draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-ipv6-options-02.txt   draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-ipv6-options-03.txt 
ippm S. Bhandari ippm S. Bhandari
Internet-Draft F. Brockners Internet-Draft F. Brockners
Intended status: Standards Track C. Pignataro Intended status: Standards Track C. Pignataro
Expires: January 14, 2021 Cisco Expires: March 22, 2021 Cisco
H. Gredler H. Gredler
RtBrick Inc. RtBrick Inc.
J. Leddy J. Leddy
Comcast Comcast
S. Youell S. Youell
JMPC JMPC
T. Mizrahi T. Mizrahi
Huawei Network.IO Innovation Lab Huawei Network.IO Innovation Lab
A. Kfir A. Kfir
B. Gafni B. Gafni
Mellanox Technologies, Inc. Mellanox Technologies, Inc.
P. Lapukhov P. Lapukhov
Facebook Facebook
M. Spiegel M. Spiegel
Barefoot Networks, an Intel company Barefoot Networks, an Intel company
S. Krishnan S. Krishnan
Kaloom Kaloom
R. Asati R. Asati
Cisco Cisco
July 13, 2020 M. Smith
September 18, 2020
In-situ OAM IPv6 Options In-situ OAM IPv6 Options
draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-ipv6-options-02 draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-ipv6-options-03
Abstract Abstract
In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) records In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) records
operational and telemetry information in the packet while the packet operational and telemetry information in the packet while the packet
traverses a path between two points in the network. This document traverses a path between two points in the network. This document
outlines how IOAM data fields are encapsulated in IPv6. outlines how IOAM data fields are encapsulated in IPv6.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
skipping to change at page 2, line 7 skipping to change at page 2, line 10
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 22, 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. In-situ OAM Metadata Transport in IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. In-situ OAM Metadata Transport in IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. IOAM Deployment In IPv6 Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. Considerations for IOAM deployment in IPv6 networks . . . 6
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. IOAM domains bounded by hosts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.3. IOAM domains bounded by network devices . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.4. Deployment options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.4.1. IPv6-in-IPv6 encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.4.2. IP-in-IPv6 encapsulation with ULA . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4.3. x-in-IPv6 Encapsulation that is used Independently . 9
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) records In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) records
operational and telemetry information in the packet while the packet operational and telemetry information in the packet while the packet
traverses a path between two points in the network. This document traverses a path between two points in the network. This document
outlines how IOAM data fields are encapsulated in the IPv6 [RFC8200]. outlines how IOAM data fields are encapsulated in the IPv6 [RFC8200]
and discusses deployment options for networks which leverage IOAM
data fields encapsulated in the IPv6 protocol. Deployment
considerations differ, whether the IOAM domain starts and ends on
hosts or whether the IOAM encapsulating and decapsulating nodes are
network devices that forward traffic, such as routers.
2. Conventions 2. Conventions
2.1. Requirements Language 2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2.2. Abbreviations 2.2. Abbreviations
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2.2. Abbreviations 2.2. Abbreviations
Abbreviations used in this document: Abbreviations used in this document:
OAM: Operations, Administration, and Maintenance E2E: Edge-to-Edge
IOAM: In-situ OAM IOAM: In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance
POT: Proof of Transit ION: IOAM Overlay Network
E2E: Edge-to-Edge OAM: Operations, Administration, and Maintenance
POT: Proof of Transit
3. In-situ OAM Metadata Transport in IPv6 3. In-situ OAM Metadata Transport in IPv6
In-situ OAM in IPv6 is used to enhance diagnostics of IPv6 networks. In-situ OAM in IPv6 is used to enhance diagnostics of IPv6 networks.
It complements other mechanisms proposed to enhance diagnostics of It complements other mechanisms proposed to enhance diagnostics of
IPv6 networks, such as the IPv6 Performance and Diagnostic Metrics IPv6 networks, such as the IPv6 Performance and Diagnostic Metrics
Destination Option described in [RFC8250]. Destination Option described in [RFC8250].
IOAM data fields are encapsulated in "option data" fields of two IOAM data fields are encapsulated in "option data" fields of two
types of extension headers in IPv6 packets - either Hop-by-Hop types of extension headers in IPv6 packets - either Hop-by-Hop
skipping to change at page 4, line 26 skipping to change at page 4, line 41
. . . . . .
. Option Data . O . Option Data . O
. . P . . P
. . T . . T
. . I . . I
. . O . . O
. . N . . N
| | | | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<-+
Option Type: 8-bit option type identifier as defined inSection 5. Option Type: 8-bit option type identifier as defined inSection 6.
Opt Data Len: 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of this option, in Opt Data Len: 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of this option, in
octets, not including the first 2 octets. octets, not including the first 2 octets.
Reserved: 8-bit field MUST be set to zero upon transmission and Reserved: 8-bit field MUST be set to zero upon transmission and
ignored upon reception. ignored upon reception.
IOAM Type: 8-bit field as defined in section 7.2 in IOAM Type: 8-bit field as defined in section 7.2 in
[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data]. [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data].
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All the in-situ OAM IPv6 options defined here have alignment All the in-situ OAM IPv6 options defined here have alignment
requirements. Specifically, they all require 4n alignment. This requirements. Specifically, they all require 4n alignment. This
ensures that fields specified in [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data] are ensures that fields specified in [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data] are
aligned at a multiple-of-4 offset from the start of the Hop-by-Hop aligned at a multiple-of-4 offset from the start of the Hop-by-Hop
and Destination Options header. In addition, to maintain IPv6 and Destination Options header. In addition, to maintain IPv6
extension header 8-octet alignment and avoid the need to add or extension header 8-octet alignment and avoid the need to add or
remove padding at every hop, the Trace-Type for Incremental Trace remove padding at every hop, the Trace-Type for Incremental Trace
Option in IPv6 MUST be selected such that the IOAM node data length Option in IPv6 MUST be selected such that the IOAM node data length
is a multiple of 8-octets. is a multiple of 8-octets.
An outline of how the options defined here can be enabled and used in 4. IOAM Deployment In IPv6 Networks
an IPv6 network is provided in
[I-D.ioametal-ippm-6man-ioam-ipv6-deployment].
4. Security Considerations 4.1. Considerations for IOAM deployment in IPv6 networks
IOAM deployment in an IPv6 network should take the following
considerations and requirements into account:
C1 It is desirable that the addition of IOAM data fields neither
changes the way routers forward the packets, nor the forwarding
decision the routers takes. The packet with the added OAM
information should follow the same path within the domain that the
same packet without the OAM information would follow within the
domain even in the presence of ECMP. Such a behavior is
particularly interesting for deployments where IOAM data fields
are only added "on-demand", e.g. to provide further insights in
case of undesired network behavior for certain flows.
Implementations of IOAM should ensure that ECMP behavior for
packets with and without IOAM data fields is the same.
C2 Given that IOAM data fields increase the total size of the packet,
the size of the packet including the IOAM data could exceed the
PMTU. In particular, the incremental trace IOAM HbH Option, which
is proposed to support hardware implementations of IOAM, changes
Option Data Length en-route. Operators of an IOAM domain are to
ensure that the addition of OAM information does not lead to
fragmentation of the packet, e.g. by configuring the MTU of
transit routers and switches to a sufficiently high value.
Careful control of the MTU in a network is one of the reasons why
IOAM is considered a domain specific feature, see also
[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data]. In addition, the PMTU tolerance range
in the IOAM domain should be identified (e.g. through
configuration) and IOAM encapsulation operations and/or IOAM data
field insertion (in case of incremental tracing) should not be
performed if it exceeds the packet size beyond PMTU.
C3 Packets with IOAM data or associated ICMP errors, should not
arrive at destinations which have no knowledge of IOAM. Consider
using IOAM in transit devices; misleading ICMP errors due to
addition and/or presence of OAM data in the packet can confuse a
source of the packet that did not insert the OAM information.
C4 OAM data leaks may affect the forwarding behavior and state of
network elements outside an IOAM domain. IOAM domains SHOULD
provide a mechanism to prevent data leaks or be able to assure
that upon leak network elements outside the domain are not
affected i.e they continue to process other valid packets.
C5 The source of that inserted and leaked the IOAM data must be easy
to identify for the purpose of troubleshooting, due to the high
complexity of troubleshooting a source that inserted the IOAM data
and did not remove it when the packet traversed across an AS.
Such a troubleshooting process may require coordination between
multiple operators, complicated configuration verification, packet
capture analysis, etc.
C6 Compliance with [RFC8200] would require OAM data to be
encapsulated instead of header/option insertion directly into in-
flight packets using the original IPv6 header.
4.2. IOAM domains bounded by hosts
For deployments where the IOAM domain is bounded by hosts, hosts will
perform the operation of IOAM data field encapsulation and
decapsulation. IOAM data is carried in IPv6 packets as Hop-by-Hop or
Destination options as specified in this document.
4.3. IOAM domains bounded by network devices
For deployments where the IOAM domain is bounded by network devices,
network devices such as routers form the edge of an IOAM domain.
Network devices will perform the operation of IOAM data field
encapsulation and decapsulation.
4.4. Deployment options
This section lists out possible deployment options that can be
employed to meet the requirements listed in Section 4.1.
4.4.1. IPv6-in-IPv6 encapsulation
Leverage an IPv6-in-IPv6 approach: Preserve the original IP packet
and add an IPv6 header including IOAM data fields in an extension
header in front of it, to forward traffic within and across the IOAM
domain. The overlay network formed by the additional IPv6 header
with the IOAM data fields included in an extension header is referred
to as IOAM Overlay Network (ION) in this document.
1. Perform an IPv6-in-IPv6 approach. The source address of the
outer IPv6 header is that of the IOAM encapsulating node. The
destination address of the outer IPv6 header is the same as the
inner IPv6 destination address, i.e. the destination address of
the packet does not change.
2. To simplify debugging in case of leaked IOAM data fields in
packets, consider a new IOAM E2E destination option to identify
the Source IOAM domain (AS, v6 prefix). Insert this option into
the IOAM destination options EH attached to the outer IPv6
header. This additional information would allow for easy
identification of an AS operator that is the source of packets
with leaked IOAM information. Note that leaked packets with IOAM
data fields would only occur in case a router would be
misconfigured.
3. All the IOAM options are defined with type "00 - skip over this
option and continue processing the header. So presence of the
options must not cause packet drop in the network elements that
do not understand the option. In addition
[I-D.ietf-6man-hbh-header-handling] should be considered.
4.4.2. IP-in-IPv6 encapsulation with ULA
The "IP-in-IPv6 encapsulation with ULA" [RFC4193] approach can be
used to apply IOAM to an IPv6 as well as an IPv4 network. In
addition, it fulfills requirement C4 (avoid leaks) by using ULA for
the ION. Similar to the IPv6-in-IPv6 encapsulation approach above,
the original IP packet is preserved. An IPv6 header including IOAM
data fields in an extension header is added in front of it, to
forward traffic within and across the IOAM domain. IPv6 addresses
for the ION, i.e. the outer IPv6 addresses are assigned from the ULA
space. Addressing and routing in the ION are to be configured so
that the IP-in-IPv6 encapsulated packets follow the same path as the
original, non-encapsulated packet would have taken. This would
create an internal IPv6 forwarding topology using the IOAM domain's
interior ULA address space which is parallel with the forwarding
topology that exists with the non-IOAM address space (the topology
and address space that would be followed by packets that do not have
supplemental IOAM information). Establishment and maintenance of the
parallel IOAM ULA forwarding topology could be automated, e.g.
similar to how LDP [RFC5036] is used in MPLS to establish and
maintain an LSP forwarding topology that is parallel to the network's
IGP forwarding topology.
Transit across the ION could leverage the transit approach for
traffic between BGP border routers, as described in [RFC1772], "A.2.3
Encapsulation". Assuming that the operational guidelines specified
in Section 4 of [RFC4193] are properly followed, the probability of
leaks in this approach will be almost close to zero. If the packets
do leak through IOAM egress device misconfiguration or partial IOAM
egress device failure, the packets' ULA destination address is
invalid outside of the IOAM domain. There is no exterior destination
to be reached, and the packets will be dropped when they encounter
either a router external to the IOAM domain that has a packet filter
that drops packets with ULA destinations, or a router that does not
have a default route.
4.4.3. x-in-IPv6 Encapsulation that is used Independently
In some cases it is desirable to monitor a domain that uses an
overlay network that is deployed independently of the need for IOAM,
e.g., an overlay network that runs Geneve-in-IPv6, or VXLAN-in-IPv6.
In this case IOAM can be encapsulated in as an extension header in
the tunnel (outer) IPv6 header. Thus, the tunnel encapsulating node
is also the IOAM encapsulating node, and the tunnel end point is also
the IOAM decapsulating node.
5. Security Considerations
This document describes the encapsulation of IOAM data fields in This document describes the encapsulation of IOAM data fields in
IPv6. Security considerations of the specific IOAM data fields for IPv6. Security considerations of the specific IOAM data fields for
each case (i.e., Trace, Proof of Transit, and E2E) are described and each case (i.e., Trace, Proof of Transit, and E2E) are described and
defined in [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data]. defined in [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data].
As this document describes new options for IPv6, these are similar to As this document describes new options for IPv6, these are similar to
the security considerations of [RFC8200] and the new weakness the security considerations of [RFC8200] and the new weakness
documented in [RFC8250]. documented in [RFC8250].
5. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This draft requests the following IPv6 Option Type assignments from This draft requests the following IPv6 Option Type assignments from
the Destination Options and Hop-by-Hop Options sub-registry of the Destination Options and Hop-by-Hop Options sub-registry of
Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Parameters. Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Parameters.
http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters/ipv6- http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters/ipv6-
parameters.xhtml#ipv6-parameters-2 parameters.xhtml#ipv6-parameters-2
Hex Value Binary Value Description Reference Hex Value Binary Value Description Reference
act chg rest act chg rest
---------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------
TBD_1_0 00 0 TBD_1 IOAM [This draft] TBD_1_0 00 0 TBD_1 IOAM [This draft]
TBD_1_1 00 1 TBD_1 IOAM [This draft] TBD_1_1 00 1 TBD_1 IOAM [This draft]
6. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Tom Herbert, Eric Vyncke, Nalini The authors would like to thank Tom Herbert, Eric Vyncke, Nalini
Elkins, Srihari Raghavan, Ranganathan T S, Karthik Babu Harichandra Elkins, Srihari Raghavan, Ranganathan T S, Karthik Babu Harichandra
Babu, Akshaya Nadahalli, Stefano Previdi, Hemant Singh, Erik Babu, Akshaya Nadahalli, Stefano Previdi, Hemant Singh, Erik
Nordmark, LJ Wobker, Mark Smith, Andrew Yourtchenko and Justin Iurman Nordmark, LJ Wobker, Mark Smith, Andrew Yourtchenko and Justin Iurman
for the comments and advice. For the IPv6 encapsulation, this for the comments and advice. For the IPv6 encapsulation, this
document leverages concepts described in document leverages concepts described in
[I-D.kitamura-ipv6-record-route]. The authors would like to [I-D.kitamura-ipv6-record-route]. The authors would like to
acknowledge the work done by the author Hiroshi Kitamura and people acknowledge the work done by the author Hiroshi Kitamura and people
involved in writing it. involved in writing it.
7. References 8. References
7.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data] [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data]
Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., Pignataro, C., Gredler, H., Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., Pignataro, C., Gredler, H.,
Leddy, J., Youell, S., Mizrahi, T., Mozes, D., Lapukhov, Leddy, J., Youell, S., Mizrahi, T., Mozes, D., Lapukhov,
P., Chang, R., and d. daniel.bernier@bell.ca, "Data Fields P., Chang, R., and d. daniel.bernier@bell.ca, "Data Fields
for In-situ OAM", draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data-01 (work in for In-situ OAM", draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data-01 (work in
progress), October 2017. progress), October 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
7.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ioametal-ippm-6man-ioam-ipv6-deployment] [I-D.ietf-6man-hbh-header-handling]
Bhandari, S., Brockners, F., Mizrahi, T., Kfir, A., Gafni, Baker, F. and R. Bonica, "IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Options
B., Spiegel, M., Krishnan, S., and M. Smith, "Deployment Extension Header", March 2016.
Considerations for In-situ OAM with IPv6 Options", draft-
ioametal-ippm-6man-ioam-ipv6-deployment-01 (work in
progress), March 2019.
[I-D.kitamura-ipv6-record-route] [I-D.kitamura-ipv6-record-route]
Kitamura, H., "Record Route for IPv6 (PR6) Hop-by-Hop Kitamura, H., "Record Route for IPv6 (PR6) Hop-by-Hop
Option Extension", draft-kitamura-ipv6-record-route-00 Option Extension", draft-kitamura-ipv6-record-route-00
(work in progress), November 2000. (work in progress), November 2000.
[RFC1772] Rekhter, Y. and P. Gross, "Application of the Border
Gateway Protocol in the Internet", RFC 1772,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1772, March 1995,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1772>.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[RFC5036] Andersson, L., Ed., Minei, I., Ed., and B. Thomas, Ed.,
"LDP Specification", RFC 5036, DOI 10.17487/RFC5036,
October 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5036>.
[RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 [RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
[RFC8250] Elkins, N., Hamilton, R., and M. Ackermann, "IPv6 [RFC8250] Elkins, N., Hamilton, R., and M. Ackermann, "IPv6
Performance and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) Destination Performance and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) Destination
Option", RFC 8250, DOI 10.17487/RFC8250, September 2017, Option", RFC 8250, DOI 10.17487/RFC8250, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8250>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8250>.
skipping to change at line 400 skipping to change at page 13, line 24
Email: suresh@kaloom.com Email: suresh@kaloom.com
Rajiv Asati Rajiv Asati
Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems, Inc.
7200 Kit Creek Road 7200 Kit Creek Road
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
US US
Email: rajiva@cisco.com Email: rajiva@cisco.com
Mark Smith
PO BOX 521
HEIDELBERG, VIC 3084
AU
Email: markzzzsmith+id@gmail.com
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