draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow-03.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow-04.txt 
OAuth W. Denniss OAuth W. Denniss
Internet-Draft Google Internet-Draft Google
Intended status: Standards Track S. Myrseth Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: January 19, 2017 ForgeRock Expires: August 31, 2017 Ping Identity
J. Bradley
Ping Identity
M. Jones M. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
H. Tschofenig H. Tschofenig
ARM Limited ARM Limited
July 18, 2016 February 27, 2017
OAuth 2.0 Device Flow OAuth 2.0 Device Flow for Browserless and Input Constrained Devices
draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow-03 draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow-04
Abstract Abstract
The device flow is suitable for OAuth 2.0 clients executing on This OAuth 2.0 authorization flow for browserless and input
devices that do not have an easy data-entry method (e.g., game constrained devices, often referred to as the device flow, enables
consoles, TVs, picture frames, and media hubs), but where the end- OAuth clients to request user authorization from devices that have an
user has separate access to a user-agent on another computer or Internet connection, but don't have an easy input method (such as a
device (e.g., desktop computer, a laptop, a smart phone, or a smart TV, media console, picture frame, or printer), or lack a
tablet). suitable browser for a more traditional OAuth flow. This
authorization flow instructs the user to perform the authorization
request on a secondary device, such as a smartphone. There is no
requirement for communication between the constrained device and the
user's secondary device.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 19, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 31, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Device Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Device Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Device Authorization Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Device Authorization Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. User Instruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. User Instruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Device Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.4. Device Access Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Device Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.5. Device Access Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Discovery Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. OAuth URI Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1. User Code Brute Forcing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.2. Device Trustworthiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.3. Remote Phishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.4. Non-confidential Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.5. Non-Visual Code Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Usability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. User Code Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. OAuth URI Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3. OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The device flow is suitable for clients executing on devices that do This OAuth 2.0 protocol flow for browserless and input constrained
not have an easy data-entry method and where the client is incapable devices, often referred to as the device flow, enables OAuth clients
of receiving incoming requests from the authorization server to request user authorization from devices that have an internet
(incapable of acting as an HTTP server). connection, but don't have an easy input method (such as a smart TV,
media console, picture frame, or printer), or lack a suitable browser
for a more traditional OAuth flow. This authorization flow instructs
the user to perform the authorization request on a secondary device,
such as a smartphone.
The device flow is not intended to replace browser-based OAuth in
native apps on capable devices (like smartphones). Those apps should
follow the practices specified in OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps OAuth 2.0
for Native Apps [I-D.ietf-oauth-native-apps].
The only requirements to use this flow are that the device is
connected to the Internet, and able to make outbound HTTPS requests,
be able to display or otherwise communicate a URI and code sequence
to the user, and that the user has a secondary device (e.g., personal
computer or smartphone) from which to process the request. There is
no requirement for two-way communication between the OAuth client and
the user-agent, enabling a broad range of use-cases.
Instead of interacting with the end-user's user-agent, the client Instead of interacting with the end-user's user-agent, the client
instructs the end-user to use another computer or device and connect instructs the end-user to use another computer or device and connect
to the authorization server to approve the access request. Since the to the authorization server to approve the access request. Since the
client cannot receive incoming requests, it polls the authorization client cannot receive incoming requests, it polls the authorization
server repeatedly until the end-user completes the approval process. server repeatedly until the end-user completes the approval process.
Note that this device flow does not utilize the client secret.
+----------+ +----------------+ +----------+ +----------------+
| |>---(A)-- Client Identifier --->| | | |>---(A)-- Client Identifier --->| |
| | | | | | | |
| |<---(B)-- Verification Code, --<| | | |<---(B)-- Verification Code, --<| |
| | User Code, | | | | User Code, | |
| | & Verification URI | | | | & Verification URI | |
| Device | | | | Device | | |
| Client | Client Identifier & | | | Client | Client Identifier & | |
| |>---(E)-- Verification Code --->| | | |>---(E)-- Verification Code --->| |
| | polling... | | | | polling... | |
skipping to change at page 4, line 23 skipping to change at page 5, line 23
responds back with the access token. responds back with the access token.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
Device Endpoint: Device Endpoint:
The authorization server's endpoint capable of issuing The authorization server's endpoint capable of issuing
verification codes, user codes, and verification URLs. verification codes, user codes, and verification URLs.
Device Verification Code: Device Verification Code:
A short-lived token representing an authorization session. A short-lived token representing an authorization session.
End-User Verification Code: End-User Verification Code:
A short-lived token which the device displays to the end user, is A short-lived token which the device displays to the end user, is
entered by the end-user on the authorization server, and is thus entered by the end-user on the authorization server, and is thus
used to bind the device to the end-user. used to bind the device to the end-user.
3. Specification 3. Protocol
3.1. Device Authorization Request 3.1. Device Authorization Request
The client initiates the flow by requesting a set of verification The client initiates the flow by requesting a set of verification
codes from the authorization server by making an HTTP "POST" request codes from the authorization server by making an HTTP "POST" request
to the device endpoint. The client constructs a request URI by to the device endpoint. The client constructs a request URI by
adding the following parameters to the request: adding the following parameters to the request:
response_type: response_type
REQUIRED. The parameter value MUST be set to "device_code". REQUIRED. The parameter value MUST be set to "device_code".
client_id: client_id
REQUIRED. The client identifier as described in Section 2.2 of REQUIRED. The client identifier as described in Section 2.2 of
[RFC6749]. [RFC6749].
scope: scope
OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by
Section 3.3 of [RFC6749]. Section 3.3 of [RFC6749].
For example, the client makes the following HTTPS request (line For example, the client makes the following HTTPS request (line
breaks are for display purposes only): breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1 POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
response_type=device_code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3 response_type=device_code&client_id=459691054427
3.2. Device Authorization Response 3.2. Device Authorization Response
In response, the authorization server generates a verification code In response, the authorization server generates a verification code
and an end-user code and includes them in the HTTP response body and an end-user code and includes them in the HTTP response body
using the "application/json" format with a 200 status code (OK). The using the "application/json" format with a 200 (OK) status code. The
response contains the following parameters: response contains the following parameters:
device_code device_code
REQUIRED. The verification code. REQUIRED. The verification code.
user_code user_code
REQUIRED. The end-user verification code. REQUIRED. The end-user verification code.
verification_uri verification_uri
REQUIRED. The end-user verification URI on the authorization REQUIRED. The end-user verification URI on the authorization
server. The URI should be short and easy to remember as end- server. The URI should be short and easy to remember as end-
users will be asked to manually type it into their user-agent. users will be asked to manually type it into their user-agent.
expires_in expires_in
OPTIONAL. The duration in seconds of the verification code OPTIONAL. The duration in seconds of the verification code
lifetime. lifetime.
interval interval
OPTIONAL. The minimum amount of time in seconds that the client OPTIONAL. The minimum amount of time in seconds that the client
SHOULD wait between polling requests to the token endpoint. SHOULD wait between polling requests to the token endpoint.
For example: For example:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store Cache-Control: no-store
{ {
skipping to change at page 6, line 12 skipping to change at page 6, line 47
OPTIONAL. The minimum amount of time in seconds that the client OPTIONAL. The minimum amount of time in seconds that the client
SHOULD wait between polling requests to the token endpoint. SHOULD wait between polling requests to the token endpoint.
For example: For example:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store Cache-Control: no-store
{ {
"device_code":"74tq5miHKB", "device_code":"GMMhmHCXhWEzkobqIHGG_EnNYYsAkukHspeYUk9E8",
"user_code":"94248", "user_code":"WDJB-MJHT",
"verification_uri":"http://www.example.com/device", "verification_uri":"https://www.example.com/device",
"interval"=5 "expires_in" : 1800,
"interval": 5
} }
3.3. User Instruction 3.3. User Instruction
After receiving a successful Authorization Response, the client After receiving a successful Authorization Response, the client
displays the end-user code and the end-user verification URI to the displays or otherwise communicates the "user_code" and the
end-user, and instructs the end-user to visit the URI using a user- "verification_uri" to the end-user, and instructs them to visit the
agent and enter the end-user code. URI in a user agent on a secondary device (for example, in a browser
on their mobile phone), and enter the user code.
The end-user manually types the provided verification URI and The end-user navigates to the "verification_uri" and authenticates
authenticates with the authorization server. The authorization with the authorization server. The authorization server prompts the
server prompts the end-user to authorize the client's request by end-user to identify the device authorization session by entering the
entering the end-user code provided by the client. Once the end-user "user_code" provided by the client. The authorization server should
approves or denies the request, the authorization server informs the then inform the user about the action they are undertaking, and ask
end-user to return to the device for further instructions. them to approve or deny the request. Once the user interaction is
complete, the server informs the user to return to their device.
3.4. Device Token Request During this user interaction, the device continuously polls the token
endpoint with the "device_code", as detailed in Section 3.4, until
the user completes the interaction, the code expires, or another
error occurs.
As the user is authorizing the request on secondary device which may Authorization servers supporting this specification MUST implement a
not have a way to communicate to the original device, the client user interaction sequence that starts with the user navigating to
polls the token endpoint until the end-user grants or denies the "verification_uri" and continues with them supplying the "user_code"
request, or the device code expires. at some stage during the interaction. Other than that, the exact
sequence and implementation of the user interaction is up to the
authorization server, and is out of scope of this specification.
The client polls at reasonable interval which MUST NOT exceed the Devices and authorization servers MAY negotiate an alternative code
minimum interval provided by the authorization server via the transmission and user interaction method in addition to the one
"interval" parameter (if provided). described here. Such an alternative user interaction flow could
obviate the need for a browser and manual input of the code, for
example, by using Bluetooth to transmit the code to the authorization
server's companion app. Such interaction methods can utilize this
protocol, as ultimately, the user just needs to identify the
authorization session to the authorization server, however user
interaction other than via the "verification_uri" is outside the
scope of this specification.
The client makes a request to the token endpoint by sending the 3.4. Device Access Token Request
following parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
format per Appendix B with a character encoding of UTF-8 in the HTTP
request entity-body:
grant_type After displaying instructions to the user, the client makes an Access
Token Request to the token endpoint with a "grant_type" of
"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code". This is an extension
grant type (as defined by Section 4.5 of [RFC6749]) with the
following parameters:
grant_type
REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant- REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-
type:device_code". type:device_code".
device_code device_code
REQUIRED. The device verification code, "device_code" from the REQUIRED. The device verification code, "device_code" from the
Device Authorization Response, defined in Section 3.2. Device Authorization Response, defined in Section 3.2.
client_id client_id
REQUIRED, if the client is not authenticating with the REQUIRED, if the client is not authenticating with the
authorization server as described in Section 3.2.1. of [RFC6749] authorization server as described in Section 3.2.1. of [RFC6749].
For example, the client makes the following HTTPS request (line For example, the client makes the following HTTPS request (line
breaks are for display purposes only): breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1 POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Adevice_code&device_code=pxDoJ3Bt9WVMTXfDATLkxJ9u
&client_id=459691054427
Note that unlike the Access Token Request for the authorization_code grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Adevice_code
grant type defined in Section 4.1.3 of [RFC6749] the "redirect_uri" &device_code=GMMhmHCXhWEzkobqIHGG_EnNYYsAkukHspeYUk9E8
parameter is NOT REQUIRED as part of this request. &client_id=459691054427
If the client was issued client credentials (or assigned other If the client was issued client credentials (or assigned other
authentication requirements), the client MUST authenticate with the authentication requirements), the client MUST authenticate with the
authorization server as described in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC6749]. authorization server as described in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC6749].
Note that there are security implications of statically distributed
client credentials, see Section 5.4.
3.5. Device Token Response The response to this request is defined in Section 3.5. Unlike other
OAuth grant types, it is expected for the client to try the Access
Token Request repeatedly in a polling fashion, based on the error
code in the response.
3.5. Device Access Token Response
If the user has approved the grant, the token endpoint responds with If the user has approved the grant, the token endpoint responds with
a success response defined in Section 5.1 of [RFC6749] otherwise, it a success response defined in Section 5.1 of [RFC6749]; otherwise it
responds with an error, as defined in Section 5.2 of [RFC6749]. responds with an error, as defined in Section 5.2 of [RFC6749].
In addition to the error codes defined in Section 5.2 of [RFC6749], In addition to the error codes defined in Section 5.2 of [RFC6749],
the following error codes are specific for the device flow: the following error codes are specific for the device flow:
authorization_pending authorization_pending
The authorization request is still pending as the end-user hasn't The authorization request is still pending as the end-user hasn't
yet visited the authorization server and entered their yet completed the user interaction steps (Section 3.3). The
verification code. client should repeat the Access Token Request to the token
endpoint.
slow_down slow_down
The client is polling too quickly and should back off at a The client is polling too quickly and should back off at a
reasonable rate. reasonable rate.
expired_token expired_token
The "device_code" has expired. The client will need to make a new
The device_code has expired. The client will need to make a new
Device Authorization Request. Device Authorization Request.
The error code "authorization_pending" and "slow_down" are considered The error codes "authorization_pending" and "slow_down" are
soft errors. The the client should continue to poll when receiving considered soft errors. The client should continue to poll the token
"authorization_pending" errors, reducing the interval if a endpoint by repeating the Device Token Request (Section 3.4) when
receiving soft errors, increasing the time between polls if a
"slow_down" error is received. Other error codes are considered hard "slow_down" error is received. Other error codes are considered hard
errors, the client should stop polling and react accordingly, for errors; the client should stop polling and react accordingly, for
example, by displaying an error to the user. example, by displaying an error to the user.
4. IANA Considerations The interval at which the client polls MUST NOT be more frequent than
the "interval" parameter returned in the Device Authorization
Response (see Section 3.2).
4.1. OAuth URI Registration The assumption of this specification is that the secondary device the
user is authorizing the request on does not have a way to communicate
back to the OAuth client. Only a one-way channel is required to make
this flow useful in many scenarios. For example, an HTML application
on a TV that can only make outbound requests. If a return channel
were to exist for the chosen user interaction interface, then the
device MAY wait until notified on that channel that the user has
completed the action before initiating the token request. Such
behavior is, however, outside the scope of this specification.
4. Discovery Metadata
Support for the device flow MAY be declared in the OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery] with the
following metadata:
device_authorization_endpoint
OPTIONAL. URL of the authorization server's device authorization
endpoint defined in Section 3.1.
5. Security Considerations
5.1. User Code Brute Forcing
Since the user code is typed by the user, the entropy is typically
less than would be used for the device code or other OAuth bearer
token types. It is therefore recommended that the server rate-limit
user code attempts. The user code SHOULD have enough entropy that
when combined with rate limiting makes a brute-force attack
infeasible.
5.2. Device Trustworthiness
Unlike other native application OAuth 2.0 flows, the device
requesting the authorization is not the same as the device that the
user grants access from. Thus, signals from the approving user's
session and device are not relevant to the trustworthiness of the
client device.
5.3. Remote Phishing
It is possible for the device flow to be initiated on a device in an
attacker's possession. For example, the attacker they might send an
email instructing the target user to visit the verification URL and
enter the user code. To mitigate such an attack, it is RECOMMENDED
to inform the user that they are authorizing a device during the user
interaction step (see Section 3.3), and to confirm that the device is
in their possession.
The user code needs to have a long enough lifetime to be useable
(allowing the user to retrieve their secondary device, navigate to
the verification URI, login, etc.), but should be sufficiently short
to limit the usability of a code obtained for phishing. This doesn't
prevent a phisher presenting a fresh token, particularly in the case
they are interacting with the user in real time, but it does limit
the viability of codes sent over email or SMS.
5.4. Non-confidential Clients
Most device clients are incapable of being confidential clients, as
secrets that are statically included as part of an app distributed to
multiple users cannot be considered confidential. For such clients,
the recommendations of Section 5.3.1 of [RFC6819] and Section 8.9 of
[I-D.ietf-oauth-native-apps] apply.
5.5. Non-Visual Code Transmission
There is no requirement that the user code be displayed by the device
visually. Other methods of one-way communication can potentially be
used, such as text-to-speech audio, or Bluetooth Low Energy. To
mitigate an attack in which a malicious user can bootstrap their
credentials on a device not in their control, it is RECOMMENDED that
any chosen communication channel only be accessible by people in
close proximity. E.g., users who can see, or hear the device, or
within range of a short-range wireless signal.
6. Usability Considerations
This section is a non-normative discussion of usability
considerations.
6.1. User Code Recommendations
For many users, their nearest Internet-connected device will be their
mobile phone, and typically these devices offer input methods that
are more time consuming than a computer keyboard to change the case
or input numbers. To improve usability (improving entry speed, and
reducing retries), these limitations should be taken into account
when selecting the user-code character set.
One way to improve input speed is to restrict the character set to
case-insensitive A-Z characters, with no digits. These characters
can typically be entered on a mobile keyboard without using modifier
keys. Further removing the I and O characters due to potential
confusion with numbers results in the base-24 character set:
"ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ". Dashes or other punctuation may be
included for readability.
An example user code following this guideline, with 24^8 bits of
entropy, is "WDJB-MJHT".
The server should ignore any characters like punctuation that are not
in the user-code character set. Provided that the character set
doesn't include characters of different case, the comparison should
be case insensitive.
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. OAuth URI Registration
This specification registers the following values in the IANA "OAuth This specification registers the following values in the IANA "OAuth
URI" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC6755]. URI" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC6755].
4.1.1. Registry Contents 7.1.1. Registry Contents
o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code
o Common Name: Device flow grant type for OAuth 2.0 o Common Name: Device flow grant type for OAuth 2.0
o Change controller: IESG o Change controller: IESG
o Specification Document: Section 3.1 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document: Section 3.1 of [[ this specification ]]
4.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration 7.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration
This specification registers the following values in the IANA "OAuth This specification registers the following values in the IANA "OAuth
Extensions Error Registry" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] Extensions Error Registry" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
established by [RFC6749]. established by [RFC6749].
4.2.1. Registry Contents 7.2.1. Registry Contents
o Error name: authorization_pending o Error name: authorization_pending
o Error usage location: Token endpoint response o Error usage location: Token endpoint response
o Related protocol extension: [[ this specification ]] o Related protocol extension: [[ this specification ]]
o Change controller: IETF o Change controller: IETF
o Specification Document: Section 3.5 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document: Section 3.5 of [[ this specification ]]
o Error name: slow_down o Error name: slow_down
o Error usage location: Token endpoint response o Error usage location: Token endpoint response
o Related protocol extension: [[ this specification ]] o Related protocol extension: [[ this specification ]]
skipping to change at page 9, line 4 skipping to change at page 12, line 25
o Error usage location: Token endpoint response o Error usage location: Token endpoint response
o Related protocol extension: [[ this specification ]] o Related protocol extension: [[ this specification ]]
o Change controller: IETF o Change controller: IETF
o Specification Document: Section 3.5 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document: Section 3.5 of [[ this specification ]]
o Error name: slow_down o Error name: slow_down
o Error usage location: Token endpoint response o Error usage location: Token endpoint response
o Related protocol extension: [[ this specification ]] o Related protocol extension: [[ this specification ]]
o Change controller: IETF o Change controller: IETF
o Specification Document: Section 3.5 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document: Section 3.5 of [[ this specification ]]
o Error name: expired_token o Error name: expired_token
o Error usage location: Token endpoint response o Error usage location: Token endpoint response
o Related protocol extension: [[ this specification ]] o Related protocol extension: [[ this specification ]]
o Change controller: IETF o Change controller: IETF
o Specification Document: Section 3.5 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document: Section 3.5 of [[ this specification ]]
5. Security Considerations 7.3. OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata
TBD This specification registers the following values in the IANA "OAuth
2.0 Authorization Server Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
established by [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery].
6. Normative References 7.3.1. Registry Contents
o Metadata name: device_authorization_endpoint
o Metadata Description: The Device Authorization Endpoint.
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification Document: Section 4 of [[ this specification ]]
8. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]
Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", draft-ietf-oauth-
discovery-05 (work in progress), January 2017.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-native-apps]
Denniss, W. and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps",
draft-ietf-oauth-native-apps-07 (work in progress),
January 2017.
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
IANA, "OAuth Parameters", IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>. <http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6755] Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace [RFC6755] Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace
for OAuth", RFC 6755, DOI 10.17487/RFC6755, October 2012, for OAuth", RFC 6755, DOI 10.17487/RFC6755, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6755>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6755>.
[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The -00 version of this document was based on draft-recordon-oauth- The -00 version of this document was based on draft-recordon-oauth-
v2-device edited by David Recordon and Brent Goldman. The content of v2-device edited by David Recordon and Brent Goldman. The content of
that document was initially part of the OAuth 2.0 protocol that document was initially part of the OAuth 2.0 protocol
specification but was later removed due to the lack of sufficient specification but was later removed due to the lack of sufficient
deployment expertise at that time. We would therefore also like to deployment expertise at that time. We would therefore also like to
thank the OAuth working group for their work on the initial content thank the OAuth working group for their work on the initial content
of this specification through 2010. of this specification through 2010.
The following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording
that shaped and formed the final specification:
Roshni Chandrashekhar, Marius Scurtescu, Breno de Medeiros, Stein
Myrseth, and Simon Moffatt.
Appendix B. Document History Appendix B. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-04
o Security & Usability sections. OAuth Discovery Metadata.
-03
o device_code is now a URN. Added IANA Considerations
-02
o Added token request & response specification.
-01 -01
o Applied spelling and grammar corrections and added the Document o Applied spelling and grammar corrections and added the Document
History appendix. History appendix.
-00 -00
o Initial working group draft based on draft-recordon-oauth- o Initial working group draft based on draft-recordon-oauth-
v2-device. v2-device.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
William Denniss William Denniss
Google Google
1600 Amphitheatre Pkwy 1600 Amphitheatre Pkwy
Mountain View, CA 94043 Mountain View, CA 94043
USA USA
Phone: +1 650-253-0000
Email: wdenniss@google.com Email: wdenniss@google.com
URI: http://google.com/ URI: http://wdenniss.com/device-flow
Stein Myrseth
ForgeRock
Lysaker torg 2
Lysaker 1366
NORWAY
Email: stein.myrseth@forgerock.com
John Bradley John Bradley
Ping Identity Ping Identity
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/ URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/
Michael B. Jones Michael B. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
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