Homenet                                                       D. Migault
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track                                R. Weber
Expires: May 6, September 27, 2021                                      Nominum
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                               R. Hunter
                                                    Globis Consulting BV
                                                            C. Griffiths

                                                             W. Cloetens
                                                        Deutsche Telekom
                                                       November 02, 2020
                                                          March 26, 2021

      Simple Provisioning of Public Names for Residential Networks
           draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-12
           draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-13

Abstract

   Home owners often have IPv6 devices that they wish to access over the
   Internet using names.  It has been possible to register and populate
   a DNS Zone with names since DNS became a thing, but it has been an
   activity typically reserved for experts.  This document automates the
   process through creation of a Homenet Naming Authority, Authority (HNA), whose
   responsibility is to select, sign and publish names to a set of
   publically
   publicly visible servers.

   The use of an outsourced primary DNS server deals with possible
   renumbering of the home network, and with possible denial of service
   attacks against the DNS infrastructure.

   This document describes the mechanism that enables the Home Network
   Authority (HNA) HNA to
   outsource the naming service to the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure
   (DOI) via a Distribution Master (DM).

   In addition, this document deals with publication of a corresponding
   reverse zone.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, September 27, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Selecting Names to Publish  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6   5
     1.2.  Alternative solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Architecture Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9   8
     3.1.  Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Distribution Master Communication Channels  . . . . . . .  11
   4.  Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) and
       Distribution Master (DM)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.1.  Information to build the Public Homenet Zone. Zone  . . . . . .  13
     4.2.  Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust  . . . . .  13
     4.3.  Information to set the Synchronization Channel  . . . . .  14
     4.4.  Deleting the delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.5.  Messages Exchange Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       4.5.1.  Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone. .  15
       4.5.2.  Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust .  16
       4.5.3.  Providing information for the Synchronization Channel  16
       4.5.4.  HNA instructing deleting the delegation . . . . . . .  17
     4.6.  Securing the Control Channel between Homenet Naming
           Authority (HNA) and Distribution Master (DM)  . . . . . .  17
     4.7.  Implementation Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   5.  DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . . . . . . . .  19
     5.1.  Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM .  20
   6.  DM Distribution Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   7.  HNA Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   8.  DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   9.  Homenet Reverse Zone Channels Configuration . . . . . . . . .  21
   10. Homenet Public Zone Channel Configurations  . . . . . . . . .  22  23
   11. Renumbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23  24
     11.1.  Hidden Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     11.2.  Distribution Master  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   12. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26  25
   13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27  26
     13.1.  HNA DMand RDM DM channels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27 . . .  26
     13.2.  Names are less secure than IP addresses  . . . . . . . .  27
     13.3.  Names are less volatile than IP addresses  . . . . . . .  27
     13.4.  DNS Reflection Attacks
   14. Information Model for Outsourced information  . . . . . . . .  27
     14.1.  Outsourced Information Model . . . . . . . . .  28
     13.5.  Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary . . . . .  28
     13.6.  Reflection Attacks involving the DM  . . . . . . . . . .  30
     13.7.  Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative
            Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     13.8.  Flooding Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     13.9.  Replay Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   14. Data Model for Outsourced information . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32  30
   16. Acknowledgment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32  30
   17. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32  31
     17.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33  31
     17.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36  34
   Appendix A.  Envisioned deployment scenarios  . . . . . . . . . .  38  36
     A.1.  CPE Vendor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38  36
     A.2.  Agnostic CPE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38  36
   Appendix B.  Example: Homenet Zone  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   Appendix C.  Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing  .  41
   Appendix D.  Example: A manufacturer provisioned HNA product flow  42  37
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43  38

1.  Introduction

   The Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) is responsible for making devices
   within the home network accessible by name within the home network as
   well as from outside the home network (e.g. the Internet).  IPv6
   connectivity provides the possibility of global end to end IP
   connectivity.  End users will be able to transparently make use of
   this connectivity if they can use names to access the services they
   want from their home network.

   The use of a DNS zone for each home network is a reasonable and
   scalable way to make the set of public names visible.  There are a
   number of ways to populate such a zone.  This specification proposes
   a way based on a number of assumptions about typical home networks.

   1.  The names of the devices accessible from the Internet are stored
       in the Public Homenet Zone, served by a DNS authoritative server.

   2.  It is unlikely that home networks will contain sufficiently
       robust platforms designed to host a service such as the DNS on
       the Internet and as such would expose the home network to DDoS
       attacks.

   3.  [RFC7368] emphasizes that the home network is subject to
       connectivity disruptions with the ISP.  But, names used within
       the home MUST be resilient against such disruption.

   This specification makes the public names resolvable within both the
   home network and on the Internet, even when there are disruptions.

   This is achieved by having a device inside the home network that
   builds, signs, publishes, and manages a Public Homenet Zone, thus
   providing bindings between public names, IP addresses, and other RR
   types.

   The management of the names can be a role that the Customer Premises
   Equipment (CPE) does.  Other devices in the home network could
   fulfill this role e.g. a NAS server, but for simplicity, this
   document assumes the function is located on one of the CPE devices.

   The homenet architecture [RFC7368] makes it clear that a home network
   may have multiple CPEs.  The management of the Public Homenet Zone
   involves DNS specific mechanisms that cannot be distributed over
   multiple servers (primary server), when multiple nodes can
   potentially manage the Public Homenet Zone, a single node needs to be
   selected per outsourced zone.  This selected node is designated as
   providing the Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) HNA function.

   The process by which a single HNA is selected per zone is not in
   scope for this document.  It is envisioned that a future document
   will describe an HNCP mechanism to elect the single HNA.

   CPEs, which may host the HNA function, as well as home network
   devices, are usually low powered devices not designed for terminating
   heavy traffic.  As a result, hosting an authoritative DNS service
   visible to the Internet may expose the home network to resource
   exhaustion and other attacks.  On the other hand, if the only copy of
   the public zone is on the Internet, then Internet connectivity
   disruptions would make the names unavailable inside the homenet.

   In order to avoid resource exhaustion and other attacks, this
   document describes an architecture that outsources the authoritative
   naming service of the home network.  More specifically, the HNA
   builds the Public Homenet Zone and outsources it to an DNS
   Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI) via a Distribution Master (DM).  The
   DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI)
   DOI is in charge of publishing the corresponding Public Homenet Zone
   on the Internet.  The transfer of DNS zone information is achieved
   using standard DNS mechanisms involving primary and secondary DNS
   servers, with the HNA hosted primary being a stealth primary, and the Distribution Master
   DM a secondary.

   Section 3.1 provides an architecture description that describes the
   relation between the HNA and the Outsourcing Architecture. DOI.  In order to keep the Public
   Homenet Zone up-to-date Section 5 describes how the HNA and the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI
   synchronizes the Pubic Homenet Zone.

   The proposed architecture is explicitly designed to enable fully
   functional DNSSEC, and the Public Homenet Zone is expected to be
   signed with a secure delegation.  DNSSEC key management and zone
   signing is handled by the HNA.

   Section 10 discusses management and configuration of the Public
   Homenet Zone.  It shows that the HNA configuration of the Outsourcing
   infrastructure DOI can
   involve no or little interaction with the end user.  More
   specifically, it shows that the existence of an account in the DOI is
   sufficient for the DOI to push the necessary configuration.

   Section 9 discusses management of one or more reverse zones.  It
   shows that management of the reverse  In
   addition, when the DOI and CPE are both managed by an ISP, the
   configuration can be entirely automated - see Section 9.

   Section 9 discusses management of one or more reverse zones.  It
   shows that management of the reverse zones can be entirely automated
   and benefit from a pre-established relation between the ISP and the
   home network.  Note that such scenarios may also be met for the
   Public Homenet Zone, but not necessarily.

   Section 11 discusses how renumbering should be handled.  Finally,
   Section 12 and Section 13 respectively discuss privacy and security
   considerations when outsourcing the Public Homenet Zone.

   The Public Homenet Zone is expected to contain public information
   only in a single universal view.  This document does not define how
   the information required to construct this view is derived.

   It is also not in the scope of this document to define names for
   exclusive use within the boundaries of the local home network.
   Instead, local scope information is expected to be provided to the
   home network using local scope naming services. mDNS [RFC6762] DNS-SD
   [RFC6763] are two examples of these services.  Currently mDNS is
   limited to a single link network.  However, future protocols and
   architectures [I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming] are expected to
   leverage this constraint as pointed out in [RFC7558].

1.1.  Selecting Names to Publish

   While this document does not create any normative mechanism by which
   the selection of names to publish, this document anticipates that the
   home network administrator (a humuan), will be presented with a list
   of current names and addresses present on the inside of the home
   network.

   The administrator would mark which devices (by name), are to be
   published.  The HNA would then collect the IPv6 address(es)
   associated with that device, and put the name into the Public Homenet
   Zone.  The address of the device can be collected from a number of
   places: mDNS [RFC6762], DHCP [RFC6644], UPnP, PCP [RFC6887], or
   manual configuration.

   A device may have a Global Unicast Address (GUA), a Unique Local IPv6
   Address (ULA), as as well IPv6-Link-Local addresses, IPv4-Link-Local
   Addresses, and RFC1918 addresses.  Of these the link-local are never
   useful for the Public Zone, and should be ommitted. omitted.  The IPv6 ULA and
   the RFC1918 addresses may be useful to publish, if the home network
   environment features a VPN that would allow the home owner to reach
   the network.

   The IPv6 ULA addressees are significantly safer to publish, as the
   RFC1918 addressees are likely to be confusing to any other entity.

   In general, one expects the GUA to be the default address to be
   published.  However, during periods when the home network has
   connectivity problems, the ULA and RFC1918 addressees can be used
   inside the home, and the mapping from public name to locally useful
   location address would permit many services secured with HTTPS to
   continue to operate.

1.2.  Alternative solutions

   An alternative existing solution in IPv4 is to have a single zone,
   where a host uses a RESTful HTTP service to register a single name
   into a common public zone.  This is often called "Dynamic DNS", and
   there are a number of commercial providers, including Dyn, Gandi etc.
   These solutions were typically used by a host behind the CPE to make
   it's CPE IPv4 address visible, usually in order to enable incoming
   connections.

   For a small number (one to three) of hosts, use of such a system
   provides an alternative to the architecture described in this
   document.

   The alternative does suffer from some severe limitations:

   o  the CPE/HNA router is unaware of the process, and cannot respond
      to queries for these names when there are disruptions in
      connectivity.  This makes the home user or application dependent
      on having to resolve different names in the event of outages or
      disruptions.

   o  the CPE/HNA router cannot control the process.  Any host can do
      this regardless of whether or not the home network administrator
      wants the name published or not.  There is therefore no possible
      audit trail.

   o  the credentials for the dynamic DNS server need to be securely
      transferred to all hosts that wish to use it.  This is not a
      problem for a technical user to do with one or two hosts, but it
      does not scale to multiple hosts and becomes a problem for non-
      technical users.

   o  "all the good names are taken" - current services put everyone's
      names into some small set of zones, and there are often conflicts.
      Distinguishing similar names by delegation of zones was among the
      primary design goals of the DNS system.

   o  The RESTful services do not always support all RR types.  The
      homenet user is dependent on the service provider supporting new
      types.  By providing full DNS delegation, this document enables
      all RR types and also future extensions.

   There is no technical reason why a RESTful cloud service could not
   provide solutions to many of these problems, but this document
   describes a DNS based solution.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Customer Premises Equipment:  (CPE) is a router providing
      connectivity to the home network.

   Homenet Zone:  is the DNS zone for use within the boundaries of the
      home network: home.arpa, see [RFC8375]).  This zone is not
      considered public and is out of scope for this document.

   Registered Homenet Domain:  is the Domain Name associated with the
      home network.

   Public Homenet Zone:  contains the names in the home network that are
      expected to be publicly resolvable on the Internet.

   Homenet Naming Authority:  (HNA) is a function responsible for
      managing the Public Homenet Zone.  This includes populating the
      Public Homenet Zone, signing the zone for DNSSEC, as well as
      managing the distribution of that Homenet Zone to the DNS
      Outsourcing
      Infrastructure. Infrastructure (DOI).

   DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI):  is the infrastructure
      responsible for receiving the Public Homenet Zone and publishing
      it on the Internet.  It is mainly composed of a Distribution
      Master and Public Authoritative Servers.

   Public Authoritative Servers:  are the authoritative name servers for
      the Public Homenet Zone.  Name resolution requests for the Homenet
      Domain are sent to these servers.  For resiliency the Public
      Homenet Zone SHOULD be hosted on multiple servers.

   Homenet Authoritative Servers:  are authoritative name servers within
      the Homenet network.

   Distribution Master (DM):  is the (set of) server(s) to which the HNA
      synchronizes the Public Homenet Zone, and which then distributes
      the relevant information to the Public Authoritative Servers.

   Homenet Reverse Zone:  The reverse zone file associated with the
      Public Homenet Zone.

   Reverse Public Authoritative Servers:  equivalent to Public
      Authoritative Servers specifically for reverse resolution.

   Reverse Distribution Master:  equivalent to Distribution Master
      specifically for reverse resolution.

   Homenet DNSSEC Resolver:  a resolver that performs a DNSSEC
      resolution on the home network for the Public Homenet Zone.  The
      resolution is performed requesting the Homenet Authoritative
      Servers.

   DNSSEC Resolver:  a resolver that performs a DNSSEC resolution on the
      Internet for the Public Homenet Zone.  The resolution is performed
      requesting the Public Authoritative Servers.

3.  Architecture Description

   This section provides an overview of the architecture for outsourcing
   the authoritative naming service fromn from the HNA to the DNS Outsourcing
   Infrastructure DOI in
   Section 3.1.  Section Appendix B and Appendix C
   illustrates this architecture with the example of a Public Homenet
   Zone as well as 14 defines necessary parameter to configure the
   HNA.

3.1.  Architecture Overview

   Figure 1 illustrates the architecture where the HNA outsources the
   publication of the Public Homenet Zone to the DNS Outsourcing
   Infrastructure (DOI). DOI.

   The Public Homenet Zone is identified by the Registered Homenet
   Domain Name - myhome.isp.example.

   The ".local" as well as ".home.arpa" are explicitly not considered as
   Public Homenet zones.

   The HNA SHOULD build the Public Homenet Zone in a single view
   populated with all resource records that are expected to be published
   on the Internet.

   As explained in {#selectingnames}, how the Public Homenet Zone is
   populated is out of the scope of this document.

   The HNA also signs the Public Homenet Zone.  The HNA handles all
   operations and keying material required for DNSSEC, so there is no
   provision made in this architecture for transferring private DNSSEC
   related keying material between the HNA and the DM.

   Once the Public Homenet Zone has been built, the HNA outsources it to
   the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI as described in Figure 1.

   The HNA acts as a hidden primary while the DM behaves as a secondary
   responsible to distribute the Public Homenet Zone to the multiple
   Public Authoritative Servers that DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI is responsible for.

   The DM has 3 communication channels:

   o  a DM Control Channel (see section Section 4) to configure the HNA
      and the Outsourcing Infrastructure, DOI,

   o  a DM Synchronization Channel (see section Section 5 to synchronize
      the Public Homenet Zone on the HNA and on the DM.

   o  one or more Distribution Channels (see section Section 6 that
      distributes the Public Homenet Zone from the DM to the Public
      Authoritative Server serving the Public Homenet Zone on the
      Internet.

   There MAY be multiple DM's, and multiple servers per DM.  This text
   assumes a single DM server for simplicity, but there is no reason why
   each channel need needs to be implemented on the same server, or indeed
   use the same code base.

   It is important to note that while the HNA is configured as an
   authoritative server, it is not expected to answer to DNS requests
   from the public Internet for the Public Homenet Zone.  The function
   of the HNA is limited to building the zone and synchronization with  More
   specifically, the DM.

   The addresses associated with the HNA SHOULD NOT be
   mentioned in the NS records of the Public Homenet zone, unless
   additional security provisions necessary to protect the HNA from
   external attack have been taken.

   The DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI is also responsible for ensuring the DS record has been
   updated in the parent zone.

   Resolution is performed by the DNSSEC resolvers.  When the resolution
   is performed outside the home network, the DNSSEC Resolver resolves
   the DS record on the Global DNS and the name associated to the Public
   Homenet Zone (example.com) on the Public Authoritative Servers.

   When the resolution is performed from within the home network, the
   Homenet DNSSEC Resolver may proceed similarly.  On the other hand, to
   provide resilience to the Public Homenet Zone in case of disruption,
   the Homenet DNSSEC Resolver SHOULD be able to perform the resolution
   on the authoritative name service of the home network implemented by
   the Homenet Authoritative Servers.  These servers are not expected
   to be mentioned in the Public Homenet Zone, nor to be accessible from
   the Internet.  As such their information as well as the corresponding
   signed DS record MAY be provided by the HNA to the Homenet DNSSEC
   Resolvers, e.g., using HNCP. HNCP [RFC7788].  Such configuration is outside
   the scope of this document.

   How the Homenet Authoritative Servers are provisioned is also out of
   scope of this specification.  It could be implemented using primary
   secondaries servers, or via rsync.  In some cases, the HNA and
   Homenet Authoritative Servers may be combined together which would
   result in a common instantiation of an authoritative server on the
   WAN and inner interface.  Other mechanisms may also be used.

          Home network                 |         Internet
                                       |
                                       | +----------------------------+
                                       | |          DNS               |
                                       | | Outsourcing Infrastructure          DOI               |
                             Control   | |                            |
   +-----------------------+ Channel   | |  +-----------------------+ |
   |         HNA           |<-------------->| Distribution Master   | |
   |+---------------------+|           | |  |+---------------------+| |
   || Public Homenet Zone ||Synchronization || Public Homenet Zone || |
   || (example.com)       || Channel   | |  ||  (example.com)      || |
   |+---------------------+|<-------------->|+---------------------+| |
   +----------------------+|           | |  +-----------------------+ |
                                       | |           ^ Distribution   |
                                       | |           | Channel        |
   +-----------------------+           | |           v                |
   | Homenet Authoritative |           | |  +-----------------------+ |
   | Server(s)             |           | |  | Public Authoritative  | |
   |+---------------------+|           | |  | Server(s)             | |
   ||Public Homenet Zone  ||           | |  |+---------------------+| |
   || (example.com)       ||           | |  || Public Homenet Zone || |
   |+---------------------+|           | |  ||  (example.com)      || |
   +-----------------------+           | |  |+---------------------+| |
              ^   |                    | |  +-----------------------+ |
              |   |                    | +----------^---|-------------+
              |   |                    |            |   |
              |   |           name resolution       |   |
              |   v                    |            |   v
    +----------------------+           | +-----------------------+
    |       Homenet        |           | |       Internet        |
    |    DNSSEC Resolver   |           | |    DNSSEC Resolver    |
    +----------------------+           | +-----------------------+

           Figure 1: Homenet Naming Architecture Name Resolution

3.2.  Distribution Master Communication Channels

   This section details the interfaces and channels of the DM, that is
   the Control Channel, the Synchronization Channel and the Distribution
   Channel.

   The Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are the
   interfaces used between the HNA and the DNS Outsourcing
   Infrastructure. DOI.  The entity within the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure
   DOI responsible to handle these communications is the DM and
   communications between the HNA and the DM SHOULD be protected and
   mutually authenticated.  While section Section 4.6 discusses in more
   depth the different security protocols that could be used to secure,
   this specification RECOMMENDS the use of TLS with mutually
   authentication based on certificates to secure the channel between
   the HNA and the DM.

   The Control Channel is used to set up the Synchronization Channel.
   We assume that the HNA initiates the Control Channel connection with
   the DM and as such has a prior knowledge of the DM identity (X509
   certificate), the IP address and port to use and protocol to set
   secure session.  We also assume the DM has knowledge of the identity
   of the HNA (X509 certificate) as well as the Registered Homenet
   Domain.  For more detail to see how this can be achieved, please see
   section Section 10.

   The information exchanged between the HNA and the DM is using DNS
   messages.  DNS messages can be protected using various kind of
   transport layers, among others, UDP:53/DTLS, TLS/TCP:53, HTTPS:443. DNS over DTLS [RFC8094], DNS over TLS
   (DoT) [RFC7858], or DNS over HTTPs (DoH) [RFC8484].  There was
   consideration to using a standard TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG(0) [RFC2931]
   to perform a dynamic DNS update to the DM.  There are a number of
   issues with this.  The first one is that TSIG or SIG(0) make
   scenarios where the end user needs to interact via its web browser
   more complex.  More precisely, authorization and access control
   granted via OAUTH would be unnecessarily complex with TSIG or SIG(0).

   The main one is that the Dynamic DNS update would also update the
   parent zone's (NS, DS and associated A or AAAA records) while the
   goal is to update the Distribution Master's DM configuration files.  The visible NS records
   SHOULD remain pointing at the cloud provider's anycast addresses.
   Revealing the address of the HNA in the DNS is not desirable.  Please
   see section Section 4.2 for more details.

   This specification also assumes:

   o  the DM serves both the Control Channel and Synchronization Channel
      on a single IP address, single port and with a single transport
      protocol.

   o  By default, the HNA uses a single IP address for both the Control
      and Synchronization channel by default. channel.  However, the HNA MAY use distinct IP
      addresses for the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel
      - see section Section 5 and section {sec-
      sync-info}} {sec-sync-info}} for more
      details.

   The Distribution Channel is internal to the DNS Outsourcing
   Infrastructure DOI and as such is not
   the primary concern of this specification.

4.  Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) and
    Distribution Master (DM)

   The DM Control Channel is used by the HNA and the DNS Outsourcing
   Infrastructure DOI to exchange
   information related to the configuration of the delegation which includes:
   includes information to build the Public Homenet Zone (see
   Section 4.1), information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust (see
   Section 4.2) and information to set the Synchronization Channel (see
   Section 4.3).

4.1.  Information to build the Public Homenet Zone. Zone

   When the HNA builds the public zone, Public Homenet Zone, it must include
   information that it retrieves from the DM relating to how the zone is
   to be published.

   The information includes at least names and IP addresses of the
   Public Authoritative Name Servers.  In term of RRset information this
   includes:

   o  the MNAME of the SOA,

   o  the NS and associated A and AAA RRsets of the name servers.

   Optionally the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI MAY also provide operational parameters such as
   other fields of SOA (SERIAL, RNAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and
   MINIMUM).  As the information is necessary for the HNA to proceed and
   the information is associated to the
   Outsourcing Infrastructure, DOI, this information exchange
   is mandatory.

4.2.  Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust

   The HNA SHOULD provide the hash of the KSK (DS RRset), so the that
   DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure
   DOI provides this value to the parent zone.  A common deployment use
   case is that the Outsourcing
   Infrastructure DOI is the registrar of the Registered Homenet
   Domain, and as such, its relationship with the registry of the parent
   zone enables it to update the parent zone.  When such relation
   exists, the HNA should be able to request the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI to update the DS
   RRset in the parent zone.  A direct update is especially necessary to
   initialize the chain of trust.

   Though the HNA may also later directly update the values of the DS
   via the Control Channel, it is RECOMMENDED to use other mechanisms
   such as CDS and CDNSKEY [RFC7344] for transparent updates during key
   roll overs.

   As some deployment may not provide an DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure a DOI that will be able to update
   the DS in the parent zone, this information exchange is OPTIONAL.

   By accepting the DS RR, the DM commits in taking care of advertising
   the DS to the parent zone.  Upon refusal, the DM clearly indicates it
   does not have the capacity to proceed to the update.

4.3.  Information to set the Synchronization Channel

   That information sets the primary/secondary relation between the HNA
   and the DM.  The

   The HNA works as a primary authoritative DNS server, and
   MUST provide while the corresponding IP address.

   The specified IP address on DM
   works like a secondary.  As a result, the HNA side and MUST provide the currently used IP
   address of the DM defines is using to reach the HNA.  The synchronization
   Channel will be set between that IP addresses involved in the
   Synchronization Channel.  Ports address and transport protocol are the same
   as those used by IP address of the Control Channel.
   DM.  By default, the same IP address used by the HNA in the Control
   Channel is considered by the DM.  Exchange DM and teh specification of this
   information the IP by
   the HNA is only OPTIONAL.  The transport channel (including port) is
   the same as the one used between the HNA and the DM for the Control
   Channel.

4.4.  Deleting the delegation

   The purpose of the previous sections were to exchange information in
   order to set a delegation.  The HNA MUST also be able to delete a
   delegation with a specific DM.  Upon an instruction of deleting the
   delegation, the DM MUST stop serving the Public Homenet Zone.

4.5.  Messages Exchange Description

   There are multiple ways these information could be exchanged between
   the HNA and the DM.  This specification defines a mechanism that re-
   use the DNS exchanges format.  The intention is to reuse standard
   libraries especially to check the format of the exchanged fields as
   well as to minimize the additional libraries needed for the HNA.  The
   re-use of DNS exchanges achieves these goals.  Note that while
   information is provided using DNS exchanges, the exchanged
   information is not expected to be set in any zone file, instead this
   information is expected to be processed appropriately.

   The Control Channel is not expected to be a long term session.  After
   a predefined timer the Control Channel is expected to be terminated.
   The Control Channel MAY Be re-opened at any time later.

   The provisioning process SHOULD provide a method of securing the
   control channel,
   Control Channel, so that the content of messages can be
   authenticated.  This authentication MAY be based on certificates for
   both the DM and each HNA.  The DM may also create the initial
   configuration for the delegation zone in the parent zone during the
   provisioning process.

4.5.1.  Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone.

   The information provided by the DM to the HNA is retrieved by the HNA
   with an AXFR exchange.  The AXFR message enables the response to
   contain any type of RRsets.  The response might be extended in the
   future if additional information will be needed.  Alternatively, the
   information provided by the HNA to the DM is pushed by the HNA via a
   DNS update exchange. exchange [RFC2136].

   To retrieve the necessary information to build the Public Homenet
   Zone, the HNA MUST send an DNS request of type AXFR associated to the
   Registered Homenet Domain.  The DM MUST respond with a zone template.
   The zone template MUST contain a RRset of type SOA, one or multiple
   RRset of type NS and zero or more RRset of type A or AAAA.

   o  The SOA RR is used to indicate to the HNA the value of the MNAME
      of the Public Homenet Zone.

   o  The NAME of the SOA RR MUST be the Registered Homenet Domain.

   o  The MNAME value of the SOA RDATA is the value provided by the DNS
      Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI
      to the HNA.

   o  Other RDATA values (RNAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM) are
      provided by the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI as suggestions.

   The NS RRsets are used to carry the Public Authoritative Servers of
   the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure. DOI.  Their associated NAME MUST be the Registered Homenet
   Domain.

   The TTL and RDATA are those expected to be published on the Public
   Homenet Zone.  The RRsets of Type A and AAAA MUST have their NAME
   matching the NSDNAME of one of the NS RRsets.

   Upon receiving the response, the HNA MUST validate format and
   properties of the SOA, NS and A or AAAA RRsets.  If an error occurs,
   the HNA MUST stop proceeding and MUST report an error.  Otherwise,
   the HNA builds the Public Homenet Zone by setting the MNAME value of
   the SOA as indicated by the SOA provided by the AXFR response.  The
   HNA SHOULD set the value of NAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM
   of the SOA to those provided by the AXFR response.  The HNA MUST
   insert the NS and corresponding A or AAAA RRset in its Public Homenet
   Zone.  The HNA MUST ignore other RRsets.  If an error message is
   returned by the DM, the HNA MUST proceed as a regular DNS resolution.
   Error messages SHOULD be logged for further analysis.  If the
   resolution does not succeed, the outsourcing operation is aborted and
   the HNA MUST close the Control Channel.

4.5.2.  Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust

   To provide the DS RRset to initialize the DNSSEC chain of trust the
   HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE update [RFC2136] message.

   1.

   The NAME in the SOA DNS update message is composed of a Header section, a Zone
   section, a Pre-requisite section, and Update section and an
   additional section.  The Zone section MUST be set the ZNAME to the
   parent zone of the Registered Homenet Domain - that is where the DS
   records should be inserted.

   2.  As described [RFC2136], ZTYPE is set to
   SOA and ZCLASS is set to the zone's class.  The DS RRset Pre-requisite section
   MUST be placed in the empty.  The Update section of the UPDATE
       query, and the is a DS RRset with its NAME SHOULD be set to
   the Registered Homenet
       Domain.

   3.  The RDATA of Domain and the DS RR SHOULD correspond associated RDATA corresponds to
   the DS record to value of the DS.  The Additional Data section MUST be
       inserted in empty.

   Though the parent zone.

   o  A NOERROR response from pre-requisite section MAY be ignored by the MD DM, this value
   is a commitment fixed to update the
      parent zone remain coherent with a standard DNS update.

   Upon receiving the provided DS.

   o  An error indicates the MD will not DNS update request, the DS, and other method
      should be used by the HNA.

4.5.3.  Providing information for the Synchronization Channel

   To provide the IP address of the primary, DM reads the HNA MAY send a DNS
   UPDATE message.

   1.  The NAME DS RRset in
   the SOA MUST be Update section.  The DM checks ZNAME corresponds to the parent zone of the Registered
       Homenet Domain.

   2.
   zone.  The Update section MUST be a RRset of Type NS.

   3. DM SHOULD ignore non empty the Pre-requisite and
   Additional Data section.  The RDATA MUST be a RRset of type A or AAAA that designates DM MAY update the
       IP addresses associated to TTL value before
   updating the primary.

   4.  There may be multiple IP addresses.

   5.  These IP addresses MUST be provided DS RRset in the additional section.

   The reason to provide these IP addresses is that it is NOT
   RECOMMENDED to publish these IP addresses.  As parent zone.  Upon a result, it is not
   expected to resolve them.

   o  A NOERROR response indicates successful update,
   the DM has configured the secondary
      and is committed to serve should return a NOERROR response as a secondary.

   o commitment to update the
   parent zone with the provided DS.  An error indicates the DM is MD does not configured as a secondary.
   update the DS, and other method should be used by the HNA.

   The regular DNS error message SHOULD be returned to the HNA when an
   error occurs.  In particular a FORMERR is returned when a format
   error is found, this includes when unexpected RRSets are added or
   when RRsets are missing.

   o  A SERVFAIL error is returned when a
   internal error is encountered.

   o  A NOTZONE error is returned when
   update and Zone sections are not coherent, a NOTAUTH error is
   returned when the DM is not authoritative for the Zone section.

   o  A
   REFUSED error is returned when the DM refuses to proceed to the
   configuration and the requested action.

4.5.4.  HNA instructing deleting

4.5.3.  Providing information for the delegation Synchronization Channel

   To instruct to delete provide a non default IP address used by the delegation HNA for the
   Synchronization Channel, the HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE
   Delete Update message.

   1.  The NAME in  Such
   exchange is OPTIONAL.

   Similarly to the SOA MUST be Section 4.5.2, the HNA MAY optionally specify the IP
   address using a DNS update message.  The Zone section sets its ZNAME
   to the parent zone of the Registered Homenet Domain.

   2.  The Update Domain, ZTYPE is set to
   SOA and ZCLASS is set to the zone's type.  Pre-requisite is empty.
   The Update section MUST be is a RRset of Type type NS.

   3.  The NAME Additional Data
   section contains the RRsets of type A or AAAA that designates the IP
   addresses associated to the primary (or the HNA).

   The reason to provide these IP addresses is that it is NOT
   RECOMMENDED to publish these IP addresses.  As a result, it is not
   expected to resolve them.

   Upon receiving the DNS update request, the DM reads the IP addresses
   and checks the ZNAME corresponds to the parent zone.  The DM SHOULD
   ignore a non empty Pre-requisite section.  The DM configures the
   secondary with the IP addresses and returns a NOERROR response to
   indicate it is committed to serve as a secondary.

   Similarly to Section 4.5.2, DNS errors are used and an error
   indicates the DM is not configured as a secondary.

4.5.4.  HNA instructing deleting the delegation

   To instruct to delete the delegation the HNA SHOULD send a DNS UPDATE
   Delete message.

   The Zone section sets its ZNAME to the Registered Homenet Domain, the
   ZTYPE to SOA and the ZCLASS to zone's type.  The Pre-requisite
   section is empty.  The Update section is a RRset of type NS RRSet MUST be with the
   NAME set to the Registered Domain Name.  As indicated by [RFC2136]
   section 2.5.2 the delete instruction is set by setting the TTL to 0,
   the Class to ANY, the RDLENGTH to 0 and the RDATA MUST be empty.  The
   Additional Data section is empty.

   Upon receiving the DNS update request, the DM checks the request and
   removes the delegation.  The DM returns a NOERROR response to
   indicate the delegation has been deleted.  Similarly to
   Section 4.5.2, DNS errors are used and an error indicates the
   delegation has not been deleted.

4.6.  Securing the Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority
      (HNA) and Distribution Master (DM)

   The control channel between the HNA and the DM MUST be secured at
   both the HNA and the DM.

   Secure protocols (like TLS [RFC8446] / DTLS [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]) SHOULD be used to secure the
   transactions between the DM and the HNA.

   The advantage of TLS/DTLS TLS is that this technology is widely deployed, and
   most of the devices already embed TLS/DTLS TLS libraries, possibly also taking
   advantage of hardware acceleration.  Further, TLS/DTLS TLS provides
   authentication facilities and can use certificates to mutually
   authenticate the DM and HNA at the application layer, including
   available API.  On the other hand, using TLS/DTLS TLS requires implementing
   DNS exchanges over TLS/DTLS, TLS, as well as a new service port.

   The HNA SHOULD authenticate inbound connections from the DM using
   standard mechanisms, such as a public certificate with baked-in root
   certificates on the HNA, or via DANE {!RFC6698}}. [RFC6698].  The HNA is expected
   to be provisioned with a connection to the DM by the manufacturer, or
   during some user-initiated onboarding process, see Section 10.

   The DM SHOULD authenticate the HNA and check that inbound messages
   are from the appropriate client.  The DM MAY use a self-signed CA
   certificate mechanism per HNA, or public certificates for this
   purpose.

   IPsec [RFC4301] and IKEv2 [RFC7296] were considered.  They would need
   to operate in transport mode, and the authenticated end points would
   need to be visible to the applications, and this is not commonly
   available at the time of this writing.

   A pure DNS solution using TSIG and/or SIG(0) to authenticate message
   was also considered.  Section 10 envisions one mechanism would
   involve the end user, with a browser, signing up to a service
   provider, with a resulting OAUTH2 token to be provided to the HNA.  A
   way to translate this OAUTH2 token from HTTPS web space to DNS SIG(0)
   space seems overly problematic, and so the enrollment protocol using
   web APIs was determined to be easier to implement at scale.

   Note also that authentication of message exchanges between the HNA
   and the DM SHOULD NOT use the external IP address of the HNA to index
   the appropriate keys.  As detailed in Section 11, the IP addresses of
   the DM and the Hidden Primary are subject to change, for example
   while the network is being renumbered.  This means that the necessary
   keys to authenticate transaction SHOULD NOT be indexed using the IP
   address, and SHOULD be resilient to IP address changes.

4.7.  Implementation Concerns

   The Hidden Primary Server on the HNA differs from a regular
   authoritative server for the home network due to:

   Interface Binding:  the Hidden Primary Server will almost certainly
      listen on the WAN Interface, whereas a regular authoritative
      server for the home network Homenet
      Authoritative Servers would listen on the internal home network
      interface.

   Limited exchanges:  the purpose of the Hidden Primary Server is to
      synchronize with the DM, not to serve any zones to end users, or
      the public Internet.

   As a result, exchanges are performed with specific nodes (the DM).
   Further, exchange types are limited.  The only legitimate exchanges
   are: NOTIFY initiated by the Hidden Primary and IXFR or AXFR
   exchanges initiated by the DM.

   On the other hand, regular authoritative servers would respond to any
   hosts, and any DNS query would be processed.  The HNA SHOULD filter
   IXFR/AXFR traffic and drop traffic not initiated by the DM.  The HNA
   MUST listen for DNS on TCP and UDP and MUST at least allow SOA lookups of the Homenet Zone.

5.  DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM

   The DM Synchronization Channel is used for communication between the
   HNA and the DM for synchronizing the Public Homenet Zone.  Note that
   the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are by
   construction different channels even though there they MAY use the
   same IP addresses. addresse.  In fact the Control Channel is set between the HNA
   working as a client using port YYYY (a high range port) toward a
   service provided by the MD DM at port XX (well known port).

   On the other hand, the Synchronization Channel is set between the DM
   working as a client using port ZZZZ ( a high range port) toward a
   service a service provided by the HNA at port XX.

   As a result, even though the same couple of IP addresses may be
   involved the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are
   always distinct channels.

   Uploading and dynamically updating the zone file on the DM can be
   seen as zone provisioning between the HNA (Hidden Primary) and the DM
   (Secondary Server).  This can be handled via AXFR + DNS UPDATE. Update.

   This document RECOMMENDS use of a primary / secondary mechanism
   instead of the use of DNS UPDATE. Update.  The primary / secondary mechanism
   is RECOMMENDED as it scales better and avoids DoS attacks.  Note that
   even when UPDATE messages are used, these messages are using a
   distinct channel as those used to set the configuration.

   Note that there is no standard way to distribute a DNS primary
   between multiple devices.  As a result, if multiple devices are
   candidate for hosting the Hidden Primary, some specific mechanisms
   should be designed so the home network only selects a single HNA for
   the Hidden Primary.  Selection mechanisms based on HNCP [RFC7788] are
   good candidates.

   The HNA acts as a Hidden Primary Server, which is a regular
   authoritative DNS Server listening on the WAN interface.

   The DM is configured as a secondary for the Registered Homenet Domain
   Name.  This secondary configuration has been previously agreed
   between the end user and the provider of the Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI as part of either
   the provisioning or due to receipt of UPDATE DNS Update messages on the DM
   Control Channel.

   The Homenet Reverse Zone MAY also be updated either with DNS UPDATE
   [RFC2136] or using a primary / secondary synchronization.

5.1.  Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM

   The Synchronization Channel used standard DNS request.

   First the primary notifies the secondary that the zone must be
   updated and eaves the secondary to proceed with the update when
   possible/convenient.

   Then, a NOTIFY message is sent by the primary, which is a small
   packet that is less likely to load the secondary.

   Finally, the AXFR [RFC1034] or IXFR [RFC1995] query performed by the
   secondary is a small packet sent over TCP (section 4.2 [RFC5936]),
   which mitigates reflection attacks using a forged NOTIFY.

   The AXFR request from the DM to the HNA SHOULD be secured.  DNS over secured and the use
   of TLS [RFC7858] is RECOMMENDED. RECOMMENDED [I-D.ietf-dprive-xfr-over-tls]

   When using TLS, the HNA MAY authenticate inbound connections from the
   DM using standard mechanisms, such as a public certificate with
   baked-in root certificates on the HNA, or via DANE {!RFC6698}} {!RFC6698}}. In
   addition, to guarantee the DM remains the same across multiple TLS
   session, the HNA and DM MAY implement [RFC8672].

   The HNA MAY apply a simple IP filter on inbound AXFR requests to
   ensure they only arrive from the DM Synchronization Channel.  In this
   case, the HNA SHOULD regularly check (via DNS resolution) that the
   address of the DM in the filter is still valid.

6.  DM Distribution Channel

   The DM Distribution Channel is used for communication between the DM
   and the Public Authoritative Servers.  The architecture and
   communication used for the DM Distribution Channels is outside the
   scope of this document, and there are many existing solutions
   available e.g. rsynch, DNS AXFR, REST, DB copy.

7.  HNA Security Policies

   This section details security policies related to the Hidden Primary
   / Secondary synchronization.

   The Hidden Primary, HNA, as described in this document Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any queries from the home
   network.  This could be implemented via port binding and/or firewall
   rules.  The precise mechanism deployed is out of scope of this
   document.  The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any DNS queries arriving on
   the WAN interface that are not issued from the DM.  The Hidden
   Primary SHOULD drop any outgoing packets other than DNS NOTIFY query,
   SOA response, IXFR response or AXFR responses.  The Hidden Primary
   SHOULD drop any incoming packets other than DNS NOTIFY response, SOA
   query, IXFR query or AXFR query.  The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any
   non protected IXFR or AXFR exchange,depending on how the
   synchronization is secured.

8.  DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture

   [RFC7368] in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to be deployed on both
   the authoritative server and the resolver.  The resolver side is out
   of scope of this document, and only the authoritative part of the
   server is considered.

   This document assumes the HNA signs the Public Homenet Zone.

   Secure delegation is achieved only if the DS RRset is properly set in
   the parent zone.  Secure delegation is performed by the HNA or the
   DNS Outsourcing Infrastructures.
   DOIs.

   The DS RRset can be updated manually with nsupdate for example.  This
   requires the HNA or the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI to be authenticated by the DNS server
   hosting the parent of the Public Homenet Zone.  Such a trust channel
   between the HNA and the parent DNS server may be hard to maintain
   with HNAs, and thus may be easier to establish with the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure. DOI.  In
   fact, the Public Authoritative Server(s) may use Automating DNSSEC
   Delegation Trust Maintenance [RFC7344].

9.  Homenet Reverse Zone Channels Configuration

   The Public Homenet Zone is associated to a Registered Homenet Domain
   and the ownership of that domain requires a specific registration
   from the end user as well as the HNA being provisioned with some
   authentication credentials.  Such steps are mandatory unless the DNS
   Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI
   has some other means to authenticate the HNA.  Such situation may
   occur, for example, when the ISP provides the Homenet Domain as well
   as the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure. DOI.

   In this case, the HNA may be authenticated by the physical link
   layer, in which case the authentication of the HNA may be performed
   without additional provisioning of the HNA.  While this may be not be so
   common for the Public Homenet Zone, this situation is expected to be
   quite common for the Reverse Homenet Zone.

   More specifically, a common case is that the upstream ISP provides
   the IPv6 prefix to the Homenet with a IA_PD [RFC8415] option and
   manages the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI of the associated reverse zone.

   This leave place for setting up automatically the relation between
   HNA and the DNS Outsourcing infrastructure as described in
   [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options].

   In the case of the reverse zone, the DOI authenticates the source of
   the updates by IPv6 Access Control Lists.  In the case of the reverse
   zone, the ISP knows exactly what addresses have been delegated.  The
   HNA SHOULD therefore always originate Synchronization Channel updates
   from an IP address within the zone that is being updated.

   For example, if the ISP has assigned 2001:db8:f00d::2/64 to the WAN
   interface (by DHCPv6, or PPP/RA), then the HNA should originate
   Synchronization Channel updates from 2001:db8:f00d::2.

   An ISP that has delegated 2001:db8:babe::/56 to the HNA via
   DHCPv6-PD, then HNA should originate Synchronization Channel updates
   an IP within that subnet, such as 2001:db8:babe:0001::2.

   With this relation automatically configured, the synchronization
   between the Home network and the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI happens similarly as for the
   Public Homenet Zone described earlier in this document.

   Note that for home networks hosted by multiple ISPs, each ISP
   provides only the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI of the reverse zones associated to the
   delegated prefix.  It is also likely that the DNS exchanges will need
   to be performed on dedicated interfaces as to be accepted by the ISP.
   More specifically, the reverse zone associated to prefix 1 will not
   be possible to be performs by the HNA using an IP address that
   belongs to prefix 2.  Such constraints does not raise major concerns
   either for hot standby or load sharing configuration.

   With IPv6, the domain space for IP addresses is so large that reverse
   zone may be confronted with scalability issues.  How the reverse zone
   is generated is out of scope of this document.
   [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] provides guidance on how to address
   scalability issues.

10.  Homenet Public Zone Channel Configurations

   This document does not deal with how the HNA is provisioned with a
   trusted relationship to the Distribution Master for the forward zone.

   This section details what needs to be provisioned into the HNA and
   serves as a requirements statement for mechanisms.

   The HNA needs to be provisioned with:

   o  the Registered Domain (e.g., myhome.isp.example )

   o  the contact info for the Distribution Master (DM), including the
      DNS name (FQDN), possibly including the IP literal, and a
      certificate (or anchor) to be used to authenticate the service

   o  the DM transport protocol and port (the default is DNS over TLS,
      on port 853)

   o  the HNA credentials used by the DM for its authentication.

   The HNA will need to select an IP address for communication for the
   Synchronization Channel.  This is typically the outside WAN address
   of the router, but could be an IPv6 LAN address in the case of a home
   with multiple ISPs (and multiple border routers).  This is
   communicated in section BLAH Section 4.5.3 when the NS and A record is or AAAA
   RRsets are communicated.

   The above parameters MUST be be provisionined provisioned for ISP-specific reverse
   zones, as per [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options].
   ISP-specific forward zones MAY also be provisioned using
   [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options], but zones which
   are not related to a specific ISP zone (such as with a DNS provider)
   must be provisioned through other means.

   Similarly, it if the HNA is provided by a registrar, the HNA may be
   given configured to end user.

   In the absence of specific pre-established relation, these pieces of
   information may be entered manually by the end user.  In order to
   ease the configuration from the end user the following scheme may be
   implemented.

   The HNA may present the end user a web interface where it provides
   the end user the ability to indicate the Registered Homenet Domain or
   the registrar for example a preselected list.  Once the regsitrar registrar has
   been selected, the HNA redirects the end user to that registrar in
   order to receive a access token.  The access token will enable the
   HNA to retrieve the DM parameters associated to the Registered
   Domain.  These parameters will include the credentials used by the
   HNA to establish the Control and Synchronization Channels.

   Such architecture limits the necessary steps to configure the HNA
   from the end user.

11.  Renumbering

   This section details how renumbering is handled by the Hidden Primary
   server or the DM.  Both types of renumbering are discussed i.e.
   "make-before-break" and "break-before-make" (aka flash renumbering).

   In the make-before-break renumbering scenario, the new prefix is
   advertised, the network is configured to prepare the transition to
   the new prefix.  During a period of time, the two prefixes old and
   new coexist, before the old prefix is completely removed.

   In the break-before-make renumbering scenario, the new prefix is
   advertised making the old prefix obsolete.

   Renumbering has been extensively described in [RFC4192] and analyzed
   in [RFC7010] and the reader is expected to be familiar with them
   before reading this section.

11.1.  Hidden Primary

   In a renumbering scenario, the HNA or Hidden Primary is informed it
   is being renumbered.  In most cases, this occurs because the whole
   home network is being renumbered.  As a result, the Public Homenet
   Zone will also be updated.  Although the new and old IP addresses may
   be stored in the Public Homenet Zone, we recommend that only the
   newly reachable IP addresses be published.

   To avoid reachability disruption, IP connectivity information
   provided by the DNS SHOULD be coherent with the IP plane.  In our
   case, this means the old IP address SHOULD NOT be provided via the
   DNS when it is not reachable anymore.  Let for example TTL be the TTL
   associated with a RRset of the Public Homenet Zone, it may be cached
   for TTL seconds.  Let T_NEW be the time the new IP address replaces
   the old IP address in the Homenet Zone, and T_OLD_UNREACHABLE the
   time the old IP is not reachable anymore.

   In the case of the make-before-break, seamless reachability is
   provided as long as T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW > 2 * TTL.  If this is
   not satisfied, then devices associated with the old IP address in the
   home network may become unreachable for 2 * TTL - (T_OLD_UNREACHABLE
   - T_NEW).  In the case of a break-before-make, T_OLD_UNREACHABLE =
   T_NEW, and the device may become unreachable up to 2 * TTL.  Of
   course if T_NEW >= T_OLD_UNREACHABLE, the disruption is increased.

   Once the Public Homenet Zone file has been updated on the Hidden
   Primary, the Hidden Primary needs to inform the DNS Outsourcing
   Infrastructure DOI that the Public
   Homenet Zone has been updated and that the IP address to use to
   retrieve the updated zone has also been updated.  Both notifications
   are performed using regular DNS exchanges.  Mechanisms to update an
   IP address provided by lower layers with protocols like SCTP
   [RFC4960], MOBIKE [RFC4555] are not considered in this document.

   The Hidden Primary SHOULD inform
   Instead the DM that IP address of the Public Homenet Zone
   has been HNA is updated by sending a NOTIFY payload with the new IP address.
   In addition, this NOTIFY payload SHOULD be authenticated using SIG(0)
   or TSIG.  When the DM receives the NOTIFY payload, it MUST
   authenticate it.  Note that the cryptographic key used for the
   authentication SHOULD be indexed by the Registered Homenet Domain
   contained
   Synchronization Channel as described in Section 4.3.

12.  Privacy Considerations

   Outsourcing the NOTIFY payload as well as the RRSIG.  In other
   words, the IP address SHOULD NOT be used as an index.

   If authentication succeeds, the DM MUST also notice DNS Authoritative service from the IP address
   has been modified and perform HNA to a reachability check before updating
   its primary configuration.  The routability check MAY performed by
   sending third
   party raises a SOA request to few privacy related concerns.

   The Public Homenet Zone lists the Hidden Primary using names of services hosted in the source IP
   address
   home network.  Combined with blocking of AXFR queries, the NOTIFY.  This exchange is also secured, and if use of
   NSEC3 [RFC5155] (vs NSEC [RFC4034]) prevents an
   authenticated response is received attacker from being
   able to walk the Hidden Primary with zone, to discover all the
   new IP address, names.  However, the DM SHOULD update its configuration file and
   retrieve
   attacker may be able to walk the Public Homenet Zone using an AXFR reverse DNS zone, or use other
   reconnaissance techniques to learn this information as described in
   [RFC7707].

   In general a IXFR exchange.

   Note that the primary reason home network owner is expected to publish only names for providing the IP address
   which there is that some need to be able to reference externally.
   Publication of the
   Hidden Primary is name does not publicly announced in the DNS.  If the Hidden
   Primary were publicly announced in the DNS, then the IP address
   update could have been performed using imply that the DNS as described in
   Section 11.2.

11.2.  Distribution Master

   Renumbering service is
   necessarily reachable from any or all parts of the Distribution Master results in it changing its IP
   address.  As the DM is a secondary, Internet.
   [RFC7084] mandates that the destination of DNS NOTIFY
   payloads MUST outgoing-only policy [RFC6092] be changed,
   available, and any configuration/firewalling that
   restricts DNS AXFR/IXFR operations MUST be updated.

   If the DM in many cases it is configured in the Hidden Primary configuration file
   using by default.  A well
   designed User Interface would combine a FQDN, then the update of the IP address is performed policy for making a service
   public by DNS.
   More specifically, before sending the NOTIFY, the Hidden Primary
   performs a DNS resolution to retrieve name with a policy on who may access it.

   In many cases, the home network owner wishes to publish names for
   services that only they will be able to access.  The access control
   may consist of an IP source address of the
   secondary.

   As described in Section 11.1, the DM DNS information SHOULD range, or access may be
   coherent with the IP plane.
   restricted via some VPN functionality.  The TTL purpose of publishing the Distribution Master
   name
   SHOULD is so that the service may be adjusted appropriately prior to changing access by the IP address.

   Some DNS infrastructure uses same name both
   within the IP address home, and outside the home.  Sending traffic to designate the
   secondary, in which case, other mechanisms must
   relevant IPv6 address causes the relevant VPN policy to be found.  A reason
   for using IP addresses instead enacted
   upon.

   While the problem of names is generally getting access to reach an internal interface that is not designated by names has been solved
   in Enterprise configurations with a FQDN, split-DNS, and to avoid
   potential bootstrap problems.  Such scenarios are considered as out
   of scope such a thing could
   be done in the case home, many recent improvements to VPN user interfaces
   make it more likely that an individual might have multiple
   connections configured.  For instance, an adult child checking on the
   state of a home networks.

12.  Privacy Considerations

   Outsourcing the DNS Authoritative service from the HNA to a third
   party raises automation system for a few privacy related concerns.

   The parent.

   In addition to the Public Homenet Zone lists the names of services hosted in Zone, pervasive DNS monitoring can
   also monitor the
   home network.  Combined traffic associated with blocking the Public Homenet Zone.
   This traffic may provide an indication of AXFR queries, the services an end user
   accesses, plus how and when they use of
   NSEC3 [RFC5155] (vs NSEC [RFC4034]) these services.  Although,
   caching may obfuscate this information inside the home network, it is
   likely that outside your home network this information will not be
   cached.

13.  Security Considerations

   This document exposes a mechanism that prevents an attacker the HNA from being
   able
   exposed to walk the zone, to discover all Internet and served DNS request from the names.  However, Internet.
   These requests are instead served by the
   attacker may be able DOI.  While this limits the
   level of exposure of the HNA, the HNA remains exposed to walk the reverse DNS zone, or use other
   reconnaissance techniques Internet
   with communications with the DOI.  This section analyses the attack
   surface associated to learn this information as described in
   [RFC7707]. these communications.  In general a home owner is expected only to publish names for which
   there is some need to be able to reference externally.  Publication
   of addition, the name does not imply DOI
   exposes data that are related to the service is necessarily reachable
   from any or all parts of the Internet.  [RFC7084] mandates that home network.  This section also
   analyses the
   outgoing-only policy [RFC6092] be available, implication of such exposure.

13.1.  HNA DM channels

   The channels between HNA and in many cases it is
   configured by default.  A well designed User Interface would combine
   a policy for making a service public by a name DM are mutually authenticated and
   encrypted with a policy on who
   may access it.

   In many cases, TLS [RFC8446] and its associated security
   considerations apply.  To ensure the home owner wishes to publish names for services
   that only they will be able to access.  The access control multiple TLS session are are
   continuously authenticating the same entity, TLS may
   consist take advantage
   of an IP source address range, second factor authentication as described in [RFC8672].

   At the time of writing TLS 1.2 or access may TLS 1.3 can be restricted
   via some VPN functionality. used and TLS 1.3 (or
   newer) SHOULD be supported.

   The purpose of publishing the name DNS protocol is so
   that subject to reflection attacks, however, these
   attacks are largely applicable when DNS is carried over UDP.  The
   interfaces between the service may be access HNA and DM are using TLS over TCP, which
   prevents such reflection attacks.  Note that Public Authoritative
   servers hosted by the same name both within DOI are subject to such attacks, but that is
   out of scope of our document.

   Note that in the home,
   and outside case of the home.  Sending traffic Reverse Homenet Zone, the data is less
   subject to attacks than in the relevant IPv6 address
   causes Public Homenet Zone.  In addition, the relevant VPN policy to
   DM and RDM may be enacted upon.

   While provided by the problem of getting access to internal names has been solved ISP - as described in Enterprise configurations with a split-DNS,
   [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options], in which case DM
   and such a thing could RDM might be done in the home, many recent improvements less exposed to VPN user interfaces
   make it more likely that an individual might have multiple
   connections configured.  For instance, an adult child checking on the
   state of a home automation system for attacks - as communications within a parent.

   In addition to the Public Homenet Zone, pervasive DNS monitoring can
   also monitor the traffic associated with the Public Homenet Zone.
   network.

13.2.  Names are less secure than IP addresses

   This traffic may provide an indication of the services document describes how an end user
   accesses, plus how can make their services and when they use these services.  Although,
   caching may obfuscate this information inside the home network, it is
   likely that outside your
   devices from his home network this information will not be
   cached.

13.  Security Considerations

   The Homenet Naming Architecture described in this document solves
   exposing reachable on the HNA's DNS service as a DoS attack vector.

13.1.  HNA DMand RDM channels

   The HNA DM channels are specified Internet by using
   names rather than IP addresses.  This exposes the home network to include their own security
   mechanisms that
   attackers, since names are designed expected to provide include less entropy than IP
   addresses.  In fact, with IP addresses, the minimum attack surface,
   and Interface Identifier is
   64 bits long leading to authenticate transactions where necessary.

   Note up to 2^64 possibilities for a given
   subnetwork.  This is not to mention that in the case of the Reverse Homenet Zone, the data subnet prefix is less
   subject also of
   64 bits long, thus providing up to attacks than in 2^64 possibilities.  On the Public Homenet Zone.  In addition, other
   hand, names used either for the
   HNA home network domain or for the
   devices present less entropy (livebox, router, printer, nicolas,
   jennifer, ...) and thus potentially exposes the DM MAY belong to the same administrative domain, i.e. the
   ISP.  More specifically, the WAN interface is located in the ISP
   network.  As a result, if provisioned using DHCPv6, the security
   credential may not even transit in the home network.  On the other
   hand, if the HNA is not hosted at the border of the home network, the
   credential may rely on the security associated to DHCPv6.  Even if
   HNA and DM are in the same administrative domain it is strongly
   RECOMMENDED to use a secure channel.

   The security of these channels heavily relies on TLS and the DM or
   RDM is authenticated by its certificate.  To ensure the multiple TLS
   session are are continuously authenticating the same entity, TLS may
   take advantage of second factor authentication as described in
   [RFC8672].

13.2.  Names are less secure than IP addresses

   This document describes how an end user can make their services and
   devices from his home network reachable on the Internet by using
   names rather than IP addresses.  This exposes the home network to
   attackers, since names are expected to include less entropy than IP
   addresses.  In fact, with IP addresses, the Interface Identifier is
   64 bits long leading to up to 2^64 possibilities for a given
   subnetwork.  This is not to mention that the subnet prefix is also of
   64 bits long, thus providing up to 2^64 possibilities.  On the other
   hand, names used either for the home network domain or for the
   devices present less entropy (livebox, router, printer, nicolas,
   jennifer, ...) and thus potentially exposes the devices devices to dictionary
   attacks.

13.3.  Names are less volatile than IP addresses

   IP addresses may be used to locate a device, a host or a service.
   However, home networks are not expected to be assigned a time
   invariant prefix by ISPs.  As a result, observing IP addresses only
   provides some ephemeral information about who is accessing the
   service.  On the other hand, names are not expected to be as volatile
   as IP addresses.  As a result, logging names over time may be more
   valuable than logging IP addresses, especially to profile an end
   user's characteristics.

   PTR provides a way to bind an IP address to a name.  In that sense,
   responding to PTR DNS queries may affect the end user's privacy.  For
   that reason end users may choose not to respond to PTR DNS queries
   and MAY instead return a NXDOMAIN response.

13.4.  DNS Reflection Attacks

   An attacker performs a reflection attack when it sends traffic to one
   or more intermediary nodes (reflectors), that in turn send back
   response traffic to the victim.  Motivations

14.  Information Model for using Outsourced information

   This section is non-normative for the front-end protocol.  It
   specifies an
   intermediary node might be anonymity of optional format for the attacker, as well as
   amplification set of parameters required by
   the traffic.  Typically, when HNA to configure the intermediary node
   is naming architecture of this document.

   In cases where a DNSSEC server, home router has not been provisioned by the attacker sends a DNSSEC query and
   manufacturer (when forward zones are provided by the victim
   is likely manufacturer),
   or by the ISP (when the ISP provides this service), then a home user/
   owner will need to receive configure these settings via an administrative
   interface.

   By defining a DNSSEC response.  This section analyzes how standard format (in JSON) for this configuration
   information, the different components user/owner may be involved as a reflector in able to just copy and paste a
   reflection attack.  Section 13.5 considers the Hidden Primary,
   Section 13.6
   configuration blob from the Synchronization Server, and Section 13.7 service provider into the Public
   Authoritative Server(s).

13.5.  Reflection Attack involving administrative
   interface of the Hidden Primary

   With HNA.

   This format may also provide the specified architecture, basis for a future OAUTH2 [RFC6749]
   flow that could do the Hidden Primary is only expected setup automatically.

   The HNA needs to receive DNS queries of type SOA, AXFR or IXFR.  This section
   analyzes how these DNS queries may be used configured with the following parameters as
   described by an attacker this CDDL [RFC8610].  These are the parameters are
   necessary to perform establish a reflection attack.

   DNS queries of type AXFR and IXFR use TCP secure channel between the HNA and the DM as
   well as such are less
   subject to reflection attacks.  This makes SOA queries specify the only
   remaining practical vector of attacks for reflection attacks, based
   on UDP.

   SOA queries are not associated with a large amplification factor
   compared to queries DNS zone that is in the scope of type "ANY" the
   communication.

   hna-configuration = {
     "registred_domain" : tstr,
     "dm"               : tstr,
     ? "dm_transport" : "53" // "DoT" // "DoH" // "DoQ"
     ? "dm_port"        : uint,
     ? "dm_acl"         : hna-acl // [ +hna-acl ]
     ? "hna_auth_method": hna-auth-method
     ? "hna_certificate": tstr
   }

   hna-acl          = tstr
   hna-auth-method  /= "certificate"

   For example:

 {
   "registered_domain" : "n8d234f.r.example.net",
   "dm"                : "2001:db8:1234:111:222::2",
   "dm_transport"      : "DoT",
   "dm_port"           : 4433,
   "dm_acl"            : "2001:db8:1f15:62e:21c::/64"
                    or to query [ "2001:db8:1f15:62e:21c::/64", ... ]
   "hna_auth_method"   : "certificate",
   "hna_certificate"   : "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIDTjCCFGy....",
 }

14.1.  Outsourced Information Model

   Registered Homenet Domain (zone)  The Domain Name of non existing FQDNs. the zone.
      Multiple Registered Homenet Domains may be provided.  This reduces will
      generate the probability a DNS query creation of type SOA will be involved
   in a DDoS attack.

   SOA queries are expected to follow a very specific pattern, which
   makes rate limiting techniques an efficient way to limit such
   attacks, and multiple Public Homenet Zones.  This
      parameter is MANDATORY.

   Distribution Master notification address (dm)  The associated impact on the naming service FQDNs
      or IP addresses of the home
   network.

   Motivations for such a flood might be a reflection attack, but could
   also be a resource exhaustion attack performed against the Hidden
   Primary.  The Hidden Primary only expects DM to exchange traffic with
   the DM, that is its associated secondary.  Even though secondary
   servers may which DNS notifies should be renumbered as mentioned in Section 11, the Hidden
   Primary sent.
      This parameter is likely to perform a DNSSEC resolution and find out the
   associated secondary's MANDATORY.  IP addresses in use.  As a result, are optional and the Hidden
   Primary
      FQDN is likely to limit sufficient and preferred.  If there are concerns about the origin
      security of its incoming traffic based
   on the origin IP address.

   With filtering rules based on IP address, SOA flooding attacks are
   limited name to forged packets with the IP address of the secondary
   server.  In other words, translation, then DNSSEC should be
      employed.

   As the only victims are session between the Hidden Primary
   itself or HNA and the secondary.  There DM is a need for the Hidden Primary to
   limit that flood to limit authenticated with TLS,
   the impact use of the reflection attack on the
   secondary, and names is easier.

   As certificates are more commonly emitted for FQDN than for IP
   addresses, it is preferred to limit use names and authenticate the resource needed to carry on name of
   the traffic
   by DM during the TLS session establishment.

   Supported Transport (dm_transport)  The transport that carries the
      DNS exchanges between the HNA hosting and the Hidden Primary.  On DM.  Typical values are
      "53", "DoT", "DoH", "DoQ".  This parameter is OPTIONAL and by
      default the other hand, mitigation
   should be performed appropriately, so as to limit HNA uses DoT.

   Distribution Master Port (dm_port)  Indicates the impact on port used by the
   legitimate SOA sent
      DM.  This parameter is OPTIONAL and the default value is provided
      by the secondary.

   The main reason for Supported Transport.  In the DM sending future, additional transport
      may not have default port, in which case either a SOA query default port
      needs to be defined or this parameter become MANDATORY.

   Note that HNA does not defines ports for the Synchronization Channel.
   In any case, this is not expected to update part of the SOA
   RRset after configuration, but
   instead negotiated through the TTL expires, Configuration Channel.  Currently the
   Configuration Channel does not provide this, and limits its agility
   to check a dedicated IP address.  If such agility is needed in the serial number upon future,
   additional exchanges will need to be defined.

   Authentication Method ("hna_auth_method"):  How the
   receipt of a NOTIFY query from HNA authenticates
      itself to the Hidden Primary, DM within the TLS connection(s).  The authentication
      meth of can typically be "certificate", "psk" or "none".  This
      Parameter is OPTIONAL and by default the Authentication Method is
      "certificate".

   Authentication data ("hna_certificate", "hna_key"): : The certificate
   chain used to re-send authenticate the
   SOA request HNA.  This parameter is OPTIONAL and
   when the response has not been received.  When specified, a flood of self-signed certificate is used.

   Distribution Master AXFR permission netmask (dm_acl):  The subnet
      from which the CPE should accept SOA queries and AXFR requests.  A
      subnet is received by used in the Hidden Primary, case where the Hidden Primary may
   assume it is involved in an attack.

   There are few legitimate time slots when the secondary is expected to
   send DNS Outsourced Infrastructure
      consists of a SOA query.  Suppose T_NOTIFY number of different systems.  An array of addresses
      is the time a NOTIFY permitted.  This parameter is sent by
   the Hidden Primary, T_SOA the last time the SOA has been queried, TTL
   the TTL associated to the SOA, OPTIONAL and T_REFRESH if unspecified, the refresh time defined
      CPE the IP addresses specified in the SOA RRset.  The specific time SOA queries are expected can be
   for example T_NOTIFY, T_SOA + 2/3 TTL, T_SOA + TTL, T_SOA +
   T_REFRESH., and.  Outside a few minutes following these specific time
   slots, dm_notify parameters or the probability
      IP addresses that result from the HNA discards DNS(SEC) resolution when
      dm_notify specifies a legitimate SOA query
   is very low.  Within these time slots, FQDN.

   For forward zones, the probability relationship between the secondary HNA and the forward
   zone provider may have its legitimate query rejected is higher.  If be the result of a legitimate
   SOA is discarded, number of transactions:

   1.  The forward zone outsourcing may be provided by the secondary will re-send SOA query every "retry
   time" second until "expire time" seconds occurs, where "retry time" maker of the
       Homenet router.  In this case, the identity and "expire time" have been defined authorization
       could be built in the SOA.

   As device at manufacturer provisioning time.
       The device would need to be provisioned with a result, device-unique
       credential, and it is RECOMMENDED to set rate limiting policies to
   protect HNA resources.  If likely that the Registered Homenet Domain
       would be derived from a flood lasts more than public attribute of the expired time
   defined device, such as a
       serial number (see Appendix B or
       [I-D.richardson-homerouter-provisioning] for more details ).

   2.  The forward zone outsourcing may be provided by the SOA, it Internet
       Service Provider.  In this case, the use of
       [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] to provide the
       credentials is RECOMMENDED appropriate.

   3.  The forward zone may be outsourced to re-initiate a
   synchronization between the Hidden Primary and the secondaries.

13.6.  Reflection Attacks involving the DM

   The DM acts third party, such as a secondary coupled with the Hidden Primary.  The
   secondary expects to receive NOTIFY query, SOA responses, AXFR and
   IXFR responses from the Hidden Primary.

   Sending a NOTIFY query to the secondary generates a NOTIFY response
   as well as initiating an SOA query exchange from
       domain registrar.  In this case, the secondary to use of the
   Hidden Primary.  As mentioned JSON-serialized
       YANG data model described in [RFC1996], this section is a known "benign
   denial of service attack".  As a result, the DM SHOULD enforce rate
   limiting on sending SOA queries appropriate, as it
       can easily be copy and NOTIFY responses to pasted by the Hidden
   Primary.  Most likely, when user, or downloaded as part
       of a web transaction.

   For reverse zones, the secondary relationship is flooded always with valid the upstream ISP
   (although there may be more than one), and
   signed NOTIFY queries, it is under a replay attack which so
   [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] is discussed
   in Section 13.9. always the
   appropriate interface.

   The key thing here following is an abbridged example of a set of data that
   represents the secondary is likely
   to be designed to be able needed configuration parameters for outsourcing.

15.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

16.  Acknowledgment

   The authors wish to process much more traffic than the
   Hidden Primary hosted thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on a HNA.

   This paragraph details how
   the secondary may limit early versions of the NOTIFY
   queries.  Because draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues
   with the Hidden Primary may be renumbered, IPv6 routed home concept and placing the secondary
   SHOULD NOT perform permanent IP filtering based on IP addresses.  In
   addition, scope of this
   document in a given secondary may be shared among multiple Hidden
   Primaries which make filtering rules based on IP harder to set.  The
   time at which wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and
   injecting a NOTIFY is sent by healthy debate on the Hidden Primary is not
   predictable.  However, a flood of NOTIFY messages may be easily
   detected, as a NOTIFY originated from a given Homenet Zone is
   expected to have a very limited number merits of unique source IP addresses,
   even when renumbering is occurring.  As a result, the secondary, MAY
   rate limit incoming NOTIFY queries.

   On the Hidden Primary side, it is recommended that the Hidden Primary
   sends a NOTIFY as long as the zone has not been updated by the
   secondary.  Multiple SOA queries may indicate the secondary is under
   attack.

13.7.  Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative Servers

   Reflection attacks involving the Public Authoritative Server(s) are
   similar to attacks idea; Ulrik de Bie
   for providing alternative solutions; Paul Mockapetris, Christian
   Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on any DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure.  This is
   not specific to the architecture described in this document,
   HNA and thus
   are considered as out of scope.

   In fact, one motivation of the architecture described in this
   document is to expose the Public Authoritative Server(s) to attacks
   instead low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC
   capabilities of the HNA, small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as it is believed that the Public Authoritative
   Server(s) will be better able to defend itself.

13.8.  Flooding Attack

   The purpose of flooding attacks is mostly resource exhaustion, where
   the resource can be bandwidth, memory, or CPU
   dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael
   Abrahamson, and Ray Bellis for example.

   One goal of the architecture described in this document is to limit
   the surface of attack their feedback on handling different
   views as well as clarifying the HNA.  This is done by impact of outsourcing the
   DNS service to the Public Authoritative Server(s).  By doing so, the
   HNA limits its DNS interactions between zone
   signing operation outside the Hidden Primary HNA; Mark Andrew and Peter Koch for
   clarifying the
   DM.  This limits the number of entities the HNA interacts with as
   well as the scope of DNS exchanges - NOTIFY, SOA, AXFR, IXFR.

   The use of an authenticated channel with SIG(0) or TSIG between the
   HNA renumbering.

17.  References

17.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-dprive-xfr-over-tls]
              Toorop, W., Dickinson, S., Sahib, S., Aras, P., and the DM, enables detection of illegitimate DNS queries, so
   appropriate action may be taken A.
              Mankin, "DNS Zone Transfer-over-TLS", draft-ietf-dprive-
              xfr-over-tls-05 (work in progress), January 2021.

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - like dropping the queries.  If
   signatures are validated, then most likely, the HNA is under a replay
   attack, as detailed concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.

   [RFC1995]  Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in Section 13.9

   In order to limit the resource required DNS", RFC 1995,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1995, August 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1995>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for authentication, it is
   recommended to use TSIG that uses symmetric cryptography over SIG(0)
   that uses asymmetric cryptography.

13.9.  Replay Attack

   Replay attacks consist of an attacker either resending or delaying a
   legitimate message that has been sent by an authorized user or
   process.  As the Hidden Primary and the DM use an authenticated
   channel, replay attacks are mostly expected to use forged DNS queries in order RFCs to provide valid traffic.

   From the perspective of an attacker, using a correctly authenticated
   DNS query may not be detected as an attack and thus may generate a
   response.  Generating Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2136]  Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and sending a response consumes more resources
   than either dropping the query by the defender, or generating the
   query by J. Bound,
              "Dynamic Updates in the attacker, and thus could be used for resource exhaustion
   attacks.  In addition, as the authentication is performed at the DNS
   layer, the source IP address could be impersonated in order to
   perform a reflection attack.

   Section 13.4 details how to mitigate reflection attacks Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
              RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>.

   [RFC2845]  Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and
   Section 13.8 details how to mitigate resource exhaustion.  Both
   sections assume a context of DoS with a flood of B.
              Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS queries.  This
   section suggests a way to limit the attack surface of replay attacks.

   As SIG(0)
              (TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>.

   [RFC2931]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and TSIG use inception Transaction Signatures
              ( SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, DOI 10.17487/RFC2931, September
              2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2931>.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and expiration time, the time frame S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for replay attack is limited.  SIG(0) and TSIG recommends a fudge
   value of 5 minutes.  This value has been set as a compromise between
   possibly loose time synchronization between devices and the valid
   lifetime of the message.  As a result, better time synchronization
   policies could reduce the time window of the attack.

14.  Data Model DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.

   [RFC4192]  Baker, F., Lear, E., and R. Droms, "Procedures for Outsourced information

   The following is
              Renumbering an abbridged example of IPv6 Network without a set of data that
   represents the needed configuration parameters Flag Day", RFC 4192,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4192, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4192>.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for outsourcing.

   {
     "dm_notify" : "2001:db8:1f15:62e:21c::2",
     "dm_acl"    : "2001:db8:1f15:62e:21c::/64",
     "dm_ctrl"   : "192.168.1.18",
     "dm_port"   : "4433",
     "ns_list"   : [ "ns1.publicdns.example", "ns2.publicdns.example"],
     "zone"      : "daniel.homenetdns.example",
     "auth_method" : "certificate",
     "hna_certificate":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIDTjCCFGy....",
     "hna_key"   : "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIEowICAQE...."
   }

   Here goes a YANG MODULE description of the above.

15.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

16.  Acknowledgment

   The authors wish to thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on
   the early versions of the draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues
   with the IPv6 routed home concept and placing the scope of this
   document in a wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and
   injecting a healthy debate on the merits of the idea; Ulrik de Bie
   for providing alternative solutions; Paul Mockapetris, Christian
   Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on
   HNA and low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC
   capabilities of small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as
   dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael
   Abrahamson, and Ray Bellis for their feedback on handling different
   views as well as clarifying the impact of outsourcing the zone
   signing operation outside the HNA; Mark Andrew and Peter Koch for
   clarifying the renumbering.

17.  References
17.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1033]  Lottor, M., "Domain Administrators Operations Guide",
              Internet Protocol", RFC 1033, 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC1033, November 1987,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1033>.

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, 10.17487/RFC4301,
              December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.

   [RFC4555]  Eronen, P., "Domain names - concepts "IKEv2 Mobility and facilities",
              STD 13, Multihoming Protocol
              (MOBIKE)", RFC 1034, 4555, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation 10.17487/RFC4555, June 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4555>.

   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
              RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and
              specification", STD 13, D. Blacka, "DNS
              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
              Existence", RFC 1035, 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC1995]  Ohta, M., "Incremental 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.

   [RFC5936]  Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, Ed., "DNS Zone Transfer in DNS", Protocol
              (AXFR)", RFC 1995, 5936, DOI 10.17487/RFC1995, August 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1995>.

   [RFC1996]  Vixie, P., "A Mechanism 10.17487/RFC5936, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5936>.

   [RFC6092]  Woodyatt, J., Ed., "Recommended Simple Security
              Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for Prompt Notification of Zone
              Changes (DNS NOTIFY)",
              Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service", RFC 1996, 6092,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1996,
              August 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1996>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use 10.17487/RFC6092, January 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6092>.

   [RFC6644]  Evans, D., Droms, R., and S. Jiang, "Rebind Capability in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
              DHCPv6 Reconfigure Messages", RFC 2119, 6644,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2136]  Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., 10.17487/RFC6644, July 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6644>.

   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Bound,
              "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 2136, 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>.

   [RFC2142]  Crocker, D., "Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles 10.17487/RFC6698, August
              2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.

   [RFC6762]  Cheshire, S. and
              Functions", M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 2142, 6762,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2142, May 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2142>.

   [RFC2308]  Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
              NCACHE)", 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.

   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 2308, 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.

   [RFC2845]  Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.

   [RFC6887]  Wing, D., Ed., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and B.
              Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
              (TSIG)",
              P. Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 2845, 6887,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>.

   [RFC2931]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request 10.17487/RFC6887, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6887>.

   [RFC7010]  Liu, B., Jiang, S., Carpenter, B., Venaas, S., and Transaction Signatures
              ( SIG(0)s )", W.
              George, "IPv6 Site Renumbering Gap Analysis", RFC 2931, 7010,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2931, 10.17487/RFC7010, September
              2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2931>.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7010>.

   [RFC7084]  Singh, H., Beebee, W., Donley, C., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records B. Stark, "Basic
              Requirements for the DNS Security Extensions", IPv6 Customer Edge Routers", RFC 4034, 7084,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.

   [RFC4192]  Baker, F., Lear, E., 10.17487/RFC7084, November 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7084>.

   [RFC7296]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and R. Droms, "Procedures for
              Renumbering an IPv6 Network without a Flag Day", T.
              Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 4192, 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC4192, 10.17487/RFC7296, October
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.

   [RFC7344]  Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
              DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4192>.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.

   [RFC7368]  Chown, T., Ed., Arkko, J., Brandt, A., Troan, O., and K. Seo, "Security J.
              Weil, "IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles",
              RFC 7368, DOI 10.17487/RFC7368, October 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7368>.

   [RFC7558]  Lynn, K., Cheshire, S., Blanchet, M., and D. Migault,
              "Requirements for the
              Internet Protocol", Scalable DNS-Based Service Discovery
              (DNS-SD) / Multicast DNS (mDNS) Extensions", RFC 4301, 7558,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
              December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.

   [RFC4555]  Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility 10.17487/RFC7558, July 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7558>.

   [RFC7707]  Gont, F. and Multihoming Protocol
              (MOBIKE)", T. Chown, "Network Reconnaissance in IPv6
              Networks", RFC 4555, 7707, DOI 10.17487/RFC4555, June 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4555>.

   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream 10.17487/RFC7707, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7707>.

   [RFC7788]  Stenberg, M., Barth, S., and P. Pfister, "Home Networking
              Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 4960, 7788, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., 10.17487/RFC7788, April
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7788>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and D. Blacka, "DNS P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of
              Existence", Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 5155,
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.

   [RFC5936]  Lewis, E. 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8375]  Pfister, P. and A. Hoenes, Ed., "DNS Zone Transfer T. Lemon, "Special-Use Domain
              'home.arpa.'", RFC 8375, DOI 10.17487/RFC8375, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8375>.

   [RFC8415]  Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
              Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
              "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
              (AXFR)", for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
              RFC 5936, 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC5936, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5936>.

   [RFC6092]  Woodyatt, J., Ed., "Recommended Simple 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security
              Capabilities (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.

   [RFC8555]  Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
              Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
              (ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.

17.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns]
              Howard, L., "Reverse DNS in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for
              Providing Residential IPv6 for Internet Service", RFC 6092,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6092, January 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6092>.

   [RFC6644]  Evans, Service
              Providers", draft-howard-dnsop-ip6rdns-00 (work in
              progress), June 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]
              Migault, D., Droms, Weber, R., Mrugalski, T., Griffiths, C., and
              W. Cloetens, "DHCPv6 Options for Home Network Naming
              Authority", draft-ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-
              options-08 (work in progress), October 2020.

   [I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming]
              Lemon, T., Migault, D., and S. Jiang, "Rebind Capability Cheshire, "Homenet Naming
              and Service Discovery Architecture", draft-ietf-homenet-
              simple-naming-03 (work in
              DHCPv6 Reconfigure Messages", progress), October 2018.

   [I-D.richardson-homerouter-provisioning]
              Richardson, M., "Provisioning Initial Device Identifiers
              into Home Routers", draft-richardson-homerouter-
              provisioning-00 (work in progress), November 2020.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6644, 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6644, July 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6644>.

   [RFC6762]  Cheshire, S.
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

   [RFC8094]  Reddy, T., Wing, D., and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", P. Patil, "DNS over Datagram
              Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 6762, 8094,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, 10.17487/RFC8094, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.

   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8094>.

   [RFC8610]  Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", C. Bormann, "Concise Data
              Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
              Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
              JSON Data Structures", RFC 6763, 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.

   [RFC6887]  Wing, D., Ed., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and
              P. Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 6887,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6887, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6887>.

   [RFC7010]  Liu, B., Jiang, S., Carpenter, B., Venaas, S., and W.
              George, "IPv6 Site Renumbering Gap Analysis", RFC 7010,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7010, September 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7010>.

   [RFC7084]  Singh, H., Beebee, W., Donley, C., and B. Stark, "Basic
              Requirements for IPv6 Customer Edge Routers", RFC 7084,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7084, November 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7084>.

   [RFC7296]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
              Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.

   [RFC7344]  Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
              DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.

   [RFC7368]  Chown, T., Ed., Arkko, J., Brandt, A., Troan, O., and J.
              Weil, "IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles",
              RFC 7368, DOI 10.17487/RFC7368, October 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7368>.

   [RFC7558]  Lynn, K., Cheshire, S., Blanchet, M., 10.17487/RFC8610,
              June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.

   [RFC8672]  Sheffer, Y. and D. Migault,
              "Requirements for Scalable DNS-Based Service Discovery
              (DNS-SD) / Multicast DNS (mDNS) Extensions", RFC 7558,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7558, July 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7558>.

   [RFC7707]  Gont, F. and T. Chown, "Network Reconnaissance in IPv6
              Networks", RFC 7707, DOI 10.17487/RFC7707, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7707>.

   [RFC7788]  Stenberg, M., Barth, S., and P. Pfister, "Home Networking
              Control Protocol", RFC 7788, DOI 10.17487/RFC7788, April
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7788>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", "TLS Server Identity Pinning
              with Tickets", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8375]  Pfister, P. and T. Lemon, "Special-Use Domain
              'home.arpa.'", RFC 8375, DOI 10.17487/RFC8375, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8375>.

   [RFC8415]  Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
              Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
              "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
              RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

17.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns]
              Howard, L., "Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service
              Providers", draft-howard-dnsop-ip6rdns-00 (work in
              progress), June 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]
              Migault, D., Weber, R., Mrugalski, T., Griffiths, C., and
              W. Cloetens, "DHCPv6 Options for Home Network Naming
              Authority", draft-ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-
              options-08 (work in progress), October 2020.

   [I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming]
              Lemon, T., Migault, D., and S. Cheshire, "Homenet Naming
              and Service Discovery Architecture", draft-ietf-homenet-
              simple-naming-03 (work in progress), October 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
              Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-38 (work in progress), May
              2020.

   [I-D.richardson-homerouter-provisioning]
              Richardson, M., "Provisioning Initial Device Identifiers
              into Home Routers", draft-richardson-homerouter-
              provisioning-00 (work in progress), November 2020.

   [RFC8672]  Sheffer, Y. and D. Migault, "TLS Server Identity Pinning
              with Tickets", RFC 8672, 8672, DOI 10.17487/RFC8672, October
              2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8672>.

Appendix A.  Envisioned deployment scenarios

   A number of deployment have been envisioned, this section aims at
   providing a brief description.  The use cases are not limitations and
   this section is not normative.

A.1.  CPE Vendor

   A specific vendor with specific relations with a registrar or a
   registry may sell a CPE that is provisioned with provisioned domain
   name.  Such domain name does not need to be necessary human readable.

   One possible way is that the vendor also provisions the HNA with a
   private and public keys as well as a certificate.  Note that these
   keys are not expected to be used for DNSSEC signing.  Instead these
   keys are solely used by the HNA to proceed to the authentication.
   Normally the keys should be necessary and sufficient to proceed to
   the authentication.  The reason to combine the domain name and the
   key is that outsourcing infrastructure are likely handle names better
   than keys and that domain names might be used as a login which
   enables the key to be regenerated.

   When the home network owner plugs the CPE at home, the relation
   between HNA and DM is expected to work out-of-the-box.

A.2.  Agnostic CPE

   An CPE that is not preconfigured may also take advanatge to the
   protocol defined in this document but some configuration steps will
   be needed.

   1.  The owner of the home network buys a domain name to a registrar,
       and as such creates an account on that registrar

   2.  Either the registrar is also providing the outsourcing
       infrastructure or the home network needs to create a specific
       account on the outsourcing infrastructure.  * If the outsourcing
       provider is the registrar, the outsourcing has by design a proof
       of ownership of the domain name by the homenet owner.  In this
       case, it is expected the infrastructure provides the necessary
       parameters to the home network owner to configure the HNA.  A
       good way to provide the parameters would be the home network be
       able to copy/paste a JSON object.  What matters at that point is
       the outsourcing infrastructure being able to generate
       authentication credentials for the HNA to authenticate itself to
       the outsourcing infrastructure.  This obviously requires the home
       network to provide the public key gnerated by the HNA in a CSR.

   o  If the outsourcing infrastructure is not the registrar, then the
      proof of ownership needs to be established using protocols like
      ACME for example that will end in the generation of a certificate.
      ACME is used here to the purpose of automating the generation of
      the certificate, the CA may be a specific CA or the outsourcing
      infrastructure.  With that being done, the outsourcing
      infrastructure has a roof of ownership and can proceed as above.

Appendix B.  Example: Homenet Zone

   This section is not normative and intends to illustrate how the HNA
   builds the Homenet Zone.

   As depicted in Figure 1, the Public Homenet Zone is hosted on the
   Public Authoritative Server(s), whereas the Homenet Zone is hosted on
   the HNA.  This section considers that the HNA builds the zone that
   will be effectively published on the Public Authoritative Server(s).
   In other words "Homenet to Public Zone transformation" is the
   identity also commonly designated as "no operation" (NOP).

   In that case, the Homenet Zone should configure its Name Server RRset
   (NS) and Start of Authority (SOA) with the values associated with the
   Public Authoritative Server(s).  This is illustrated in Figure 2.
   public.primary.example.net is the FQDN of the Public Authoritative
   Server(s), and IP1, IP2, IP3, IP4 are the associated IP addresses.
   Then the HNA should add the additional new nodes that enter the home
   network, remove those that should be removed, and sign the Homenet
   Zone.

   $ORIGIN example.com
   $TTL 1h

   @  IN  SOA  public.primary.example.net
          hostmaster.example.com. (
          2013120710 ; serial number of this zone file
          1d         ; secondary refresh
          2h         ; secondary retry time in case of a problem
          4w         ; secondary expiration time
          1h         ; maximum caching time in case of failed
                     ; lookups
          )

   @   NS  public.authoritative.servers.example.net

   public.primary.example.net   A @IP1
   public.primary.example.net   A @IP2
   public.primary.example.net   AAAA @IP3
   public.primary.example.net   AAAA @IP4

                          Figure 2: Homenet Zone

   The SOA RRset is defined in [RFC1033], [RFC1035] and [RFC2308].  This
   SOA is specific, as it is used for the synchronization between the
   Hidden Primary and the DM and published on the DNS Public
   Authoritative Server(s)..

   o  MNAME: indicates the primary.  In our case the zone is published
      on the Public Authoritative Server(s), and its name MUST be
      included.  If multiple Public Authoritative Server(s) are
      involved, one of them MUST be chosen.  More specifically, the HNA
      MUST NOT include the name of the Hidden Primary.

   o  RNAME: indicates the email address to reach the administrator.
      [RFC2142] recommends using hostmaster@domain and replacing the '@'
      sign by '.'.

   o  REFRESH and RETRY: indicate respectively in seconds how often
      secondaries need to check the primary, and the time between two
      refresh when a refresh has failed.  Default values indicated by
      [RFC1033] are 3600 (1 hour) for refresh and 600 (10 minutes) for
      retry.  This value might be too long for highly dynamic content.
      However, the Public Authoritative Server(s) and the HNA are
      expected to implement NOTIFY [RFC1996].  So whilst shorter refresh
      timers might increase the bandwidth usage for secondaries hosting
      large number of zones, it will have little practical impact on the
      elapsed time required to achieve synchronization between the
      Outsourcing Infrastructure and the Hidden Master.  As a result,
      the default values are acceptable.

   o  EXPIRE: is the upper limit data SHOULD be kept in absence of
      refresh.  The default value indicated by [RFC1033] is 3600000
      (approx. 42 days).  In home network architectures, the HNA
      provides both the DNS synchronization and the access to the home
      network.  This device may be plugged and unplugged by the end user
      without notification, thus we recommend a long expiry timer.

   o  MINIMUM: indicates the minimum TTL.  The default value indicated
      by [RFC1033] is 86400 (1 day).  For home network, this value MAY
      be reduced, and 3600 (1 hour) seems more appropriate.

Appendix C.  Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing

   This section specifies the various parameters required by the HNA to
   configure the naming architecture <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8672>.

Appendix A.  Envisioned deployment scenarios

   A number of deployment have been envisioned, this document.  This section is
   informational, aims at
   providing a brief description.  The use cases are not limitations and
   this section is intended to clarify the information handled by
   the HNA and the various settings to be done.

   The HNA needs to be configured not normative.

A.1.  CPE Vendor

   A specific vendor with specific relations with the following parameters.  These
   parameters are necessary to establish a secure channel between the
   HNA and the DM as well as to specify the DNS zone registrar or a
   registry may sell a CPE that is in the
   scope of the communication:

   Distribution Master notification address (dm_notify):  The associated
      FQDNs or IP addresses of the DM provisioned with provisioned domain
   name.  Such domain name does not need to which DNS notifies should be
      sent.  IP addresses are optional and the FQDN necessary human readable.

   One possible way is sufficient and
      preferred.  If there are concerns about the security of that the name
      to IP translation, then DNSSEC should be employed.

   Authentication Method ("method"):  How vendor also provisions the HNA authenticates itself
      to the DM.  This specification defines only "certificate"

   Authentication data ("hna_certificate", "hna_key"):  While with a PSK can
      be used used as part of TSIG authentication, it has poor security
      properties
   private and is hard to scale.  Better solutions use public key
      mechanisms, leveraging private keys built into the HNA.

   Public Authoritative Server(s) (dm_ctrl and dm_port):  The FQDN or IP
      addresses of the Public Authoritative Server(s) as well as a certificate.  Note that these
   keys are not expected to which control
      messages will be sent.  IP addresses used for DNSSEC signing.  Instead these
   keys are optional and the FQDN is
      sufficient.

   (XXX? what?  It MAY correspond solely used by the HNA to proceed to the data that will be sent in authentication.
   Normally the
   NS RRsets keys should be necessary and SOA of sufficient to proceed to
   the Homenet Zone.)
   Registered Homenet Domain (???): authentication.  The domain name used reason to establish combine the secure channel.  This domain name is used by the DM and the HNA for
      the primary / secondary configuration as well
   key is that DOI are likely handle names better than keys and that
   domain names might be used as to index the
      NOTIFY queries of the HNA when the HNA has been renumbered.

   Registered Homenet Domain (zone):  The Domain Name of a login which enables the zone.
      Multiple Registered Homenet Domains may key to be provided.  This will
      generate
   regenerated.

   When the creation of multiple Public Homenet Zones.

   Public Authoritative Server (ns-list):  The Public Authoritative
      Server(s) associated with home network owner plugs the Registered Homenet Domain.  Multiple
      Public Authoritative Server(s) may be provided.

   For forward zones, CPE at home, the relationship relation
   between the HNA and the forward
   zone provider DM is expected to work out-of-the-box.

A.2.  Agnostic CPE

   An CPE that is not preconfigured may be also take advantage to the result of a number of transactions:
   protocol defined in this document but some configuration steps will
   be needed.

   1.  The forward zone outsourcing may be provided by the maker owner of the
       Homenet router.  In this case, the identity home network buys a domain name to a registrar,
       and authorization
       could be built in as such creates an account on that registrar

   2.  Either the device at manufacturer provisioning time.
       The device would need registrar is also providing the outsourcing
       infrastructure or the home network needs to be provisioned with create a device-unique
       credential, and it specific
       account on the outsourcing infrastructure.  * If the DOI is likely that the Registered Homenet Domain
       would be derived from
       registrar, it has by design a public attribute proof of ownership of the device, such as a
       serial number.

   2.  The forward zone outsourcing may be provided domain
       name by the Internet
       Service Provider. homenet owner.  In this case, it is expected the use of
       [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] DOI
       provides the necessary parameters to the home network owner to
       configure the HNA.  A good way to provide the
       credentials is appropriate.

   3.  The forward zone may parameters would be outsourced
       the home network be able to copy/paste a third party, such as a
       domain registrar.  In this case, JSON object - see
       Section 14.  What matters at that point is the use of DOI being able to
       generate authentication credentials for the JSON-serialized
       YANG data model described HNA to authenticate
       itself to the DOI.  This obviously requires the home network to
       provide the public key generated by the HNA in section Section 14 a CSR.

   o  If the DOI is appropriate,
       as it can easily not the registrar, then the proof of ownership needs
      to be copy and pasted by established using protocols like ACME [RFC8555] for example
      that will end in the user, or downloaded as
       part generation of a web transaction.

   For reverse zones, the relationship certificate.  ACME is always with used
      here to the upstream ISP
   (although there purpose of automating the generation of the
      certificate, the CA may be more than one), and so
   [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] is always a specific CA or the
   appropriate interface. DOI.  With that
      being done, the DOI has a roof of ownership and can proceed as
      above.

Appendix D. B.  Example: A manufacturer provisioned HNA product flow

   This scenario is one where a homenet router device manufacturer
   decides to offer DNS hosting as a value add.

   [I-D.richardson-homerouter-provisioning] describes a process for a
   home router credential provisioning system.  The outline of it is
   that near the end of the manufacturing process, as part of the
   firmware loading, the manufacturer provisions a private key and
   certificate into the device.

   In addition to having a assymmetric credential known to the
   manufacturer, the device also has been provisioned with an agreed
   upon name.  In the example in the above document, the name
   "n8d234f.r.example.net" has already been allocated and confirmed with
   the manufacturer.

   The HNA can use the above domain for itself.  It is not very pretty
   or personal, but if the owner wishes a better name, they can arrange
   for it.

   The configuration would look like:

   {
     "dm_notify" : "2001:db8:1234:111:222::2",
     "dm_acl"    : "2001:db8:1234:111:222::/64",
     "dm_ctrl"   : "manufacturer.example.net",
     "dm_port"   : "4433",
     "ns_list"   : [ "ns1.publicdns.example", "ns2.publicdns.example"],
     "zone"      : "n8d234f.r.example.net",
     "auth_method" : "certificate",
     "hna_certificate":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIDTjCCFGy....",
   }

   The dm_ctrl and dm_port values would be built into the firmware.

Authors' Addresses

   Daniel Migault
   Ericsson
   8275 Trans Canada Route
   Saint Laurent, QC  4S 0B6
   Canada

   EMail: daniel.migault@ericsson.com

   Ralf Weber
   Nominum
   2000 Seaport Blvd
   Redwood City  94063
   US

   EMail: ralf.weber@nominum.com

   Michael Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works
   470 Dawson Avenue
   Ottawa, ON  K1Z 5V7
   Canada

   EMail: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca

   Ray Hunter
   Globis Consulting BV
   Weegschaalstraat 3
   Eindhoven  5632CW
   NL

   EMail: v6ops@globis.net

   Chris Griffiths

   EMail: cgriffiths@gmail.com

   Wouter Cloetens
   Deutsche Telekom

   EMail: wouter.cloetens@external.telekom.de