, the authorization server MAY support including the Alternatively, the authorization server MAY support including the
client credentials in the request body using the following client credentials in the request body using the following
parameters: parameters:
client_id client_id
REQUIRED. The client identifier issued to the client during REQUIRED. The client identifier issued to the client during
the registration process described by Section 2.2. the registration process described by Section 2.2.
client_secret client_secret
REQUIRED. The client secret. The client MAY omit the REQUIRED. The client secret. The client MAY omit the
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This specification does not exclude the use of unregistered clients. This specification does not exclude the use of unregistered clients.
However, the use with such clients is beyond the scope of this However, the use with such clients is beyond the scope of this
specification, and requires additional security analysis and review specification, and requires additional security analysis and review
of its interoperability impact. of its interoperability impact.
3. Protocol Endpoints 3. Protocol Endpoints
The authorization process utilizes two authorization server endpoints The authorization process utilizes two authorization server endpoints
(HTTP resources): (HTTP resources):
o Authorization endpoint - used to obtain authorization from the o Authorization endpoint - used by the client to obtain
resource owner via user-agent redirection. authorization from the resource owner via user-agent redirection.
o Token endpoint - used to exchange an authorization grant for an o Token endpoint - used by the client to exchange an authorization
access token, typically with client authentication. grant for an access token, typically with client authentication.
As well as one client endpoint: As well as one client endpoint:
o Redirection endpoint - used to return authorization credentials o Redirection endpoint - used by the authorization server to return
responses from the authorization server to the client via the authorization credentials responses to the client via the resource
resource owner user-agent. owner user-agent.
Not every authorization grant type utilizes both endpoints. Not every authorization grant type utilizes both endpoints.
Extension grant types MAY define additional endpoints as needed. Extension grant types MAY define additional endpoints as needed.
3.1. Authorization Endpoint 3.1. Authorization Endpoint
The authorization endpoint is used to interact with the resource The authorization endpoint is used to interact with the resource
owner and obtain an authorization grant. The authorization server owner and obtain an authorization grant. The authorization server
MUST first verify the identity of the resource owner. The way in MUST first verify the identity of the resource owner. The way in
which the authorization server authenticates the resource owner (e.g. which the authorization server authenticates the resource owner (e.g.
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requesting an access token (implicit grant) as described by requesting an access token (implicit grant) as described by
Section 4.2.1, or a registered extension value as described by Section 4.2.1, or a registered extension value as described by
Section 8.4. Section 8.4.
Extension response types MAY contain a space-delimited (%x20) list of Extension response types MAY contain a space-delimited (%x20) list of
values, where the order of values does not matter (e.g. response type values, where the order of values does not matter (e.g. response type
"a b" is the same as "b a"). The meaning of such composite response "a b" is the same as "b a"). The meaning of such composite response
types is defined by their respective specifications. types is defined by their respective specifications.
If an authorization request is missing the "response_type" parameter, If an authorization request is missing the "response_type" parameter,
the authorization server MUST return an error response as described or if the response type is not understood, the authorization server
in Section 4.1.2.1. MUST return an error response as described in Section 4.1.2.1.
3.1.2. Redirection Endpoint 3.1.2. Redirection Endpoint
After completing its interaction with the resource owner, the After completing its interaction with the resource owner, the
authorization server directs the resource owner's user-agent back to authorization server directs the resource owner's user-agent back to
the client. The authorization server redirects the user-agent to the the client. The authorization server redirects the user-agent to the
client's redirection endpoint previously established with the client's redirection endpoint previously established with the
authorization server during the client registration process or when authorization server during the client registration process or when
making the authorization request. making the authorization request.
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which MUST be retained when adding additional query parameters. The which MUST be retained when adding additional query parameters. The
endpoint URI MUST NOT include a fragment component. endpoint URI MUST NOT include a fragment component.
3.1.2.1. Endpoint Request Confidentiality 3.1.2.1. Endpoint Request Confidentiality
The redirection endpoint SHOULD require the use of TLS as described The redirection endpoint SHOULD require the use of TLS as described
in Section 1.6 when the requested response type is "code" or "token", in Section 1.6 when the requested response type is "code" or "token",
or when the redirection request will result in the transmission of or when the redirection request will result in the transmission of
sensitive credentials over an open network. This specification does sensitive credentials over an open network. This specification does
not mandate the use of TLS because at the time of this writing, not mandate the use of TLS because at the time of this writing,
requiring clients to deploy TLS is a significant hurdle for most requiring clients to deploy TLS is a significant hurdle for many
client developers. client developers. If TLS is not available, the authorization server
SHOULD warn the resource owner about the insecure endpoint prior to
redirection.
Lack of transport-layer security can have a severe impact on the Lack of transport-layer security can have a severe impact on the
security of the client and the protected resources it is authorized security of the client and the protected resources it is authorized
to access. The use of transport-layer security is particularly to access. The use of transport-layer security is particularly
critical when the authorization process is used as a form of critical when the authorization process is used as a form of
delegated end-user authentication by the client (e.g. third-party delegated end-user authentication by the client (e.g. third-party
sign-in service). sign-in service).
3.1.2.2. Registration Requirements 3.1.2.2. Registration Requirements
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automatically redirect the user-agent to the invalid redirection URI. automatically redirect the user-agent to the invalid redirection URI.
3.1.2.5. Endpoint Content 3.1.2.5. Endpoint Content
The redirection request to the client's endpoint typically results in The redirection request to the client's endpoint typically results in
an HTML document response, processed by the user-agent. If the HTML an HTML document response, processed by the user-agent. If the HTML
response is served directly as the result of the redirection request, response is served directly as the result of the redirection request,
any script included in the HTML document will execute with full any script included in the HTML document will execute with full
access to the redirection URI and the credentials it contains. access to the redirection URI and the credentials it contains.
The client MUST NOT include any untrusted third-party scripts in the The client SHOULD NOT include any third-party scripts (e.g. third-
redirection endpoint response (e.g. third-party analytics, social party analytics, social plug-ins, ad networks) in the redirection
plug-ins, ad networks) without first ensuring that its own scripts endpoint response. Instead, it SHOULD extract the credentials from
used to extract and remove the credentials from the URI will execute the URI and redirect the user-agent again to another endpoint without
first. exposing the credentials (in the URI or elsewhere). If third-party
scripts are included, the client MUST NOT ensure that its own scripts
The client SHOULD NOT include any third-party scripts in the (used to extract and remove the credentials from the URI) will
redirection endpoint response. Instead, it should extract the execute first.
credentials from the URI and redirect the user-agent again to another
endpoint without the credentials in the URI.
3.2. Token Endpoint 3.2. Token Endpoint
The token endpoint is used by the client to obtain an access token by The token endpoint is used by the client to obtain an access token by
presenting its authorization grant or refresh token. The token presenting its authorization grant or refresh token. The token
endpoint is used with every authorization grant except for the endpoint is used with every authorization grant except for the
implicit grant type (since an access token is issued directly). implicit grant type (since an access token is issued directly).
The means through which the client obtains the location of the token The means through which the client obtains the location of the token
endpoint are beyond the scope of this specification but is typically endpoint are beyond the scope of this specification but is typically
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stolen refresh tokens. Changing a single set of client stolen refresh tokens. Changing a single set of client
credentials is significantly faster than revoking an entire set of credentials is significantly faster than revoking an entire set of
refresh tokens. refresh tokens.
o Implementing authentication management best practices which o Implementing authentication management best practices which
require periodic credential rotation. Rotation of an entire set require periodic credential rotation. Rotation of an entire set
of refresh tokens can be challenging, while rotation of a single of refresh tokens can be challenging, while rotation of a single
set of client credentials is significantly easier. set of client credentials is significantly easier.
A public client that was not issued a client password MAY use the A public client that was not issued a client password MAY use the
"client_id" request parameter to identify itself when sending "client_id" request parameter to identify itself when sending
requests to the token endpoint. requests to the token endpoint (e.g. for the purpose of providing
end-user context, client usage statistics).
3.3. Access Token Scope 3.3. Access Token Scope
The authorization and token endpoints allow the client to specify the The authorization and token endpoints allow the client to specify the
scope of the access request using the "scope" request parameter. In scope of the access request using the "scope" request parameter. In
turn, the authorization server uses the "scope" response parameter to turn, the authorization server uses the "scope" response parameter to
inform the client of the scope of the access token issued. inform the client of the scope of the access token issued.
The value of the scope parameter is expressed as a list of space- The value of the scope parameter is expressed as a list of space-
delimited, case sensitive strings. The strings are defined by the delimited, case sensitive strings. The strings are defined by the
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5.2. Error Response 5.2. Error Response
The authorization server responds with an HTTP 400 (Bad Request) The authorization server responds with an HTTP 400 (Bad Request)
status code and includes the following parameters with the response: status code and includes the following parameters with the response:
error error
REQUIRED. A single error code from the following: REQUIRED. A single error code from the following:
invalid_request invalid_request
The request is missing a required parameter, includes an The request is missing a required parameter, includes an
unsupported parameter value, repeats a parameter, unsupported parameter value (other than grant type),
includes multiple credentials, utilizes more than one repeats a parameter, includes multiple credentials,
mechanism for authenticating the client, or is otherwise utilizes more than one mechanism for authenticating the
malformed. client, or is otherwise malformed.
invalid_client invalid_client
Client authentication failed (e.g. unknown client, no Client authentication failed (e.g. unknown client, no
client authentication included, or unsupported client authentication included, or unsupported
authentication method). The authorization server MAY authentication method). The authorization server MAY
return an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code to indicate return an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code to indicate
which HTTP authentication schemes are supported. If the which HTTP authentication schemes are supported. If the
client attempted to authenticate via the "Authorization" client attempted to authenticate via the "Authorization"
request header field, the authorization server MUST request header field, the authorization server MUST
respond with an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code, and respond with an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code, and
include the "WWW-Authenticate" response header field include the "WWW-Authenticate" response header field
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Client authentication failed (e.g. unknown client, no Client authentication failed (e.g. unknown client, no
client authentication included, or unsupported client authentication included, or unsupported
authentication method). The authorization server MAY authentication method). The authorization server MAY
return an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code to indicate return an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code to indicate
which HTTP authentication schemes are supported. If the which HTTP authentication schemes are supported. If the
client attempted to authenticate via the "Authorization" client attempted to authenticate via the "Authorization"
request header field, the authorization server MUST request header field, the authorization server MUST
respond with an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code, and respond with an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code, and
include the "WWW-Authenticate" response header field include the "WWW-Authenticate" response header field
matching the authentication scheme used by the client. matching the authentication scheme used by the client.
invalid_grant invalid_grant
The provided authorization grant (e.g. authorization The provided authorization grant (e.g. authorization
code, resource owner credentials) is invalid, expired, code, resource owner credentials) or refresh token is
revoked, does not match the redirection URI used in the invalid, expired, revoked, does not match the redirection
authorization request, or was issued to another client. URI used in the authorization request, or was issued to
another client.
unauthorized_client unauthorized_client
The authenticated client is not authorized to use this The authenticated client is not authorized to use this
authorization grant type. authorization grant type.
unsupported_grant_type unsupported_grant_type
The authorization grant type is not supported by the The authorization grant type is not supported by the
authorization server. authorization server.
invalid_scope invalid_scope
The requested scope is invalid, unknown, malformed, or The requested scope is invalid, unknown, malformed, or
exceeds the scope granted by the resource owner. exceeds the scope granted by the resource owner.
error_description error_description
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resource under the client's control, which in turn makes the resource under the client's control, which in turn makes the
response available to the native application. response available to the native application.
o Embedded user-agent - the native application obtains the response o Embedded user-agent - the native application obtains the response
by directly communicating with the embedded user-agent by by directly communicating with the embedded user-agent by
monitoring state changes emitted during the resource load, or monitoring state changes emitted during the resource load, or
accessing the user-agent's cookies storage. accessing the user-agent's cookies storage.
When choosing between an external or embedded user-agent, developers When choosing between an external or embedded user-agent, developers
should consider: should consider:
o External user-agents may improve completion rate as the resource o An External user-agent may improve completion rate as the resource
owner may already have an active session with the authorization owner may already have an active session with the authorization
server removing the need to re-authenticate. It provides a server removing the need to re-authenticate. It provides a
familiar end-user experience and functionality. The resource familiar end-user experience and functionality. The resource
owner may also rely on user-agent features or extensions to assist owner may also rely on user-agent features or extensions to assist
with authentication (e.g. password manager, 2-factor device with authentication (e.g. password manager, 2-factor device
reader). reader).
o Embedded user-agents may offer improved usability, as they remove
o An embedded user-agent may offer improved usability, as it removes
the need to switch context and open new windows. the need to switch context and open new windows.
o Embedded user-agents pose a security challenge because resource o An embedded user-agent poses a security challenge because resource
owners are authenticating in an unidentified window without access owners are authenticating in an unidentified window without access
to the visual protections found in most external user-agents. to the visual protections found in most external user-agents. An
Embedded user-agents educate end-user to trust unidentified embedded user-agent educates end-users to trust unidentified
requests for authentication (making phishing attacks easier to requests for authentication (making phishing attacks easier to
execute). execute).
When choosing between the implicit grant type and the authorization When choosing between the implicit grant type and the authorization
code grant type, the following should be considered: code grant type, the following should be considered:
o Native applications that use the authorization code grant type o Native applications that use the authorization code grant type
SHOULD do so without using client credentials, due to the native SHOULD do so without using client credentials, due to the native
application's inability to keep client credentials confidential. application's inability to keep client credentials confidential.
o When using the implicit grant type flow a refresh token is not o When using the implicit grant type flow a refresh token is not
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application clients for the purpose of client authentication. The application clients for the purpose of client authentication. The
authorization server MAY issue a client password or other credentials authorization server MAY issue a client password or other credentials
for a specific installation of a native application client on a for a specific installation of a native application client on a
specific device. specific device.
When client authentication is not possible, the authorization server When client authentication is not possible, the authorization server
SHOULD employ other means to validate the client's identity. For SHOULD employ other means to validate the client's identity. For
example, by requiring the registration of the client redirection URI example, by requiring the registration of the client redirection URI
or enlisting the resource owner to confirm identity. A valid or enlisting the resource owner to confirm identity. A valid
redirection URI is not sufficient to verify the client's identity redirection URI is not sufficient to verify the client's identity
when asking for end-user authorization, but can be used to prevent when asking for resource owner authorization, but can be used to
delivering credentials to a counterfeit client after obtaining end- prevent delivering credentials to a counterfeit client after
user authorization. obtaining resource owner authorization.
The authorization server must consider the security implications of The authorization server must consider the security implications of
interacting with unauthenticated clients and take measures to limit interacting with unauthenticated clients and take measures to limit
the potential exposure of other credentials (e.g. refresh tokens) the potential exposure of other credentials (e.g. refresh tokens)
issued to such clients. issued to such clients.
10.2. Client Impersonation 10.2. Client Impersonation
A malicious client can impersonate another client and obtain access A malicious client can impersonate another client and obtain access
to protected resources, if the impersonated client fails to, or is to protected resources, if the impersonated client fails to, or is
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as described in Section 1.6 with server authentication as defined by as described in Section 1.6 with server authentication as defined by
[RFC2818]. [RFC2818].
When using the implicit grant type, the access token is transmitted When using the implicit grant type, the access token is transmitted
in the URI fragment, which can expose it to unauthorized parties. in the URI fragment, which can expose it to unauthorized parties.
The authorization server MUST ensure that access tokens cannot be The authorization server MUST ensure that access tokens cannot be
generated, modified, or guessed to produce valid access tokens by generated, modified, or guessed to produce valid access tokens by
unauthorized parties. unauthorized parties.
The client SHOULD request access tokens with the minimal scope and The client SHOULD request access tokens with the minimal scope
lifetime necessary. The authorization server SHOULD take the client necessary. The authorization server SHOULD take the client identity
identity into account when choosing how to honor the requested scope into account when choosing how to honor the requested scope, and MAY
and lifetime, and MAY issue an access token with a less rights than issue an access token with a less rights than requested.
requested.
10.4. Refresh Tokens 10.4. Refresh Tokens
Authorization servers MAY issue refresh tokens to web application Authorization servers MAY issue refresh tokens to web application
clients and native application clients. clients and native application clients.
Refresh tokens MUST be kept confidential in transit and storage, and Refresh tokens MUST be kept confidential in transit and storage, and
shared only among the authorization server and the client to whom the shared only among the authorization server and the client to whom the
refresh tokens were issued. The authorization server MUST maintain refresh tokens were issued. The authorization server MUST maintain
the binding between a refresh token and the client to whom it was the binding between a refresh token and the client to whom it was
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10.6. Authorization Code Redirection URI Manipulation 10.6. Authorization Code Redirection URI Manipulation
When requesting authorization using the authorization code grant When requesting authorization using the authorization code grant
type, the client can specify a redirection URI via the "redirect_uri" type, the client can specify a redirection URI via the "redirect_uri"
parameter. If an attacker can manipulate the value of the parameter. If an attacker can manipulate the value of the
redirection URI, it can cause the authorization server to redirect redirection URI, it can cause the authorization server to redirect
the resource owner user-agent to a URI under the control of the the resource owner user-agent to a URI under the control of the
attacker with the authorization code. attacker with the authorization code.
An attacker can create an account at a legitimate client and initiate An attacker can create an account at a legitimate client and initiate
the authorization flow. When the attacker is sent to the the authorization flow. When the attacker's user-agent is sent to
authorization server to grant access, the attacker grabs the the authorization server to grant access, the attacker grabs the
authorization URI provided by the legitimate client, and replaces the authorization URI provided by the legitimate client, and replaces the
client's redirection URI with a URI under the control of the client's redirection URI with a URI under the control of the
attacker. The attacker then tricks the victim into following the attacker. The attacker then tricks the victim into following the
manipulated link to authorize access to the legitimate client. manipulated link to authorize access to the legitimate client.
Once at the authorization server, the victim is prompted with a Once at the authorization server, the victim is prompted with a
normal, valid request on behalf of a legitimate and trusted client, normal, valid request on behalf of a legitimate and trusted client,
and authorizes the request. The victim is then redirected to an and authorizes the request. The victim is then redirected to an
endpoint under the control of the attacker with the authorization endpoint under the control of the attacker with the authorization
code. The attacker completes the authorization flow by sending the code. The attacker completes the authorization flow by sending the
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This grant type carries a higher risk than other grant types because This grant type carries a higher risk than other grant types because
it maintains the password anti-pattern this protocol seeks to avoid. it maintains the password anti-pattern this protocol seeks to avoid.
The client could abuse the password or the password could The client could abuse the password or the password could
unintentionally be disclosed to an attacker (e.g. via log files or unintentionally be disclosed to an attacker (e.g. via log files or
other records kept by the client). other records kept by the client).
Additionally, because the resource owner does not have control over Additionally, because the resource owner does not have control over
the authorization process (the resource owner involvement ends when the authorization process (the resource owner involvement ends when
it hands over its credentials to the client), the client can obtain it hands over its credentials to the client), the client can obtain
access tokens with a broader scope and longer lifetime than desired access tokens with a broader scope than desired by the resource
by the resource owner. The authorization server should consider the owner. The authorization server should consider the scope and
scope and lifetime of access tokens issued via this grant type. lifetime of access tokens issued via this grant type.
The authorization server and client SHOULD minimize use of this grant The authorization server and client SHOULD minimize use of this grant
type and utilize other grant types whenever possible. type and utilize other grant types whenever possible.
10.8. Request Confidentiality 10.8. Request Confidentiality
Access tokens, refresh tokens, resource owner passwords, and client Access tokens, refresh tokens, resource owner passwords, and client
credentials MUST NOT be transmitted in the clear. Authorization credentials MUST NOT be transmitted in the clear. Authorization
codes SHOULD NOT be transmitted in the clear. codes SHOULD NOT be transmitted in the clear.
The "state" and "scope" parameters SHOULD NOT include sensitive The "state" and "scope" parameters SHOULD NOT include sensitive
client or resource owner information in plain text as they can be client or resource owner information in plain text as they can be
transmitted over insecure channels or stored insecurely. transmitted over insecure channels or stored insecurely.
10.9. Endpoints Authenticity 10.9. Endpoints Authenticity
In order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, the authorization In order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, the authorization
server MUST implement and require TLS with server authentication as server MUST implement and require TLS with server authentication as
defined by [RFC2818] for any request sent to the authorization and defined by [RFC2818] for any request sent to the authorization and
token endpoints. The client MUST validate the authorization server's token endpoints. The client MUST validate the authorization server's
TLS certificate in accordance with its requirements for server TLS certificate as defined by [RFC6125], and in accordance with its
identity authentication. requirements for server identity authentication.
10.10. Credentials Guessing Attacks 10.10. Credentials Guessing Attacks
The authorization server MUST prevent attackers from guessing access The authorization server MUST prevent attackers from guessing access
tokens, authorization codes, refresh tokens, resource owner tokens, authorization codes, refresh tokens, resource owner
passwords, and client credentials. passwords, and client credentials.
Generated tokens and other credentials not intended for handling by The probability of an attacker guessing generated tokens (and other
end-users MUST be constructed from a cryptographically strong random credentials not intended for handling by end-users) MUST be less than
or pseudo-random number sequence ([RFC1750]) generated by the or equal to 2^(-128) and SHOULD be less than or equal to 2^(-160).
authorization server. The probability of any two values being
identical MUST be less than or equal to 2^(-128) and SHOULD be less
than or equal to 2^(-160).
The authorization server MUST utilize other means to protect The authorization server MUST utilize other means to protect
credentials intended for end-user usage. credentials intended for end-user usage.
10.11. Phishing Attacks 10.11. Phishing Attacks
Wide deployment of this and similar protocols may cause end-users to Wide deployment of this and similar protocols may cause end-users to
become inured to the practice of being redirected to websites where become inured to the practice of being redirected to websites where
they are asked to enter their passwords. If end-users are not they are asked to enter their passwords. If end-users are not
careful to verify the authenticity of these websites before entering careful to verify the authenticity of these websites before entering
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can be used but may not be effective in all browsers. can be used but may not be effective in all browsers.
10.14. Code Injection and Input Validation 10.14. Code Injection and Input Validation
A code injection attack occurs when an input or otherwise external A code injection attack occurs when an input or otherwise external
variable is used by an application unsanitized and causes variable is used by an application unsanitized and causes
modification to the application logic. This may allow an attacker to modification to the application logic. This may allow an attacker to
gain access to the application device or its data, cause denial of gain access to the application device or its data, cause denial of
service, or a wide range of malicious side-effects. service, or a wide range of malicious side-effects.
The Authorization server and client MUST validate and sanitize any The Authorization server and client MUST sanitize (and validate when
value received, and in particular, the value of the "state" and possible) any value received, in particular, the value of the "state"
"redirect_uri" parameters. and "redirect_uri" parameters.
10.15. Open Redirectors 10.15. Open Redirectors
The authorization server authorization endpoint and the client The authorization server authorization endpoint and the client
redirection endpoint can be improperly configured and operate as open redirection endpoint can be improperly configured and operate as open
redirectors. An open redirector is an endpoint using a parameter to redirectors. An open redirector is an endpoint using a parameter to
automatically redirect a user-agent to the location specified by the automatically redirect a user-agent to the location specified by the
parameter value without any validation. parameter value without any validation.
Open redirectors can be used in phishing attacks, or by an attacker Open redirectors can be used in phishing attacks, or by an attacker
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The OAuth WRAP specification was edited by Dick Hardt and authored by The OAuth WRAP specification was edited by Dick Hardt and authored by
Brian Eaton, Yaron Goland, Dick Hardt, and Allen Tom. Brian Eaton, Yaron Goland, Dick Hardt, and Allen Tom.
This specification is the work of the OAuth Working Group which This specification is the work of the OAuth Working Group which
includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular, includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular,
the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording
which shaped and formed the final specification: which shaped and formed the final specification:
Michael Adams, Amanda Anganes, Andrew Arnott, Dirk Balfanz, Aiden Michael Adams, Amanda Anganes, Andrew Arnott, Dirk Balfanz, Aiden
Bell, Brian Campbell, Scott Cantor, Marcos Caceres, Blaine Cook, Bell, Brian Campbell, Scott Cantor, Marcos Caceres, Blaine Cook,
Roger Crew, Brian Eaton, Leah Culver, Bill de h ra, Andr DeMarre, Roger Crew, Brian Eaton, Leah Culver, Bill de hOra, Andre DeMarre,
Brian Eaton, Wolter Eldering, Brian Ellin, Igor Faynberg, George Brian Eaton, Wolter Eldering, Brian Ellin, Igor Faynberg, George
Fletcher, Tim Freeman, Evan Gilbert, Yaron Goland, Brent Goldman, Fletcher, Tim Freeman, Evan Gilbert, Yaron Goland, Brent Goldman,
Kristoffer Gronowski, Justin Hart, Dick Hardt, Craig Heath, Phil Kristoffer Gronowski, Justin Hart, Dick Hardt, Craig Heath, Phil
Hunt, Michael B. Jones, Terry Jones, John Kemp, Mark Kent, Raffi Hunt, Michael B. Jones, Terry Jones, John Kemp, Mark Kent, Raffi
Krikorian, Chasen Le Hara, Rasmus Lerdorf, Torsten Lodderstedt, Hui- Krikorian, Chasen Le Hara, Rasmus Lerdorf, Torsten Lodderstedt, Hui-
Lan Lu, Casey Lucas, Paul Madsen, Alastair Mair, Eve Maler, James Lan Lu, Casey Lucas, Paul Madsen, Alastair Mair, Eve Maler, James
Manger, Mark McGloin, Laurence Miao, William Mills, Chuck Mortimore, Manger, Mark McGloin, Laurence Miao, William Mills, Chuck Mortimore,
Anthony Nadalin, Julian Reschke, Justin Richer, Peter Saint-Andre, Anthony Nadalin, Julian Reschke, Justin Richer, Peter Saint-Andre,
Nat Sakimura, Rob Sayre, Marius Scurtescu, Naitik Shah, Luke Shepard, Nat Sakimura, Rob Sayre, Marius Scurtescu, Naitik Shah, Luke Shepard,
Vlad Skvortsov, Justin Smith, Niv Steingarten, Christian St bner, Vlad Skvortsov, Justin Smith, Haibin Song, Niv Steingarten, Christian
Jeremy Suriel, Paul Tarjan, Allen Tom, Franklin Tse, Nick Walker, Stubner, Jeremy Suriel, Paul Tarjan, Christopher Thomas, Henry S.
Shane Weeden, and Skylar Woodward. Thompson, Allen Tom, Franklin Tse, Nick Walker, Shane Weeden, and
Skylar Woodward.
This document was produced under the chairmanship of Blaine Cook, This document was produced under the chairmanship of Blaine Cook,
Peter Saint-Andre, Hannes Tschofenig, and Barry Leiba. The area Peter Saint-Andre, Hannes Tschofenig, and Barry Leiba. The area
directors included Lisa Dusseault, Peter Saint-Andre, and Stephen directors included Lisa Dusseault, Peter Saint-Andre, and Stephen
Farrell. Farrell.
Appendix A. Editor's Notes Appendix A. Editor's Notes
While many people contributed to this specification throughout its While many people contributed to this specification throughout its
long journey, the editor would like to acknowledge and thank a few long journey, the editor would like to acknowledge and thank a few
individuals for their outstanding and invaluable efforts leading up individuals for their outstanding and invaluable efforts leading up
to the publication of this specification. It is these individuals to the publication of this specification. It is these individuals
without whom this work would not have existed or reached its without whom this work would not have existed or reached its
successful conclusion. successful conclusion.
David Recordon for continuously being one of OAuth s most valuable David Recordon for continuously being one of OAuth's most valuable
assets, bringing pragmatism and urgency to the work, and helping assets, bringing pragmatism and urgency to the work, and helping
shape it from its very beginning, as well as being one of the best shape it from its very beginning, as well as being one of the best
collaborators I had the pleasure of working with. collaborators I had the pleasure of working with.
James Manger for his creative ideas and always insightful feedback. James Manger for his creative ideas and always insightful feedback.
Brian Campbell, Torsten Lodderstedt, Chuck Mortimore, Justin Richer, Brian Campbell, Torsten Lodderstedt, Chuck Mortimore, Justin Richer,
Marius Scurtescu, and Luke Shepard for their continued participation Marius Scurtescu, and Luke Shepard for their continued participation
and valuable feedback. and valuable feedback.
Special thanks goes to Mike Curtis and Yahoo! for their unconditional Special thanks goes to Mike Curtis and Yahoo! for their unconditional
support of this work for over three years. support of this work for over three years.
13. References 13. References
13.1. Normative References 13.1. Normative References
[RFC1750] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", [RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, January 1999. RFC 2246, January 1999.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999. Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
skipping to change at page 64, line 32 skipping to change at page 65, line 9
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. May 2008.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax [RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008. Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[W3C.REC-html401-19991224] [W3C.REC-html401-19991224]
Hors, A., Raggett, D., and I. Jacobs, "HTML 4.01 Hors, A., Raggett, D., and I. Jacobs, "HTML 4.01
Specification", World Wide Web Consortium Specification", World Wide Web Consortium
Recommendation REC-html401-19991224, December 1999, Recommendation REC-html401-19991224, December 1999,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224>. <http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224>.
13.2. Informative References 13.2. Informative References
[I-D.draft-hardt-oauth-01] [I-D.draft-hardt-oauth-01]
Hardt, D., Ed., Tom, A., Eaton, B., and Y. Goland, "OAuth Hardt, D., Ed., Tom, A., Eaton, B., and Y. Goland, "OAuth
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