draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-10.txt   draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-11.txt 
IDR and SIDR K. Sriram, Ed. IDR and SIDR K. Sriram, Ed.
Internet-Draft USA NIST Internet-Draft USA NIST
Intended status: Standards Track A. Azimov, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track A. Azimov, Ed.
Expires: April 25, 2019 Qrator Labs Expires: October 20, 2019 Yandex
October 22, 2018 April 18, 2019
Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-10 draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-11
Abstract Abstract
Problem definition for route leaks and enumeration of types of route Problem definition for route leaks and enumeration of types of route
leaks are provided in RFC 7908. This document describes a solution leaks are provided in RFC 7908. This document describes a solution
for detection and mitigation route leaks which is based on conveying for detection and mitigation route leaks which is based on conveying
route-leak protection (RLP) information in a Border Gateway Protocol route-leak protection (RLP) information in a Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) community. The RLP information is carried in a new well-known (BGP) community. The RLP information is carried in a new well-known
transitive BGP community, called the RLP community. The RLP transitive BGP community, called the RLP community. The RLP
community helps with detection and mitigation of route leaks at ASes community helps with detection and mitigation of route leaks at ASes
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 20, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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information in a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) community. The RLP information in a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) community. The RLP
information is carried in a new well-known transitive BGP community, information is carried in a new well-known transitive BGP community,
called the RLP community. The RLP community helps with detection and called the RLP community. The RLP community helps with detection and
mitigation of route leaks at ASes downstream from the leaking AS (in mitigation of route leaks at ASes downstream from the leaking AS (in
the path of the BGP update). This is an inter-AS (multi-hop) the path of the BGP update). This is an inter-AS (multi-hop)
solution mechanism. This solution complements the intra-AS (local solution mechanism. This solution complements the intra-AS (local
AS) route-leak avoidance solution that is described in AS) route-leak avoidance solution that is described in
[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy]. [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy].
Previously, an optional transitive BGP RLP Attribute was proposed to Previously, an optional transitive BGP RLP Attribute was proposed to
carry the RLP information carry the RLP information (in earlier versions of this document).
[I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation]. However, this However, this updated document proposes a well-known transitive BGP
document proposes a well-known transitive BGP community to carry the community to carry the RLP information, with the intention of
RLP information, with the intention of promoting faster adoption. promoting faster adoption.
The inter-AS RLP mechanism described here can be incrementally The inter-AS RLP mechanism described here can be incrementally
deployed. Early adopters would see significant benefits. If a group deployed. Early adopters would see significant benefits. If a group
of big ISPs deploy RLP, then they would be helping each other by of big ISPs deploy RLP, then they would be helping each other by
blocking route leaks originated within one's customer cone from blocking route leaks originated within one's customer cone from
propagating into a peer's AS or their customer cone. propagating into a peer's AS or their customer cone.
2. Mechanisms for Detection and Mitigation of Route Leaks 2. Mechanisms for Detection and Mitigation of Route Leaks
There are two considerations for route leaks: (1) Prevention of route There are two considerations for route leaks: (1) Prevention of route
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[draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns] [draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns]
Dickson, B., "Route Leaks -- Proposed Solutions", IETF Dickson, B., "Route Leaks -- Proposed Solutions", IETF
Internet Draft (expired), March 2012, Internet Draft (expired), March 2012,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/ <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns-01>. draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns-01>.
[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy] [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy]
Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., and K. Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., and K.
Sriram, "Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Sriram, "Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and
Open messages", draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-03 (work in Open messages", draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-05 (work in
progress), June 2018. progress), February 2019.
[I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation]
Sriram, K. and A. Azimov, "Methods for Detection and
Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-
detection-mitigation-09 (work in progress), July 2018.
[Luckie] Luckie, M., Huffaker, B., Dhamdhere, A., Giotsas, V., and [Luckie] Luckie, M., Huffaker, B., Dhamdhere, A., Giotsas, V., and
kc. claffy, "AS Relationships, Customer Cones, and kc. claffy, "AS Relationships, Customer Cones, and
Validation", IMC 2013, October 2013, Validation", IMC 2013, October 2013,
<http://www.caida.org/~amogh/papers/asrank-IMC13.pdf>. <http://www.caida.org/~amogh/papers/asrank-IMC13.pdf>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
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Kotikalapudi Sriram (editor) Kotikalapudi Sriram (editor)
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive 100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Gaithersburg, MD 20899
United States of America United States of America
Email: ksriram@nist.gov Email: ksriram@nist.gov
Alexander Azimov (editor) Alexander Azimov (editor)
Qrator Labs Yandex
1-Y Magistral'nyy Tupik Moscow
Moskva, XYZ 123007
Russia Russia
Email: aa@qrator.net Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com
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