draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-12.txt   draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-13.txt 
Homenet D. Migault Homenet D. Migault
Internet-Draft Ericsson Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track R. Weber Intended status: Standards Track R. Weber
Expires: May 6, 2021 Nominum Expires: September 27, 2021 Nominum
M. Richardson M. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works Sandelman Software Works
R. Hunter R. Hunter
Globis Consulting BV Globis Consulting BV
C. Griffiths C. Griffiths
W. Cloetens W. Cloetens
Deutsche Telekom Deutsche Telekom
November 02, 2020 March 26, 2021
Simple Provisioning of Public Names for Residential Networks Simple Provisioning of Public Names for Residential Networks
draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-12 draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-13
Abstract Abstract
Home owners often have IPv6 devices that they wish to access over the Home owners often have IPv6 devices that they wish to access over the
Internet using names. It has been possible to register and populate Internet using names. It has been possible to register and populate
a DNS Zone with names since DNS became a thing, but it has been an a DNS Zone with names since DNS became a thing, but it has been an
activity typically reserved for experts. This document automates the activity typically reserved for experts. This document automates the
process through creation of a Homenet Naming Authority, whose process through creation of a Homenet Naming Authority (HNA), whose
responsibility is to select, sign and publish names to a set of responsibility is to select, sign and publish names to a set of
publically visible servers. publicly visible servers.
The use of an outsourced primary DNS server deals with possible The use of an outsourced primary DNS server deals with possible
renumbering of the home network, and with possible denial of service renumbering of the home network, and with possible denial of service
attacks against the DNS infrastructure. attacks against the DNS infrastructure.
This document describes the mechanism that enables the Home Network This document describes the mechanism that enables the HNA to
Authority (HNA) to outsource the naming service to the DNS outsource the naming service to the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure
Outsourcing Infrastructure via a Distribution Master (DM). (DOI) via a Distribution Master (DM).
In addition, this document deals with publication of a corresponding In addition, this document deals with publication of a corresponding
reverse zone. reverse zone.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 27, 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Selecting Names to Publish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.1. Selecting Names to Publish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Alternative solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.2. Alternative solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Architecture Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. Architecture Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1. Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Distribution Master Communication Channels . . . . . . . 11 3.2. Distribution Master Communication Channels . . . . . . . 11
4. Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) and 4. Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) and
Distribution Master (DM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Distribution Master (DM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Information to build the Public Homenet Zone. . . . . . . 13 4.1. Information to build the Public Homenet Zone . . . . . . 13
4.2. Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust . . . . . 13 4.2. Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust . . . . . 13
4.3. Information to set the Synchronization Channel . . . . . 14 4.3. Information to set the Synchronization Channel . . . . . 14
4.4. Deleting the delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.4. Deleting the delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5. Messages Exchange Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.5. Messages Exchange Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5.1. Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone. . 15 4.5.1. Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone. . 15
4.5.2. Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust . 16 4.5.2. Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust . 16
4.5.3. Providing information for the Synchronization Channel 16 4.5.3. Providing information for the Synchronization Channel 16
4.5.4. HNA instructing deleting the delegation . . . . . . . 17 4.5.4. HNA instructing deleting the delegation . . . . . . . 17
4.6. Securing the Control Channel between Homenet Naming 4.6. Securing the Control Channel between Homenet Naming
Authority (HNA) and Distribution Master (DM) . . . . . . 17 Authority (HNA) and Distribution Master (DM) . . . . . . 17
4.7. Implementation Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.7. Implementation Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . . . . . . . . 19 5. DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . . . . . . . . 19
5.1. Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . 20 5.1. Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . 20
6. DM Distribution Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6. DM Distribution Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7. HNA Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7. HNA Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9. Homenet Reverse Zone Channels Configuration . . . . . . . . . 21 9. Homenet Reverse Zone Channels Configuration . . . . . . . . . 21
10. Homenet Public Zone Channel Configurations . . . . . . . . . 22 10. Homenet Public Zone Channel Configurations . . . . . . . . . 23
11. Renumbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 11. Renumbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.1. Hidden Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 11.1. Hidden Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.2. Distribution Master . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 12. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
12. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 13.1. HNA DM channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
13.1. HNA DMand RDM channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
13.2. Names are less secure than IP addresses . . . . . . . . 27 13.2. Names are less secure than IP addresses . . . . . . . . 27
13.3. Names are less volatile than IP addresses . . . . . . . 27 13.3. Names are less volatile than IP addresses . . . . . . . 27
13.4. DNS Reflection Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 14. Information Model for Outsourced information . . . . . . . . 27
13.5. Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary . . . . . 28 14.1. Outsourced Information Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
13.6. Reflection Attacks involving the DM . . . . . . . . . . 30 15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13.7. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative 16. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
13.8. Flooding Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
13.9. Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
14. Data Model for Outsourced information . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Appendix A. Envisioned deployment scenarios . . . . . . . . . . 36
15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 A.1. CPE Vendor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
16. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 A.2. Agnostic CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Appendix B. Example: A manufacturer provisioned HNA product flow 37
17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix A. Envisioned deployment scenarios . . . . . . . . . . 38
A.1. CPE Vendor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A.2. Agnostic CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix B. Example: Homenet Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix C. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing . 41
Appendix D. Example: A manufacturer provisioned HNA product flow 42
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) is responsible for making devices The Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) is responsible for making devices
within the home network accessible by name within the home network as within the home network accessible by name within the home network as
well as from outside the home network (e.g. the Internet). IPv6 well as from outside the home network (e.g. the Internet). IPv6
connectivity provides the possibility of global end to end IP connectivity provides the possibility of global end to end IP
connectivity. End users will be able to transparently make use of connectivity. End users will be able to transparently make use of
this connectivity if they can use names to access the services they this connectivity if they can use names to access the services they
want from their home network. want from their home network.
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Equipment (CPE) does. Other devices in the home network could Equipment (CPE) does. Other devices in the home network could
fulfill this role e.g. a NAS server, but for simplicity, this fulfill this role e.g. a NAS server, but for simplicity, this
document assumes the function is located on one of the CPE devices. document assumes the function is located on one of the CPE devices.
The homenet architecture [RFC7368] makes it clear that a home network The homenet architecture [RFC7368] makes it clear that a home network
may have multiple CPEs. The management of the Public Homenet Zone may have multiple CPEs. The management of the Public Homenet Zone
involves DNS specific mechanisms that cannot be distributed over involves DNS specific mechanisms that cannot be distributed over
multiple servers (primary server), when multiple nodes can multiple servers (primary server), when multiple nodes can
potentially manage the Public Homenet Zone, a single node needs to be potentially manage the Public Homenet Zone, a single node needs to be
selected per outsourced zone. This selected node is designated as selected per outsourced zone. This selected node is designated as
providing the Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) function. providing the HNA function.
The process by which a single HNA is selected per zone is not in The process by which a single HNA is selected per zone is not in
scope for this document. It is envisioned that a future document scope for this document. It is envisioned that a future document
will describe an HNCP mechanism to elect the single HNA. will describe an HNCP mechanism to elect the single HNA.
CPEs, which may host the HNA function, as well as home network CPEs, which may host the HNA function, as well as home network
devices, are usually low powered devices not designed for terminating devices, are usually low powered devices not designed for terminating
heavy traffic. As a result, hosting an authoritative DNS service heavy traffic. As a result, hosting an authoritative DNS service
visible to the Internet may expose the home network to resource visible to the Internet may expose the home network to resource
exhaustion and other attacks. On the other hand, if the only copy of exhaustion and other attacks. On the other hand, if the only copy of
the public zone is on the Internet, then Internet connectivity the public zone is on the Internet, then Internet connectivity
disruptions would make the names unavailable inside the homenet. disruptions would make the names unavailable inside the homenet.
In order to avoid resource exhaustion and other attacks, this In order to avoid resource exhaustion and other attacks, this
document describes an architecture that outsources the authoritative document describes an architecture that outsources the authoritative
naming service of the home network. More specifically, the HNA naming service of the home network. More specifically, the HNA
builds the Public Homenet Zone and outsources it to an DNS builds the Public Homenet Zone and outsources it to an DNS
Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI) via a Distribution Master (DM). The Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI) via a Distribution Master (DM). The
DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI) is in charge of publishing the DOI is in charge of publishing the corresponding Public Homenet Zone
corresponding Public Homenet Zone on the Internet. The transfer of on the Internet. The transfer of DNS zone information is achieved
DNS zone information is achieved using standard DNS mechanisms using standard DNS mechanisms involving primary and secondary DNS
involving primary and secondary DNS servers, with the HNA hosted servers, with the HNA hosted primary being a stealth primary, and the
primary being a stealth primary, and the Distribution Master a DM a secondary.
secondary.
Section 3.1 provides an architecture description that describes the Section 3.1 provides an architecture description that describes the
relation between the HNA and the Outsourcing Architecture. In order relation between the HNA and the DOI. In order to keep the Public
to keep the Public Homenet Zone up-to-date Section 5 describes how Homenet Zone up-to-date Section 5 describes how the HNA and the DOI
the HNA and the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure synchronizes the Pubic synchronizes the Pubic Homenet Zone.
Homenet Zone.
The proposed architecture is explicitly designed to enable fully The proposed architecture is explicitly designed to enable fully
functional DNSSEC, and the Public Homenet Zone is expected to be functional DNSSEC, and the Public Homenet Zone is expected to be
signed with a secure delegation. DNSSEC key management and zone signed with a secure delegation. DNSSEC key management and zone
signing is handled by the HNA. signing is handled by the HNA.
Section 10 discusses management and configuration of the Public Section 10 discusses management and configuration of the Public
Homenet Zone. It shows that the HNA configuration of the Outsourcing Homenet Zone. It shows that the HNA configuration of the DOI can
infrastructure can involve no or little interaction with the end involve no or little interaction with the end user. More
user. More specifically, it shows that the existence of an account specifically, it shows that the existence of an account in the DOI is
in the DOI is sufficient for the DOI to push the necessary sufficient for the DOI to push the necessary configuration. In
configuration. addition, when the DOI and CPE are both managed by an ISP, the
configuration can be entirely automated - see Section 9.
Section 9 discusses management of one or more reverse zones. It Section 9 discusses management of one or more reverse zones. It
shows that management of the reverse zones can be entirely automated shows that management of the reverse zones can be entirely automated
and benefit from a pre-established relation between the ISP and the and benefit from a pre-established relation between the ISP and the
home network. Note that such scenarios may also be met for the home network. Note that such scenarios may also be met for the
Public Homenet Zone, but not necessarily. Public Homenet Zone, but not necessarily.
Section 11 discusses how renumbering should be handled. Finally, Section 11 discusses how renumbering should be handled. Finally,
Section 12 and Section 13 respectively discuss privacy and security Section 12 and Section 13 respectively discuss privacy and security
considerations when outsourcing the Public Homenet Zone. considerations when outsourcing the Public Homenet Zone.
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The administrator would mark which devices (by name), are to be The administrator would mark which devices (by name), are to be
published. The HNA would then collect the IPv6 address(es) published. The HNA would then collect the IPv6 address(es)
associated with that device, and put the name into the Public Homenet associated with that device, and put the name into the Public Homenet
Zone. The address of the device can be collected from a number of Zone. The address of the device can be collected from a number of
places: mDNS [RFC6762], DHCP [RFC6644], UPnP, PCP [RFC6887], or places: mDNS [RFC6762], DHCP [RFC6644], UPnP, PCP [RFC6887], or
manual configuration. manual configuration.
A device may have a Global Unicast Address (GUA), a Unique Local IPv6 A device may have a Global Unicast Address (GUA), a Unique Local IPv6
Address (ULA), as as well IPv6-Link-Local addresses, IPv4-Link-Local Address (ULA), as as well IPv6-Link-Local addresses, IPv4-Link-Local
Addresses, and RFC1918 addresses. Of these the link-local are never Addresses, and RFC1918 addresses. Of these the link-local are never
useful for the Public Zone, and should be ommitted. The IPv6 ULA and useful for the Public Zone, and should be omitted. The IPv6 ULA and
the RFC1918 addresses may be useful to publish, if the home network the RFC1918 addresses may be useful to publish, if the home network
environment features a VPN that would allow the home owner to reach environment features a VPN that would allow the home owner to reach
the network. the network.
The IPv6 ULA addressees are significantly safer to publish, as the The IPv6 ULA addressees are significantly safer to publish, as the
RFC1918 addressees are likely to be confusing to any other entity. RFC1918 addressees are likely to be confusing to any other entity.
In general, one expects the GUA to be the default address to be In general, one expects the GUA to be the default address to be
published. However, during periods when the home network has published. However, during periods when the home network has
connectivity problems, the ULA and RFC1918 addressees can be used connectivity problems, the ULA and RFC1918 addressees can be used
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Registered Homenet Domain: is the Domain Name associated with the Registered Homenet Domain: is the Domain Name associated with the
home network. home network.
Public Homenet Zone: contains the names in the home network that are Public Homenet Zone: contains the names in the home network that are
expected to be publicly resolvable on the Internet. expected to be publicly resolvable on the Internet.
Homenet Naming Authority: (HNA) is a function responsible for Homenet Naming Authority: (HNA) is a function responsible for
managing the Public Homenet Zone. This includes populating the managing the Public Homenet Zone. This includes populating the
Public Homenet Zone, signing the zone for DNSSEC, as well as Public Homenet Zone, signing the zone for DNSSEC, as well as
managing the distribution of that Homenet Zone to the Outsourcing managing the distribution of that Homenet Zone to the DNS
Infrastructure. Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI).
DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI): is the infrastructure DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI): is the infrastructure
responsible for receiving the Public Homenet Zone and publishing responsible for receiving the Public Homenet Zone and publishing
it on the Internet. It is mainly composed of a Distribution it on the Internet. It is mainly composed of a Distribution
Master and Public Authoritative Servers. Master and Public Authoritative Servers.
Public Authoritative Servers: are the authoritative name servers for Public Authoritative Servers: are the authoritative name servers for
the Public Homenet Zone. Name resolution requests for the Homenet the Public Homenet Zone. Name resolution requests for the Homenet
Domain are sent to these servers. For resiliency the Public Domain are sent to these servers. For resiliency the Public
Homenet Zone SHOULD be hosted on multiple servers. Homenet Zone SHOULD be hosted on multiple servers.
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resolution is performed requesting the Homenet Authoritative resolution is performed requesting the Homenet Authoritative
Servers. Servers.
DNSSEC Resolver: a resolver that performs a DNSSEC resolution on the DNSSEC Resolver: a resolver that performs a DNSSEC resolution on the
Internet for the Public Homenet Zone. The resolution is performed Internet for the Public Homenet Zone. The resolution is performed
requesting the Public Authoritative Servers. requesting the Public Authoritative Servers.
3. Architecture Description 3. Architecture Description
This section provides an overview of the architecture for outsourcing This section provides an overview of the architecture for outsourcing
the authoritative naming service fromn the HNA to the DNS Outsourcing the authoritative naming service from the HNA to the DOI in
Infrastructure in Section 3.1. Section Appendix B and Appendix C Section 3.1. Section 14 defines necessary parameter to configure the
illustrates this architecture with the example of a Public Homenet HNA.
Zone as well as necessary parameter to configure the HNA.
3.1. Architecture Overview 3.1. Architecture Overview
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture where the HNA outsources the Figure 1 illustrates the architecture where the HNA outsources the
publication of the Public Homenet Zone to the DNS Outsourcing publication of the Public Homenet Zone to the DOI.
Infrastructure (DOI).
The Public Homenet Zone is identified by the Registered Homenet The Public Homenet Zone is identified by the Registered Homenet
Domain Name - myhome.isp.example. Domain Name - myhome.isp.example.
The ".local" as well as ".home.arpa" are explicitly not considered as The ".local" as well as ".home.arpa" are explicitly not considered as
Public Homenet zones. Public Homenet zones.
The HNA SHOULD build the Public Homenet Zone in a single view The HNA SHOULD build the Public Homenet Zone in a single view
populated with all resource records that are expected to be published populated with all resource records that are expected to be published
on the Internet. on the Internet.
As explained in {#selectingnames}, how the Public Homenet Zone is As explained in {#selectingnames}, how the Public Homenet Zone is
populated is out of the scope of this document. populated is out of the scope of this document.
The HNA also signs the Public Homenet Zone. The HNA handles all The HNA also signs the Public Homenet Zone. The HNA handles all
operations and keying material required for DNSSEC, so there is no operations and keying material required for DNSSEC, so there is no
provision made in this architecture for transferring private DNSSEC provision made in this architecture for transferring private DNSSEC
related keying material between the HNA and the DM. related keying material between the HNA and the DM.
Once the Public Homenet Zone has been built, the HNA outsources it to Once the Public Homenet Zone has been built, the HNA outsources it to
the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure as described in Figure 1. the DOI as described in Figure 1.
The HNA acts as a hidden primary while the DM behaves as a secondary The HNA acts as a hidden primary while the DM behaves as a secondary
responsible to distribute the Public Homenet Zone to the multiple responsible to distribute the Public Homenet Zone to the multiple
Public Authoritative Servers that DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure is Public Authoritative Servers that DOI is responsible for.
responsible for.
The DM has 3 communication channels: The DM has 3 communication channels:
o a DM Control Channel (see section Section 4) to configure the HNA o a DM Control Channel (see section Section 4) to configure the HNA
and the Outsourcing Infrastructure, and the DOI,
o a DM Synchronization Channel (see section Section 5 to synchronize o a DM Synchronization Channel (see section Section 5 to synchronize
the Public Homenet Zone on the HNA and on the DM. the Public Homenet Zone on the HNA and on the DM.
o one or more Distribution Channels (see section Section 6 that o one or more Distribution Channels (see section Section 6 that
distributes the Public Homenet Zone from the DM to the Public distributes the Public Homenet Zone from the DM to the Public
Authoritative Server serving the Public Homenet Zone on the Authoritative Server serving the Public Homenet Zone on the
Internet. Internet.
There MAY be multiple DM's, and multiple servers per DM. This text There MAY be multiple DM's, and multiple servers per DM. This text
assumes a single DM server for simplicity, but there is no reason why assumes a single DM server for simplicity, but there is no reason why
each channel need to be implemented on the same server, or indeed use each channel needs to be implemented on the same server, or indeed
the same code base. use the same code base.
It is important to note that while the HNA is configured as an It is important to note that while the HNA is configured as an
authoritative server, it is not expected to answer to DNS requests authoritative server, it is not expected to answer to DNS requests
from the public Internet for the Public Homenet Zone. The function from the public Internet for the Public Homenet Zone. More
of the HNA is limited to building the zone and synchronization with specifically, the addresses associated with the HNA SHOULD NOT be
the DM. mentioned in the NS records of the Public Homenet zone, unless
additional security provisions necessary to protect the HNA from
The addresses associated with the HNA SHOULD NOT be mentioned in the external attack have been taken.
NS records of the Public Homenet zone, unless additional security
provisions necessary to protect the HNA from external attack have
been taken.
The DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure is also responsible for ensuring The DOI is also responsible for ensuring the DS record has been
the DS record has been updated in the parent zone. updated in the parent zone.
Resolution is performed by the DNSSEC resolvers. When the resolution Resolution is performed by the DNSSEC resolvers. When the resolution
is performed outside the home network, the DNSSEC Resolver resolves is performed outside the home network, the DNSSEC Resolver resolves
the DS record on the Global DNS and the name associated to the Public the DS record on the Global DNS and the name associated to the Public
Homenet Zone (example.com) on the Public Authoritative Servers. Homenet Zone (example.com) on the Public Authoritative Servers.
When the resolution is performed from within the home network, the When the resolution is performed from within the home network, the
Homenet DNSSEC Resolver may proceed similarly. On the other hand, to Homenet DNSSEC Resolver may proceed similarly. On the other hand, to
provide resilience to the Public Homenet Zone in case of disruption, provide resilience to the Public Homenet Zone in case of disruption,
the Homenet DNSSEC Resolver SHOULD be able to perform the resolution the Homenet DNSSEC Resolver SHOULD be able to perform the resolution
on the authoritative name service of the home network implemented by on the Homenet Authoritative Servers. These servers are not expected
the Homenet Authoritative Servers. These servers are not expected to to be mentioned in the Public Homenet Zone, nor to be accessible from
be mentioned in the Public Homenet Zone, nor to be accessible from
the Internet. As such their information as well as the corresponding the Internet. As such their information as well as the corresponding
signed DS record MAY be provided by the HNA to the Homenet DNSSEC signed DS record MAY be provided by the HNA to the Homenet DNSSEC
Resolvers, e.g., using HNCP. Such configuration is outside the scope Resolvers, e.g., using HNCP [RFC7788]. Such configuration is outside
of this document. the scope of this document.
How the Homenet Authoritative Servers are provisioned is also out of How the Homenet Authoritative Servers are provisioned is also out of
scope of this specification. It could be implemented using primary scope of this specification. It could be implemented using primary
secondaries servers, or via rsync. In some cases, the HNA and secondaries servers, or via rsync. In some cases, the HNA and
Homenet Authoritative Servers may be combined together which would Homenet Authoritative Servers may be combined together which would
result in a common instantiation of an authoritative server on the result in a common instantiation of an authoritative server on the
WAN and inner interface. Other mechanisms may also be used. WAN and inner interface. Other mechanisms may also be used.
Home network | Internet Home network | Internet
| |
| +----------------------------+ | +----------------------------+
| | DNS | | | DOI |
| | Outsourcing Infrastructure |
Control | | | Control | | |
+-----------------------+ Channel | | +-----------------------+ | +-----------------------+ Channel | | +-----------------------+ |
| HNA |<-------------->| Distribution Master | | | HNA |<-------------->| Distribution Master | |
|+---------------------+| | | |+---------------------+| | |+---------------------+| | | |+---------------------+| |
|| Public Homenet Zone ||Synchronization || Public Homenet Zone || | || Public Homenet Zone ||Synchronization || Public Homenet Zone || |
|| (example.com) || Channel | | || (example.com) || | || (example.com) || Channel | | || (example.com) || |
|+---------------------+|<-------------->|+---------------------+| | |+---------------------+|<-------------->|+---------------------+| |
+----------------------+| | | +-----------------------+ | +----------------------+| | | +-----------------------+ |
| | ^ Distribution | | | ^ Distribution |
| | | Channel | | | | Channel |
skipping to change at page 11, line 49 skipping to change at page 11, line 46
Figure 1: Homenet Naming Architecture Name Resolution Figure 1: Homenet Naming Architecture Name Resolution
3.2. Distribution Master Communication Channels 3.2. Distribution Master Communication Channels
This section details the interfaces and channels of the DM, that is This section details the interfaces and channels of the DM, that is
the Control Channel, the Synchronization Channel and the Distribution the Control Channel, the Synchronization Channel and the Distribution
Channel. Channel.
The Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are the The Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are the
interfaces used between the HNA and the DNS Outsourcing interfaces used between the HNA and the DOI. The entity within the
Infrastructure. The entity within the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure DOI responsible to handle these communications is the DM and
responsible to handle these communications is the DM and
communications between the HNA and the DM SHOULD be protected and communications between the HNA and the DM SHOULD be protected and
mutually authenticated. While section Section 4.6 discusses in more mutually authenticated. While section Section 4.6 discusses in more
depth the different security protocols that could be used to secure, depth the different security protocols that could be used to secure,
this specification RECOMMENDS the use of TLS with mutually this specification RECOMMENDS the use of TLS with mutually
authentication based on certificates to secure the channel between authentication based on certificates to secure the channel between
the HNA and the DM. the HNA and the DM.
The Control Channel is used to set up the Synchronization Channel. The Control Channel is used to set up the Synchronization Channel.
We assume that the HNA initiates the Control Channel connection with We assume that the HNA initiates the Control Channel connection with
the DM and as such has a prior knowledge of the DM identity (X509 the DM and as such has a prior knowledge of the DM identity (X509
certificate), the IP address and port to use and protocol to set certificate), the IP address and port to use and protocol to set
secure session. We also assume the DM has knowledge of the identity secure session. We also assume the DM has knowledge of the identity
of the HNA (X509 certificate) as well as the Registered Homenet of the HNA (X509 certificate) as well as the Registered Homenet
Domain. For more detail to see how this can be achieved, please see Domain. For more detail to see how this can be achieved, please see
section Section 10. section Section 10.
The information exchanged between the HNA and the DM is using DNS The information exchanged between the HNA and the DM is using DNS
messages. DNS messages can be protected using various kind of messages. DNS messages can be protected using various kind of
transport layers, among others, UDP:53/DTLS, TLS/TCP:53, HTTPS:443. transport layers, among others, DNS over DTLS [RFC8094], DNS over TLS
(DoT) [RFC7858], or DNS over HTTPs (DoH) [RFC8484]. There was
There was consideration to using a standard TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG(0) consideration to using a standard TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG(0) [RFC2931]
[RFC2931] to perform a dynamic DNS update to the DM. There are a to perform a dynamic DNS update to the DM. There are a number of
number of issues with this. issues with this. The first one is that TSIG or SIG(0) make
scenarios where the end user needs to interact via its web browser
more complex. More precisely, authorization and access control
granted via OAUTH would be unnecessarily complex with TSIG or SIG(0).
The main one is that the Dynamic DNS update would also update the The main one is that the Dynamic DNS update would also update the
parent zone's (NS, DS and associated A or AAAA records) while the parent zone's (NS, DS and associated A or AAAA records) while the
goal is to update the Distribution Master's configuration files. The goal is to update the DM configuration files. The visible NS records
visible NS records SHOULD remain pointing at the cloud provider's SHOULD remain pointing at the cloud provider's anycast addresses.
anycast addresses. Revealing the address of the HNA in the DNS is Revealing the address of the HNA in the DNS is not desirable. Please
not desirable. Please see section Section 4.2 for more details. see section Section 4.2 for more details.
This specification also assumes: This specification assumes:
o the DM serves both the Control Channel and Synchronization Channel o the DM serves both the Control Channel and Synchronization Channel
on a single IP address, single port and with a single transport on a single IP address, single port and with a single transport
protocol. protocol.
o the HNA uses a single IP address for both the Control and o By default, the HNA uses a single IP address for both the Control
Synchronization channel by default. However, the HNA MAY use and Synchronization channel. However, the HNA MAY use distinct IP
distinct IP addresses - see section Section 5 and section {sec- addresses for the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel
sync-info}} for more details. - see section Section 5 and section {sec-sync-info}} for more
details.
The Distribution Channel is internal to the DNS Outsourcing The Distribution Channel is internal to the DOI and as such is not
Infrastructure and as such is not the primary concern of this the primary concern of this specification.
specification.
4. Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) and 4. Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) and
Distribution Master (DM) Distribution Master (DM)
The DM Control Channel is used by the HNA and the DNS Outsourcing The DM Control Channel is used by the HNA and the DOI to exchange
Infrastructure to exchange information related to the configuration information related to the configuration of the delegation which
of the delegation which includes: includes information to build the Public Homenet Zone (see
Section 4.1), information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust (see
Section 4.2) and information to set the Synchronization Channel (see
Section 4.3).
4.1. Information to build the Public Homenet Zone. 4.1. Information to build the Public Homenet Zone
When the HNA builds the public zone, it must include information that When the HNA builds the Public Homenet Zone, it must include
it retrieves from the DM relating to how the zone is to be published. information that it retrieves from the DM relating to how the zone is
to be published.
The information includes at least names and IP addresses of the The information includes at least names and IP addresses of the
Public Authoritative Name Servers. In term of RRset information this Public Authoritative Name Servers. In term of RRset information this
includes: includes:
o the MNAME of the SOA, o the MNAME of the SOA,
o the NS and associated A and AAA RRsets of the name servers. o the NS and associated A and AAA RRsets of the name servers.
Optionally the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure MAY also provide Optionally the DOI MAY also provide operational parameters such as
operational parameters such as other fields of SOA (SERIAL, RNAME, other fields of SOA (SERIAL, RNAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and
REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM). As the information is necessary MINIMUM). As the information is necessary for the HNA to proceed and
for the HNA to proceed and the information is associated to the the information is associated to the DOI, this information exchange
Outsourcing Infrastructure, this information exchange is mandatory. is mandatory.
4.2. Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust 4.2. Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust
The HNA SHOULD provide the hash of the KSK (DS RRset), so the that The HNA SHOULD provide the hash of the KSK (DS RRset), so the that
DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure provides this value to the parent DOI provides this value to the parent zone. A common deployment use
zone. A common deployment use case is that the Outsourcing case is that the DOI is the registrar of the Registered Homenet
Infrastructure is the registrar of the Registered Homenet Domain, and Domain, and as such, its relationship with the registry of the parent
as such, its relationship with the registry of the parent zone zone enables it to update the parent zone. When such relation
enables it to update the parent zone. When such relation exists, the exists, the HNA should be able to request the DOI to update the DS
HNA should be able to request the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure to RRset in the parent zone. A direct update is especially necessary to
update the DS RRset in the parent zone. A direct update is initialize the chain of trust.
especially necessary to initialize the chain of trust.
Though the HNA may also later directly update the values of the DS Though the HNA may also later directly update the values of the DS
via the Control Channel, it is RECOMMENDED to use other mechanisms via the Control Channel, it is RECOMMENDED to use other mechanisms
such as CDS and CDNSKEY [RFC7344] for transparent updates during key such as CDS and CDNSKEY [RFC7344] for transparent updates during key
roll overs. roll overs.
As some deployment may not provide an DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure As some deployment may not provide a DOI that will be able to update
that will be able to update the DS in the parent zone, this the DS in the parent zone, this information exchange is OPTIONAL.
information exchange is OPTIONAL.
By accepting the DS RR, the DM commits in taking care of advertising By accepting the DS RR, the DM commits in taking care of advertising
the DS to the parent zone. Upon refusal, the DM clearly indicates it the DS to the parent zone. Upon refusal, the DM clearly indicates it
does not have the capacity to proceed to the update. does not have the capacity to proceed to the update.
4.3. Information to set the Synchronization Channel 4.3. Information to set the Synchronization Channel
That information sets the primary/secondary relation between the HNA The HNA works as a primary authoritative DNS server, while the DM
and the DM. The HNA works as a primary authoritative DNS server, and works like a secondary. As a result, the HNA MUST provide the IP
MUST provide the corresponding IP address. address the DM is using to reach the HNA. The synchronization
Channel will be set between that IP address and the IP address of the
The specified IP address on the HNA side and the currently used IP DM. By default, the IP address used by the HNA in the Control
address of the DM defines the IP addresses involved in the Channel is considered by the DM and teh specification of the IP by
Synchronization Channel. Ports and transport protocol are the same the HNA is only OPTIONAL. The transport channel (including port) is
as those used by the Control Channel. By default, the same IP the same as the one used between the HNA and the DM for the Control
address used by the HNA is considered by the DM. Exchange of this Channel.
information is OPTIONAL.
4.4. Deleting the delegation 4.4. Deleting the delegation
The purpose of the previous sections were to exchange information in The purpose of the previous sections were to exchange information in
order to set a delegation. The HNA MUST also be able to delete a order to set a delegation. The HNA MUST also be able to delete a
delegation with a specific DM. Upon an instruction of deleting the delegation with a specific DM. Upon an instruction of deleting the
delegation, the DM MUST stop serving the Public Homenet Zone. delegation, the DM MUST stop serving the Public Homenet Zone.
4.5. Messages Exchange Description 4.5. Messages Exchange Description
skipping to change at page 14, line 46 skipping to change at page 14, line 45
re-use of DNS exchanges achieves these goals. Note that while re-use of DNS exchanges achieves these goals. Note that while
information is provided using DNS exchanges, the exchanged information is provided using DNS exchanges, the exchanged
information is not expected to be set in any zone file, instead this information is not expected to be set in any zone file, instead this
information is expected to be processed appropriately. information is expected to be processed appropriately.
The Control Channel is not expected to be a long term session. After The Control Channel is not expected to be a long term session. After
a predefined timer the Control Channel is expected to be terminated. a predefined timer the Control Channel is expected to be terminated.
The Control Channel MAY Be re-opened at any time later. The Control Channel MAY Be re-opened at any time later.
The provisioning process SHOULD provide a method of securing the The provisioning process SHOULD provide a method of securing the
control channel, so that the content of messages can be Control Channel, so that the content of messages can be
authenticated. This authentication MAY be based on certificates for authenticated. This authentication MAY be based on certificates for
both the DM and each HNA. The DM may also create the initial both the DM and each HNA. The DM may also create the initial
configuration for the delegation zone in the parent zone during the configuration for the delegation zone in the parent zone during the
provisioning process. provisioning process.
4.5.1. Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone. 4.5.1. Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone.
The information provided by the DM to the HNA is retrieved by the HNA The information provided by the DM to the HNA is retrieved by the HNA
with an AXFR exchange. The AXFR message enables the response to with an AXFR exchange. The AXFR message enables the response to
contain any type of RRsets. The response might be extended in the contain any type of RRsets. The response might be extended in the
future if additional information will be needed. Alternatively, the future if additional information will be needed. Alternatively, the
information provided by the HNA to the DM is pushed by the HNA via a information provided by the HNA to the DM is pushed by the HNA via a
DNS update exchange. DNS update exchange [RFC2136].
To retrieve the necessary information to build the Public Homenet To retrieve the necessary information to build the Public Homenet
Zone, the HNA MUST send an DNS request of type AXFR associated to the Zone, the HNA MUST send an DNS request of type AXFR associated to the
Registered Homenet Domain. The DM MUST respond with a zone template. Registered Homenet Domain. The DM MUST respond with a zone template.
The zone template MUST contain a RRset of type SOA, one or multiple The zone template MUST contain a RRset of type SOA, one or multiple
RRset of type NS and zero or more RRset of type A or AAAA. RRset of type NS and zero or more RRset of type A or AAAA.
o The SOA RR is used to indicate to the HNA the value of the MNAME o The SOA RR is used to indicate to the HNA the value of the MNAME
of the Public Homenet Zone. of the Public Homenet Zone.
o The NAME of the SOA RR MUST be the Registered Homenet Domain. o The NAME of the SOA RR MUST be the Registered Homenet Domain.
o The MNAME value of the SOA RDATA is the value provided by the DNS o The MNAME value of the SOA RDATA is the value provided by the DOI
Outsourcing Infrastructure to the HNA. to the HNA.
o Other RDATA values (RNAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM) are o Other RDATA values (RNAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM) are
provided by the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure as suggestions. provided by the DOI as suggestions.
The NS RRsets are used to carry the Public Authoritative Servers of The NS RRsets are used to carry the Public Authoritative Servers of
the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure. Their associated NAME MUST be the DOI. Their associated NAME MUST be the Registered Homenet
the Registered Homenet Domain. Domain.
The TTL and RDATA are those expected to be published on the Public The TTL and RDATA are those expected to be published on the Public
Homenet Zone. The RRsets of Type A and AAAA MUST have their NAME Homenet Zone. The RRsets of Type A and AAAA MUST have their NAME
matching the NSDNAME of one of the NS RRsets. matching the NSDNAME of one of the NS RRsets.
Upon receiving the response, the HNA MUST validate format and Upon receiving the response, the HNA MUST validate format and
properties of the SOA, NS and A or AAAA RRsets. If an error occurs, properties of the SOA, NS and A or AAAA RRsets. If an error occurs,
the HNA MUST stop proceeding and MUST report an error. Otherwise, the HNA MUST stop proceeding and MUST report an error. Otherwise,
the HNA builds the Public Homenet Zone by setting the MNAME value of the HNA builds the Public Homenet Zone by setting the MNAME value of
the SOA as indicated by the SOA provided by the AXFR response. The the SOA as indicated by the SOA provided by the AXFR response. The
skipping to change at page 16, line 8 skipping to change at page 16, line 8
insert the NS and corresponding A or AAAA RRset in its Public Homenet insert the NS and corresponding A or AAAA RRset in its Public Homenet
Zone. The HNA MUST ignore other RRsets. If an error message is Zone. The HNA MUST ignore other RRsets. If an error message is
returned by the DM, the HNA MUST proceed as a regular DNS resolution. returned by the DM, the HNA MUST proceed as a regular DNS resolution.
Error messages SHOULD be logged for further analysis. If the Error messages SHOULD be logged for further analysis. If the
resolution does not succeed, the outsourcing operation is aborted and resolution does not succeed, the outsourcing operation is aborted and
the HNA MUST close the Control Channel. the HNA MUST close the Control Channel.
4.5.2. Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust 4.5.2. Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust
To provide the DS RRset to initialize the DNSSEC chain of trust the To provide the DS RRset to initialize the DNSSEC chain of trust the
HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE [RFC2136] message. HNA MAY send a DNS update [RFC2136] message.
1. The NAME in the SOA MUST be set to the parent zone of the
Registered Homenet Domain - that is where the DS records should
be inserted.
2. The DS RRset MUST be placed in the Update section of the UPDATE The DNS update message is composed of a Header section, a Zone
query, and the NAME SHOULD be set to the Registered Homenet section, a Pre-requisite section, and Update section and an
Domain. additional section. The Zone section MUST set the ZNAME to the
parent zone of the Registered Homenet Domain - that is where the DS
records should be inserted. As described [RFC2136], ZTYPE is set to
SOA and ZCLASS is set to the zone's class. The Pre-requisite section
MUST be empty. The Update section is a DS RRset with its NAME set to
the Registered Homenet Domain and the associated RDATA corresponds to
the value of the DS. The Additional Data section MUST be empty.
3. The RDATA of the DS RR SHOULD correspond to the DS record to be Though the pre-requisite section MAY be ignored by the DM, this value
inserted in the parent zone. is fixed to remain coherent with a standard DNS update.
o A NOERROR response from the MD is a commitment to update the Upon receiving the DNS update request, the DM reads the DS RRset in
parent zone with the provided DS. the Update section. The DM checks ZNAME corresponds to the parent
zone. The DM SHOULD ignore non empty the Pre-requisite and
Additional Data section. The DM MAY update the TTL value before
updating the DS RRset in the parent zone. Upon a successful update,
the DM should return a NOERROR response as a commitment to update the
parent zone with the provided DS. An error indicates the MD does not
update the DS, and other method should be used by the HNA.
o An error indicates the MD will not update the DS, and other method The regular DNS error message SHOULD be returned to the HNA when an
should be used by the HNA. error occurs. In particular a FORMERR is returned when a format
error is found, this includes when unexpected RRSets are added or
when RRsets are missing. A SERVFAIL error is returned when a
internal error is encountered. A NOTZONE error is returned when
update and Zone sections are not coherent, a NOTAUTH error is
returned when the DM is not authoritative for the Zone section. A
REFUSED error is returned when the DM refuses to proceed to the
configuration and the requested action.
4.5.3. Providing information for the Synchronization Channel 4.5.3. Providing information for the Synchronization Channel
To provide the IP address of the primary, the HNA MAY send a DNS To provide a non default IP address used by the HNA for the
UPDATE message. Synchronization Channel, the HNA MAY send a DNS Update message. Such
exchange is OPTIONAL.
1. The NAME in the SOA MUST be the parent zone of the Registered
Homenet Domain.
2. The Update section MUST be a RRset of Type NS.
3. The RDATA MUST be a RRset of type A or AAAA that designates the
IP addresses associated to the primary.
4. There may be multiple IP addresses.
5. These IP addresses MUST be provided in the additional section. Similarly to the Section 4.5.2, the HNA MAY optionally specify the IP
address using a DNS update message. The Zone section sets its ZNAME
to the parent zone of the Registered Homenet Domain, ZTYPE is set to
SOA and ZCLASS is set to the zone's type. Pre-requisite is empty.
The Update section is a RRset of type NS. The Additional Data
section contains the RRsets of type A or AAAA that designates the IP
addresses associated to the primary (or the HNA).
The reason to provide these IP addresses is that it is NOT The reason to provide these IP addresses is that it is NOT
RECOMMENDED to publish these IP addresses. As a result, it is not RECOMMENDED to publish these IP addresses. As a result, it is not
expected to resolve them. expected to resolve them.
o A NOERROR response indicates the DM has configured the secondary Upon receiving the DNS update request, the DM reads the IP addresses
and is committed to serve as a secondary. and checks the ZNAME corresponds to the parent zone. The DM SHOULD
ignore a non empty Pre-requisite section. The DM configures the
o An error indicates the DM is not configured as a secondary. secondary with the IP addresses and returns a NOERROR response to
indicate it is committed to serve as a secondary.
The regular DNS error message SHOULD be returned to the HNA when an
error occurs. In particular a FORMERR is returned when a format
error is found, this includes when unexpected RRSets are added or
when RRsets are missing.
o A SERVFAIL error is returned when a internal error is encountered.
o A NOTZONE error is returned when update and Zone sections are not
coherent, a NOTAUTH error is returned when the DM is not
authoritative for the Zone section.
o A REFUSED error is returned when the DM refuses to proceed to the Similarly to Section 4.5.2, DNS errors are used and an error
configuration and the requested action. indicates the DM is not configured as a secondary.
4.5.4. HNA instructing deleting the delegation 4.5.4. HNA instructing deleting the delegation
To instruct to delete the delegation the HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE To instruct to delete the delegation the HNA SHOULD send a DNS UPDATE
Delete message. Delete message.
1. The NAME in the SOA MUST be the parent zone of the Registered The Zone section sets its ZNAME to the Registered Homenet Domain, the
Homenet Domain. ZTYPE to SOA and the ZCLASS to zone's type. The Pre-requisite
section is empty. The Update section is a RRset of type NS with the
2. The Update section MUST be a RRset of Type NS. NAME set to the Registered Domain Name. As indicated by [RFC2136]
section 2.5.2 the delete instruction is set by setting the TTL to 0,
3. The NAME associated to the NS RRSet MUST be the Registered Domain the Class to ANY, the RDLENGTH to 0 and the RDATA MUST be empty. The
Name. Additional Data section is empty.
As indicated by [RFC2136] section 2.5.2 the delete instruction is set Upon receiving the DNS update request, the DM checks the request and
by setting the TTL to 0, the Class to ANY, the RDLENGTH to 0 and the removes the delegation. The DM returns a NOERROR response to
RDATA MUST be empty. indicate the delegation has been deleted. Similarly to
Section 4.5.2, DNS errors are used and an error indicates the
delegation has not been deleted.
4.6. Securing the Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority 4.6. Securing the Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority
(HNA) and Distribution Master (DM) (HNA) and Distribution Master (DM)
The control channel between the HNA and the DM MUST be secured at The control channel between the HNA and the DM MUST be secured at
both the HNA and the DM. both the HNA and the DM.
Secure protocols (like TLS [RFC8446] / DTLS [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]) Secure protocols (like TLS [RFC8446] SHOULD be used to secure the
SHOULD be used to secure the transactions between the DM and the HNA. transactions between the DM and the HNA.
The advantage of TLS/DTLS is that this technology is widely deployed, The advantage of TLS is that this technology is widely deployed, and
and most of the devices already embed TLS/DTLS libraries, possibly most of the devices already embed TLS libraries, possibly also taking
also taking advantage of hardware acceleration. Further, TLS/DTLS advantage of hardware acceleration. Further, TLS provides
provides authentication facilities and can use certificates to authentication facilities and can use certificates to mutually
mutually authenticate the DM and HNA at the application layer, authenticate the DM and HNA at the application layer, including
including available API. On the other hand, using TLS/DTLS requires available API. On the other hand, using TLS requires implementing
implementing DNS exchanges over TLS/DTLS, as well as a new service DNS exchanges over TLS, as well as a new service port.
port.
The HNA SHOULD authenticate inbound connections from the DM using The HNA SHOULD authenticate inbound connections from the DM using
standard mechanisms, such as a public certificate with baked-in root standard mechanisms, such as a public certificate with baked-in root
certificates on the HNA, or via DANE {!RFC6698}}. The HNA is expected certificates on the HNA, or via DANE [RFC6698]. The HNA is expected
to be provisioned with a connection to the DM by the manufacturer, or to be provisioned with a connection to the DM by the manufacturer, or
during some user-initiated onboarding process, see Section 10. during some user-initiated onboarding process, see Section 10.
The DM SHOULD authenticate the HNA and check that inbound messages The DM SHOULD authenticate the HNA and check that inbound messages
are from the appropriate client. The DM MAY use a self-signed CA are from the appropriate client. The DM MAY use a self-signed CA
certificate mechanism per HNA, or public certificates for this certificate mechanism per HNA, or public certificates for this
purpose. purpose.
IPsec [RFC4301] and IKEv2 [RFC7296] were considered. They would need IPsec [RFC4301] and IKEv2 [RFC7296] were considered. They would need
to operate in transport mode, and the authenticated end points would to operate in transport mode, and the authenticated end points would
skipping to change at page 18, line 43 skipping to change at page 18, line 46
while the network is being renumbered. This means that the necessary while the network is being renumbered. This means that the necessary
keys to authenticate transaction SHOULD NOT be indexed using the IP keys to authenticate transaction SHOULD NOT be indexed using the IP
address, and SHOULD be resilient to IP address changes. address, and SHOULD be resilient to IP address changes.
4.7. Implementation Concerns 4.7. Implementation Concerns
The Hidden Primary Server on the HNA differs from a regular The Hidden Primary Server on the HNA differs from a regular
authoritative server for the home network due to: authoritative server for the home network due to:
Interface Binding: the Hidden Primary Server will almost certainly Interface Binding: the Hidden Primary Server will almost certainly
listen on the WAN Interface, whereas a regular authoritative listen on the WAN Interface, whereas a regular Homenet
server for the home network would listen on the internal home Authoritative Servers would listen on the internal home network
network interface. interface.
Limited exchanges: the purpose of the Hidden Primary Server is to Limited exchanges: the purpose of the Hidden Primary Server is to
synchronize with the DM, not to serve any zones to end users, or synchronize with the DM, not to serve any zones to end users, or
the public Internet. the public Internet.
As a result, exchanges are performed with specific nodes (the DM). As a result, exchanges are performed with specific nodes (the DM).
Further, exchange types are limited. The only legitimate exchanges Further, exchange types are limited. The only legitimate exchanges
are: NOTIFY initiated by the Hidden Primary and IXFR or AXFR are: NOTIFY initiated by the Hidden Primary and IXFR or AXFR
exchanges initiated by the DM. exchanges initiated by the DM.
On the other hand, regular authoritative servers would respond to any On the other hand, regular authoritative servers would respond to any
hosts, and any DNS query would be processed. The HNA SHOULD filter hosts, and any DNS query would be processed. The HNA SHOULD filter
IXFR/AXFR traffic and drop traffic not initiated by the DM. The HNA IXFR/AXFR traffic and drop traffic not initiated by the DM. The HNA
MUST listen for DNS on TCP and UDP and MUST at least allow SOA MUST MUST at least allow SOA lookups of the Homenet Zone.
lookups of the Homenet Zone.
5. DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM 5. DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM
The DM Synchronization Channel is used for communication between the The DM Synchronization Channel is used for communication between the
HNA and the DM for synchronizing the Public Homenet Zone. Note that HNA and the DM for synchronizing the Public Homenet Zone. Note that
the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are by the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are by
construction different channels even though there they MAY use the construction different channels even though there they MAY use the
same IP addresses. In fact the Control Channel is set between the same IP addresse. In fact the Control Channel is set between the HNA
HNA working as a client using port YYYY (a high range port) toward a working as a client using port YYYY (a high range port) toward a
service provided by the MD at port XX (well known port). service provided by the DM at port XX (well known port).
On the other hand, the Synchronization Channel is set between the DM On the other hand, the Synchronization Channel is set between the DM
working as a client using port ZZZZ ( a high range port) toward a working as a client using port ZZZZ ( a high range port) toward a
service a service provided by the HNA at port XX. service a service provided by the HNA at port XX.
As a result, even though the same couple of IP addresses may be As a result, even though the same couple of IP addresses may be
involved the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are involved the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are
always distinct channels. always distinct channels.
Uploading and dynamically updating the zone file on the DM can be Uploading and dynamically updating the zone file on the DM can be
seen as zone provisioning between the HNA (Hidden Primary) and the DM seen as zone provisioning between the HNA (Hidden Primary) and the DM
(Secondary Server). This can be handled via AXFR + DNS UPDATE. (Secondary Server). This can be handled via AXFR + DNS Update.
This document RECOMMENDS use of a primary / secondary mechanism This document RECOMMENDS use of a primary / secondary mechanism
instead of the use of DNS UPDATE. The primary / secondary mechanism instead of the use of DNS Update. The primary / secondary mechanism
is RECOMMENDED as it scales better and avoids DoS attacks. Note that is RECOMMENDED as it scales better and avoids DoS attacks. Note that
even when UPDATE messages are used, these messages are using a even when UPDATE messages are used, these messages are using a
distinct channel as those used to set the configuration. distinct channel as those used to set the configuration.
Note that there is no standard way to distribute a DNS primary Note that there is no standard way to distribute a DNS primary
between multiple devices. As a result, if multiple devices are between multiple devices. As a result, if multiple devices are
candidate for hosting the Hidden Primary, some specific mechanisms candidate for hosting the Hidden Primary, some specific mechanisms
should be designed so the home network only selects a single HNA for should be designed so the home network only selects a single HNA for
the Hidden Primary. Selection mechanisms based on HNCP [RFC7788] are the Hidden Primary. Selection mechanisms based on HNCP [RFC7788] are
good candidates. good candidates.
The HNA acts as a Hidden Primary Server, which is a regular The HNA acts as a Hidden Primary Server, which is a regular
authoritative DNS Server listening on the WAN interface. authoritative DNS Server listening on the WAN interface.
The DM is configured as a secondary for the Homenet Domain Name. The DM is configured as a secondary for the Registered Homenet Domain
This secondary configuration has been previously agreed between the Name. This secondary configuration has been previously agreed
end user and the provider of the Outsourcing Infrastructure as part between the end user and the provider of the DOI as part of either
of either the provisioning or due to receipt of UPDATE messages on the provisioning or due to receipt of DNS Update messages on the DM
the DM Control Channel. Control Channel.
The Homenet Reverse Zone MAY also be updated either with DNS UPDATE The Homenet Reverse Zone MAY also be updated either with DNS UPDATE
[RFC2136] or using a primary / secondary synchronization. [RFC2136] or using a primary / secondary synchronization.
5.1. Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM 5.1. Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM
The Synchronization Channel used standard DNS request. The Synchronization Channel used standard DNS request.
First the primary notifies the secondary that the zone must be First the primary notifies the secondary that the zone must be
updated and eaves the secondary to proceed with the update when updated and eaves the secondary to proceed with the update when
possible/convenient. possible/convenient.
Then, a NOTIFY message is sent by the primary, which is a small Then, a NOTIFY message is sent by the primary, which is a small
packet that is less likely to load the secondary. packet that is less likely to load the secondary.
Finally, the AXFR [RFC1034] or IXFR [RFC1995] query performed by the Finally, the AXFR [RFC1034] or IXFR [RFC1995] query performed by the
secondary is a small packet sent over TCP (section 4.2 [RFC5936]), secondary is a small packet sent over TCP (section 4.2 [RFC5936]),
which mitigates reflection attacks using a forged NOTIFY. which mitigates reflection attacks using a forged NOTIFY.
The AXFR request from the DM to the HNA SHOULD be secured. DNS over The AXFR request from the DM to the HNA SHOULD be secured and the use
TLS [RFC7858] is RECOMMENDED. of TLS is RECOMMENDED [I-D.ietf-dprive-xfr-over-tls]
When using TLS, the HNA MAY authenticate inbound connections from the When using TLS, the HNA MAY authenticate inbound connections from the
DM using standard mechanisms, such as a public certificate with DM using standard mechanisms, such as a public certificate with
baked-in root certificates on the HNA, or via DANE {!RFC6698}} baked-in root certificates on the HNA, or via DANE {!RFC6698}}. In
addition, to guarantee the DM remains the same across multiple TLS
session, the HNA and DM MAY implement [RFC8672].
The HNA MAY apply a simple IP filter on inbound AXFR requests to The HNA MAY apply a simple IP filter on inbound AXFR requests to
ensure they only arrive from the DM Synchronization Channel. In this ensure they only arrive from the DM Synchronization Channel. In this
case, the HNA SHOULD regularly check (via DNS resolution) that the case, the HNA SHOULD regularly check (via DNS resolution) that the
address of the DM in the filter is still valid. address of the DM in the filter is still valid.
6. DM Distribution Channel 6. DM Distribution Channel
The DM Distribution Channel is used for communication between the DM The DM Distribution Channel is used for communication between the DM
and the Public Authoritative Servers. The architecture and and the Public Authoritative Servers. The architecture and
communication used for the DM Distribution Channels is outside the communication used for the DM Distribution Channels is outside the
scope of this document, and there are many existing solutions scope of this document, and there are many existing solutions
available e.g. rsynch, DNS AXFR, REST, DB copy. available e.g. rsynch, DNS AXFR, REST, DB copy.
7. HNA Security Policies 7. HNA Security Policies
This section details security policies related to the Hidden Primary This section details security policies related to the Hidden Primary
/ Secondary synchronization. / Secondary synchronization.
The Hidden Primary, as described in this document SHOULD drop any The HNA, as Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any queries from the home
queries from the home network. This could be implemented via port network. This could be implemented via port binding and/or firewall
binding and/or firewall rules. The precise mechanism deployed is out rules. The precise mechanism deployed is out of scope of this
of scope of this document. The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any DNS document. The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any DNS queries arriving on
queries arriving on the WAN interface that are not issued from the the WAN interface that are not issued from the DM. The Hidden
DM. The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any outgoing packets other than Primary SHOULD drop any outgoing packets other than DNS NOTIFY query,
DNS NOTIFY query, SOA response, IXFR response or AXFR responses. The SOA response, IXFR response or AXFR responses. The Hidden Primary
Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any incoming packets other than DNS NOTIFY SHOULD drop any incoming packets other than DNS NOTIFY response, SOA
response, SOA query, IXFR query or AXFR query. The Hidden Primary query, IXFR query or AXFR query. The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any
SHOULD drop any non protected IXFR or AXFR exchange,depending on how non protected IXFR or AXFR exchange,depending on how the
the synchronization is secured. synchronization is secured.
8. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture 8. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture
[RFC7368] in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to be deployed on both [RFC7368] in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to be deployed on both
the authoritative server and the resolver. The resolver side is out the authoritative server and the resolver. The resolver side is out
of scope of this document, and only the authoritative part of the of scope of this document, and only the authoritative part of the
server is considered. server is considered.
This document assumes the HNA signs the Public Homenet Zone. This document assumes the HNA signs the Public Homenet Zone.
Secure delegation is achieved only if the DS RRset is properly set in Secure delegation is achieved only if the DS RRset is properly set in
the parent zone. Secure delegation is performed by the HNA or the the parent zone. Secure delegation is performed by the HNA or the
DNS Outsourcing Infrastructures. DOIs.
The DS RRset can be updated manually with nsupdate for example. This The DS RRset can be updated manually with nsupdate for example. This
requires the HNA or the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure to be requires the HNA or the DOI to be authenticated by the DNS server
authenticated by the DNS server hosting the parent of the Public hosting the parent of the Public Homenet Zone. Such a trust channel
Homenet Zone. Such a trust channel between the HNA and the parent between the HNA and the parent DNS server may be hard to maintain
DNS server may be hard to maintain with HNAs, and thus may be easier with HNAs, and thus may be easier to establish with the DOI. In
to establish with the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure. In fact, the fact, the Public Authoritative Server(s) may use Automating DNSSEC
Public Authoritative Server(s) may use Automating DNSSEC Delegation Delegation Trust Maintenance [RFC7344].
Trust Maintenance [RFC7344].
9. Homenet Reverse Zone Channels Configuration 9. Homenet Reverse Zone Channels Configuration
The Public Homenet Zone is associated to a Registered Homenet Domain The Public Homenet Zone is associated to a Registered Homenet Domain
and the ownership of that domain requires a specific registration and the ownership of that domain requires a specific registration
from the end user as well as the HNA being provisioned with some from the end user as well as the HNA being provisioned with some
authentication credentials. Such steps are mandatory unless the DNS authentication credentials. Such steps are mandatory unless the DOI
Outsourcing Infrastructure has some other means to authenticate the has some other means to authenticate the HNA. Such situation may
HNA. Such situation may occur, for example, when the ISP provides occur, for example, when the ISP provides the Homenet Domain as well
the Homenet Domain as well as the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure. as the DOI.
In this case, the HNA may be authenticated by the physical link In this case, the HNA may be authenticated by the physical link
layer, in which case the authentication of the HNA may be performed layer, in which case the authentication of the HNA may be performed
without additional provisioning of the HNA. While this may be not so without additional provisioning of the HNA. While this may not be so
common for the Public Homenet Zone, this situation is expected to be common for the Public Homenet Zone, this situation is expected to be
quite common for the Reverse Homenet Zone. quite common for the Reverse Homenet Zone.
More specifically, a common case is that the upstream ISP provides More specifically, a common case is that the upstream ISP provides
the IPv6 prefix to the Homenet with a IA_PD [RFC8415] option and the IPv6 prefix to the Homenet with a IA_PD [RFC8415] option and
manages the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure of the associated reverse manages the DOI of the associated reverse zone.
zone. This leave place for setting up automatically the relation
between HNA and the DNS Outsourcing infrastructure as described in This leave place for setting up automatically the relation between
HNA and the DNS Outsourcing infrastructure as described in
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]. [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options].
In the case of the reverse zone, the DOI authenticates the source of
the updates by IPv6 Access Control Lists. In the case of the reverse
zone, the ISP knows exactly what addresses have been delegated. The
HNA SHOULD therefore always originate Synchronization Channel updates
from an IP address within the zone that is being updated.
For example, if the ISP has assigned 2001:db8:f00d::2/64 to the WAN
interface (by DHCPv6, or PPP/RA), then the HNA should originate
Synchronization Channel updates from 2001:db8:f00d::2.
An ISP that has delegated 2001:db8:babe::/56 to the HNA via
DHCPv6-PD, then HNA should originate Synchronization Channel updates
an IP within that subnet, such as 2001:db8:babe:0001::2.
With this relation automatically configured, the synchronization With this relation automatically configured, the synchronization
between the Home network and the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure between the Home network and the DOI happens similarly as for the
happens similarly as for the Public Homenet Zone described earlier in Public Homenet Zone described earlier in this document.
this document.
Note that for home networks hosted by multiple ISPs, each ISP Note that for home networks hosted by multiple ISPs, each ISP
provides only the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure of the reverse zones provides only the DOI of the reverse zones associated to the
associated to the delegated prefix. It is also likely that the DNS delegated prefix. It is also likely that the DNS exchanges will need
exchanges will need to be performed on dedicated interfaces as to be to be performed on dedicated interfaces as to be accepted by the ISP.
accepted by the ISP. More specifically, the reverse zone associated More specifically, the reverse zone associated to prefix 1 will not
to prefix 1 will not be possible to be performs by the HNA using an be possible to be performs by the HNA using an IP address that
IP address that belongs to prefix 2. Such constraints does not raise belongs to prefix 2. Such constraints does not raise major concerns
major concerns either for hot standby or load sharing configuration. either for hot standby or load sharing configuration.
With IPv6, the domain space for IP addresses is so large that reverse With IPv6, the domain space for IP addresses is so large that reverse
zone may be confronted with scalability issues. How the reverse zone zone may be confronted with scalability issues. How the reverse zone
is generated is out of scope of this document. is generated is out of scope of this document.
[I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] provides guidance on how to address [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] provides guidance on how to address
scalability issues. scalability issues.
10. Homenet Public Zone Channel Configurations 10. Homenet Public Zone Channel Configurations
This document does not deal with how the HNA is provisioned with a This document does not deal with how the HNA is provisioned with a
skipping to change at page 23, line 14 skipping to change at page 23, line 30
o the DM transport protocol and port (the default is DNS over TLS, o the DM transport protocol and port (the default is DNS over TLS,
on port 853) on port 853)
o the HNA credentials used by the DM for its authentication. o the HNA credentials used by the DM for its authentication.
The HNA will need to select an IP address for communication for the The HNA will need to select an IP address for communication for the
Synchronization Channel. This is typically the outside WAN address Synchronization Channel. This is typically the outside WAN address
of the router, but could be an IPv6 LAN address in the case of a home of the router, but could be an IPv6 LAN address in the case of a home
with multiple ISPs (and multiple border routers). This is with multiple ISPs (and multiple border routers). This is
communicated in section BLAH when the NS and A record is communicated in section Section 4.5.3 when the NS and A or AAAA
communicated. RRsets are communicated.
The above parameters MUST be be provisionined for ISP-specific The above parameters MUST be be provisioned for ISP-specific reverse
reverse zones, as per zones, as per [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options].
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]. ISP-specific ISP-specific forward zones MAY also be provisioned using
forward zones MAY also be provisioned using
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options], but zones which [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options], but zones which
are not related to a specific ISP zone (such as with a DNS provider) are not related to a specific ISP zone (such as with a DNS provider)
must be provisioned through other means. must be provisioned through other means.
Similarly, it the HNA is provided by a registrar, the HNA may be Similarly, if the HNA is provided by a registrar, the HNA may be
given configured to end user. given configured to end user.
In the absence of specific pre-established relation, these pieces of In the absence of specific pre-established relation, these pieces of
information may be entered manually by the end user. In order to information may be entered manually by the end user. In order to
ease the configuration from the end user the following scheme may be ease the configuration from the end user the following scheme may be
implemented. implemented.
The HNA may present the end user a web interface where it provides The HNA may present the end user a web interface where it provides
the end user the ability to indicate the Registered Domain or the the end user the ability to indicate the Registered Homenet Domain or
registrar for example a preselected list. Once the regsitrar has the registrar for example a preselected list. Once the registrar has
been selected, the HNA redirects the end user to that registrar in been selected, the HNA redirects the end user to that registrar in
order to receive a access token. The access token will enable the order to receive a access token. The access token will enable the
HNA to retrieve the DM parameters associated to the Registered HNA to retrieve the DM parameters associated to the Registered
Domain. These parameters will include the credentials used by the Domain. These parameters will include the credentials used by the
HNA to establish the Control and Synchronization Channels. HNA to establish the Control and Synchronization Channels.
Such architecture limits the necessary steps to configure the HNA Such architecture limits the necessary steps to configure the HNA
from the end user. from the end user.
11. Renumbering 11. Renumbering
skipping to change at page 24, line 16 skipping to change at page 24, line 31
In the break-before-make renumbering scenario, the new prefix is In the break-before-make renumbering scenario, the new prefix is
advertised making the old prefix obsolete. advertised making the old prefix obsolete.
Renumbering has been extensively described in [RFC4192] and analyzed Renumbering has been extensively described in [RFC4192] and analyzed
in [RFC7010] and the reader is expected to be familiar with them in [RFC7010] and the reader is expected to be familiar with them
before reading this section. before reading this section.
11.1. Hidden Primary 11.1. Hidden Primary
In a renumbering scenario, the Hidden Primary is informed it is being In a renumbering scenario, the HNA or Hidden Primary is informed it
renumbered. In most cases, this occurs because the whole home is being renumbered. In most cases, this occurs because the whole
network is being renumbered. As a result, the Public Homenet Zone home network is being renumbered. As a result, the Public Homenet
will also be updated. Although the new and old IP addresses may be Zone will also be updated. Although the new and old IP addresses may
stored in the Public Homenet Zone, we recommend that only the newly be stored in the Public Homenet Zone, we recommend that only the
reachable IP addresses be published. newly reachable IP addresses be published.
To avoid reachability disruption, IP connectivity information To avoid reachability disruption, IP connectivity information
provided by the DNS SHOULD be coherent with the IP plane. In our provided by the DNS SHOULD be coherent with the IP plane. In our
case, this means the old IP address SHOULD NOT be provided via the case, this means the old IP address SHOULD NOT be provided via the
DNS when it is not reachable anymore. Let for example TTL be the TTL DNS when it is not reachable anymore. Let for example TTL be the TTL
associated with a RRset of the Public Homenet Zone, it may be cached associated with a RRset of the Public Homenet Zone, it may be cached
for TTL seconds. Let T_NEW be the time the new IP address replaces for TTL seconds. Let T_NEW be the time the new IP address replaces
the old IP address in the Homenet Zone, and T_OLD_UNREACHABLE the the old IP address in the Homenet Zone, and T_OLD_UNREACHABLE the
time the old IP is not reachable anymore. time the old IP is not reachable anymore.
In the case of the make-before-break, seamless reachability is In the case of the make-before-break, seamless reachability is
provided as long as T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW > 2 * TTL. If this is provided as long as T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW > 2 * TTL. If this is
not satisfied, then devices associated with the old IP address in the not satisfied, then devices associated with the old IP address in the
home network may become unreachable for 2 * TTL - (T_OLD_UNREACHABLE home network may become unreachable for 2 * TTL - (T_OLD_UNREACHABLE
- T_NEW). In the case of a break-before-make, T_OLD_UNREACHABLE = - T_NEW). In the case of a break-before-make, T_OLD_UNREACHABLE =
T_NEW, and the device may become unreachable up to 2 * TTL. T_NEW, and the device may become unreachable up to 2 * TTL. Of
course if T_NEW >= T_OLD_UNREACHABLE, the disruption is increased.
Once the Public Homenet Zone file has been updated on the Hidden Once the Public Homenet Zone file has been updated on the Hidden
Primary, the Hidden Primary needs to inform the DNS Outsourcing Primary, the Hidden Primary needs to inform the DOI that the Public
Infrastructure that the Public Homenet Zone has been updated and that Homenet Zone has been updated and that the IP address to use to
the IP address to use to retrieve the updated zone has also been retrieve the updated zone has also been updated. Both notifications
updated. Both notifications are performed using regular DNS are performed using regular DNS exchanges. Mechanisms to update an
exchanges. Mechanisms to update an IP address provided by lower IP address provided by lower layers with protocols like SCTP
layers with protocols like SCTP [RFC4960], MOBIKE [RFC4555] are not [RFC4960], MOBIKE [RFC4555] are not considered in this document.
considered in this document. Instead the IP address of the HNA is updated using the
Synchronization Channel as described in Section 4.3.
The Hidden Primary SHOULD inform the DM that the Public Homenet Zone
has been updated by sending a NOTIFY payload with the new IP address.
In addition, this NOTIFY payload SHOULD be authenticated using SIG(0)
or TSIG. When the DM receives the NOTIFY payload, it MUST
authenticate it. Note that the cryptographic key used for the
authentication SHOULD be indexed by the Registered Homenet Domain
contained in the NOTIFY payload as well as the RRSIG. In other
words, the IP address SHOULD NOT be used as an index.
If authentication succeeds, the DM MUST also notice the IP address
has been modified and perform a reachability check before updating
its primary configuration. The routability check MAY performed by
sending a SOA request to the Hidden Primary using the source IP
address of the NOTIFY. This exchange is also secured, and if an
authenticated response is received from the Hidden Primary with the
new IP address, the DM SHOULD update its configuration file and
retrieve the Public Homenet Zone using an AXFR or a IXFR exchange.
Note that the primary reason for providing the IP address is that the
Hidden Primary is not publicly announced in the DNS. If the Hidden
Primary were publicly announced in the DNS, then the IP address
update could have been performed using the DNS as described in
Section 11.2.
11.2. Distribution Master
Renumbering of the Distribution Master results in it changing its IP
address. As the DM is a secondary, the destination of DNS NOTIFY
payloads MUST be changed, and any configuration/firewalling that
restricts DNS AXFR/IXFR operations MUST be updated.
If the DM is configured in the Hidden Primary configuration file
using a FQDN, then the update of the IP address is performed by DNS.
More specifically, before sending the NOTIFY, the Hidden Primary
performs a DNS resolution to retrieve the IP address of the
secondary.
As described in Section 11.1, the DM DNS information SHOULD be
coherent with the IP plane. The TTL of the Distribution Master name
SHOULD be adjusted appropriately prior to changing the IP address.
Some DNS infrastructure uses the IP address to designate the
secondary, in which case, other mechanisms must be found. A reason
for using IP addresses instead of names is generally to reach an
internal interface that is not designated by a FQDN, and to avoid
potential bootstrap problems. Such scenarios are considered as out
of scope in the case of home networks.
12. Privacy Considerations 12. Privacy Considerations
Outsourcing the DNS Authoritative service from the HNA to a third Outsourcing the DNS Authoritative service from the HNA to a third
party raises a few privacy related concerns. party raises a few privacy related concerns.
The Public Homenet Zone lists the names of services hosted in the The Public Homenet Zone lists the names of services hosted in the
home network. Combined with blocking of AXFR queries, the use of home network. Combined with blocking of AXFR queries, the use of
NSEC3 [RFC5155] (vs NSEC [RFC4034]) prevents an attacker from being NSEC3 [RFC5155] (vs NSEC [RFC4034]) prevents an attacker from being
able to walk the zone, to discover all the names. However, the able to walk the zone, to discover all the names. However, the
attacker may be able to walk the reverse DNS zone, or use other attacker may be able to walk the reverse DNS zone, or use other
reconnaissance techniques to learn this information as described in reconnaissance techniques to learn this information as described in
[RFC7707]. [RFC7707].
In general a home owner is expected only to publish names for which In general a home network owner is expected to publish only names for
there is some need to be able to reference externally. Publication which there is some need to be able to reference externally.
of the name does not imply that the service is necessarily reachable Publication of the name does not imply that the service is
from any or all parts of the Internet. [RFC7084] mandates that the necessarily reachable from any or all parts of the Internet.
outgoing-only policy [RFC6092] be available, and in many cases it is [RFC7084] mandates that the outgoing-only policy [RFC6092] be
configured by default. A well designed User Interface would combine available, and in many cases it is configured by default. A well
a policy for making a service public by a name with a policy on who designed User Interface would combine a policy for making a service
may access it. public by a name with a policy on who may access it.
In many cases, the home owner wishes to publish names for services In many cases, the home network owner wishes to publish names for
that only they will be able to access. The access control may services that only they will be able to access. The access control
consist of an IP source address range, or access may be restricted may consist of an IP source address range, or access may be
via some VPN functionality. The purpose of publishing the name is so restricted via some VPN functionality. The purpose of publishing the
that the service may be access by the same name both within the home, name is so that the service may be access by the same name both
and outside the home. Sending traffic to the relevant IPv6 address within the home, and outside the home. Sending traffic to the
causes the relevant VPN policy to be enacted upon. relevant IPv6 address causes the relevant VPN policy to be enacted
upon.
While the problem of getting access to internal names has been solved While the problem of getting access to internal names has been solved
in Enterprise configurations with a split-DNS, and such a thing could in Enterprise configurations with a split-DNS, and such a thing could
be done in the home, many recent improvements to VPN user interfaces be done in the home, many recent improvements to VPN user interfaces
make it more likely that an individual might have multiple make it more likely that an individual might have multiple
connections configured. For instance, an adult child checking on the connections configured. For instance, an adult child checking on the
state of a home automation system for a parent. state of a home automation system for a parent.
In addition to the Public Homenet Zone, pervasive DNS monitoring can In addition to the Public Homenet Zone, pervasive DNS monitoring can
also monitor the traffic associated with the Public Homenet Zone. also monitor the traffic associated with the Public Homenet Zone.
This traffic may provide an indication of the services an end user This traffic may provide an indication of the services an end user
accesses, plus how and when they use these services. Although, accesses, plus how and when they use these services. Although,
caching may obfuscate this information inside the home network, it is caching may obfuscate this information inside the home network, it is
likely that outside your home network this information will not be likely that outside your home network this information will not be
cached. cached.
13. Security Considerations 13. Security Considerations
The Homenet Naming Architecture described in this document solves This document exposes a mechanism that prevents the HNA from being
exposing the HNA's DNS service as a DoS attack vector. exposed to the Internet and served DNS request from the Internet.
These requests are instead served by the DOI. While this limits the
level of exposure of the HNA, the HNA remains exposed to the Internet
with communications with the DOI. This section analyses the attack
surface associated to these communications. In addition, the DOI
exposes data that are related to the home network. This section also
analyses the implication of such exposure.
13.1. HNA DMand RDM channels 13.1. HNA DM channels
The HNA DM channels are specified to include their own security The channels between HNA and DM are mutually authenticated and
mechanisms that are designed to provide the minimum attack surface, encrypted with TLS [RFC8446] and its associated security
and to authenticate transactions where necessary. considerations apply. To ensure the multiple TLS session are are
continuously authenticating the same entity, TLS may take advantage
of second factor authentication as described in [RFC8672].
At the time of writing TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3 can be used and TLS 1.3 (or
newer) SHOULD be supported.
The DNS protocol is subject to reflection attacks, however, these
attacks are largely applicable when DNS is carried over UDP. The
interfaces between the HNA and DM are using TLS over TCP, which
prevents such reflection attacks. Note that Public Authoritative
servers hosted by the DOI are subject to such attacks, but that is
out of scope of our document.
Note that in the case of the Reverse Homenet Zone, the data is less Note that in the case of the Reverse Homenet Zone, the data is less
subject to attacks than in the Public Homenet Zone. In addition, the subject to attacks than in the Public Homenet Zone. In addition, the
HNA and the DM MAY belong to the same administrative domain, i.e. the DM and RDM may be provided by the ISP - as described in
ISP. More specifically, the WAN interface is located in the ISP [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options], in which case DM
network. As a result, if provisioned using DHCPv6, the security and RDM might be less exposed to attacks - as communications within a
credential may not even transit in the home network. On the other network.
hand, if the HNA is not hosted at the border of the home network, the
credential may rely on the security associated to DHCPv6. Even if
HNA and DM are in the same administrative domain it is strongly
RECOMMENDED to use a secure channel.
The security of these channels heavily relies on TLS and the DM or
RDM is authenticated by its certificate. To ensure the multiple TLS
session are are continuously authenticating the same entity, TLS may
take advantage of second factor authentication as described in
[RFC8672].
13.2. Names are less secure than IP addresses 13.2. Names are less secure than IP addresses
This document describes how an end user can make their services and This document describes how an end user can make their services and
devices from his home network reachable on the Internet by using devices from his home network reachable on the Internet by using
names rather than IP addresses. This exposes the home network to names rather than IP addresses. This exposes the home network to
attackers, since names are expected to include less entropy than IP attackers, since names are expected to include less entropy than IP
addresses. In fact, with IP addresses, the Interface Identifier is addresses. In fact, with IP addresses, the Interface Identifier is
64 bits long leading to up to 2^64 possibilities for a given 64 bits long leading to up to 2^64 possibilities for a given
subnetwork. This is not to mention that the subnet prefix is also of subnetwork. This is not to mention that the subnet prefix is also of
skipping to change at page 28, line 15 skipping to change at page 27, line 36
service. On the other hand, names are not expected to be as volatile service. On the other hand, names are not expected to be as volatile
as IP addresses. As a result, logging names over time may be more as IP addresses. As a result, logging names over time may be more
valuable than logging IP addresses, especially to profile an end valuable than logging IP addresses, especially to profile an end
user's characteristics. user's characteristics.
PTR provides a way to bind an IP address to a name. In that sense, PTR provides a way to bind an IP address to a name. In that sense,
responding to PTR DNS queries may affect the end user's privacy. For responding to PTR DNS queries may affect the end user's privacy. For
that reason end users may choose not to respond to PTR DNS queries that reason end users may choose not to respond to PTR DNS queries
and MAY instead return a NXDOMAIN response. and MAY instead return a NXDOMAIN response.
13.4. DNS Reflection Attacks 14. Information Model for Outsourced information
An attacker performs a reflection attack when it sends traffic to one
or more intermediary nodes (reflectors), that in turn send back
response traffic to the victim. Motivations for using an
intermediary node might be anonymity of the attacker, as well as
amplification of the traffic. Typically, when the intermediary node
is a DNSSEC server, the attacker sends a DNSSEC query and the victim
is likely to receive a DNSSEC response. This section analyzes how
the different components may be involved as a reflector in a
reflection attack. Section 13.5 considers the Hidden Primary,
Section 13.6 the Synchronization Server, and Section 13.7 the Public
Authoritative Server(s).
13.5. Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary
With the specified architecture, the Hidden Primary is only expected
to receive DNS queries of type SOA, AXFR or IXFR. This section
analyzes how these DNS queries may be used by an attacker to perform
a reflection attack.
DNS queries of type AXFR and IXFR use TCP and as such are less
subject to reflection attacks. This makes SOA queries the only
remaining practical vector of attacks for reflection attacks, based
on UDP.
SOA queries are not associated with a large amplification factor
compared to queries of type "ANY" or to query of non existing FQDNs.
This reduces the probability a DNS query of type SOA will be involved
in a DDoS attack.
SOA queries are expected to follow a very specific pattern, which This section is non-normative for the front-end protocol. It
makes rate limiting techniques an efficient way to limit such specifies an optional format for the set of parameters required by
attacks, and associated impact on the naming service of the home the HNA to configure the naming architecture of this document.
network.
Motivations for such a flood might be a reflection attack, but could In cases where a home router has not been provisioned by the
also be a resource exhaustion attack performed against the Hidden manufacturer (when forward zones are provided by the manufacturer),
Primary. The Hidden Primary only expects to exchange traffic with or by the ISP (when the ISP provides this service), then a home user/
the DM, that is its associated secondary. Even though secondary owner will need to configure these settings via an administrative
servers may be renumbered as mentioned in Section 11, the Hidden interface.
Primary is likely to perform a DNSSEC resolution and find out the
associated secondary's IP addresses in use. As a result, the Hidden
Primary is likely to limit the origin of its incoming traffic based
on the origin IP address.
With filtering rules based on IP address, SOA flooding attacks are By defining a standard format (in JSON) for this configuration
limited to forged packets with the IP address of the secondary information, the user/owner may be able to just copy and paste a
server. In other words, the only victims are the Hidden Primary configuration blob from the service provider into the administrative
itself or the secondary. There is a need for the Hidden Primary to interface of the HNA.
limit that flood to limit the impact of the reflection attack on the
secondary, and to limit the resource needed to carry on the traffic
by the HNA hosting the Hidden Primary. On the other hand, mitigation
should be performed appropriately, so as to limit the impact on the
legitimate SOA sent by the secondary.
The main reason for the DM sending a SOA query is to update the SOA This format may also provide the basis for a future OAUTH2 [RFC6749]
RRset after the TTL expires, to check the serial number upon the flow that could do the setup automatically.
receipt of a NOTIFY query from the Hidden Primary, or to re-send the
SOA request when the response has not been received. When a flood of
SOA queries is received by the Hidden Primary, the Hidden Primary may
assume it is involved in an attack.
There are few legitimate time slots when the secondary is expected to The HNA needs to be configured with the following parameters as
send a SOA query. Suppose T_NOTIFY is the time a NOTIFY is sent by described by this CDDL [RFC8610]. These are the parameters are
the Hidden Primary, T_SOA the last time the SOA has been queried, TTL necessary to establish a secure channel between the HNA and the DM as
the TTL associated to the SOA, and T_REFRESH the refresh time defined well as to specify the DNS zone that is in the scope of the
in the SOA RRset. The specific time SOA queries are expected can be communication.
for example T_NOTIFY, T_SOA + 2/3 TTL, T_SOA + TTL, T_SOA +
T_REFRESH., and. Outside a few minutes following these specific time
slots, the probability that the HNA discards a legitimate SOA query
is very low. Within these time slots, the probability the secondary
may have its legitimate query rejected is higher. If a legitimate
SOA is discarded, the secondary will re-send SOA query every "retry
time" second until "expire time" seconds occurs, where "retry time"
and "expire time" have been defined in the SOA.
As a result, it is RECOMMENDED to set rate limiting policies to hna-configuration = {
protect HNA resources. If a flood lasts more than the expired time "registred_domain" : tstr,
defined by the SOA, it is RECOMMENDED to re-initiate a "dm" : tstr,
synchronization between the Hidden Primary and the secondaries. ? "dm_transport" : "53" // "DoT" // "DoH" // "DoQ"
? "dm_port" : uint,
? "dm_acl" : hna-acl // [ +hna-acl ]
? "hna_auth_method": hna-auth-method
? "hna_certificate": tstr
}
13.6. Reflection Attacks involving the DM hna-acl = tstr
hna-auth-method /= "certificate"
The DM acts as a secondary coupled with the Hidden Primary. The For example:
secondary expects to receive NOTIFY query, SOA responses, AXFR and
IXFR responses from the Hidden Primary.
Sending a NOTIFY query to the secondary generates a NOTIFY response {
as well as initiating an SOA query exchange from the secondary to the "registered_domain" : "n8d234f.r.example.net",
Hidden Primary. As mentioned in [RFC1996], this is a known "benign "dm" : "2001:db8:1234:111:222::2",
denial of service attack". As a result, the DM SHOULD enforce rate "dm_transport" : "DoT",
limiting on sending SOA queries and NOTIFY responses to the Hidden "dm_port" : 4433,
Primary. Most likely, when the secondary is flooded with valid and "dm_acl" : "2001:db8:1f15:62e:21c::/64"
signed NOTIFY queries, it is under a replay attack which is discussed or [ "2001:db8:1f15:62e:21c::/64", ... ]
in Section 13.9. The key thing here is that the secondary is likely "hna_auth_method" : "certificate",
to be designed to be able to process much more traffic than the "hna_certificate" : "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIDTjCCFGy....",
Hidden Primary hosted on a HNA. }
This paragraph details how the secondary may limit the NOTIFY 14.1. Outsourced Information Model
queries. Because the Hidden Primary may be renumbered, the secondary
SHOULD NOT perform permanent IP filtering based on IP addresses. In
addition, a given secondary may be shared among multiple Hidden
Primaries which make filtering rules based on IP harder to set. The
time at which a NOTIFY is sent by the Hidden Primary is not
predictable. However, a flood of NOTIFY messages may be easily
detected, as a NOTIFY originated from a given Homenet Zone is
expected to have a very limited number of unique source IP addresses,
even when renumbering is occurring. As a result, the secondary, MAY
rate limit incoming NOTIFY queries.
On the Hidden Primary side, it is recommended that the Hidden Primary Registered Homenet Domain (zone) The Domain Name of the zone.
sends a NOTIFY as long as the zone has not been updated by the Multiple Registered Homenet Domains may be provided. This will
secondary. Multiple SOA queries may indicate the secondary is under generate the creation of multiple Public Homenet Zones. This
attack. parameter is MANDATORY.
13.7. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative Servers Distribution Master notification address (dm) The associated FQDNs
or IP addresses of the DM to which DNS notifies should be sent.
This parameter is MANDATORY. IP addresses are optional and the
FQDN is sufficient and preferred. If there are concerns about the
security of the name to IP translation, then DNSSEC should be
employed.
Reflection attacks involving the Public Authoritative Server(s) are As the session between the HNA and the DM is authenticated with TLS,
similar to attacks on any DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure. This is the use of names is easier.
not specific to the architecture described in this document, and thus
are considered as out of scope.
In fact, one motivation of the architecture described in this As certificates are more commonly emitted for FQDN than for IP
document is to expose the Public Authoritative Server(s) to attacks addresses, it is preferred to use names and authenticate the name of
instead of the HNA, as it is believed that the Public Authoritative the DM during the TLS session establishment.
Server(s) will be better able to defend itself.
13.8. Flooding Attack Supported Transport (dm_transport) The transport that carries the
DNS exchanges between the HNA and the DM. Typical values are
"53", "DoT", "DoH", "DoQ". This parameter is OPTIONAL and by
default the HNA uses DoT.
The purpose of flooding attacks is mostly resource exhaustion, where Distribution Master Port (dm_port) Indicates the port used by the
the resource can be bandwidth, memory, or CPU for example. DM. This parameter is OPTIONAL and the default value is provided
by the Supported Transport. In the future, additional transport
may not have default port, in which case either a default port
needs to be defined or this parameter become MANDATORY.
One goal of the architecture described in this document is to limit Note that HNA does not defines ports for the Synchronization Channel.
the surface of attack on the HNA. This is done by outsourcing the In any case, this is not expected to part of the configuration, but
DNS service to the Public Authoritative Server(s). By doing so, the instead negotiated through the Configuration Channel. Currently the
HNA limits its DNS interactions between the Hidden Primary and the Configuration Channel does not provide this, and limits its agility
DM. This limits the number of entities the HNA interacts with as to a dedicated IP address. If such agility is needed in the future,
well as the scope of DNS exchanges - NOTIFY, SOA, AXFR, IXFR. additional exchanges will need to be defined.
The use of an authenticated channel with SIG(0) or TSIG between the Authentication Method ("hna_auth_method"): How the HNA authenticates
HNA and the DM, enables detection of illegitimate DNS queries, so itself to the DM within the TLS connection(s). The authentication
appropriate action may be taken - like dropping the queries. If meth of can typically be "certificate", "psk" or "none". This
signatures are validated, then most likely, the HNA is under a replay Parameter is OPTIONAL and by default the Authentication Method is
attack, as detailed in Section 13.9 "certificate".
In order to limit the resource required for authentication, it is Authentication data ("hna_certificate", "hna_key"): : The certificate
recommended to use TSIG that uses symmetric cryptography over SIG(0) chain used to authenticate the HNA. This parameter is OPTIONAL and
that uses asymmetric cryptography. when not specified, a self-signed certificate is used.
13.9. Replay Attack Distribution Master AXFR permission netmask (dm_acl): The subnet
from which the CPE should accept SOA queries and AXFR requests. A
subnet is used in the case where the DNS Outsourced Infrastructure
consists of a number of different systems. An array of addresses
is permitted. This parameter is OPTIONAL and if unspecified, the
CPE the IP addresses specified in the dm_notify parameters or the
IP addresses that result from the DNS(SEC) resolution when
dm_notify specifies a FQDN.
Replay attacks consist of an attacker either resending or delaying a For forward zones, the relationship between the HNA and the forward
legitimate message that has been sent by an authorized user or zone provider may be the result of a number of transactions:
process. As the Hidden Primary and the DM use an authenticated
channel, replay attacks are mostly expected to use forged DNS queries
in order to provide valid traffic.
From the perspective of an attacker, using a correctly authenticated 1. The forward zone outsourcing may be provided by the maker of the
DNS query may not be detected as an attack and thus may generate a Homenet router. In this case, the identity and authorization
response. Generating and sending a response consumes more resources could be built in the device at manufacturer provisioning time.
than either dropping the query by the defender, or generating the The device would need to be provisioned with a device-unique
query by the attacker, and thus could be used for resource exhaustion credential, and it is likely that the Registered Homenet Domain
attacks. In addition, as the authentication is performed at the DNS would be derived from a public attribute of the device, such as a
layer, the source IP address could be impersonated in order to serial number (see Appendix B or
perform a reflection attack. [I-D.richardson-homerouter-provisioning] for more details ).
Section 13.4 details how to mitigate reflection attacks and 2. The forward zone outsourcing may be provided by the Internet
Section 13.8 details how to mitigate resource exhaustion. Both Service Provider. In this case, the use of
sections assume a context of DoS with a flood of DNS queries. This [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] to provide the
section suggests a way to limit the attack surface of replay attacks. credentials is appropriate.
As SIG(0) and TSIG use inception and expiration time, the time frame 3. The forward zone may be outsourced to a third party, such as a
for replay attack is limited. SIG(0) and TSIG recommends a fudge domain registrar. In this case, the use of the JSON-serialized
value of 5 minutes. This value has been set as a compromise between YANG data model described in this section is appropriate, as it
possibly loose time synchronization between devices and the valid can easily be copy and pasted by the user, or downloaded as part
lifetime of the message. As a result, better time synchronization of a web transaction.
policies could reduce the time window of the attack.
14. Data Model for Outsourced information For reverse zones, the relationship is always with the upstream ISP
(although there may be more than one), and so
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] is always the
appropriate interface.
The following is an abbridged example of a set of data that The following is an abbridged example of a set of data that
represents the needed configuration parameters for outsourcing. represents the needed configuration parameters for outsourcing.
{
"dm_notify" : "2001:db8:1f15:62e:21c::2",
"dm_acl" : "2001:db8:1f15:62e:21c::/64",
"dm_ctrl" : "192.168.1.18",
"dm_port" : "4433",
"ns_list" : [ "ns1.publicdns.example", "ns2.publicdns.example"],
"zone" : "daniel.homenetdns.example",
"auth_method" : "certificate",
"hna_certificate":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIDTjCCFGy....",
"hna_key" : "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIEowICAQE...."
}
Here goes a YANG MODULE description of the above.
15. IANA Considerations 15. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no actions for IANA.
16. Acknowledgment 16. Acknowledgment
The authors wish to thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on The authors wish to thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on
the early versions of the draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues the early versions of the draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues
with the IPv6 routed home concept and placing the scope of this with the IPv6 routed home concept and placing the scope of this
document in a wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and document in a wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and
skipping to change at page 33, line 4 skipping to change at page 31, line 6
Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on
HNA and low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC HNA and low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC
capabilities of small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as capabilities of small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as
dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael
Abrahamson, and Ray Bellis for their feedback on handling different Abrahamson, and Ray Bellis for their feedback on handling different
views as well as clarifying the impact of outsourcing the zone views as well as clarifying the impact of outsourcing the zone
signing operation outside the HNA; Mark Andrew and Peter Koch for signing operation outside the HNA; Mark Andrew and Peter Koch for
clarifying the renumbering. clarifying the renumbering.
17. References 17. References
17.1. Normative References 17.1. Normative References
[RFC1033] Lottor, M., "Domain Administrators Operations Guide", [I-D.ietf-dprive-xfr-over-tls]
RFC 1033, DOI 10.17487/RFC1033, November 1987, Toorop, W., Dickinson, S., Sahib, S., Aras, P., and A.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1033>. Mankin, "DNS Zone Transfer-over-TLS", draft-ietf-dprive-
xfr-over-tls-05 (work in progress), January 2021.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987, STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995, [RFC1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1995, August 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC1995, August 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1995>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1995>.
[RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone
Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC1996,
August 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1996>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2136] Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound, [RFC2136] Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997, RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>.
[RFC2142] Crocker, D., "Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and
Functions", RFC 2142, DOI 10.17487/RFC2142, May 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2142>.
[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.
[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B. [RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B.
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
(TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000, (TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>.
[RFC2931] Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures [RFC2931] Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures
( SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, DOI 10.17487/RFC2931, September ( SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, DOI 10.17487/RFC2931, September
2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2931>. 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2931>.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
skipping to change at page 34, line 47 skipping to change at page 32, line 37
Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for
Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service", RFC 6092, Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service", RFC 6092,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6092, January 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6092, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6092>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6092>.
[RFC6644] Evans, D., Droms, R., and S. Jiang, "Rebind Capability in [RFC6644] Evans, D., Droms, R., and S. Jiang, "Rebind Capability in
DHCPv6 Reconfigure Messages", RFC 6644, DHCPv6 Reconfigure Messages", RFC 6644,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6644, July 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6644, July 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6644>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6644>.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.
[RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762, [RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.
[RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service [RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013, Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.
[RFC6887] Wing, D., Ed., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and [RFC6887] Wing, D., Ed., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and
P. Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 6887, P. Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 6887,
skipping to change at page 36, line 28 skipping to change at page 34, line 23
[RFC8415] Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A., [RFC8415] Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters, Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
"Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018, RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
(DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.
[RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.
17.2. Informative References 17.2. Informative References
[I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns]
Howard, L., "Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service Howard, L., "Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service
Providers", draft-howard-dnsop-ip6rdns-00 (work in Providers", draft-howard-dnsop-ip6rdns-00 (work in
progress), June 2014. progress), June 2014.
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]
Migault, D., Weber, R., Mrugalski, T., Griffiths, C., and Migault, D., Weber, R., Mrugalski, T., Griffiths, C., and
W. Cloetens, "DHCPv6 Options for Home Network Naming W. Cloetens, "DHCPv6 Options for Home Network Naming
Authority", draft-ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc- Authority", draft-ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-
options-08 (work in progress), October 2020. options-08 (work in progress), October 2020.
[I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming] [I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming]
Lemon, T., Migault, D., and S. Cheshire, "Homenet Naming Lemon, T., Migault, D., and S. Cheshire, "Homenet Naming
and Service Discovery Architecture", draft-ietf-homenet- and Service Discovery Architecture", draft-ietf-homenet-
simple-naming-03 (work in progress), October 2018. simple-naming-03 (work in progress), October 2018.
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-38 (work in progress), May
2020.
[I-D.richardson-homerouter-provisioning] [I-D.richardson-homerouter-provisioning]
Richardson, M., "Provisioning Initial Device Identifiers Richardson, M., "Provisioning Initial Device Identifiers
into Home Routers", draft-richardson-homerouter- into Home Routers", draft-richardson-homerouter-
provisioning-00 (work in progress), November 2020. provisioning-00 (work in progress), November 2020.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC8094] Reddy, T., Wing, D., and P. Patil, "DNS over Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 8094,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8094, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8094>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
[RFC8672] Sheffer, Y. and D. Migault, "TLS Server Identity Pinning [RFC8672] Sheffer, Y. and D. Migault, "TLS Server Identity Pinning
with Tickets", RFC 8672, DOI 10.17487/RFC8672, October with Tickets", RFC 8672, DOI 10.17487/RFC8672, October
2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8672>. 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8672>.
Appendix A. Envisioned deployment scenarios Appendix A. Envisioned deployment scenarios
A number of deployment have been envisioned, this section aims at A number of deployment have been envisioned, this section aims at
providing a brief description. The use cases are not limitations and providing a brief description. The use cases are not limitations and
this section is not normative. this section is not normative.
skipping to change at page 38, line 23 skipping to change at page 36, line 23
A specific vendor with specific relations with a registrar or a A specific vendor with specific relations with a registrar or a
registry may sell a CPE that is provisioned with provisioned domain registry may sell a CPE that is provisioned with provisioned domain
name. Such domain name does not need to be necessary human readable. name. Such domain name does not need to be necessary human readable.
One possible way is that the vendor also provisions the HNA with a One possible way is that the vendor also provisions the HNA with a
private and public keys as well as a certificate. Note that these private and public keys as well as a certificate. Note that these
keys are not expected to be used for DNSSEC signing. Instead these keys are not expected to be used for DNSSEC signing. Instead these
keys are solely used by the HNA to proceed to the authentication. keys are solely used by the HNA to proceed to the authentication.
Normally the keys should be necessary and sufficient to proceed to Normally the keys should be necessary and sufficient to proceed to
the authentication. The reason to combine the domain name and the the authentication. The reason to combine the domain name and the
key is that outsourcing infrastructure are likely handle names better key is that DOI are likely handle names better than keys and that
than keys and that domain names might be used as a login which domain names might be used as a login which enables the key to be
enables the key to be regenerated. regenerated.
When the home network owner plugs the CPE at home, the relation When the home network owner plugs the CPE at home, the relation
between HNA and DM is expected to work out-of-the-box. between HNA and DM is expected to work out-of-the-box.
A.2. Agnostic CPE A.2. Agnostic CPE
An CPE that is not preconfigured may also take advanatge to the An CPE that is not preconfigured may also take advantage to the
protocol defined in this document but some configuration steps will protocol defined in this document but some configuration steps will
be needed. be needed.
1. The owner of the home network buys a domain name to a registrar, 1. The owner of the home network buys a domain name to a registrar,
and as such creates an account on that registrar and as such creates an account on that registrar
2. Either the registrar is also providing the outsourcing 2. Either the registrar is also providing the outsourcing
infrastructure or the home network needs to create a specific infrastructure or the home network needs to create a specific
account on the outsourcing infrastructure. * If the outsourcing account on the outsourcing infrastructure. * If the DOI is the
provider is the registrar, the outsourcing has by design a proof registrar, it has by design a proof of ownership of the domain
of ownership of the domain name by the homenet owner. In this name by the homenet owner. In this case, it is expected the DOI
case, it is expected the infrastructure provides the necessary provides the necessary parameters to the home network owner to
parameters to the home network owner to configure the HNA. A configure the HNA. A good way to provide the parameters would be
good way to provide the parameters would be the home network be the home network be able to copy/paste a JSON object - see
able to copy/paste a JSON object. What matters at that point is Section 14. What matters at that point is the DOI being able to
the outsourcing infrastructure being able to generate generate authentication credentials for the HNA to authenticate
authentication credentials for the HNA to authenticate itself to itself to the DOI. This obviously requires the home network to
the outsourcing infrastructure. This obviously requires the home provide the public key generated by the HNA in a CSR.
network to provide the public key gnerated by the HNA in a CSR.
o If the outsourcing infrastructure is not the registrar, then the
proof of ownership needs to be established using protocols like
ACME for example that will end in the generation of a certificate.
ACME is used here to the purpose of automating the generation of
the certificate, the CA may be a specific CA or the outsourcing
infrastructure. With that being done, the outsourcing
infrastructure has a roof of ownership and can proceed as above.
Appendix B. Example: Homenet Zone
This section is not normative and intends to illustrate how the HNA
builds the Homenet Zone.
As depicted in Figure 1, the Public Homenet Zone is hosted on the
Public Authoritative Server(s), whereas the Homenet Zone is hosted on
the HNA. This section considers that the HNA builds the zone that
will be effectively published on the Public Authoritative Server(s).
In other words "Homenet to Public Zone transformation" is the
identity also commonly designated as "no operation" (NOP).
In that case, the Homenet Zone should configure its Name Server RRset
(NS) and Start of Authority (SOA) with the values associated with the
Public Authoritative Server(s). This is illustrated in Figure 2.
public.primary.example.net is the FQDN of the Public Authoritative
Server(s), and IP1, IP2, IP3, IP4 are the associated IP addresses.
Then the HNA should add the additional new nodes that enter the home
network, remove those that should be removed, and sign the Homenet
Zone.
$ORIGIN example.com
$TTL 1h
@ IN SOA public.primary.example.net
hostmaster.example.com. (
2013120710 ; serial number of this zone file
1d ; secondary refresh
2h ; secondary retry time in case of a problem
4w ; secondary expiration time
1h ; maximum caching time in case of failed
; lookups
)
@ NS public.authoritative.servers.example.net
public.primary.example.net A @IP1
public.primary.example.net A @IP2
public.primary.example.net AAAA @IP3
public.primary.example.net AAAA @IP4
Figure 2: Homenet Zone
The SOA RRset is defined in [RFC1033], [RFC1035] and [RFC2308]. This
SOA is specific, as it is used for the synchronization between the
Hidden Primary and the DM and published on the DNS Public
Authoritative Server(s)..
o MNAME: indicates the primary. In our case the zone is published
on the Public Authoritative Server(s), and its name MUST be
included. If multiple Public Authoritative Server(s) are
involved, one of them MUST be chosen. More specifically, the HNA
MUST NOT include the name of the Hidden Primary.
o RNAME: indicates the email address to reach the administrator.
[RFC2142] recommends using hostmaster@domain and replacing the '@'
sign by '.'.
o REFRESH and RETRY: indicate respectively in seconds how often
secondaries need to check the primary, and the time between two
refresh when a refresh has failed. Default values indicated by
[RFC1033] are 3600 (1 hour) for refresh and 600 (10 minutes) for
retry. This value might be too long for highly dynamic content.
However, the Public Authoritative Server(s) and the HNA are
expected to implement NOTIFY [RFC1996]. So whilst shorter refresh
timers might increase the bandwidth usage for secondaries hosting
large number of zones, it will have little practical impact on the
elapsed time required to achieve synchronization between the
Outsourcing Infrastructure and the Hidden Master. As a result,
the default values are acceptable.
o EXPIRE: is the upper limit data SHOULD be kept in absence of
refresh. The default value indicated by [RFC1033] is 3600000
(approx. 42 days). In home network architectures, the HNA
provides both the DNS synchronization and the access to the home
network. This device may be plugged and unplugged by the end user
without notification, thus we recommend a long expiry timer.
o MINIMUM: indicates the minimum TTL. The default value indicated
by [RFC1033] is 86400 (1 day). For home network, this value MAY
be reduced, and 3600 (1 hour) seems more appropriate.
Appendix C. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing
This section specifies the various parameters required by the HNA to
configure the naming architecture of this document. This section is
informational, and is intended to clarify the information handled by
the HNA and the various settings to be done.
The HNA needs to be configured with the following parameters. These
parameters are necessary to establish a secure channel between the
HNA and the DM as well as to specify the DNS zone that is in the
scope of the communication:
Distribution Master notification address (dm_notify): The associated
FQDNs or IP addresses of the DM to which DNS notifies should be
sent. IP addresses are optional and the FQDN is sufficient and
preferred. If there are concerns about the security of the name
to IP translation, then DNSSEC should be employed.
Authentication Method ("method"): How the HNA authenticates itself
to the DM. This specification defines only "certificate"
Authentication data ("hna_certificate", "hna_key"): While a PSK can
be used used as part of TSIG authentication, it has poor security
properties and is hard to scale. Better solutions use public key
mechanisms, leveraging private keys built into the HNA.
Public Authoritative Server(s) (dm_ctrl and dm_port): The FQDN or IP
addresses of the Public Authoritative Server(s) to which control
messages will be sent. IP addresses are optional and the FQDN is
sufficient.
(XXX? what? It MAY correspond to the data that will be sent in the
NS RRsets and SOA of the Homenet Zone.)
Registered Homenet Domain (???): The domain name used to establish
the secure channel. This name is used by the DM and the HNA for
the primary / secondary configuration as well as to index the
NOTIFY queries of the HNA when the HNA has been renumbered.
Registered Homenet Domain (zone): The Domain Name of the zone.
Multiple Registered Homenet Domains may be provided. This will
generate the creation of multiple Public Homenet Zones.
Public Authoritative Server (ns-list): The Public Authoritative
Server(s) associated with the Registered Homenet Domain. Multiple
Public Authoritative Server(s) may be provided.
For forward zones, the relationship between the HNA and the forward
zone provider may be the result of a number of transactions:
1. The forward zone outsourcing may be provided by the maker of the
Homenet router. In this case, the identity and authorization
could be built in the device at manufacturer provisioning time.
The device would need to be provisioned with a device-unique
credential, and it is likely that the Registered Homenet Domain
would be derived from a public attribute of the device, such as a
serial number.
2. The forward zone outsourcing may be provided by the Internet
Service Provider. In this case, the use of
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] to provide the
credentials is appropriate.
3. The forward zone may be outsourced to a third party, such as a
domain registrar. In this case, the use of the JSON-serialized
YANG data model described in section Section 14 is appropriate,
as it can easily be copy and pasted by the user, or downloaded as
part of a web transaction.
For reverse zones, the relationship is always with the upstream ISP o If the DOI is not the registrar, then the proof of ownership needs
(although there may be more than one), and so to be established using protocols like ACME [RFC8555] for example
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] is always the that will end in the generation of a certificate. ACME is used
appropriate interface. here to the purpose of automating the generation of the
certificate, the CA may be a specific CA or the DOI. With that
being done, the DOI has a roof of ownership and can proceed as
above.
Appendix D. Example: A manufacturer provisioned HNA product flow Appendix B. Example: A manufacturer provisioned HNA product flow
This scenario is one where a homenet router device manufacturer This scenario is one where a homenet router device manufacturer
decides to offer DNS hosting as a value add. decides to offer DNS hosting as a value add.
[I-D.richardson-homerouter-provisioning] describes a process for a [I-D.richardson-homerouter-provisioning] describes a process for a
home router credential provisioning system. The outline of it is home router credential provisioning system. The outline of it is
that near the end of the manufacturing process, as part of the that near the end of the manufacturing process, as part of the
firmware loading, the manufacturer provisions a private key and firmware loading, the manufacturer provisions a private key and
certificate into the device. certificate into the device.
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