draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-14.txt   draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-15.txt 
Network Working Group A. Azimov Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft Qrator Labs & Yandex Internet-Draft Qrator Labs & Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov
Expires: July 5, 2021 Qrator Labs Expires: July 20, 2021 Qrator Labs
R. Bush R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc. Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
K. Patel K. Patel
Arrcus Arrcus
K. Sriram K. Sriram
USA NIST USA NIST
January 1, 2021 January 16, 2021
Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-14 draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-15
Abstract Abstract
Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate
assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route
learned from one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit learned from one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit
provider, passing a route learned from one transit provider to provider, passing a route learned from one transit provider to
another transit provider or a lateral peer. Existing approaches to another transit provider or a lateral peer. Existing approaches to
leak prevention rely on marking routes by operator configuration, leak prevention rely on marking routes by operator configuration,
with no check that the configuration corresponds to that of the eBGP with no check that the configuration corresponds to that of the eBGP
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 5, 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 20, 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 4, line 18 skipping to change at page 4, line 18
from another RS. from another RS.
Peer: MAY send to a peer prefixes which the sender originates and Peer: MAY send to a peer prefixes which the sender originates and
prefixes learned from its customers. A peer MUST NOT send to a prefixes learned from its customers. A peer MUST NOT send to a
peer prefixes learned from other peers, from its providers, or peer prefixes learned from other peers, from its providers, or
from RS(s). from RS(s).
Of course, any BGP speaker may apply policy to reduce what is Of course, any BGP speaker may apply policy to reduce what is
announced, and a recipient may apply policy to reduce the set of announced, and a recipient may apply policy to reduce the set of
routes they accept. Violation of the above rules may result in route routes they accept. Violation of the above rules may result in route
leaks and MUST not be allowed. Automatic enforcement of these rules leaks and MUST NOT be allowed. Automatic enforcement of these rules
should significantly reduce route leaks that may otherwise occur due should significantly reduce route leaks that may otherwise occur due
to manual configuration mistakes. While enforcing the above rules to manual configuration mistakes. While enforcing the above rules
will address most BGP peering scenarios, their configuration is not will address most BGP peering scenarios, their configuration is not
part of BGP itself; therefore, configuration of ingress and egress part of BGP itself; therefore, configuration of ingress and egress
prefix filters is still strongly advised. prefix filters is still strongly advised.
3. BGP Role 3. BGP Role
BGP Role is a new configuration option that is configured on a per- BGP Role is a new configuration option that is configured on a per-
session basis. BGP Roles reflect the agreement between two BGP session basis. BGP Roles reflect the agreement between two BGP
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9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
This document defines a new Capability Codes option [to be removed This document defines a new Capability Codes option [to be removed
upon publication: https://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/ upon publication: https://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/
capability-codes.xhtml ] [RFC5492], named "BGP Role" with an assigned capability-codes.xhtml ] [RFC5492], named "BGP Role" with an assigned
value <TBD1>. The length of this capability is 1. value <TBD1>. The length of this capability is 1.
The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is
requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role
Value". Assignments consist of Value and corresponding Role name. Value". Assignments consist of Value and corresponding Role name.
Initially this registry is to be populated with the data in Table 1. Initially this registry is to be populated with the data contained in
Future assignments may be made by a standard action procedure Table 1 found in Section 4. Future assignments may be made by a
[RFC5226]. The allocation policy for new entries up to and including Standard Action procedure [RFC8126]. The allocation policy for new
value 127 is "Expert Review" [RFC5226]. The allocation policy for entries up to and including value 127 is "Expert Review" [RFC8126].
values 128 through 251 is "First Come First Served". The values from The allocation policy for values 128 through 251 is "First Come First
252 through 255 are for "Experimental Use". Served". The values from 252 through 255 are for "Experimental Use".
This document defines a new subcode, "Role Mismatch" with an assigned This document defines a new subcode, "Role Mismatch" with an assigned
value <TBD2> in the OPEN Message Error subcodes registry [to be value <TBD2> in the OPEN Message Error subcodes registry [to be
removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp- removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-
parameters/bgp-parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6] [RFC4271]. parameters/bgp-parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6] [RFC4271].
This document defines a new optional, transitive BGP Path Attributes This document defines a new optional, transitive BGP Path Attributes
option, named "Only to Customer (OTC)" with an assigned value <TBD3> option, named "Only to Customer (OTC)" with an assigned value <TBD3>
[To be removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp- [To be removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-
parameters/bgp-parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-2] [RFC4271]. The parameters/bgp-parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-2] [RFC4271]. The
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Networking, Volume 9, Issue 6, pp 689-692, DOI Networking, Volume 9, Issue 6, pp 689-692, DOI
10.1109/90.974523, December 2001, 10.1109/90.974523, December 2001,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/974523>. <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/974523>.
[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation] [I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation]
Sriram, K. and A. Azimov, "Methods for Detection and Sriram, K. and A. Azimov, "Methods for Detection and
Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-grow-route- Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-grow-route-
leak-detection-mitigation-04 (work in progress), October leak-detection-mitigation-04 (work in progress), October
2020. 2020.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E., [RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>. 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8212] Mauch, J., Snijders, J., and G. Hankins, "Default External [RFC8212] Mauch, J., Snijders, J., and G. Hankins, "Default External
BGP (EBGP) Route Propagation Behavior without Policies", BGP (EBGP) Route Propagation Behavior without Policies",
RFC 8212, DOI 10.17487/RFC8212, July 2017, RFC 8212, DOI 10.17487/RFC8212, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8212>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8212>.
[Streibelt] [Streibelt]
Streibelt, F., Lichtblau, F., Beverly, R., Feldmann, A., Streibelt, F., Lichtblau, F., Beverly, R., Feldmann, A.,
Cristel, C., Smaragdakis, G., and R. Bush, "BGP Cristel, C., Smaragdakis, G., and R. Bush, "BGP
Communities: Even more Worms in the Routing Can", Communities: Even more Worms in the Routing Can",
<https://people.mpi-inf.mpg.de/~fstreibelt/preprint/ <https://people.mpi-inf.mpg.de/~fstreibelt/preprint/
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