draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-11.txt   draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-12.txt 
Homenet D. Migault Homenet D. Migault
Internet-Draft Ericsson Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Informational R. Weber Intended status: Standards Track R. Weber
Expires: October 21, 2020 Nominum Expires: May 6, 2021 Nominum
M. Richardson M. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works Sandelman Software Works
R. Hunter R. Hunter
Globis Consulting BV Globis Consulting BV
C. Griffiths C. Griffiths
W. Cloetens W. Cloetens
SoftAtHome Deutsche Telekom
April 19, 2020 November 02, 2020
Outsourcing Home Network Authoritative Naming Service Simple Provisioning of Public Names for Residential Networks
draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-11 draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-12
Abstract Abstract
The Homenet Naming authority is responsible for making devices within Home owners often have IPv6 devices that they wish to access over the
the home network accessible by name within the home network as well Internet using names. It has been possible to register and populate
as from outside the home network (e.g. the Internet). The names of a DNS Zone with names since DNS became a thing, but it has been an
the devices accessible from the Internet are stored in the Public activity typically reserved for experts. This document automates the
Homenet Zone, served by a DNS authoritative server. It is unlikely process through creation of a Homenet Naming Authority, whose
that home networks will contain sufficiently robust platforms responsibility is to select, sign and publish names to a set of
designed to host a service such as the DNS on the Internet and as publically visible servers.
such would expose the home network to DDoS attacks.
This document describes a mechanism that enables the Home Network The use of an outsourced primary DNS server deals with possible
Authority (HNA) to outsource the naming service to the Outsourcing renumbering of the home network, and with possible denial of service
Infrastructure via a Distribution Master (DM). attacks against the DNS infrastructure.
This document describes the mechanism that enables the Home Network
Authority (HNA) to outsource the naming service to the DNS
Outsourcing Infrastructure via a Distribution Master (DM).
In addition, this document deals with publication of a corresponding
reverse zone.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 21, 2020.
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Alternative solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Selecting Names to Publish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.2. Alternative solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Architecture Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Architecture Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Distribution Master Communication Channels . . . . . . . 10 3.1. Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Distribution Master Communication Channels . . . . . . . 11
4. Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) and 4. Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) and
Distribution Master (DM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Distribution Master (DM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Information to build the Public Homenet Zone. . . . . . . 12 4.1. Information to build the Public Homenet Zone. . . . . . . 13
4.2. Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust. . . . . . 12 4.2. Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust . . . . . 13
4.3. Information to set the Synchronization Channel, . . . . . 12 4.3. Information to set the Synchronization Channel . . . . . 14
4.4. Deleting the delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4. Deleting the delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5. Messages Exchange Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.5. Messages Exchange Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5.1. Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone. . 13 4.5.1. Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone. . 15
4.5.2. Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust . 14 4.5.2. Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust . 16
4.5.3. Providing information for the Synchronization Channel 15 4.5.3. Providing information for the Synchronization Channel 16
4.5.4. HNA instructing deleting the delegation . . . . . . . 15 4.5.4. HNA instructing deleting the delegation . . . . . . . 17
4.6. Securing the Control Channel between Homenet Naming 4.6. Securing the Control Channel between Homenet Naming
Authority (HNA) and Distribution Master (DM) . . . . . . 15 Authority (HNA) and Distribution Master (DM) . . . . . . 17
4.7. Implementation Tips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.7. Implementation Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . . . . . . . . 17 5. DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . . . . . . . . 19
5.1. Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . 18 5.1. Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . 20
6. DM Distribution Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6. DM Distribution Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7. HNA Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7. HNA Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9. Homenet Reverse Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9. Homenet Reverse Zone Channels Configuration . . . . . . . . . 21
10. Renumbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10. Homenet Public Zone Channel Configurations . . . . . . . . . 22
10.1. Hidden Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 11. Renumbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10.2. Distribution Master . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 11.1. Hidden Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.2. Distribution Master . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
11. Operational considerations for Offline/Disconnected 12. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
12. provisioning of the Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) . . . . . 22 13.1. HNA DMand RDM channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
13. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 13.2. Names are less secure than IP addresses . . . . . . . . 27
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 13.3. Names are less volatile than IP addresses . . . . . . . 27
14.1. HNA DM channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 13.4. DNS Reflection Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
14.2. Names are less secure than IP addresses . . . . . . . . 24 13.5. Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary . . . . . 28
14.3. Names are less volatile than IP addresses . . . . . . . 24 13.6. Reflection Attacks involving the DM . . . . . . . . . . 30
14.4. DNS Reflection Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 13.7. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative
14.5. Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary . . . . . 25 Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
14.6. Reflection Attacks involving the DM . . . . . . . . . . 26 13.8. Flooding Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
14.7. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative 13.9. Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 14. Data Model for Outsourced information . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
14.8. Flooding Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
14.9. Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 16. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
16. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Appendix A. Envisioned deployment scenarios . . . . . . . . . . 38
17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 A.1. CPE Vendor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix A. Envisioned deployment scenarios . . . . . . . . . . 34 A.2. Agnostic CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A.1. CPE Vendor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Appendix B. Example: Homenet Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
A.2. Agnostic CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Appendix C. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing . 41
Appendix B. Example: Homenet Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Appendix D. Example: A manufacturer provisioned HNA product flow 42
Appendix C. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing . 37 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Homenet Naming authority is responsible for making devices within The Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) is responsible for making devices
the home network accessible by name within the home network as well within the home network accessible by name within the home network as
as from outside the home network (e.g. the Internet). IPv6 well as from outside the home network (e.g. the Internet). IPv6
connectivity provides the possibility of global end to end IP connectivity provides the possibility of global end to end IP
connectivity. End users will be able to transparently make use of connectivity. End users will be able to transparently make use of
this connectivity if they can use names to access the services they this connectivity if they can use names to access the services they
want from their home network. want from their home network.
The use of a DNS zone for each home network is a reasonable and The use of a DNS zone for each home network is a reasonable and
scalable way to make the set of public names visible. There are a scalable way to make the set of public names visible. There are a
number of ways to populate such a zone. This specification proposes number of ways to populate such a zone. This specification proposes
a way to do with based upon a number of assumptions about typical a way based on a number of assumptions about typical home networks.
home networks.
1. The names of the devices accessible from the Internet are stored 1. The names of the devices accessible from the Internet are stored
in the Public Homenet Zone, served by a DNS authoritative server. in the Public Homenet Zone, served by a DNS authoritative server.
2. It is unlikely that home networks will contain sufficiently 2. It is unlikely that home networks will contain sufficiently
robust platforms designed to host a service such as the DNS on robust platforms designed to host a service such as the DNS on
the Internet and as such would expose the home network to DDoS the Internet and as such would expose the home network to DDoS
attacks. attacks.
3. [RFC7368] emphazes that the home network is subject to 3. [RFC7368] emphasizes that the home network is subject to
connectivity disruptions with the ISP. But, names used within connectivity disruptions with the ISP. But, names used within
the home MUST be resilient against such disruption. the home MUST be resilient against such disruption.
So a goal of this specification is to make the public names This specification makes the public names resolvable within both the
resolvable within both the home network and on the Internet, even home network and on the Internet, even when there are disruptions.
when there are disruptions.
This is achieved by having a device inside the home network that This is achieved by having a device inside the home network that
builds, publishes, and manages a Public Homenet Zone, thus providing builds, signs, publishes, and manages a Public Homenet Zone, thus
bindings between public names, IP addresses, and other RR types. providing bindings between public names, IP addresses, and other RR
types.
The management of the names can be a role that the Customer Premises The management of the names can be a role that the Customer Premises
Equipment (CPE) does. Other devices in the home network could Equipment (CPE) does. Other devices in the home network could
fulfill this role e.g. a NAS server, but for simplicity, this fulfill this role e.g. a NAS server, but for simplicity, this
document assumes the function is located on one of the CPE devices. document assumes the function is located on one of the CPE devices.
The homenet architecture [RFC7368] makes it clear that a home network The homenet architecture [RFC7368] makes it clear that a home network
may have multiple CPEs. The management of the Public Homenet Zone may have multiple CPEs. The management of the Public Homenet Zone
involves DNS specific mechanisms that cannot be distributed over involves DNS specific mechanisms that cannot be distributed over
multiple servers (primary server), when multiple nodes can multiple servers (primary server), when multiple nodes can
skipping to change at page 4, line 47 skipping to change at page 5, line 4
devices, are usually low powered devices not designed for terminating devices, are usually low powered devices not designed for terminating
heavy traffic. As a result, hosting an authoritative DNS service heavy traffic. As a result, hosting an authoritative DNS service
visible to the Internet may expose the home network to resource visible to the Internet may expose the home network to resource
exhaustion and other attacks. On the other hand, if the only copy of exhaustion and other attacks. On the other hand, if the only copy of
the public zone is on the Internet, then Internet connectivity the public zone is on the Internet, then Internet connectivity
disruptions would make the names unavailable inside the homenet. disruptions would make the names unavailable inside the homenet.
In order to avoid resource exhaustion and other attacks, this In order to avoid resource exhaustion and other attacks, this
document describes an architecture that outsources the authoritative document describes an architecture that outsources the authoritative
naming service of the home network. More specifically, the HNA naming service of the home network. More specifically, the HNA
builds the Public Homenet Zone and outsources it to an Outsourcing builds the Public Homenet Zone and outsources it to an DNS
Infrastructure via a Distribution Master (DM). The Outsourcing Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI) via a Distribution Master (DM). The
Infrastructure is in charge of publishing the corresponding Public DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI) is in charge of publishing the
Homenet Zone on the Internet. The transfer of DNS zone information corresponding Public Homenet Zone on the Internet. The transfer of
is achieved using standard DNS mechanisms involving primary and DNS zone information is achieved using standard DNS mechanisms
secondary DNS servers, with the HNA hosted primary being a stealth involving primary and secondary DNS servers, with the HNA hosted
primary, and the Distribution Master a secondary. primary being a stealth primary, and the Distribution Master a
secondary.
Section 3.1 provides an architecture description that describes the Section 3.1 provides an architecture description that describes the
relation between the HNA and the Outsourcing Architecture. In order relation between the HNA and the Outsourcing Architecture. In order
to keep the Public Homenet Zone up-to-date Section 5 describes how to keep the Public Homenet Zone up-to-date Section 5 describes how
the HNA and the Outsourcing Infrastructure synchronizes the Pubic the HNA and the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure synchronizes the Pubic
Homenet Zone. Homenet Zone.
The proposed architecture is explicitly designed to enable fully The proposed architecture is explicitly designed to enable fully
functional DNSSEC, and the Public Homenet Zone is expected to be functional DNSSEC, and the Public Homenet Zone is expected to be
signed with a secure delegation. DNSSEC key management and zone signed with a secure delegation. DNSSEC key management and zone
signing is handled by the HNA. signing is handled by the HNA.
Section 10 discusses management and configuration of the Public
Homenet Zone. It shows that the HNA configuration of the Outsourcing
infrastructure can involve no or little interaction with the end
user. More specifically, it shows that the existence of an account
in the DOI is sufficient for the DOI to push the necessary
configuration.
Section 9 discusses management of one or more reverse zones. It Section 9 discusses management of one or more reverse zones. It
shows that management of the reverse zones can be entirely automated shows that management of the reverse zones can be entirely automated
and benefit from a pre-established relation between the ISP and the and benefit from a pre-established relation between the ISP and the
home network. Note that such scenarios may also be met for the home network. Note that such scenarios may also be met for the
Public Homenet Zone, but not necessarily. Public Homenet Zone, but not necessarily.
Section 10 discusses how renumbering should be handled. Finally, Section 11 discusses how renumbering should be handled. Finally,
Section 13 and Section 14 respectively discuss privacy and security Section 12 and Section 13 respectively discuss privacy and security
considerations when outsourcing the Public Homenet Zone. considerations when outsourcing the Public Homenet Zone.
The Public Homenet Zone is expected to contain public information The Public Homenet Zone is expected to contain public information
only in a single universal view. This document does not define how only in a single universal view. This document does not define how
the information required to construct this view is derived. the information required to construct this view is derived.
It is also not in the scope of this document to define names for It is also not in the scope of this document to define names for
exclusive use within the boundaries of the local home network. exclusive use within the boundaries of the local home network.
Instead, local scope information is expected to be provided to the Instead, local scope information is expected to be provided to the
home network using local scope naming services. mDNS [RFC6762] DNS-SD home network using local scope naming services. mDNS [RFC6762] DNS-SD
[RFC6763] are two examples of these services. Currently mDNS is [RFC6763] are two examples of these services. Currently mDNS is
limited to a single link network. However, future protocols and limited to a single link network. However, future protocols and
architectures [I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming] are expected to architectures [I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming] are expected to
leverage this constraint as pointed out in [RFC7558]. leverage this constraint as pointed out in [RFC7558].
1.1. Alternative solutions 1.1. Selecting Names to Publish
While this document does not create any normative mechanism by which
the selection of names to publish, this document anticipates that the
home network administrator (a humuan), will be presented with a list
of current names and addresses present on the inside of the home
network.
The administrator would mark which devices (by name), are to be
published. The HNA would then collect the IPv6 address(es)
associated with that device, and put the name into the Public Homenet
Zone. The address of the device can be collected from a number of
places: mDNS [RFC6762], DHCP [RFC6644], UPnP, PCP [RFC6887], or
manual configuration.
A device may have a Global Unicast Address (GUA), a Unique Local IPv6
Address (ULA), as as well IPv6-Link-Local addresses, IPv4-Link-Local
Addresses, and RFC1918 addresses. Of these the link-local are never
useful for the Public Zone, and should be ommitted. The IPv6 ULA and
the RFC1918 addresses may be useful to publish, if the home network
environment features a VPN that would allow the home owner to reach
the network.
The IPv6 ULA addressees are significantly safer to publish, as the
RFC1918 addressees are likely to be confusing to any other entity.
In general, one expects the GUA to be the default address to be
published. However, during periods when the home network has
connectivity problems, the ULA and RFC1918 addressees can be used
inside the home, and the mapping from public name to locally useful
location address would permit many services secured with HTTPS to
continue to operate.
1.2. Alternative solutions
An alternative existing solution in IPv4 is to have a single zone, An alternative existing solution in IPv4 is to have a single zone,
where a host uses a RESTful HTTP service to register a single name where a host uses a RESTful HTTP service to register a single name
into a common public zone. This is often called "Dynamic DNS", and into a common public zone. This is often called "Dynamic DNS", and
there are a number of commercial providers, including Dyn, Gandi etc. there are a number of commercial providers, including Dyn, Gandi etc.
These solutions were typically used by a host behind the CPE to make These solutions were typically used by a host behind the CPE to make
it's CPE IPv4 address visible, usually in order to enable incoming it's CPE IPv4 address visible, usually in order to enable incoming
connections. connections.
For a small number (one to three) of hosts, use of such a system For a small number (one to three) of hosts, use of such a system
skipping to change at page 6, line 50 skipping to change at page 7, line 50
describes a DNS based solution. describes a DNS based solution.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
o Customer Premises Equipment: (CPE) is a router providing Customer Premises Equipment: (CPE) is a router providing
connectivity to the home network. connectivity to the home network.
o Homenet Zone: is the DNS zone for use within the boundaries of the Homenet Zone: is the DNS zone for use within the boundaries of the
home network: home.arpa, see [RFC8375]). This zone is not home network: home.arpa, see [RFC8375]). This zone is not
considered public and is out of scope for this document. considered public and is out of scope for this document.
o Registered Homenet Domain: is the Domain Name associated with the Registered Homenet Domain: is the Domain Name associated with the
home network. home network.
o Public Homenet Zone: contains the names in the home network that Public Homenet Zone: contains the names in the home network that are
are expected to be publicly resolvable on the Internet. expected to be publicly resolvable on the Internet.
o Homenet Naming Authority: (HNA) is a function responsible for Homenet Naming Authority: (HNA) is a function responsible for
managing the Public Homenet Zone. This includes populating the managing the Public Homenet Zone. This includes populating the
Public Homenet Zone, signing the zone for DNSSEC, as well as Public Homenet Zone, signing the zone for DNSSEC, as well as
managing the distribution of that Homenet Zone to the Outsourcing managing the distribution of that Homenet Zone to the Outsourcing
Infrastructure. Infrastructure.
o Outsourcing Infrastructure: is the infrastructure responsible for DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI): is the infrastructure
receiving the Public Homenet Zone and publishing it on the responsible for receiving the Public Homenet Zone and publishing
Internet. It is mainly composed of a Distribution Master and it on the Internet. It is mainly composed of a Distribution
Public Authoritative Servers. Master and Public Authoritative Servers.
o Public Authoritative Servers: are the authoritative name servers Public Authoritative Servers: are the authoritative name servers for
for the Public Homenet Zone. Name resolution requests for the the Public Homenet Zone. Name resolution requests for the Homenet
Homenet Domain are sent to these servers. For resiliency the Domain are sent to these servers. For resiliency the Public
Public Homenet Zone SHOULD be hosted on multiple servers. Homenet Zone SHOULD be hosted on multiple servers.
o Homenet Authoritative Servers: are authoritative name servers Homenet Authoritative Servers: are authoritative name servers within
within the Homenet network. the Homenet network.
o Distribution Master (DM): is the (set of) server(s) to which the Distribution Master (DM): is the (set of) server(s) to which the HNA
HNA synchronizes the Public Homenet Zone, and which then synchronizes the Public Homenet Zone, and which then distributes
distributes the relevant information to the Public Authoritative the relevant information to the Public Authoritative Servers.
Servers.
o Homenet Reverse Zone: The reverse zone file associated with the Homenet Reverse Zone: The reverse zone file associated with the
Public Homenet Zone. Public Homenet Zone.
o Reverse Public Authoritative Servers: equivalent to Public Reverse Public Authoritative Servers: equivalent to Public
Authoritative Servers specifically for reverse resolution. Authoritative Servers specifically for reverse resolution.
o Reverse Distribution Master: equivalent to Distribution Master Reverse Distribution Master: equivalent to Distribution Master
specifically for reverse resolution. specifically for reverse resolution.
o Homenet DNSSEC Resolver: a resolver that performs a DNSSEC Homenet DNSSEC Resolver: a resolver that performs a DNSSEC
resolution on the home network for the Public Homenet Zone. The resolution on the home network for the Public Homenet Zone. The
resolution is performed requesting the Homenet Authoritative resolution is performed requesting the Homenet Authoritative
Servers. Servers.
o DNSSEC Resolver: a resolver that performs a DNSSEC resolution on DNSSEC Resolver: a resolver that performs a DNSSEC resolution on the
the Internet for the Public Homenet Zone. The resolution is Internet for the Public Homenet Zone. The resolution is performed
performed requesting the Public Authoritative Servers. requesting the Public Authoritative Servers.
3. Architecture Description 3. Architecture Description
This section provides an overview of the architecture for outsourcing This section provides an overview of the architecture for outsourcing
the authoritative naming service from the HNA to the Outsourcing the authoritative naming service fromn the HNA to the DNS Outsourcing
Infrastructure in Section 3.1. Section Appendix B and Appendix C Infrastructure in Section 3.1. Section Appendix B and Appendix C
illustrates this architecture with the example of a Public Homenet illustrates this architecture with the example of a Public Homenet
Zone as well as necessary parameter to configure the HNA. Zone as well as necessary parameter to configure the HNA.
3.1. Architecture Overview 3.1. Architecture Overview
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture where the HNA outsources the Figure 1 illustrates the architecture where the HNA outsources the
publication of the Public Homenet Zone to the Outsourcing publication of the Public Homenet Zone to the DNS Outsourcing
Infrastructure. Infrastructure (DOI).
The Public Homenet Zone is identified by the Registered Homenet The Public Homenet Zone is identified by the Registered Homenet
Domain Name - example.com. Domain Name - myhome.isp.example.
".local" as well as ".home.arpa" are explicitly not considered as The ".local" as well as ".home.arpa" are explicitly not considered as
Public Homenet zones. Public Homenet zones.
The HNA SHOULD build the Public Homenet Zone in a single view The HNA SHOULD build the Public Homenet Zone in a single view
populated with all resource records that are expected to be published populated with all resource records that are expected to be published
on the Internet. on the Internet.
How the Public Homenet Zone is populated is out of the scope of this As explained in {#selectingnames}, how the Public Homenet Zone is
document. The node providing the HNA function may also host or populated is out of the scope of this document.
interact with multiple services to determine name-to-address
mappings, such as a web GUI, DHCP [RFC6644] or mDNS [RFC6762]. These
services may coexist and may be used to populate the Public Homenet
Zone.
The HNA also signs the Public Homenet Zone. The HNA handles all The HNA also signs the Public Homenet Zone. The HNA handles all
operations and keying material required for DNSSEC, so there is no operations and keying material required for DNSSEC, so there is no
provision made in this architecture for transferring private DNSSEC provision made in this architecture for transferring private DNSSEC
related keying material between the HNA and the DM. related keying material between the HNA and the DM.
Once the Public Homenet Zone has been built, the HNA outsources it to Once the Public Homenet Zone has been built, the HNA outsources it to
the Outsourcing Infrastructure as described in Figure 1. the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure as described in Figure 1.
The HNA acts as a hidden primary while the DM behaves as a secondary The HNA acts as a hidden primary while the DM behaves as a secondary
responsible to distribute the Public Homenet Zone to the multiple responsible to distribute the Public Homenet Zone to the multiple
Public Authoritative Servers that Outsourcing Infrastructure is Public Authoritative Servers that DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure is
responsible for. responsible for.
The DM has 3 communication channels: The DM has 3 communication channels:
o a DM Control Channel (see section Section 4) to configure the HNA o a DM Control Channel (see section Section 4) to configure the HNA
and the Outsourcing Infrastructure, and the Outsourcing Infrastructure,
o a DM Synchronization Channel (see section Section 5 to synchronize o a DM Synchronization Channel (see section Section 5 to synchronize
the Public Homenet Zone on the HNA and on the DM. the Public Homenet Zone on the HNA and on the DM.
skipping to change at page 9, line 34 skipping to change at page 10, line 29
authoritative server, it is not expected to answer to DNS requests authoritative server, it is not expected to answer to DNS requests
from the public Internet for the Public Homenet Zone. The function from the public Internet for the Public Homenet Zone. The function
of the HNA is limited to building the zone and synchronization with of the HNA is limited to building the zone and synchronization with
the DM. the DM.
The addresses associated with the HNA SHOULD NOT be mentioned in the The addresses associated with the HNA SHOULD NOT be mentioned in the
NS records of the Public Homenet zone, unless additional security NS records of the Public Homenet zone, unless additional security
provisions necessary to protect the HNA from external attack have provisions necessary to protect the HNA from external attack have
been taken. been taken.
The Outsourcing Infrastructure is also responsible for ensuring the The DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure is also responsible for ensuring
DS record has been updated in the parent zone. the DS record has been updated in the parent zone.
Resolution is performed by the DNSSEC resolvers. When the resolution Resolution is performed by the DNSSEC resolvers. When the resolution
is performed outside the home network, the DNSSEC Resolver resolves is performed outside the home network, the DNSSEC Resolver resolves
the DS record on the Global DNS and the name associated to the Public the DS record on the Global DNS and the name associated to the Public
Homenet Zone (example.com) on the Public Authoritative Servers. Homenet Zone (example.com) on the Public Authoritative Servers.
When the resolution is performed from within the home network, the When the resolution is performed from within the home network, the
Homenet DNSSEC Resolver may proceed similarly. On the other hand, to Homenet DNSSEC Resolver may proceed similarly. On the other hand, to
provide resilience to the Public Homenet Zone in case of disruption, provide resilience to the Public Homenet Zone in case of disruption,
the Homenet DNSSEC Resolver SHOULD be able to perform the resolution the Homenet DNSSEC Resolver SHOULD be able to perform the resolution
on the authoritative name service of the home network implemented by on the authoritative name service of the home network implemented by
the Homenet Authoritative Servers. These servers are not expected to the Homenet Authoritative Servers. These servers are not expected to
be mentioned in the Public Homenet Zone, nor to be accessible from be mentioned in the Public Homenet Zone, nor to be accessible from
the Internet. As such their information as well as the corresponding the Internet. As such their information as well as the corresponding
signed DS record MAY be provided by the HNA to the Homenet DNSSEC signed DS record MAY be provided by the HNA to the Homenet DNSSEC
Resolvers e.g. using HNCP. Such configuration is outside the scope Resolvers, e.g., using HNCP. Such configuration is outside the scope
of this document. of this document.
How the Homenet Authoritative Servers are provisioned is also out of How the Homenet Authoritative Servers are provisioned is also out of
scope of this specification. It could be implemented using primary scope of this specification. It could be implemented using primary
secondaries servers, or via rsync. In some cases, the HNA and secondaries servers, or via rsync. In some cases, the HNA and
Homenet Authoritative Servers may be combined together which would Homenet Authoritative Servers may be combined together which would
result in a common instantiation of an authoritative server on the result in a common instantiation of an authoritative server on the
WAN and inner interface. Other mechanisms may also be used. WAN and inner interface. Other mechanisms may also be used.
Home network | Internet Home network | Internet
| |
| +----------------------------+ | +----------------------------+
| | Outsourcing Infrastructure | | | DNS |
Control | | | | | Outsourcing Infrastructure |
+-----------------------+Channel | | +-----------------------+ | Control | | |
| HNA |<-------------->| Distribution Master | | +-----------------------+ Channel | | +-----------------------+ |
|+---------------------+| | | |+---------------------+| | | HNA |<-------------->| Distribution Master | |
|| Public Homenet Zone ||Synchronization || Public Homenet Zone || | |+---------------------+| | | |+---------------------+| |
|| (example.com) ||Channel | | || (example.com) || | || Public Homenet Zone ||Synchronization || Public Homenet Zone || |
|+---------------------+|<-------------->|+---------------------+| | || (example.com) || Channel | | || (example.com) || |
+----------------------+| | | +-----------------------+ | |+---------------------+|<-------------->|+---------------------+| |
| | ^ Distribution | +----------------------+| | | +-----------------------+ |
| | | Channel | | | ^ Distribution |
+-----------------------+ | | v | | | | Channel |
| Homenet Authoritative | | | +-----------------------+ | +-----------------------+ | | v |
| Server(s) | | | | Public Authoritative | | | Homenet Authoritative | | | +-----------------------+ |
|+---------------------+| | | | Server(s) | | | Server(s) | | | | Public Authoritative | |
||Public Homenet Zone || | | |+---------------------+| | |+---------------------+| | | | Server(s) | |
|| (example.com) || | | || Public Homenet Zone || | ||Public Homenet Zone || | | |+---------------------+| |
|+---------------------+| | | || (example.com) || | || (example.com) || | | || Public Homenet Zone || |
+-----------------------+ | | |+---------------------+| | |+---------------------+| | | || (example.com) || |
^ | | | +-----------------------+ | +-----------------------+ | | |+---------------------+| |
| | | +----------^---|-------------+ ^ | | | +-----------------------+ |
| | | | | | | | +----------^---|-------------+
| | name resolution | | | | | | |
| v | | v | | name resolution | |
+----------------------+ | +-----------------------+ | v | | v
| Homenet | | | Internet | +----------------------+ | +-----------------------+
| DNSSEC Resolver | | | DNSSEC Resolver | | Homenet | | | Internet |
+----------------------+ | +-----------------------+ | DNSSEC Resolver | | | DNSSEC Resolver |
+----------------------+ | +-----------------------+
Figure 1: Homenet Naming Architecture Name Resolution Figure 1: Homenet Naming Architecture Name Resolution
3.2. Distribution Master Communication Channels 3.2. Distribution Master Communication Channels
This section details the interfaces and channels of the DM, that is This section details the interfaces and channels of the DM, that is
the Control Channel, the Synchronization Channel and the Distribution the Control Channel, the Synchronization Channel and the Distribution
Channel. Channel.
The Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are the The Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are the
interfaces used between the HNA and the Outsourcing Infrastructure. interfaces used between the HNA and the DNS Outsourcing
The entity within the Outsourcing Infrastructure responsible to Infrastructure. The entity within the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure
handle these communications is the DM and communications between the responsible to handle these communications is the DM and
HNA and the DM SHOULD be protected and mutually authenticated. While communications between the HNA and the DM SHOULD be protected and
section Section 4.6 discusses in more depth the different security mutually authenticated. While section Section 4.6 discusses in more
protocols that could be used to secure, this specification RECOMMENDS depth the different security protocols that could be used to secure,
the use of TLS with mutually authentication based on certificates to this specification RECOMMENDS the use of TLS with mutually
secure the channel between the HNA and the DM. authentication based on certificates to secure the channel between
the HNA and the DM.
The Control Channel is used to set up the Synchronization Channel. The Control Channel is used to set up the Synchronization Channel.
We assume that the HNA initiates the Control Channel connection with We assume that the HNA initiates the Control Channel connection with
the DM and as such has a prior knowledge of the DM identity (X509 the DM and as such has a prior knowledge of the DM identity (X509
certificate), the IP address and port to use and protocol to set certificate), the IP address and port to use and protocol to set
secure session. We also assume the DM has knowledge of the identity secure session. We also assume the DM has knowledge of the identity
of the HNA (X509 certificate) as well as the Registered Homenet of the HNA (X509 certificate) as well as the Registered Homenet
Domain. Domain. For more detail to see how this can be achieved, please see
section Section 10.
The information exchanged between the HNA and the DM is using DNS The information exchanged between the HNA and the DM is using DNS
messages. DNS messages can be protected using various kind of messages. DNS messages can be protected using various kind of
transport layers, among others, UDP:53/DTLS, TLS/TCP:53, HTTPS:443. transport layers, among others, UDP:53/DTLS, TLS/TCP:53, HTTPS:443.
There was consideration to using a standard TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG(0) There was consideration to using a standard TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG(0)
[RFC2931] to perform a dynamic DNS update to the DM. There are a [RFC2931] to perform a dynamic DNS update to the DM. There are a
number of issues with this. The main one is that the Dynamic DNS number of issues with this.
update would also update the zone's NS records, while the goal is to
update the Distribution Master's configuration files. The visible NS
records SHOULD remain pointing at the cloud provider's anycast
addresses. Revealing the address of the HNA in the DNS is not
desireable.
This specification also assumes the same transport protocol and ports The main one is that the Dynamic DNS update would also update the
used by the DM to serve the Control Channel and by the HNA to serve parent zone's (NS, DS and associated A or AAAA records) while the
the Synchronization Channel are the same. goal is to update the Distribution Master's configuration files. The
visible NS records SHOULD remain pointing at the cloud provider's
anycast addresses. Revealing the address of the HNA in the DNS is
not desirable. Please see section Section 4.2 for more details.
The Distribution Channel is internal to the Outsourcing This specification also assumes:
o the DM serves both the Control Channel and Synchronization Channel
on a single IP address, single port and with a single transport
protocol.
o the HNA uses a single IP address for both the Control and
Synchronization channel by default. However, the HNA MAY use
distinct IP addresses - see section Section 5 and section {sec-
sync-info}} for more details.
The Distribution Channel is internal to the DNS Outsourcing
Infrastructure and as such is not the primary concern of this Infrastructure and as such is not the primary concern of this
specification. specification.
4. Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) and 4. Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) and
Distribution Master (DM) Distribution Master (DM)
The DM Control Channel is used by the HNA and the Outsourcing The DM Control Channel is used by the HNA and the DNS Outsourcing
Infrastructure to exchange information related to the configuration Infrastructure to exchange information related to the configuration
of the delegation which includes: of the delegation which includes:
4.1. Information to build the Public Homenet Zone. 4.1. Information to build the Public Homenet Zone.
When the Homenet Naming Authority builds the public zone, it must When the HNA builds the public zone, it must include information that
include information that it retrieves from the Distribution Master it retrieves from the DM relating to how the zone is to be published.
relating to how the zone is to be published.
The information includes at least names and IP addresses of the The information includes at least names and IP addresses of the
Public Authoritative Name Servers. In term of RRset information: Public Authoritative Name Servers. In term of RRset information this
includes:
o this includes the MNAME of the SOA, o the MNAME of the SOA,
o the NS and associated A and AAA RRsets of the name servers. o the NS and associated A and AAA RRsets of the name servers.
Optionally the Outsourcing Infrastructure MAY also provide Optionally the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure MAY also provide
operational parameters such as other fields of SOA (SERIAL, RNAME, operational parameters such as other fields of SOA (SERIAL, RNAME,
REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM). As the information is necessary REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM). As the information is necessary
for the HNA to proceed and the information is associated to the for the HNA to proceed and the information is associated to the
Outsourcing Infrastructure, this information exchange is mandatory. Outsourcing Infrastructure, this information exchange is mandatory.
4.2. Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust. 4.2. Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust
The HNA SHOULD provide the hash of the KSK (DS RRset), so the that The HNA SHOULD provide the hash of the KSK (DS RRset), so the that
Outsourcing Infrastructure provides this value to the parent zone. A DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure provides this value to the parent
common deployment use case is that the Outsourcing Infrastructure is zone. A common deployment use case is that the Outsourcing
the registrar of the Registered Homenet Domain, and as such, its Infrastructure is the registrar of the Registered Homenet Domain, and
relationship with the registry of the parent zone enables it to as such, its relationship with the registry of the parent zone
update the parent zone. When such relation exists, the HNA should be enables it to update the parent zone. When such relation exists, the
able to request the Outsourcing Infrastructure to update the DS RRset HNA should be able to request the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure to
in the parent zone. A direct update is especially necessary to update the DS RRset in the parent zone. A direct update is
initialize the chain of trust. especially necessary to initialize the chain of trust.
Though the HNA may also later directly update the values of the DS Though the HNA may also later directly update the values of the DS
via the Control Channel, it is RECOMMENDED to use other mechanisms via the Control Channel, it is RECOMMENDED to use other mechanisms
such as CDS and CDNSKEY [RFC7344] are used for key roll overs. such as CDS and CDNSKEY [RFC7344] for transparent updates during key
roll overs.
As some deployment may not provide an Outsourcing Infrastructure that As some deployment may not provide an DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure
will be able to update the DS in the parent zone, this information that will be able to update the DS in the parent zone, this
exchange is OPTIONAL. information exchange is OPTIONAL.
By accepting the DS, the DM commits in taking care of advertising the By accepting the DS RR, the DM commits in taking care of advertising
DS to the parent zone. Upon refusal, the DM MUST clearly indicate the DS to the parent zone. Upon refusal, the DM clearly indicates it
the DM does not have the capacity to proceed to the update. does not have the capacity to proceed to the update.
4.3. Information to set the Synchronization Channel, 4.3. Information to set the Synchronization Channel
That information sets the primary/secondary relation between the HNA That information sets the primary/secondary relation between the HNA
and the DM. The HNA works as a primary authoritative DNS server, and and the DM. The HNA works as a primary authoritative DNS server, and
MUST provide the corresponding IP address. MUST provide the corresponding IP address.
The specified IP address on the HNA side and the currently used IP The specified IP address on the HNA side and the currently used IP
address of the DM defines the IP addresses involved in the address of the DM defines the IP addresses involved in the
Synchronization Channel. Ports and transport protocol are the same Synchronization Channel. Ports and transport protocol are the same
as those used by the Control Channel. By default, the same IP as those used by the Control Channel. By default, the same IP
address used by the HNA is considered by the DM. Exchange of this address used by the HNA is considered by the DM. Exchange of this
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The provisioning process SHOULD provide a method of securing the The provisioning process SHOULD provide a method of securing the
control channel, so that the content of messages can be control channel, so that the content of messages can be
authenticated. This authentication MAY be based on certificates for authenticated. This authentication MAY be based on certificates for
both the DM and each HNA. The DM may also create the initial both the DM and each HNA. The DM may also create the initial
configuration for the delegation zone in the parent zone during the configuration for the delegation zone in the parent zone during the
provisioning process. provisioning process.
4.5.1. Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone. 4.5.1. Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone.
The information provided by the DM to the HNA is retrieved by the HNA The information provided by the DM to the HNA is retrieved by the HNA
with a AXFR exchange. The AXFR message enables the response to with an AXFR exchange. The AXFR message enables the response to
contain any type of RRsets. The response might be extended in the contain any type of RRsets. The response might be extended in the
future if additional information will be needed. Alternatively, the future if additional information will be needed. Alternatively, the
information provided by the HNA to the DM is pushed by the HNA via a information provided by the HNA to the DM is pushed by the HNA via a
DNS update exchange. DNS update exchange.
To retrieve the necessary information to build the Public Homenet To retrieve the necessary information to build the Public Homenet
Zone, the HNA MUST send an DNS request of type AXFR associated to the Zone, the HNA MUST send an DNS request of type AXFR associated to the
Registered Homenet Domain. The DM MUST respond with a zone template. Registered Homenet Domain. The DM MUST respond with a zone template.
The zone template MUST contain a RRset of type SOA, one or multiple The zone template MUST contain a RRset of type SOA, one or multiple
RRset of type NS and zero or more RRset of type A or AAAA. RRset of type NS and zero or more RRset of type A or AAAA.
The SOA RR is used to indicate to the HNA the value of the MNAME of o The SOA RR is used to indicate to the HNA the value of the MNAME
the Public Homenet Zone. The NAME of the SOA RR MUST be the of the Public Homenet Zone.
Registered Homenet Domain. The MNAME value of the SOA RDATA is the
value provided by the Outsourcing Infrastructure to the HNA. Other
RDATA values (RNAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM) are provided
by the Outsourcing Infrastructure as suggestions. The NS RRsets are
used to carry the Public Authoritative Servers of the Outsourcing
Infrastructure. Their associated NAME MUST be the Registered Homenet
Domain. The TTL and RDATA are those expected to be published on the
Public Homenet Zone. The RRsets of Type A and AAAA MUST have their
NAME matching the NSDNAME of one of the NS RRsets.
Upon receiving the response, the HNA MUST validate the conditions on o The NAME of the SOA RR MUST be the Registered Homenet Domain.
the SOA, NS and A or AAAA RRsets. If an error occurs, the HNA MUST
stop proceeding and MUST report an error. Otherwise, the HNA builds o The MNAME value of the SOA RDATA is the value provided by the DNS
the Public Homenet Zone by setting the MNAME value of the SOA as Outsourcing Infrastructure to the HNA.
indicated by the SOA provided by the AXFR response. The HNA SHOULD
set the value of NAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM of the SOA o Other RDATA values (RNAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM) are
to those provided by the AXFR response. The HNA MUST insert the NS provided by the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure as suggestions.
and corresponding A or AAAA RRset in its Public Homenet Zone. The
HNA MUST ignore other RRsets. If an error message is returned by the The NS RRsets are used to carry the Public Authoritative Servers of
DM, the HNA MUST proceed as a regular DNS resolution. Error messages the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure. Their associated NAME MUST be
SHOULD be logged for further analysis. If the resolution does not the Registered Homenet Domain.
succeed, the outsourcing operation is aborted and the HNA MUST close
the Control Channel. The TTL and RDATA are those expected to be published on the Public
Homenet Zone. The RRsets of Type A and AAAA MUST have their NAME
matching the NSDNAME of one of the NS RRsets.
Upon receiving the response, the HNA MUST validate format and
properties of the SOA, NS and A or AAAA RRsets. If an error occurs,
the HNA MUST stop proceeding and MUST report an error. Otherwise,
the HNA builds the Public Homenet Zone by setting the MNAME value of
the SOA as indicated by the SOA provided by the AXFR response. The
HNA SHOULD set the value of NAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM
of the SOA to those provided by the AXFR response. The HNA MUST
insert the NS and corresponding A or AAAA RRset in its Public Homenet
Zone. The HNA MUST ignore other RRsets. If an error message is
returned by the DM, the HNA MUST proceed as a regular DNS resolution.
Error messages SHOULD be logged for further analysis. If the
resolution does not succeed, the outsourcing operation is aborted and
the HNA MUST close the Control Channel.
4.5.2. Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust 4.5.2. Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust
To provide the DS RRset to initialize the DNSSEC chain of trust the To provide the DS RRset to initialize the DNSSEC chain of trust the
HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE [RFC2136] message. The NAME in the SOA HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE [RFC2136] message.
MUST be set to the parent zone of the Registered Homenet Domain -
that is where the DS records should be inserted. The DS RRset MUST
be placed in the Update section of the UPDATE query, and the NAME
SHOULD be set to the Registered Homenet Domain. The rdata of the DS
RR SHOULD correspond to the DS record to be inserted in the parent
zone.
A NOERROR response from the MD is a commitment to update the parent 1. The NAME in the SOA MUST be set to the parent zone of the
zone with the provided DS. An error indicates the MD will not update Registered Homenet Domain - that is where the DS records should
the DS, and other method should be used by the HNA. be inserted.
2. The DS RRset MUST be placed in the Update section of the UPDATE
query, and the NAME SHOULD be set to the Registered Homenet
Domain.
3. The RDATA of the DS RR SHOULD correspond to the DS record to be
inserted in the parent zone.
o A NOERROR response from the MD is a commitment to update the
parent zone with the provided DS.
o An error indicates the MD will not update the DS, and other method
should be used by the HNA.
4.5.3. Providing information for the Synchronization Channel 4.5.3. Providing information for the Synchronization Channel
To provide the IP address of the primary, the HNA MAY send a DNS To provide the IP address of the primary, the HNA MAY send a DNS
UPDATE message. The NAME in the SOA MUST be the parent zone of the UPDATE message.
Registered Homenet Domain. The Update section MUST be a RRset of
Type NS. The NAME associated to the NS RRSet MUST be the Registered 1. The NAME in the SOA MUST be the parent zone of the Registered
Domain Name. The RDATA MUST be a FQDN that designates the IP Homenet Domain.
addresses associated to the primary. There may be multiple IP
addresses. These IP addresses MUST be provided in the additional 2. The Update section MUST be a RRset of Type NS.
section. The reason to provide these IP addresses is that it is NOT
3. The RDATA MUST be a RRset of type A or AAAA that designates the
IP addresses associated to the primary.
4. There may be multiple IP addresses.
5. These IP addresses MUST be provided in the additional section.
The reason to provide these IP addresses is that it is NOT
RECOMMENDED to publish these IP addresses. As a result, it is not RECOMMENDED to publish these IP addresses. As a result, it is not
expected to resolve them. IP addresses are provided via RRsets of expected to resolve them.
type A or AAAA. The NAME associated to RRsets of type A and AAAA
MUST be the Registered Homenet Domain.
A NOERROR response indicates the DM has configured the secondary and o A NOERROR response indicates the DM has configured the secondary
is committed to serve as a secondary. An error indicates the DM is and is committed to serve as a secondary.
not configured as a secondary.
o An error indicates the DM is not configured as a secondary.
The regular DNS error message SHOULD be returned to the HNA when an The regular DNS error message SHOULD be returned to the HNA when an
error occurs. In particular a FORMERR is returned when a format error occurs. In particular a FORMERR is returned when a format
error is found, this error includes when unexpected RRSets are added error is found, this includes when unexpected RRSets are added or
or when RRsets are missing. A SERVFAIL error is returned when a when RRsets are missing.
internal error is encountered. a NOTZONE error is returned when
update and Zone sections are not coherent, a NOTAUTH error is o A SERVFAIL error is returned when a internal error is encountered.
returned when the DM is not authoritative for the Zone section. A
REFUSED error is returned when the DM refuses to proceed to the o A NOTZONE error is returned when update and Zone sections are not
configuration and the requested action. coherent, a NOTAUTH error is returned when the DM is not
authoritative for the Zone section.
o A REFUSED error is returned when the DM refuses to proceed to the
configuration and the requested action.
4.5.4. HNA instructing deleting the delegation 4.5.4. HNA instructing deleting the delegation
To instruct to delete the delegation the HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE To instruct to delete the delegation the HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE
Delete message. The NAME in the SOA MUST be the parent zone of the Delete message.
Registered Homenet Domain. The Update section MUST be a RRset of
Type NS. The NAME associated to the NS RRSet MUST be the Registered 1. The NAME in the SOA MUST be the parent zone of the Registered
Domain Name. As indictaed by [RFC2136] section 2.5.2 the delete Homenet Domain.
instruction is set by setting the TTL to 0, the CLass to ANY, the
RDLENGTH to 0 and the RDATA MUST be empty. 2. The Update section MUST be a RRset of Type NS.
3. The NAME associated to the NS RRSet MUST be the Registered Domain
Name.
As indicated by [RFC2136] section 2.5.2 the delete instruction is set
by setting the TTL to 0, the Class to ANY, the RDLENGTH to 0 and the
RDATA MUST be empty.
4.6. Securing the Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority 4.6. Securing the Control Channel between Homenet Naming Authority
(HNA) and Distribution Master (DM) (HNA) and Distribution Master (DM)
The control channel between the HNA and the DM MUST be secured at The control channel between the HNA and the DM MUST be secured at
both the HNA and the DM. both the HNA and the DM.
Secure protocols (like TLS [RFC5246] / DTLS [RFC6347]) SHOULD be used Secure protocols (like TLS [RFC8446] / DTLS [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13])
to secure the transactions between the DM and the HNA. SHOULD be used to secure the transactions between the DM and the HNA.
The advantage of TLS/DTLS is that this technology is widely deployed, The advantage of TLS/DTLS is that this technology is widely deployed,
and most of the devices already embed TLS/DTLS libraries, possibly and most of the devices already embed TLS/DTLS libraries, possibly
also taking advantage of hardware acceleration. Further, TLS/DTLS also taking advantage of hardware acceleration. Further, TLS/DTLS
provides authentication facilities and can use certificates to provides authentication facilities and can use certificates to
mutually authenticate the DM and HNA at the applicationlayer, mutually authenticate the DM and HNA at the application layer,
including available API. On the other hand, using TLS/DTLS requires including available API. On the other hand, using TLS/DTLS requires
implementing DNS exchanges over TLS/DTLS, as well as a new service implementing DNS exchanges over TLS/DTLS, as well as a new service
port. port.
The HNA SHOULD authenticate inbound connections from the DM using The HNA SHOULD authenticate inbound connections from the DM using
standard mechanisms, such as a public certificate with baked-in root standard mechanisms, such as a public certificate with baked-in root
certificates on the HNA, or via DANE {!RFC6698}}. The HNA is expected certificates on the HNA, or via DANE {!RFC6698}}. The HNA is expected
to be provisioned with a connection to the DM by the manufacturer, or to be provisioned with a connection to the DM by the manufacturer, or
during some user-initiated onboarding process, see Section 12. during some user-initiated onboarding process, see Section 10.
The DM SHOULD authenticate the HNA and check that inbound messages The DM SHOULD authenticate the HNA and check that inbound messages
are from the appropriate client. The DM MAY use a self-signed CA are from the appropriate client. The DM MAY use a self-signed CA
certificate mechanism per HNA, or public certificates for this certificate mechanism per HNA, or public certificates for this
purpose. purpose.
IPsec [RFC4301] and IKEv2 [RFC7296] were considered. They would need IPsec [RFC4301] and IKEv2 [RFC7296] were considered. They would need
to operate in transport mode, and the authenticated end points would to operate in transport mode, and the authenticated end points would
need to be visible to the applications, and this is not commonly need to be visible to the applications, and this is not commonly
available at the time of this writing. available at the time of this writing.
A pure DNS solution using TSIG and/or SIG(0) to authenticate message A pure DNS solution using TSIG and/or SIG(0) to authenticate message
was also considered. Section 12 envisions one mechanism would was also considered. Section 10 envisions one mechanism would
involve the end user, with a browser, signing up to a service involve the end user, with a browser, signing up to a service
provider, with a resulting OAUTH2 token to be provided to the HNA. A provider, with a resulting OAUTH2 token to be provided to the HNA. A
way to translate this OAUTH2 token from HTTPS web space to DNS SIG(0) way to translate this OAUTH2 token from HTTPS web space to DNS SIG(0)
space seems overly problematic, and so the enrollment protocol using space seems overly problematic, and so the enrollment protocol using
web APIs was determined to be easier to implement at scale. web APIs was determined to be easier to implement at scale.
Note also that authentication of message exchanges between the HNA Note also that authentication of message exchanges between the HNA
and the DM SHOULD NOT use the external IP address of the HNA to index and the DM SHOULD NOT use the external IP address of the HNA to index
the appropriate keys. As detailed in Section 10, the IP addresses of the appropriate keys. As detailed in Section 11, the IP addresses of
the DM and the Hidden Primary are subject to change, for example the DM and the Hidden Primary are subject to change, for example
while the network is being renumbered. This means that the necessary while the network is being renumbered. This means that the necessary
keys to authenticate transaction SHOULD NOT be indexed using the IP keys to authenticate transaction SHOULD NOT be indexed using the IP
address, and SHOULD be resilient to IP address changes. This should address, and SHOULD be resilient to IP address changes.
apply to any OAUTH2 token produced as envisioned by Section 12.
4.7. Implementation Tips 4.7. Implementation Concerns
The Hidden Primary Server on the HNA differs from a regular The Hidden Primary Server on the HNA differs from a regular
authoritative server for the home network due to: authoritative server for the home network due to:
o Interface Binding: the Hidden Primary Server will almost certainly Interface Binding: the Hidden Primary Server will almost certainly
listen on the WAN Interface, whereas a regular authoritative listen on the WAN Interface, whereas a regular authoritative
server for the home network would listen on the internal home server for the home network would listen on the internal home
network interface. network interface.
o Limited exchanges: the purpose of the Hidden Primary Server is to Limited exchanges: the purpose of the Hidden Primary Server is to
synchronize with the DM, not to serve any zones to end users, or synchronize with the DM, not to serve any zones to end users, or
the public Internet. the public Internet.
As a result, exchanges are performed with specific nodes (the DM). As a result, exchanges are performed with specific nodes (the DM).
Further, exchange types are limited. The only legitimate exchanges Further, exchange types are limited. The only legitimate exchanges
are: NOTIFY initiated by the Hidden Primary and IXFR or AXFR are: NOTIFY initiated by the Hidden Primary and IXFR or AXFR
exchanges initiated by the DM. On the other hand, regular exchanges initiated by the DM.
authoritative servers would respond to any hosts, and any DNS query
would be processed. The HNA SHOULD filter IXFR/AXFR traffic and drop On the other hand, regular authoritative servers would respond to any
traffic not initiated by the DM. The HNA MUST listen for DNS on TCP hosts, and any DNS query would be processed. The HNA SHOULD filter
and UDP and MUST at least allow SOA lookups of the Homenet Zone. IXFR/AXFR traffic and drop traffic not initiated by the DM. The HNA
MUST listen for DNS on TCP and UDP and MUST at least allow SOA
lookups of the Homenet Zone.
5. DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM 5. DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM
The DM Synchronization Channel is used for communication between the The DM Synchronization Channel is used for communication between the
HNA and the DM for synchronizing the Public Homenet Zone. Note that HNA and the DM for synchronizing the Public Homenet Zone. Note that
the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are by the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are by
construction different channels even though there they MAY use the construction different channels even though there they MAY use the
same IP addresses. In fact the Control Channel is set between the same IP addresses. In fact the Control Channel is set between the
HNA working as a client using port YYYY (a high range port) toward a HNA working as a client using port YYYY (a high range port) toward a
service provided by the MD at port XX (well known port). On the service provided by the MD at port XX (well known port).
other hand, the Synchronization Channel is set between the MD working
as a client using port ZZZZ ( a high range port) toward a service a On the other hand, the Synchronization Channel is set between the DM
service provided by the HNA at port XX. As a result, even though the working as a client using port ZZZZ ( a high range port) toward a
same couple of IP addresses may be involved the Control Channel and service a service provided by the HNA at port XX.
the Synchronization Channel are always disc tint channels.
As a result, even though the same couple of IP addresses may be
involved the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are
always distinct channels.
Uploading and dynamically updating the zone file on the DM can be Uploading and dynamically updating the zone file on the DM can be
seen as zone provisioning between the HNA (Hidden Primary) and the DM seen as zone provisioning between the HNA (Hidden Primary) and the DM
(Secondary Server). This can be handled via AXFR + DNS UPDATE. (Secondary Server). This can be handled via AXFR + DNS UPDATE.
This document RECOMMENDS use of a primary / secondary mechanism This document RECOMMENDS use of a primary / secondary mechanism
instead of the use of DNS UPDATE. The primary / secondary mechanism instead of the use of DNS UPDATE. The primary / secondary mechanism
is RECOMMENDED as it scales better and avoids DoS attacks. Note that is RECOMMENDED as it scales better and avoids DoS attacks. Note that
even when UPDATE messages are used, these messages are using a even when UPDATE messages are used, these messages are using a
distinct channel as those used to set the configuration. distinct channel as those used to set the configuration.
skipping to change at page 18, line 25 skipping to change at page 20, line 20
The Homenet Reverse Zone MAY also be updated either with DNS UPDATE The Homenet Reverse Zone MAY also be updated either with DNS UPDATE
[RFC2136] or using a primary / secondary synchronization. [RFC2136] or using a primary / secondary synchronization.
5.1. Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM 5.1. Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM
The Synchronization Channel used standard DNS request. The Synchronization Channel used standard DNS request.
First the primary notifies the secondary that the zone must be First the primary notifies the secondary that the zone must be
updated and eaves the secondary to proceed with the update when updated and eaves the secondary to proceed with the update when
possible/ convenient. possible/convenient.
Then, a NOTIFY message is sent by the primary, which is a small Then, a NOTIFY message is sent by the primary, which is a small
packet that is less likely to load the secondary. packet that is less likely to load the secondary.
Finally, the AXFR [RFC1034] or IXFR [RFC1995] query performed by the Finally, the AXFR [RFC1034] or IXFR [RFC1995] query performed by the
secondary is a small packet sent over TCP (section 4.2 [RFC5936]), secondary is a small packet sent over TCP (section 4.2 [RFC5936]),
which mitigates reflection attacks using a forged NOTIFY. which mitigates reflection attacks using a forged NOTIFY.
The AXFR request from the DM to the HNA SHOULD be secured. DNS over The AXFR request from the DM to the HNA SHOULD be secured. DNS over
TLS [RFC7858] is RECOMMENDED. TLS [RFC7858] is RECOMMENDED.
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[RFC7368] in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to be deployed on both [RFC7368] in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to be deployed on both
the authoritative server and the resolver. The resolver side is out the authoritative server and the resolver. The resolver side is out
of scope of this document, and only the authoritative part of the of scope of this document, and only the authoritative part of the
server is considered. server is considered.
This document assumes the HNA signs the Public Homenet Zone. This document assumes the HNA signs the Public Homenet Zone.
Secure delegation is achieved only if the DS RRset is properly set in Secure delegation is achieved only if the DS RRset is properly set in
the parent zone. Secure delegation is performed by the HNA or the the parent zone. Secure delegation is performed by the HNA or the
Outsourcing Infrastructures. DNS Outsourcing Infrastructures.
The DS RRset can be updated manually with nsupdate for example. This The DS RRset can be updated manually with nsupdate for example. This
requires the HNA or the Outsourcing Infrastructure to be requires the HNA or the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure to be
authenticated by the DNS server hosting the parent of the Public authenticated by the DNS server hosting the parent of the Public
Homenet Zone. Such a trust channel between the HNA and the parent Homenet Zone. Such a trust channel between the HNA and the parent
DNS server may be hard to maintain with HNAs, and thus may be easier DNS server may be hard to maintain with HNAs, and thus may be easier
to establish with the Outsourcing Infrastructure. In fact, the to establish with the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure. In fact, the
Public Authoritative Server(s) may use Automating DNSSEC Delegation Public Authoritative Server(s) may use Automating DNSSEC Delegation
Trust Maintenance [RFC7344]. Trust Maintenance [RFC7344].
9. Homenet Reverse Zone 9. Homenet Reverse Zone Channels Configuration
The Public Homenet Zone is associated to a Registered Homenet Domain The Public Homenet Zone is associated to a Registered Homenet Domain
and the ownership of that domain requires a specific registration and the ownership of that domain requires a specific registration
from the end user as well as the HNA being provisioned with some from the end user as well as the HNA being provisioned with some
authentication credentials . Such steps are mandatory unless the authentication credentials. Such steps are mandatory unless the DNS
Outsourcing Infrastructure has some other means to authenticate the Outsourcing Infrastructure has some other means to authenticate the
HNA. Such situation may occur, for example, when the ISP provides HNA. Such situation may occur, for example, when the ISP provides
the Homenet Domain as well as the Outsourcing Infrastructure. In the Homenet Domain as well as the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure.
this case, the HNA may be authenticated by the physical link layer,
in which case the authentication of the HNA may be performed without In this case, the HNA may be authenticated by the physical link
additional provisioning of the HNA. While this may be not so common layer, in which case the authentication of the HNA may be performed
for the Public Homenet Zone, this situation is expected to be quite without additional provisioning of the HNA. While this may be not so
common for the Reverse Homenet Zone. common for the Public Homenet Zone, this situation is expected to be
quite common for the Reverse Homenet Zone.
More specifically, a common case is that the upstream ISP provides More specifically, a common case is that the upstream ISP provides
the IPv6 prefix to the Homenet with a IA_PD [RFC8415] option and the IPv6 prefix to the Homenet with a IA_PD [RFC8415] option and
manages the Outsourcing Infrastructure of the associated reverse manages the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure of the associated reverse
zone. This leave place for setting up automatically the relation zone. This leave place for setting up automatically the relation
between HNA and the Outsourcing infrastructure as described in between HNA and the DNS Outsourcing infrastructure as described in
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]. [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options].
With this relation automatically configured, the synchronization With this relation automatically configured, the synchronization
between the Home network and the Outsourcing infrastructure happens between the Home network and the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure
similarly as for the Public Homenet Zone described earlier in this happens similarly as for the Public Homenet Zone described earlier in
document. this document.
Note that for home networks hosted by multiple ISPs, each ISP Note that for home networks hosted by multiple ISPs, each ISP
provides only the Outsourcing Infrastructure of the reverse zones provides only the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure of the reverse zones
associated to the delegated prefix. It is also likely that the DNS associated to the delegated prefix. It is also likely that the DNS
exchanges will need to be performed on dedicated interfaces as to be exchanges will need to be performed on dedicated interfaces as to be
accepted by the ISP. More specifically, the reverse zone associated accepted by the ISP. More specifically, the reverse zone associated
to prefix 1 will not be possible to be performs by the HNA using an to prefix 1 will not be possible to be performs by the HNA using an
IP address that belongs to prefix 2. Such constraints does not raise IP address that belongs to prefix 2. Such constraints does not raise
major concerns either for hot standby or load sharing configuration. major concerns either for hot standby or load sharing configuration.
With IPv6, the domain space for IP addresses is so large that reverse With IPv6, the domain space for IP addresses is so large that reverse
zone may be confronted with scalability issues. How the reverse zone zone may be confronted with scalability issues. How the reverse zone
is generated is out of scope of this document. is generated is out of scope of this document.
[I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] provides guidance on how to address [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] provides guidance on how to address
scalability issues. scalability issues.
10. Renumbering 10. Homenet Public Zone Channel Configurations
This document does not deal with how the HNA is provisioned with a
trusted relationship to the Distribution Master for the forward zone.
This section details what needs to be provisioned into the HNA and
serves as a requirements statement for mechanisms.
The HNA needs to be provisioned with:
o the Registered Domain (e.g., myhome.isp.example )
o the contact info for the Distribution Master (DM), including the
DNS name (FQDN), possibly including the IP literal, and a
certificate (or anchor) to be used to authenticate the service
o the DM transport protocol and port (the default is DNS over TLS,
on port 853)
o the HNA credentials used by the DM for its authentication.
The HNA will need to select an IP address for communication for the
Synchronization Channel. This is typically the outside WAN address
of the router, but could be an IPv6 LAN address in the case of a home
with multiple ISPs (and multiple border routers). This is
communicated in section BLAH when the NS and A record is
communicated.
The above parameters MUST be be provisionined for ISP-specific
reverse zones, as per
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]. ISP-specific
forward zones MAY also be provisioned using
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options], but zones which
are not related to a specific ISP zone (such as with a DNS provider)
must be provisioned through other means.
Similarly, it the HNA is provided by a registrar, the HNA may be
given configured to end user.
In the absence of specific pre-established relation, these pieces of
information may be entered manually by the end user. In order to
ease the configuration from the end user the following scheme may be
implemented.
The HNA may present the end user a web interface where it provides
the end user the ability to indicate the Registered Domain or the
registrar for example a preselected list. Once the regsitrar has
been selected, the HNA redirects the end user to that registrar in
order to receive a access token. The access token will enable the
HNA to retrieve the DM parameters associated to the Registered
Domain. These parameters will include the credentials used by the
HNA to establish the Control and Synchronization Channels.
Such architecture limits the necessary steps to configure the HNA
from the end user.
11. Renumbering
This section details how renumbering is handled by the Hidden Primary This section details how renumbering is handled by the Hidden Primary
server or the DM. Both types of renumbering are discussed i.e. server or the DM. Both types of renumbering are discussed i.e.
"make-before-break" and "break-before-make". "make-before-break" and "break-before-make" (aka flash renumbering).
In the make-before-break renumbering scenario, the new prefix is In the make-before-break renumbering scenario, the new prefix is
advertised, the network is configured to prepare the transition to advertised, the network is configured to prepare the transition to
the new prefix. During a period of time, the two prefixes old and the new prefix. During a period of time, the two prefixes old and
new coexist, before the old prefix is completely removed. In the new coexist, before the old prefix is completely removed.
break-before-make renumbering scenario, the new prefix is advertised
making the old prefix obsolete. In the break-before-make renumbering scenario, the new prefix is
advertised making the old prefix obsolete.
Renumbering has been extensively described in [RFC4192] and analyzed Renumbering has been extensively described in [RFC4192] and analyzed
in [RFC7010] and the reader is expected to be familiar with them in [RFC7010] and the reader is expected to be familiar with them
before reading this section. before reading this section.
10.1. Hidden Primary 11.1. Hidden Primary
In a renumbering scenario, the Hidden Primary is informed it is being In a renumbering scenario, the Hidden Primary is informed it is being
renumbered. In most cases, this occurs because the whole home renumbered. In most cases, this occurs because the whole home
network is being renumbered. As a result, the Public Homenet Zone network is being renumbered. As a result, the Public Homenet Zone
will also be updated. Although the new and old IP addresses may be will also be updated. Although the new and old IP addresses may be
stored in the Public Homenet Zone, we recommend that only the newly stored in the Public Homenet Zone, we recommend that only the newly
reachable IP addresses be published. reachable IP addresses be published.
To avoid reachability disruption, IP connectivity information To avoid reachability disruption, IP connectivity information
provided by the DNS SHOULD be coherent with the IP plane. In our provided by the DNS SHOULD be coherent with the IP plane. In our
skipping to change at page 21, line 35 skipping to change at page 24, line 40
time the old IP is not reachable anymore. time the old IP is not reachable anymore.
In the case of the make-before-break, seamless reachability is In the case of the make-before-break, seamless reachability is
provided as long as T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW > 2 * TTL. If this is provided as long as T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW > 2 * TTL. If this is
not satisfied, then devices associated with the old IP address in the not satisfied, then devices associated with the old IP address in the
home network may become unreachable for 2 * TTL - (T_OLD_UNREACHABLE home network may become unreachable for 2 * TTL - (T_OLD_UNREACHABLE
- T_NEW). In the case of a break-before-make, T_OLD_UNREACHABLE = - T_NEW). In the case of a break-before-make, T_OLD_UNREACHABLE =
T_NEW, and the device may become unreachable up to 2 * TTL. T_NEW, and the device may become unreachable up to 2 * TTL.
Once the Public Homenet Zone file has been updated on the Hidden Once the Public Homenet Zone file has been updated on the Hidden
Primary, the Hidden Primary needs to inform the Outsourcing Primary, the Hidden Primary needs to inform the DNS Outsourcing
Infrastructure that the Public Homenet Zone has been updated and that Infrastructure that the Public Homenet Zone has been updated and that
the IP address to use to retrieve the updated zone has also been the IP address to use to retrieve the updated zone has also been
updated. Both notifications are performed using regular DNS updated. Both notifications are performed using regular DNS
exchanges. Mechanisms to update an IP address provided by lower exchanges. Mechanisms to update an IP address provided by lower
layers with protocols like SCTP [RFC4960], MOBIKE [RFC4555] are not layers with protocols like SCTP [RFC4960], MOBIKE [RFC4555] are not
considered in this document. considered in this document.
The Hidden Primary SHOULD inform the DM that the Public Homenet Zone The Hidden Primary SHOULD inform the DM that the Public Homenet Zone
has been updated by sending a NOTIFY payload with the new IP address. has been updated by sending a NOTIFY payload with the new IP address.
In addition, this NOTIFY payload SHOULD be authenticated using SIG(0) In addition, this NOTIFY payload SHOULD be authenticated using SIG(0)
or TSIG. When the DM receives the NOTIFY payload, it MUST or TSIG. When the DM receives the NOTIFY payload, it MUST
authenticate it. Note that the cryptographic key used for the authenticate it. Note that the cryptographic key used for the
authentication SHOULD be indexed by the Registered Homenet Domain authentication SHOULD be indexed by the Registered Homenet Domain
contained in the NOTIFY payload as well as the RRSIG. In other contained in the NOTIFY payload as well as the RRSIG. In other
words, the IP address SHOULD NOT be used as an index. If words, the IP address SHOULD NOT be used as an index.
authentication succeeds, the DM MUST also notice the IP address has
been modified and perform a reachability check before updating its If authentication succeeds, the DM MUST also notice the IP address
primary configuration. The routability check MAY performed by has been modified and perform a reachability check before updating
its primary configuration. The routability check MAY performed by
sending a SOA request to the Hidden Primary using the source IP sending a SOA request to the Hidden Primary using the source IP
address of the NOTIFY. This exchange is also secured, and if an address of the NOTIFY. This exchange is also secured, and if an
authenticated response is received from the Hidden Primary with the authenticated response is received from the Hidden Primary with the
new IP address, the DM SHOULD update its configuration file and new IP address, the DM SHOULD update its configuration file and
retrieve the Public Homenet Zone using an AXFR or a IXFR exchange. retrieve the Public Homenet Zone using an AXFR or a IXFR exchange.
Note that the primary reason for providing the IP address is that the Note that the primary reason for providing the IP address is that the
Hidden Primary is not publicly announced in the DNS. If the Hidden Hidden Primary is not publicly announced in the DNS. If the Hidden
Primary were publicly announced in the DNS, then the IP address Primary were publicly announced in the DNS, then the IP address
update could have been performed using the DNS as described in update could have been performed using the DNS as described in
Section 10.2. Section 11.2.
10.2. Distribution Master 11.2. Distribution Master
Renumbering of the Distribution Master results in it changing its IP Renumbering of the Distribution Master results in it changing its IP
address. As the DM is a secondary, the destination of DNS NOTIFY address. As the DM is a secondary, the destination of DNS NOTIFY
payloads MUST be changed, and any configuration/firewalling that payloads MUST be changed, and any configuration/firewalling that
restricts DNS AXFR/IXFR operations MUST be updated. restricts DNS AXFR/IXFR operations MUST be updated.
If the DM is configured in the Hidden Primary configuration file If the DM is configured in the Hidden Primary configuration file
using a FQDN, then the update of the IP address is performed by DNS. using a FQDN, then the update of the IP address is performed by DNS.
More specifically, before sending the NOTIFY, the Hidden Primary More specifically, before sending the NOTIFY, the Hidden Primary
performs a DNS resolution to retrieve the IP address of the performs a DNS resolution to retrieve the IP address of the
secondary. secondary.
As described in Section 10.1, the DM DNS information SHOULD be As described in Section 11.1, the DM DNS information SHOULD be
coherent with the IP plane. The TTL of the Distribution Master name coherent with the IP plane. The TTL of the Distribution Master name
SHOULD be adjusted appropriately prior to changing the IP address. SHOULD be adjusted appropriately prior to changing the IP address.
Some DNS infrastructure uses the IP address to designate the Some DNS infrastructure uses the IP address to designate the
secondary, in which case, other mechanisms must be found. The reason secondary, in which case, other mechanisms must be found. A reason
for using IP addresses instead of names is generally to reach an for using IP addresses instead of names is generally to reach an
internal interface that is not designated by a FQDN, and to avoid internal interface that is not designated by a FQDN, and to avoid
potential bootstrap problems. Such scenarios are considered as out potential bootstrap problems. Such scenarios are considered as out
of scope in the case of home networks. of scope in the case of home networks.
11. Operational considerations for Offline/Disconnected resolution 12. Privacy Considerations
This section is non-normative. It provides suggestions on
operational consideration. TBD.
12. provisioning of the Homenet Naming Authority (HNA)
This document does not deal with how the HNA is provisioned with a
trusted relationship to the Distribution Master for the forward zone.
Provisioning of the relationship with an ISP-connection specific
Distribution Master for reverse zones is dealt with in
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]
This section details what needs to be provisioned into the HNA and
serves as a requirements statement for mechanisms.
13. Privacy Considerations
Outsourcing the DNS Authoritative service from the HNA to a third Outsourcing the DNS Authoritative service from the HNA to a third
party raises a few privacy related concerns. party raises a few privacy related concerns.
The Public Homenet Zone contains a full description of the services The Public Homenet Zone lists the names of services hosted in the
hosted in the network. These services may not be expected to be home network. Combined with blocking of AXFR queries, the use of
publicly shared although their names remain accessible through the NSEC3 [RFC5155] (vs NSEC [RFC4034]) prevents an attacker from being
Internet. Even though DNS makes information public, the DNS does not able to walk the zone, to discover all the names. However, the
expect to make the complete list of services public. In fact, making attacker may be able to walk the reverse DNS zone, or use other
information public still requires the key (or FQDN) of each service reconnaissance techniques to learn this information as described in
to be known by the resolver in order to retrieve information about [RFC7707].
the services. More specifically, making mywebsite.example.com public
in the DNS, is not sufficient to make resolvers aware of the
existence web site. However, an attacker may walk the reverse DNS
zone, or use other reconnaissance techniques to learn this
information as described in [RFC7707].
In order to prevent the complete Public Homenet Zone being published In general a home owner is expected only to publish names for which
on the Internet, AXFR queries SHOULD be blocked on the Public there is some need to be able to reference externally. Publication
Authoritative Server(s). Similarly, to avoid zone-walking NSEC3 of the name does not imply that the service is necessarily reachable
[RFC5155] SHOULD be preferred over NSEC [RFC4034]. When the Public from any or all parts of the Internet. [RFC7084] mandates that the
Homenet Zone is outsourced, the end user should be aware that it outgoing-only policy [RFC6092] be available, and in many cases it is
provides a complete description of the services available on the home configured by default. A well designed User Interface would combine
network. More specifically, names usually provides a clear a policy for making a service public by a name with a policy on who
indication of the service and possibly even the device type, and as may access it.
the Public Homenet Zone contains the IP addresses associated with the
service, they also limit the scope of the scan space.
In addition to the Public Homenet Zone, the third party can also In many cases, the home owner wishes to publish names for services
monitor the traffic associated with the Public Homenet Zone. This that only they will be able to access. The access control may
traffic may provide an indication of the services an end user consist of an IP source address range, or access may be restricted
via some VPN functionality. The purpose of publishing the name is so
that the service may be access by the same name both within the home,
and outside the home. Sending traffic to the relevant IPv6 address
causes the relevant VPN policy to be enacted upon.
While the problem of getting access to internal names has been solved
in Enterprise configurations with a split-DNS, and such a thing could
be done in the home, many recent improvements to VPN user interfaces
make it more likely that an individual might have multiple
connections configured. For instance, an adult child checking on the
state of a home automation system for a parent.
In addition to the Public Homenet Zone, pervasive DNS monitoring can
also monitor the traffic associated with the Public Homenet Zone.
This traffic may provide an indication of the services an end user
accesses, plus how and when they use these services. Although, accesses, plus how and when they use these services. Although,
caching may obfuscate this information inside the home network, it is caching may obfuscate this information inside the home network, it is
likely that outside your home network this information will not be likely that outside your home network this information will not be
cached. cached.
14. Security Considerations 13. Security Considerations
The Homenet Naming Architecture described in this document solves The Homenet Naming Architecture described in this document solves
exposing the HNA's DNS service as a DoS attack vector. exposing the HNA's DNS service as a DoS attack vector.
14.1. HNA DM channels 13.1. HNA DMand RDM channels
The HNA DM channels are specified to include their own security The HNA DM channels are specified to include their own security
mechanisms that are designed to provide the minimum attacke surface, mechanisms that are designed to provide the minimum attack surface,
and to authenticate transactions where necessary. and to authenticate transactions where necessary.
Note that in the case of the Reverse Homenet Zone, the data is less Note that in the case of the Reverse Homenet Zone, the data is less
subject to attacks than in the Public Homenet Zone. In addition, the subject to attacks than in the Public Homenet Zone. In addition, the
HNA and the DM MAY belong to the same administrative domain, i.e. the HNA and the DM MAY belong to the same administrative domain, i.e. the
ISP. More specifically, the WAN interface is located in the ISP ISP. More specifically, the WAN interface is located in the ISP
network. As a result, if provisioned using DHCPv6, the security network. As a result, if provisioned using DHCPv6, the security
credential may not even transit in the home network. On the other credential may not even transit in the home network. On the other
hand, if the HNA is not hosted at the border of the home network, the hand, if the HNA is not hosted at the border of the home network, the
credential may rely on the security associated to DHCPv6. Even if credential may rely on the security associated to DHCPv6. Even if
HNA and DM are in the same administrative domain it is strongly HNA and DM are in the same administrative domain it is strongly
RECOMMENDED to use a secure channel. RECOMMENDED to use a secure channel.
14.2. Names are less secure than IP addresses The security of these channels heavily relies on TLS and the DM or
RDM is authenticated by its certificate. To ensure the multiple TLS
session are are continuously authenticating the same entity, TLS may
take advantage of second factor authentication as described in
[RFC8672].
13.2. Names are less secure than IP addresses
This document describes how an end user can make their services and This document describes how an end user can make their services and
devices from his home network reachable on the Internet by using devices from his home network reachable on the Internet by using
names rather than IP addresses. This exposes the home network to names rather than IP addresses. This exposes the home network to
attackers, since names are expected to include less entropy than IP attackers, since names are expected to include less entropy than IP
addresses. In fact, with IP addresses, the Interface Identifier is addresses. In fact, with IP addresses, the Interface Identifier is
64 bits long leading to up to 2^64 possibilities for a given 64 bits long leading to up to 2^64 possibilities for a given
subnetwork. This is not to mention that the subnet prefix is also of subnetwork. This is not to mention that the subnet prefix is also of
64 bits long, thus providing up to 2^64 possibilities. On the other 64 bits long, thus providing up to 2^64 possibilities. On the other
hand, names used either for the home network domain or for the hand, names used either for the home network domain or for the
devices present less entropy (livebox, router, printer, nicolas, devices present less entropy (livebox, router, printer, nicolas,
jennifer, ...) and thus potentially exposes the devices to dictionary jennifer, ...) and thus potentially exposes the devices to dictionary
attacks. attacks.
14.3. Names are less volatile than IP addresses 13.3. Names are less volatile than IP addresses
IP addresses may be used to locate a device, a host or a service. IP addresses may be used to locate a device, a host or a service.
However, home networks are not expected to be assigned a time However, home networks are not expected to be assigned a time
invariant prefix by ISPs. As a result, observing IP addresses only invariant prefix by ISPs. As a result, observing IP addresses only
provides some ephemeral information about who is accessing the provides some ephemeral information about who is accessing the
service. On the other hand, names are not expected to be as volatile service. On the other hand, names are not expected to be as volatile
as IP addresses. As a result, logging names over time may be more as IP addresses. As a result, logging names over time may be more
valuable than logging IP addresses, especially to profile an end valuable than logging IP addresses, especially to profile an end
user's characteristics. user's characteristics.
PTR provides a way to bind an IP address to a name. In that sense, PTR provides a way to bind an IP address to a name. In that sense,
responding to PTR DNS queries may affect the end user's privacy. For responding to PTR DNS queries may affect the end user's privacy. For
that reason end users may choose not to respond to PTR DNS queries that reason end users may choose not to respond to PTR DNS queries
and MAY instead return a NXDOMAIN response. and MAY instead return a NXDOMAIN response.
14.4. DNS Reflection Attacks 13.4. DNS Reflection Attacks
An attacker performs a reflection attack when it sends traffic to one An attacker performs a reflection attack when it sends traffic to one
or more intermediary nodes (reflectors), that in turn send back or more intermediary nodes (reflectors), that in turn send back
response traffic to the victim. Motivations for using an response traffic to the victim. Motivations for using an
intermediary node might be anonymity of the attacker, as well as intermediary node might be anonymity of the attacker, as well as
amplification of the traffic. Typically, when the intermediary node amplification of the traffic. Typically, when the intermediary node
is a DNSSEC server, the attacker sends a DNSSEC query and the victim is a DNSSEC server, the attacker sends a DNSSEC query and the victim
is likely to receive a DNSSEC response. This section analyzes how is likely to receive a DNSSEC response. This section analyzes how
the different components may be involved as a reflector in a the different components may be involved as a reflector in a
reflection attack. Section 14.5 considers the Hidden Primary, reflection attack. Section 13.5 considers the Hidden Primary,
Section 14.6 the Synchronization Server, and Section 14.7 the Public Section 13.6 the Synchronization Server, and Section 13.7 the Public
Authoritative Server(s). Authoritative Server(s).
14.5. Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary 13.5. Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary
With the specified architecture, the Hidden Primary is only expected With the specified architecture, the Hidden Primary is only expected
to receive DNS queries of type SOA, AXFR or IXFR. This section to receive DNS queries of type SOA, AXFR or IXFR. This section
analyzes how these DNS queries may be used by an attacker to perform analyzes how these DNS queries may be used by an attacker to perform
a reflection attack. a reflection attack.
DNS queries of type AXFR and IXFR use TCP and as such are less DNS queries of type AXFR and IXFR use TCP and as such are less
subject to reflection attacks. This makes SOA queries the only subject to reflection attacks. This makes SOA queries the only
remaining practical vector of attacks for reflection attacks, based remaining practical vector of attacks for reflection attacks, based
on UDP. on UDP.
skipping to change at page 25, line 45 skipping to change at page 29, line 9
SOA queries are expected to follow a very specific pattern, which SOA queries are expected to follow a very specific pattern, which
makes rate limiting techniques an efficient way to limit such makes rate limiting techniques an efficient way to limit such
attacks, and associated impact on the naming service of the home attacks, and associated impact on the naming service of the home
network. network.
Motivations for such a flood might be a reflection attack, but could Motivations for such a flood might be a reflection attack, but could
also be a resource exhaustion attack performed against the Hidden also be a resource exhaustion attack performed against the Hidden
Primary. The Hidden Primary only expects to exchange traffic with Primary. The Hidden Primary only expects to exchange traffic with
the DM, that is its associated secondary. Even though secondary the DM, that is its associated secondary. Even though secondary
servers may be renumbered as mentioned in Section 10, the Hidden servers may be renumbered as mentioned in Section 11, the Hidden
Primary is likely to perform a DNSSEC resolution and find out the Primary is likely to perform a DNSSEC resolution and find out the
associated secondary's IP addresses in use. As a result, the Hidden associated secondary's IP addresses in use. As a result, the Hidden
Primary is likely to limit the origin of its incoming traffic based Primary is likely to limit the origin of its incoming traffic based
on the origin IP address. on the origin IP address.
With filtering rules based on IP address, SOA flooding attacks are With filtering rules based on IP address, SOA flooding attacks are
limited to forged packets with the IP address of the secondary limited to forged packets with the IP address of the secondary
server. In other words, the only victims are the Hidden Primary server. In other words, the only victims are the Hidden Primary
itself or the secondary. There is a need for the Hidden Primary to itself or the secondary. There is a need for the Hidden Primary to
limit that flood to limit the impact of the reflection attack on the limit that flood to limit the impact of the reflection attack on the
skipping to change at page 26, line 38 skipping to change at page 30, line 5
may have its legitimate query rejected is higher. If a legitimate may have its legitimate query rejected is higher. If a legitimate
SOA is discarded, the secondary will re-send SOA query every "retry SOA is discarded, the secondary will re-send SOA query every "retry
time" second until "expire time" seconds occurs, where "retry time" time" second until "expire time" seconds occurs, where "retry time"
and "expire time" have been defined in the SOA. and "expire time" have been defined in the SOA.
As a result, it is RECOMMENDED to set rate limiting policies to As a result, it is RECOMMENDED to set rate limiting policies to
protect HNA resources. If a flood lasts more than the expired time protect HNA resources. If a flood lasts more than the expired time
defined by the SOA, it is RECOMMENDED to re-initiate a defined by the SOA, it is RECOMMENDED to re-initiate a
synchronization between the Hidden Primary and the secondaries. synchronization between the Hidden Primary and the secondaries.
14.6. Reflection Attacks involving the DM 13.6. Reflection Attacks involving the DM
The DM acts as a secondary coupled with the Hidden Primary. The The DM acts as a secondary coupled with the Hidden Primary. The
secondary expects to receive NOTIFY query, SOA responses, AXFR and secondary expects to receive NOTIFY query, SOA responses, AXFR and
IXFR responses from the Hidden Primary. IXFR responses from the Hidden Primary.
Sending a NOTIFY query to the secondary generates a NOTIFY response Sending a NOTIFY query to the secondary generates a NOTIFY response
as well as initiating an SOA query exchange from the secondary to the as well as initiating an SOA query exchange from the secondary to the
Hidden Primary. As mentioned in [RFC1996], this is a known "benign Hidden Primary. As mentioned in [RFC1996], this is a known "benign
denial of service attack". As a result, the DM SHOULD enforce rate denial of service attack". As a result, the DM SHOULD enforce rate
limiting on sending SOA queries and NOTIFY responses to the Hidden limiting on sending SOA queries and NOTIFY responses to the Hidden
Primary. Most likely, when the secondary is flooded with valid and Primary. Most likely, when the secondary is flooded with valid and
signed NOTIFY queries, it is under a replay attack which is discussed signed NOTIFY queries, it is under a replay attack which is discussed
in Section 14.9. The key thing here is that the secondary is likely in Section 13.9. The key thing here is that the secondary is likely
to be designed to be able to process much more traffic than the to be designed to be able to process much more traffic than the
Hidden Primary hosted on a HNA. Hidden Primary hosted on a HNA.
This paragraph details how the secondary may limit the NOTIFY This paragraph details how the secondary may limit the NOTIFY
queries. Because the Hidden Primary may be renumbered, the secondary queries. Because the Hidden Primary may be renumbered, the secondary
SHOULD NOT perform permanent IP filtering based on IP addresses. In SHOULD NOT perform permanent IP filtering based on IP addresses. In
addition, a given secondary may be shared among multiple Hidden addition, a given secondary may be shared among multiple Hidden
Primaries which make filtering rules based on IP harder to set. The Primaries which make filtering rules based on IP harder to set. The
time at which a NOTIFY is sent by the Hidden Primary is not time at which a NOTIFY is sent by the Hidden Primary is not
predictable. However, a flood of NOTIFY messages may be easily predictable. However, a flood of NOTIFY messages may be easily
detected, as a NOTIFY originated from a given Homenet Zone is detected, as a NOTIFY originated from a given Homenet Zone is
expected to have a very limited number of unique source IP addresses, expected to have a very limited number of unique source IP addresses,
even when renumbering is occurring. As a result, the secondary, MAY even when renumbering is occurring. As a result, the secondary, MAY
rate limit incoming NOTIFY queries. rate limit incoming NOTIFY queries.
On the Hidden Primary side, it is recommended that the Hidden Primary On the Hidden Primary side, it is recommended that the Hidden Primary
sends a NOTIFY as long as the zone has not been updated by the sends a NOTIFY as long as the zone has not been updated by the
secondary. Multiple SOA queries may indicate the secondary is under secondary. Multiple SOA queries may indicate the secondary is under
attack. attack.
14.7. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative Servers 13.7. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative Servers
Reflection attacks involving the Public Authoritative Server(s) are Reflection attacks involving the Public Authoritative Server(s) are
similar to attacks on any Outsourcing Infrastructure. This is not similar to attacks on any DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure. This is
specific to the architecture described in this document, and thus are not specific to the architecture described in this document, and thus
considered as out of scope. are considered as out of scope.
In fact, one motivation of the architecture described in this In fact, one motivation of the architecture described in this
document is to expose the Public Authoritative Server(s) to attacks document is to expose the Public Authoritative Server(s) to attacks
instead of the HNA, as it is believed that the Public Authoritative instead of the HNA, as it is believed that the Public Authoritative
Server(s) will be better able to defend itself. Server(s) will be better able to defend itself.
14.8. Flooding Attack 13.8. Flooding Attack
The purpose of flooding attacks is mostly resource exhaustion, where The purpose of flooding attacks is mostly resource exhaustion, where
the resource can be bandwidth, memory, or CPU for example. the resource can be bandwidth, memory, or CPU for example.
One goal of the architecture described in this document is to limit One goal of the architecture described in this document is to limit
the surface of attack on the HNA. This is done by outsourcing the the surface of attack on the HNA. This is done by outsourcing the
DNS service to the Public Authoritative Server(s). By doing so, the DNS service to the Public Authoritative Server(s). By doing so, the
HNA limits its DNS interactions between the Hidden Primary and the HNA limits its DNS interactions between the Hidden Primary and the
DM. This limits the number of entities the HNA interacts with as DM. This limits the number of entities the HNA interacts with as
well as the scope of DNS exchanges - NOTIFY, SOA, AXFR, IXFR. well as the scope of DNS exchanges - NOTIFY, SOA, AXFR, IXFR.
The use of an authenticated channel with SIG(0) or TSIG between the The use of an authenticated channel with SIG(0) or TSIG between the
HNA and the DM, enables detection of illegitimate DNS queries, so HNA and the DM, enables detection of illegitimate DNS queries, so
appropriate action may be taken - like dropping the queries. If appropriate action may be taken - like dropping the queries. If
signatures are validated, then most likely, the HNA is under a replay signatures are validated, then most likely, the HNA is under a replay
attack, as detailed in Section 14.9 attack, as detailed in Section 13.9
In order to limit the resource required for authentication, it is In order to limit the resource required for authentication, it is
recommended to use TSIG that uses symmetric cryptography over SIG(0) recommended to use TSIG that uses symmetric cryptography over SIG(0)
that uses asymmetric cryptography. that uses asymmetric cryptography.
14.9. Replay Attack 13.9. Replay Attack
Replay attacks consist of an attacker either resending or delaying a Replay attacks consist of an attacker either resending or delaying a
legitimate message that has been sent by an authorized user or legitimate message that has been sent by an authorized user or
process. As the Hidden Primary and the DM use an authenticated process. As the Hidden Primary and the DM use an authenticated
channel, replay attacks are mostly expected to use forged DNS queries channel, replay attacks are mostly expected to use forged DNS queries
in order to provide valid traffic. in order to provide valid traffic.
From the perspective of an attacker, using a correctly authenticated From the perspective of an attacker, using a correctly authenticated
DNS query may not be detected as an attack and thus may generate a DNS query may not be detected as an attack and thus may generate a
response. Generating and sending a response consumes more resources response. Generating and sending a response consumes more resources
than either dropping the query by the defender, or generating the than either dropping the query by the defender, or generating the
query by the attacker, and thus could be used for resource exhaustion query by the attacker, and thus could be used for resource exhaustion
attacks. In addition, as the authentication is performed at the DNS attacks. In addition, as the authentication is performed at the DNS
layer, the source IP address could be impersonated in order to layer, the source IP address could be impersonated in order to
perform a reflection attack. perform a reflection attack.
Section 14.4 details how to mitigate reflection attacks and Section 13.4 details how to mitigate reflection attacks and
Section 14.8 details how to mitigate resource exhaustion. Both Section 13.8 details how to mitigate resource exhaustion. Both
sections assume a context of DoS with a flood of DNS queries. This sections assume a context of DoS with a flood of DNS queries. This
section suggests a way to limit the attack surface of replay attacks. section suggests a way to limit the attack surface of replay attacks.
As SIG(0) and TSIG use inception and expiration time, the time frame As SIG(0) and TSIG use inception and expiration time, the time frame
for replay attack is limited. SIG(0) and TSIG recommends a fudge for replay attack is limited. SIG(0) and TSIG recommends a fudge
value of 5 minutes. This value has been set as a compromise between value of 5 minutes. This value has been set as a compromise between
possibly loose time synchronization between devices and the valid possibly loose time synchronization between devices and the valid
lifetime of the message. As a result, better time synchronization lifetime of the message. As a result, better time synchronization
policies could reduce the time window of the attack. policies could reduce the time window of the attack.
[](<!- <section title="DNSSEC is recommended to authenticate DNS 14. Data Model for Outsourced information
hosted data
Deploying DNSSEC is recommended, since in some cases the information The following is an abbridged example of a set of data that
stored in the DNS is used by the ISP or an IT department to grant represents the needed configuration parameters for outsourcing.
access. For example some servers may perform PTR DNS queries to
grant access based on host names. DNSSEC mitigates lack of trust in
DNS, and it is RECOMMENDED to deploy DNSSEC on HNAs.
->) {
"dm_notify" : "2001:db8:1f15:62e:21c::2",
"dm_acl" : "2001:db8:1f15:62e:21c::/64",
"dm_ctrl" : "192.168.1.18",
"dm_port" : "4433",
"ns_list" : [ "ns1.publicdns.example", "ns2.publicdns.example"],
"zone" : "daniel.homenetdns.example",
"auth_method" : "certificate",
"hna_certificate":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIDTjCCFGy....",
"hna_key" : "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIEowICAQE...."
}
Here goes a YANG MODULE description of the above.
15. IANA Considerations 15. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no actions for IANA.
16. Acknowledgment 16. Acknowledgment
The authors wish to thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on The authors wish to thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on
the early versions of the draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues the early versions of the draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues
with the IPv6 routed home concept and placing the scope of this with the IPv6 routed home concept and placing the scope of this
document in a wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and document in a wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and
injecting a healthy debate on the merits of the idea; Ulrik de Bie injecting a healthy debate on the merits of the idea; Ulrik de Bie
for providing alternative solutions; Paul Mockapetris, Christian for providing alternative solutions; Paul Mockapetris, Christian
Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on
HNA and low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC HNA and low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC
capabilities of small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as capabilities of small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as
dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael
Abrahamson, Michael Richardson and Ray Bellis for their feedback on Abrahamson, and Ray Bellis for their feedback on handling different
handling different views as well as clarifying the impact of views as well as clarifying the impact of outsourcing the zone
outsourcing the zone signing operation outside the HNA; Mark Andrew signing operation outside the HNA; Mark Andrew and Peter Koch for
and Peter Koch for clarifying the renumbering. clarifying the renumbering.
17. References 17. References
17.1. Normative References 17.1. Normative References
[RFC1033] Lottor, M., "Domain Administrators Operations Guide", [RFC1033] Lottor, M., "Domain Administrators Operations Guide",
RFC 1033, DOI 10.17487/RFC1033, November 1987, RFC 1033, DOI 10.17487/RFC1033, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1033>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1033>.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987, STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
skipping to change at page 30, line 19 skipping to change at page 33, line 40
[RFC2136] Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound, [RFC2136] Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997, RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>.
[RFC2142] Crocker, D., "Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and [RFC2142] Crocker, D., "Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and
Functions", RFC 2142, DOI 10.17487/RFC2142, May 1997, Functions", RFC 2142, DOI 10.17487/RFC2142, May 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2142>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2142>.
[RFC2181] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
Specification", RFC 2181, DOI 10.17487/RFC2181, July 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2181>.
[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS [RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998, NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.
[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B. [RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B.
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
(TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000, (TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>.
[RFC2931] Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures [RFC2931] Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures
skipping to change at page 31, line 14 skipping to change at page 34, line 32
[RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", [RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007, RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS [RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008, Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5936] Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, Ed., "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol [RFC5936] Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, Ed., "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol
(AXFR)", RFC 5936, DOI 10.17487/RFC5936, June 2010, (AXFR)", RFC 5936, DOI 10.17487/RFC5936, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5936>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5936>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer [RFC6092] Woodyatt, J., Ed., "Recommended Simple Security
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347, Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>. Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service", RFC 6092,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6092, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6092>.
[RFC6644] Evans, D., Droms, R., and S. Jiang, "Rebind Capability in [RFC6644] Evans, D., Droms, R., and S. Jiang, "Rebind Capability in
DHCPv6 Reconfigure Messages", RFC 6644, DHCPv6 Reconfigure Messages", RFC 6644,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6644, July 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6644, July 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6644>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6644>.
[RFC6672] Rose, S. and W. Wijngaards, "DNAME Redirection in the
DNS", RFC 6672, DOI 10.17487/RFC6672, June 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6672>.
[RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762, [RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.
[RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service [RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013, Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.
[RFC6887] Wing, D., Ed., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and
P. Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 6887,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6887, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6887>.
[RFC7010] Liu, B., Jiang, S., Carpenter, B., Venaas, S., and W. [RFC7010] Liu, B., Jiang, S., Carpenter, B., Venaas, S., and W.
George, "IPv6 Site Renumbering Gap Analysis", RFC 7010, George, "IPv6 Site Renumbering Gap Analysis", RFC 7010,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7010, September 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC7010, September 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7010>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7010>.
[RFC7084] Singh, H., Beebee, W., Donley, C., and B. Stark, "Basic
Requirements for IPv6 Customer Edge Routers", RFC 7084,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7084, November 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7084>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>. 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating [RFC7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344, DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.
skipping to change at page 32, line 48 skipping to change at page 36, line 24
[RFC8375] Pfister, P. and T. Lemon, "Special-Use Domain [RFC8375] Pfister, P. and T. Lemon, "Special-Use Domain
'home.arpa.'", RFC 8375, DOI 10.17487/RFC8375, May 2018, 'home.arpa.'", RFC 8375, DOI 10.17487/RFC8375, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8375>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8375>.
[RFC8415] Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A., [RFC8415] Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters, Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
"Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018, RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
17.2. Informative References 17.2. Informative References
[I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns]
Howard, L., "Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service Howard, L., "Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service
Providers", draft-howard-dnsop-ip6rdns-00 (work in Providers", draft-howard-dnsop-ip6rdns-00 (work in
progress), June 2014. progress), June 2014.
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]
Migault, D., Mrugalski, T., Griffiths, C., Weber, R., and Migault, D., Weber, R., Mrugalski, T., Griffiths, C., and
W. Cloetens, "DHCPv6 Options for Homenet Naming W. Cloetens, "DHCPv6 Options for Home Network Naming
Architecture", draft-ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc- Authority", draft-ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-
options-06 (work in progress), June 2018. options-08 (work in progress), October 2020.
[I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming] [I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming]
Lemon, T., Migault, D., and S. Cheshire, "Homenet Naming Lemon, T., Migault, D., and S. Cheshire, "Homenet Naming
and Service Discovery Architecture", draft-ietf-homenet- and Service Discovery Architecture", draft-ietf-homenet-
simple-naming-03 (work in progress), October 2018. simple-naming-03 (work in progress), October 2018.
[I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname] [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
Sury, O., "CNAME+DNAME Name Redirection", draft-sury- Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
dnsext-cname-dname-00 (work in progress), April 2010. Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-38 (work in progress), May
2020.
[I-D.richardson-homerouter-provisioning]
Richardson, M., "Provisioning Initial Device Identifiers
into Home Routers", draft-richardson-homerouter-
provisioning-00 (work in progress), November 2020.
[RFC8672] Sheffer, Y. and D. Migault, "TLS Server Identity Pinning
with Tickets", RFC 8672, DOI 10.17487/RFC8672, October
2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8672>.
Appendix A. Envisioned deployment scenarios Appendix A. Envisioned deployment scenarios
A number of deployment have been envisionned, this section aims at A number of deployment have been envisioned, this section aims at
providing a brief description. The use cases are not limitatives and providing a brief description. The use cases are not limitations and
this section is not normative. this section is not normative.
A.1. CPE Vendor A.1. CPE Vendor
A specific vendor with specific relations with a registrar or a A specific vendor with specific relations with a registrar or a
registry may sell a CPE that is provisioned with provisioned domain registry may sell a CPE that is provisioned with provisioned domain
name. Such domain name does not need to be necessary human readable. name. Such domain name does not need to be necessary human readable.
One possible way is that the vendor also provisions the HNA with a One possible way is that the vendor also provisions the HNA with a
private and public keys as well as a certificate. Note that these private and public keys as well as a certificate. Note that these
skipping to change at page 37, line 18 skipping to change at page 41, line 18
refresh. The default value indicated by [RFC1033] is 3600000 refresh. The default value indicated by [RFC1033] is 3600000
(approx. 42 days). In home network architectures, the HNA (approx. 42 days). In home network architectures, the HNA
provides both the DNS synchronization and the access to the home provides both the DNS synchronization and the access to the home
network. This device may be plugged and unplugged by the end user network. This device may be plugged and unplugged by the end user
without notification, thus we recommend a long expiry timer. without notification, thus we recommend a long expiry timer.
o MINIMUM: indicates the minimum TTL. The default value indicated o MINIMUM: indicates the minimum TTL. The default value indicated
by [RFC1033] is 86400 (1 day). For home network, this value MAY by [RFC1033] is 86400 (1 day). For home network, this value MAY
be reduced, and 3600 (1 hour) seems more appropriate. be reduced, and 3600 (1 hour) seems more appropriate.
<<!-- ## Considerations on multiple Registered Homenet Domain Names
## are left for future versions When multiple Registered Homenet
Domains are used -like example.com, example.net, example.org, a DNS
Homenet Zone file per Registered Homenet Domain SHOULD be generated.
In order to synchronize the zone contents, the HNA may provide all
bindings in each zone files. As a result, any update MUST be
performed on all zone files, i.e. for all Registered Homenet Domains.
To limit thees updates when multiple Registered Homenet Domains are
involved, the HNA MAY fill all bindings in a specific zone file and
redirect all other zones to that zone. This can be achieved with
redirecting mechanisms like CNAME {{RFC2181}}, {{RFC1034}}, DNAME
{{RFC6672}} or CNAME+DNAME {{I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname}}. This is
an implementation issue to determine whether redirection mechanisms
MAY be preferred for large Homenet Zones, or when the number of
Registered Homenet Domain becomes quite large. -->>
Appendix C. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing Appendix C. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing
This section specifies the various parameters required by the HNA to This section specifies the various parameters required by the HNA to
configure the naming architecture of this document. This section is configure the naming architecture of this document. This section is
informational, and is intended to clarify the information handled by informational, and is intended to clarify the information handled by
the HNA and the various settings to be done. the HNA and the various settings to be done.
DM may be configured with the following parameters. These parameters The HNA needs to be configured with the following parameters. These
are necessary to establish a secure channel between the HNA and the parameters are necessary to establish a secure channel between the
DM as well as to specify the DNS zone that is in the scope of the HNA and the DM as well as to specify the DNS zone that is in the
communication: scope of the communication:
o DM: The associated FQDNs or IP addresses of the DM. IP addresses Distribution Master notification address (dm_notify): The associated
are optional and the FQDN is sufficient. To secure the binding FQDNs or IP addresses of the DM to which DNS notifies should be
name and IP addresses, a DNSSEC exchange is required. Otherwise, sent. IP addresses are optional and the FQDN is sufficient and
the IP addresses should be entered manually. preferred. If there are concerns about the security of the name
to IP translation, then DNSSEC should be employed.
o Authentication Method: How the HNA authenticates itself to the DM. Authentication Method ("method"): How the HNA authenticates itself
to the DM. This specification defines only "certificate"
o Authentication data: Associated Data. PSK only requires a single Authentication data ("hna_certificate", "hna_key"): While a PSK can
argument. If other authentication mechanisms based on be used used as part of TSIG authentication, it has poor security
certificates are used, then HNA private keys, certificates and properties and is hard to scale. Better solutions use public key
certification authority should be specified. mechanisms, leveraging private keys built into the HNA.
o Public Authoritative Server(s): The FQDN or IP addresses of the Public Authoritative Server(s) (dm_ctrl and dm_port): The FQDN or IP
Public Authoritative Server(s). It MAY correspond to the data addresses of the Public Authoritative Server(s) to which control
that will be set in the NS RRsets and SOA of the Homenet Zone. IP messages will be sent. IP addresses are optional and the FQDN is
addresses are optional and the FQDN is sufficient. To secure the sufficient.
binding between name and IP addresses, a DNSSEC exchange is
required. Otherwise, the IP addresses should be entered manually.
o Registered Homenet Domain: The domain name used to establish the (XXX? what? It MAY correspond to the data that will be sent in the
secure channel. This name is used by the DM and the HNA for the NS RRsets and SOA of the Homenet Zone.)
primary / secondary configuration as well as to index the NOTIFY Registered Homenet Domain (???): The domain name used to establish
queries of the HNA when the HNA has been renumbered. the secure channel. This name is used by the DM and the HNA for
the primary / secondary configuration as well as to index the
NOTIFY queries of the HNA when the HNA has been renumbered.
Setting the Homenet Zone requires the following information. Registered Homenet Domain (zone): The Domain Name of the zone.
Multiple Registered Homenet Domains may be provided. This will
generate the creation of multiple Public Homenet Zones.
o Registered Homenet Domain: The Domain Name of the zone. Multiple Public Authoritative Server (ns-list): The Public Authoritative
Registered Homenet Domains may be provided. This will generate Server(s) associated with the Registered Homenet Domain. Multiple
the creation of multiple Public Homenet Zones. Public Authoritative Server(s) may be provided.
o Public Authoritative Server(s): The Public Authoritative Server(s) For forward zones, the relationship between the HNA and the forward
associated with the Registered Homenet Domain. Multiple Public zone provider may be the result of a number of transactions:
Authoritative Server(s) may be provided.
Two possible methods of providing the required information would be: 1. The forward zone outsourcing may be provided by the maker of the
Homenet router. In this case, the identity and authorization
could be built in the device at manufacturer provisioning time.
The device would need to be provisioned with a device-unique
credential, and it is likely that the Registered Homenet Domain
would be derived from a public attribute of the device, such as a
serial number.
JSON for forward zones should be standardized in a similar way to 2. The forward zone outsourcing may be provided by the Internet
zone file layout in RFC1035 Service Provider. In this case, the use of
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] to provide the
credentials is appropriate.
DHCP for reverse zones needs a separate draft 3. The forward zone may be outsourced to a third party, such as a
domain registrar. In this case, the use of the JSON-serialized
YANG data model described in section Section 14 is appropriate,
as it can easily be copy and pasted by the user, or downloaded as
part of a web transaction.
For reverse zones, the relationship is always with the upstream ISP
(although there may be more than one), and so
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] is always the
appropriate interface.
Appendix D. Example: A manufacturer provisioned HNA product flow
This scenario is one where a homenet router device manufacturer
decides to offer DNS hosting as a value add.
[I-D.richardson-homerouter-provisioning] describes a process for a
home router credential provisioning system. The outline of it is
that near the end of the manufacturing process, as part of the
firmware loading, the manufacturer provisions a private key and
certificate into the device.
In addition to having a assymmetric credential known to the
manufacturer, the device also has been provisioned with an agreed
upon name. In the example in the above document, the name
"n8d234f.r.example.net" has already been allocated and confirmed with
the manufacturer.
The HNA can use the above domain for itself. It is not very pretty
or personal, but if the owner wishes a better name, they can arrange
for it.
The configuration would look like:
{
"dm_notify" : "2001:db8:1234:111:222::2",
"dm_acl" : "2001:db8:1234:111:222::/64",
"dm_ctrl" : "manufacturer.example.net",
"dm_port" : "4433",
"ns_list" : [ "ns1.publicdns.example", "ns2.publicdns.example"],
"zone" : "n8d234f.r.example.net",
"auth_method" : "certificate",
"hna_certificate":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIDTjCCFGy....",
}
The dm_ctrl and dm_port values would be built into the firmware.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Daniel Migault Daniel Migault
Ericsson Ericsson
8275 Trans Canada Route 8275 Trans Canada Route
Saint Laurent, QC 4S 0B6 Saint Laurent, QC 4S 0B6
Canada Canada
EMail: daniel.migault@ericsson.com EMail: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
skipping to change at page 39, line 33 skipping to change at page 44, line 25
Eindhoven 5632CW Eindhoven 5632CW
NL NL
EMail: v6ops@globis.net EMail: v6ops@globis.net
Chris Griffiths Chris Griffiths
EMail: cgriffiths@gmail.com EMail: cgriffiths@gmail.com
Wouter Cloetens Wouter Cloetens
SoftAtHome Deutsche Telekom
vaartdijk 3 701
Wijgmaal 3018
BE
EMail: wouter.cloetens@softathome.com EMail: wouter.cloetens@external.telekom.de
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