draft-ietf-ippm-stamp-06.txt   draft-ietf-ippm-stamp-07.txt 
Network Working Group G. Mirsky Network Working Group G. Mirsky
Internet-Draft ZTE Corp. Internet-Draft ZTE Corp.
Intended status: Standards Track G. Jun Intended status: Standards Track G. Jun
Expires: October 25, 2019 ZTE Corporation Expires: February 13, 2020 ZTE Corporation
H. Nydell H. Nydell
Accedian Networks Accedian Networks
R. Foote R. Foote
Nokia Nokia
April 23, 2019 August 12, 2019
Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol
draft-ietf-ippm-stamp-06 draft-ietf-ippm-stamp-07
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol This document describes a Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol
which enables the measurement of both one-way and round-trip which enables the measurement of both one-way and round-trip
performance metrics like delay, delay variation, and packet loss. performance metrics like delay, delay variation, and packet loss.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
skipping to change at page 1, line 37 skipping to change at page 1, line 37
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 25, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 13, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 16 skipping to change at page 2, line 16
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Softwarization of Performance Measurement . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Softwarization of Performance Measurement . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Theory of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Theory of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Session-Sender Behavior and Packet Format . . . . . . . . 4 4.1. Session-Sender Behavior and Packet Format . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.1. Session-Sender Packet Format in Unauthenticated Mode 4 4.1.1. Session-Sender Packet Format in Unauthenticated Mode 5
4.1.2. Session-Sender Packet Format in Authenticated Mode . 6 4.1.2. Session-Sender Packet Format in Authenticated Mode . 6
4.2. Session-Reflector Behavior and Packet Format . . . . . . 7 4.2. Session-Reflector Behavior and Packet Format . . . . . . 7
4.2.1. Session-Reflector Packet Format in Unauthenticated 4.2.1. Session-Reflector Packet Format in Unauthenticated
Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.2. Session-Reflector Packet Format in Authenticated Mode 9 4.2.2. Session-Reflector Packet Format in Authenticated Mode 9
4.3. Integrity and Confidentiality Protection in STAMP . . . . 11 4.3. Integrity and Confidentiality Protection in STAMP . . . . 10
4.4. Interoperability with TWAMP Light . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.4. Interoperability with TWAMP Light . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Development and deployment of Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol Development and deployment of Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol
(TWAMP) [RFC5357] and its extensions, e.g., [RFC6038] that defined (TWAMP) [RFC5357] and its extensions, e.g., [RFC6038] that defined
features such as Reflect Octets and Symmetrical Size for TWAMP features such as Reflect Octets and Symmetrical Size for TWAMP
provided invaluable experience. Several independent implementations provided invaluable experience. Several independent implementations
exist, have been deployed and provide important operational exist, have been deployed and provide important operational
performance measurements. At the same time, there has been performance measurements. At the same time, there has been
noticeable interest in using a simpler mechanism for active noticeable interest in using a more straightforward mechanism for
performance monitoring that can provide deterministic behavior and active performance monitoring that can provide deterministic behavior
inherit separation of control (vendor-specific configuration or and inherit separation of control (vendor-specific configuration or
orchestration) and test functions. One of such is Performance orchestration) and test functions. One of such is Performance
Measurement from IP Edge to Customer Equipment using TWAMP Light from Measurement from IP Edge to Customer Equipment using TWAMP Light from
Broadband Forum [BBF.TR-390] used as the reference TWAMP Light that, Broadband Forum [BBF.TR-390] used as the reference TWAMP Light that,
according to [RFC8545], includes sub-set of TWAMP-Test functions in according to [RFC8545], includes sub-set of TWAMP-Test functions in
combination with other applications that provide, for example, combination with other applications that provide, for example,
control and security. This document defines active performance control and security. This document defines an active performance
measurement test protocol, Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol measurement test protocol, Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol
(STAMP), that enables measurement of both one-way and round-trip (STAMP), that enables measurement of both one-way and round-trip
performance metrics like delay, delay variation, and packet loss. performance metrics like delay, delay variation, and packet loss.
Some TWAMP extensions, e.g., [RFC7750] are supported by the
extensions to STAMP base specification in
[I-D.ietf-ippm-stamp-option-tlv].
2. Conventions used in this document 2. Conventions used in this document
2.1. Terminology 2.1. Terminology
AES Advanced Encryption Standard AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining CBC Cipher Block Chaining
ECB Electronic Cookbook ECB Electronic Cookbook
skipping to change at page 3, line 31 skipping to change at page 3, line 33
NTP - Network Time Protocol NTP - Network Time Protocol
PTP - Precision Time Protocol PTP - Precision Time Protocol
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
OWAMP One-Way Active Measurement Protocol OWAMP One-Way Active Measurement Protocol
TWAMP Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol TWAMP Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol
MBZ May be Zero
2.2. Requirements Language 2.2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. Softwarization of Performance Measurement 3. Softwarization of Performance Measurement
Figure 1 presents the Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol Figure 1 presents the Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol
(STAMP) Session-Sender and Session-Reflector with a measurement (STAMP) Session-Sender, and Session-Reflector with a measurement
session. The configuration and management of the STAMP Session- session. The configuration and management of the STAMP Session-
Sender, Session-Reflector and management of the STAMP sessions can be Sender, Session-Reflector, and management of the STAMP sessions can
achieved through various means. Command Line Interface, OSS/BSS be achieved through various means. Command Line Interface, OSS/BSS
(operations support system/business support system as a combination (operations support system/business support system as a combination
of two systems used to support a range of telecommunication services) of two systems used to support a range of telecommunication services)
using SNMP or controllers in Software-Defined Networking using using SNMP or controllers in Software-Defined Networking using
Netconf/YANG are but a few examples. Netconf/YANG are but a few examples.
o----------------------------------------------------------o o----------------------------------------------------------o
| Configuration and | | Configuration and |
| Management | | Management |
o----------------------------------------------------------o o----------------------------------------------------------o
|| || || ||
|| || || ||
|| || || ||
+----------------------+ +-------------------------+ +----------------------+ +-------------------------+
| STAMP Session-Sender | <--- STAMP---> | STAMP Session-Reflector | | STAMP Session-Sender | <--- STAMP---> | STAMP Session-Reflector |
+----------------------+ +-------------------------+ +----------------------+ +-------------------------+
Figure 1: STAMP Reference Model Figure 1: STAMP Reference Model
4. Theory of Operation 4. Theory of Operation
STAMP Session-Sender transmits test packets toward STAMP Session- STAMP Session-Sender transmits test packets over UDP transport toward
Reflector. STAMP Session-Reflector receives Session-Sender's packet STAMP Session-Reflector. A STAMP Session-Sender MUST use UDP port
and acts according to the configuration and optional control 862 (TWAMP-Test Receiver Port) as the default destination UDP port
information communicated in the Session-Sender's test packet. STAMP number. A STAMP implementation of Session-Sender MUST be able to use
defines two different test packet formats, one for packets UDP port numbers from User, a.k.a. Registered, Ports and Dynamic,
transmitted by the STAMP-Session-Sender and one for packets a.k.a. Private or Ephemeral, Ports ranges defined in [RFC6335].
transmitted by the STAMP-Session-Reflector. STAMP supports two Before using numbers from the User Ports range, the possible impact
modes: unauthenticated and authenticated. Unauthenticated STAMP test on the network MUST be carefully studied and agreed by all users of
packets, defined in Section 4.1.1 and Section 4.2.1, ensure the network.
interworking between STAMP and TWAMP Light as described in
Section 4.4 packet formats. STAMP Session-Reflector receives Session-Sender's packet and acts
according to the configuration and optional control information
communicated in the Session-Sender's test packet. An implementation
of STAMP Session-Reflector by default MUST use receive STAMP test
packets on UDP port 862. An implementation of Session-Reflector that
supports this specification MUST be able to define the port number to
receive STAMP test packets from User Ports and Dynamic Ports ranges
that are defined in [RFC6335]. STAMP defines two different test
packet formats, one for packets transmitted by the STAMP-Session-
Sender and one for packets transmitted by the STAMP-Session-
Reflector.
STAMP supports two modes: unauthenticated and authenticated.
Unauthenticated STAMP test packets, defined in Section 4.1.1 and
Section 4.2.1, ensure interworking between STAMP and TWAMP Light as
described in Section 4.4 packet formats.
By default, STAMP uses symmetrical packets, i.e., size of the packet By default, STAMP uses symmetrical packets, i.e., size of the packet
transmitted by Session-Reflector equals the size of the packet transmitted by Session-Reflector equals the size of the packet
received by the Session-Reflector. received by the Session-Reflector.
4.1. Session-Sender Behavior and Packet Format 4.1. Session-Sender Behavior and Packet Format
Because STAMP supports symmetrical test packets, STAMP Session-Sender Because STAMP supports symmetrical test packets, STAMP Session-Sender
packet has a minimum size of 44 octets in unauthenticated mode, see packet has a minimum size of 44 octets in unauthenticated mode, see
Figure 2, and 112 octets in the authenticated mode, see Figure 4. Figure 2, and 112 octets in the authenticated mode, see Figure 4.
skipping to change at page 5, line 17 skipping to change at page 5, line 31
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number | | Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamp | | Timestamp |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Estimate | | | Error Estimate | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
| | | |
| | | |
| MBZ (27 octets) | | MBZ (30 octets) |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| | Server Octets | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
| Remaining Packet Padding (to be reflected) |
~ (length in octets specified in Server Octets) ~
+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: STAMP Session-Sender test packet format in unauthenticated Figure 2: STAMP Session-Sender test packet format in unauthenticated
mode mode
where fields are defined as the following: where fields are defined as the following:
o Sequence Number is four octets long field. For each new session o Sequence Number is four octets long field. For each new session
its value starts at zero and is incremented with each transmitted its value starts at zero and is incremented with each transmitted
packet. packet.
skipping to change at page 6, line 25 skipping to change at page 6, line 29
* 0 - NTP 64 bit format of a timestamp; * 0 - NTP 64 bit format of a timestamp;
* 1 - PTPv2 truncated format of a timestamp. * 1 - PTPv2 truncated format of a timestamp.
The STAMP Session-Sender and Session-Reflector MAY use, not use, The STAMP Session-Sender and Session-Reflector MAY use, not use,
or set value of the Z field in accordance with the timestamp or set value of the Z field in accordance with the timestamp
format in use. This optional field is to enhance operations, but format in use. This optional field is to enhance operations, but
local configuration or defaults could be used in its place. local configuration or defaults could be used in its place.
o Must-be-Zero (MBZ) field in the session-sender unauthenticated o May-be-Zero (MBZ) field in the session-sender unauthenticated
packet is 27 octets long. It MUST be all zeroed on the packet is 30 octets long. It MAY be all zeroed on the
transmission and ignored on receipt. transmission and MUST be ignored on receipt.
o Server Octets field is optional two octets long field. This field
is used for the Reflect Octets capability defined in [RFC6038].
If being used, the Server Octets field MUST follow the 27 octets
long MBZ field. The value in the Server Octets field equals the
number of octets the Session-Reflector is expected to copy back to
the Session-Sender starting with the Server Octets field. Thus
the minimum non-zero value for the Server Octets field is two.
Therefore, the value of one is invalid. If none of Payload to be
copied, the value of the Server Octets field MUST be set to zero
on transmit.
o Remaining Packet Padding is an optional field of variable length.
The number of octets in the Remaining Packet Padding field is the
value of the Server Octets field minus the length of the Server
Octets field.
4.1.2. Session-Sender Packet Format in Authenticated Mode 4.1.2. Session-Sender Packet Format in Authenticated Mode
STAMP Session-Sender packet format in authenticated mode: STAMP Session-Sender packet format in authenticated mode:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number | | Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
skipping to change at page 7, line 33 skipping to change at page 7, line 33
| | | |
| HMAC (16 octets) | | HMAC (16 octets) |
| | | |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: STAMP Session-Sender test packet format in authenticated Figure 4: STAMP Session-Sender test packet format in authenticated
mode mode
The field definitions are the same as the unauthenticated mode, The field definitions are the same as the unauthenticated mode,
listed in Section 4.1.1. Also, Comp.MBZ field is a variable length listed in Section 4.1.1. Also, MBZ fields are used to align the
field to align the packet on 16 octets boundary. Also, the packet packet on 16 octets boundary. The value of the field MAY be zeroed
on transmission and MUST be ignored on receipt. Also, the packet
includes a key-hashed message authentication code (HMAC) ([RFC2104]) includes a key-hashed message authentication code (HMAC) ([RFC2104])
hash at the end of the PDU. The detailed use of the HMAC field is hash at the end of the PDU. The detailed use of the HMAC field is
described in Section 4.3. described in Section 4.3.
4.2. Session-Reflector Behavior and Packet Format 4.2. Session-Reflector Behavior and Packet Format
The Session-Reflector receives the STAMP test packet, verifies it, The Session-Reflector receives the STAMP test packet, verifies it,
prepares and transmits the reflected test packet. prepares and transmits the reflected test packet.
Two modes of STAMP Session-Reflector characterize the expected Two modes of STAMP Session-Reflector characterize the expected
skipping to change at page 8, line 39 skipping to change at page 8, line 39
| Receive Timestamp | | Receive Timestamp |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session-Sender Sequence Number | | Session-Sender Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session-Sender Timestamp | | Session-Sender Timestamp |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session-Sender Error Estimate | MBZ | | Session-Sender Error Estimate | MBZ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Ses-Sender TTL | | |Ses-Sender TTL | MBZ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Packet Padding (reflected) ~
+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format in Figure 5: STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format in
unauthenticated mode unauthenticated mode
where fields are defined as the following: where fields are defined as the following:
o Sequence Number is four octets long field. The value of the o Sequence Number is four octets long field. The value of the
Sequence Number field is set according to the mode of the STAMP Sequence Number field is set according to the mode of the STAMP
Session-Reflector: Session-Reflector:
skipping to change at page 9, line 31 skipping to change at page 9, line 24
in Section 4.1. in Section 4.1.
o Session-Sender Sequence Number, Session-Sender Timestamp, and o Session-Sender Sequence Number, Session-Sender Timestamp, and
Session-Sender Error Estimate are copies of the corresponding Session-Sender Error Estimate are copies of the corresponding
fields in the STAMP test packet sent by the Session-Sender. fields in the STAMP test packet sent by the Session-Sender.
o Session-Sender TTL is one octet long field, and its value is the o Session-Sender TTL is one octet long field, and its value is the
copy of the TTL field in IPv4 (or Hop Limit in IPv6) from the copy of the TTL field in IPv4 (or Hop Limit in IPv6) from the
received STAMP test packet. received STAMP test packet.
o Packet Padding (reflected) is an optional variable length field. o MBZ is used to achieve alignment on a four octets boundary. The
The length of the Packet Padding (reflected) field MUST be equal value of the field MAY be zeroed on transmission and MUST be
to the value of the Server Octets field (Figure 2). If the value ignored on receipt.
is non-zero, the Session-Reflector MUST copy number of octets
equal to the value of Server Octets field starting with the Server
Octets field.
o Comp.MBZ is a variable length field used to achieve alignment on a
word boundary. Thus the length of Comp.MBZ field may be only 0,
1, 2 or 3 octets. The value of the field MUST be zeroed on
transmission and ignored on receipt.
4.2.2. Session-Reflector Packet Format in Authenticated Mode 4.2.2. Session-Reflector Packet Format in Authenticated Mode
For the authenticated mode: For the authenticated mode:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number | | Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
skipping to change at page 10, line 49 skipping to change at page 10, line 34
| HMAC (16 octets) | | HMAC (16 octets) |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format in authenticated Figure 6: STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format in authenticated
mode mode
The field definitions are the same as the unauthenticated mode, The field definitions are the same as the unauthenticated mode,
listed in Section 4.2.1. Additionally, the packet MAY include listed in Section 4.2.1. Additionally, the MBZ field is used to
Comp.MBZ field is a variable length field to align the packet on 16 align the packet on 16 octets boundary. The value of the field MAY
octets boundary. Also, STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format in be zeroed on transmission and MUST be ignored on receipt. Also,
authenticated mode includes a key (HMAC) ([RFC2104]) hash at the end STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format in authenticated mode
of the PDU. The detailed use of the HMAC field is in Section 4.3. includes a key (HMAC) ([RFC2104]) hash at the end of the PDU. The
detailed use of the HMAC field is in Section 4.3.
4.3. Integrity and Confidentiality Protection in STAMP 4.3. Integrity and Confidentiality Protection in STAMP
To provide integrity protection, each STAMP message is being To provide integrity protection, each STAMP message is being
authenticated by adding Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC). authenticated by adding Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC).
STAMP uses HMAC-SHA-256 truncated to 128 bits (similarly to the use STAMP uses HMAC-SHA-256 truncated to 128 bits (similarly to the use
of it in IPSec defined in [RFC4868]); hence the length of the HMAC of it in IPSec defined in [RFC4868]); hence the length of the HMAC
field is 16 octets. HMAC uses own key and the definition of the field is 16 octets. HMAC uses its own key, and the definition of the
mechanism to distribute the HMAC key is outside the scope of this mechanism to distribute the HMAC key is outside the scope of this
specification. One example is to use an orchestrator to configure specification. One example is to use an orchestrator to configure
HMAC key based on STAMP YANG data model [I-D.ietf-ippm-stamp-yang]. HMAC key based on STAMP YANG data model [I-D.ietf-ippm-stamp-yang].
HMAC MUST be verified as early as possible to avoid using or HMAC MUST be verified as early as possible to avoid using or
propagating corrupted data. propagating corrupted data.
If confidentiality protection for STAMP is required, encryption at If confidentiality protection for STAMP is required, encryption at
the higher level MUST be used. For example, STAMP packets could be the higher level MUST be used. For example, STAMP packets could be
transmitted in the dedicated IPsec tunnel or share the IPsec tunnel transmitted in the dedicated IPsec tunnel or share the IPsec tunnel
with the monitored flow. with the monitored flow.
4.4. Interoperability with TWAMP Light 4.4. Interoperability with TWAMP Light
skipping to change at page 11, line 39 skipping to change at page 11, line 26
interwork with a TWAMP Light device. There are two possible interwork with a TWAMP Light device. There are two possible
combinations for such use case: combinations for such use case:
o STAMP Session-Sender with TWAMP Light Session-Reflector; o STAMP Session-Sender with TWAMP Light Session-Reflector;
o TWAMP Light Session-Sender with STAMP Session-Reflector. o TWAMP Light Session-Sender with STAMP Session-Reflector.
In the former case, the Session-Sender MAY not be aware that its In the former case, the Session-Sender MAY not be aware that its
Session-Reflector does not support STAMP. For example, a TWAMP Light Session-Reflector does not support STAMP. For example, a TWAMP Light
Session-Reflector may not support the use of UDP port 862 as defined Session-Reflector may not support the use of UDP port 862 as defined
in [RFC8545]. Thus STAMP Session-Sender MUST be able to send test in [RFC8545]. Thus STAMP Session-Sender MAY use port numbers as
packets to destination UDP port number from the Dynamic and/or defined in Section 4. If any of STAMP extensions are used, the TWAMP
Private Ports range 49152-65535, test management system should find a Light Session-Reflector will view them as Packet Padding field. The
port number that both devices can use. And if any of STAMP Session-Sender SHOULD use the default format for its timestamps -
extensions are used, the TWAMP Light Session-Reflector will view them NTP. And it MAY use PTPv2 timestamp format.
as Packet Padding field. The Session-Sender SHOULD use the default
format for its timestamps - NTP. And it MAY use PTPv2 timestamp
format.
In the latter scenario, the test management system should set STAMP In the latter scenario, if a TWAMP Light Session-Sender does not
Session-Reflector to use UDP port number from the Dynamic and/or support the use of UDP port 862, the test management system MUST set
Private Ports range. As for Packet Padding field that the TWAMP STAMP Session-Reflector to use UDP port number as defined in
Light Session-Sender includes in its transmitted packet, the STAMP Section 4. If the TWAMP Light Session-Sender includes Packet Padding
Session-Reflector will process it according to [RFC6038] and return field in its transmitted packet, the STAMP Session-Reflector will
reflected packet of the symmetrical size. The Session-Reflector MUST return the reflected packet of the symmetrical size if the size of
use the default format for its timestamps - NTP. the received test packet is larger than the size of the STAMP base
packet. The Session-Reflector MUST be set to use the default format
for its timestamps, NTP.
STAMP does not support the Reflect Octets capability defined in
[RFC6038]. If the Server Octets field is present in the TWAMP
Session-Sender packet, STAMP Session-Reflector will not copy the
content starting from the Server Octets field but will transmit the
reflected packet of equal size.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
This document doesn't have any IANA action. This section may be This document doesn't have any IANA action. This section may be
removed before the publication. removed before the publication.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
In general, all the security considerations related to TWAMP-Test, In general, all the security considerations related to TWAMP-Test,
discussed in [RFC5357] apply to STAMP. Since STAMP uses the well- discussed in [RFC5357] apply to STAMP. Since STAMP uses the well-
known UDP port number allocated for the OWAMP-Test/TWAMP-Test known UDP port number allocated for the OWAMP-Test/TWAMP-Test
Receiver port, the security considerations and measures to mitigate Receiver port, the security considerations and measures to mitigate
the risk of the attack using the registered port number documented in the risk of the attack using the registered port number documented in
Section 6 [RFC8545] equally apply to STAMP. Because of the control Section 6 [RFC8545] equally apply to STAMP. Because of the control
and management of a STAMP test being outside the scope of this and management of a STAMP test being outside the scope of this
specification only the more general requirement is set: specification only the more general requirement is set:
To mitigate the possible attack vector, the control and management To mitigate the possible attack vector, the control, and
of a STAMP test session MUST use the secured transport. management of a STAMP test session MUST use the secured transport.
Load of STAMP test packets offered to a network MUST be carefully
estimated, and the possible impact on the existing services MUST
be thoroughly analyzed before launching the test session.
[RFC8085] section 3.1.5 provides guidance on handling network load
for UDP-based protocol. While the characteristic of test traffic
depends on the test objective, it is highly recommended to stay in
the limits as provided in [RFC8085].
STAMP test packets can be transmitted with the destination UDP port
number from the User Ports range, as defined in Section 4, that is
already or will be assigned by IANA. The possible impact of the
STAMP test packets on the network MUST be thoroughly analyzed, and
the use of STAMP for each case MUST be agreed by all users on the
network before starting the STAMP test session.
Use of HMAC-SHA-256 in the authenticated mode protects the data Use of HMAC-SHA-256 in the authenticated mode protects the data
integrity of the STAMP test packets. integrity of the STAMP test packets.
7. Acknowledgments 7. Acknowledgments
Authors express their appreciation to Jose Ignacio Alvarez-Hamelin Authors express their appreciation to Jose Ignacio Alvarez-Hamelin
and Brian Weis for their great insights into the security and and Brian Weis for their great insights into the security and
identity protection, and the most helpful and practical suggestions. identity protection, and the most helpful and practical suggestions.
Also, our sincere thanks to David Ball for his thorough review and Also, our sincere thanks to David Ball and Rakesh Gandhi or their
helpful comments. thorough reviews and helpful comments.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[IEEE.1588.2008] [IEEE.1588.2008]
"Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol "Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol
for Networked Measurement and Control Systems", for Networked Measurement and Control Systems",
IEEE Standard 1588, March 2008. IEEE Standard 1588, March 2008.
skipping to change at page 13, line 25 skipping to change at page 13, line 30
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010, Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
[RFC6038] Morton, A. and L. Ciavattone, "Two-Way Active Measurement [RFC6038] Morton, A. and L. Ciavattone, "Two-Way Active Measurement
Protocol (TWAMP) Reflect Octets and Symmetrical Size Protocol (TWAMP) Reflect Octets and Symmetrical Size
Features", RFC 6038, DOI 10.17487/RFC6038, October 2010, Features", RFC 6038, DOI 10.17487/RFC6038, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6038>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6038>.
[RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8186] Mirsky, G. and I. Meilik, "Support of the IEEE 1588 [RFC8186] Mirsky, G. and I. Meilik, "Support of the IEEE 1588
Timestamp Format in a Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol Timestamp Format in a Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol
(TWAMP)", RFC 8186, DOI 10.17487/RFC8186, June 2017, (TWAMP)", RFC 8186, DOI 10.17487/RFC8186, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8186>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8186>.
[RFC8545] Morton, A., Ed. and G. Mirsky, Ed., "Well-Known Port [RFC8545] Morton, A., Ed. and G. Mirsky, Ed., "Well-Known Port
skipping to change at page 13, line 46 skipping to change at page 14, line 11
(OWAMP) and the Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) and the Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol
(TWAMP)", RFC 8545, DOI 10.17487/RFC8545, March 2019, (TWAMP)", RFC 8545, DOI 10.17487/RFC8545, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8545>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8545>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[BBF.TR-390] [BBF.TR-390]
"Performance Measurement from IP Edge to Customer "Performance Measurement from IP Edge to Customer
Equipment using TWAMP Light", BBF TR-390, May 2017. Equipment using TWAMP Light", BBF TR-390, May 2017.
[I-D.ietf-ippm-stamp-option-tlv]
Mirsky, G., Xiao, M., Jun, G., Nydell, H., and R. Foote,
"Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol Optional
Extensions", draft-ietf-ippm-stamp-option-tlv-00 (work in
progress), July 2019.
[I-D.ietf-ippm-stamp-yang] [I-D.ietf-ippm-stamp-yang]
Mirsky, G., Xiao, M., and W. Luo, "Simple Two-way Active Mirsky, G., Xiao, M., and W. Luo, "Simple Two-way Active
Measurement Protocol (STAMP) Data Model", draft-ietf-ippm- Measurement Protocol (STAMP) Data Model", draft-ietf-ippm-
stamp-yang-03 (work in progress), March 2019. stamp-yang-03 (work in progress), March 2019.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA- [RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, 384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007, DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>.
[RFC7750] Hedin, J., Mirsky, G., and S. Baillargeon, "Differentiated
Service Code Point and Explicit Congestion Notification
Monitoring in the Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol
(TWAMP)", RFC 7750, DOI 10.17487/RFC7750, February 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7750>.
[RFC8085] Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage
Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, DOI 10.17487/RFC8085,
March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8085>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Greg Mirsky Greg Mirsky
ZTE Corp. ZTE Corp.
Email: gregimirsky@gmail.com Email: gregimirsky@gmail.com
Guo Jun Guo Jun
ZTE Corporation ZTE Corporation
68# Zijinghua Road 68# Zijinghua Road
Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012 Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012
P.R.China P.R.China
Phone: +86 18105183663 Phone: +86 18105183663
Email: guo.jun2@zte.com.cn Email: guo.jun2@zte.com.cn
Henrik Nydell Henrik Nydell
 End of changes. 32 change blocks. 
101 lines changed or deleted 131 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/