Homenet                                                       D. Migault
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                                  R. Weber
Expires: November 11, 2019 May 20, 2020                                            Nominum
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                               R. Hunter
                                                    Globis Consulting BV
                                                            C. Griffiths

                                                             W. Cloetens
                                                             SoftAtHome<
                                                            May 10,
                                                              SoftAtHome
                                                       November 17, 2019

         Outsourcing Home Network Authoritative Naming Service
           draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-08
           draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-09

Abstract

   Designation of services and

   The Homenet Naming authority is responsible for making devices of a within
   the home network is not user
   friendly, and mechanisms should enable a user to designate services
   and devices inside a accessible by name within the home network using names.

   In order to enable internal communications while as well
   as from outside the home network
   experiments Internet connectivity shortage, (e.g. the naming service should
   be hosted on a device inside Internet).  The names of
   the home network.  On devices accessible from the other hand, Internet are stored in the Public
   Homenet Zone, served by a DNS authoritative server.  It is unlikely
   that home networks devices have not been will contain sufficiently robust platforms
   designed to handle heavy loads.
   As host a result, hosting the naming service on such home network device,
   visible as the DNS on the Internet exposes this device to resource exhaustion
   and other attacks, which could make the home network unreachable, and
   most probably as
   such would also affect the internal communications of expose the home network.

   As result, home networks may prefer not serving the naming service
   for the Internet, but instead prefer outsourcing it network to a third party. DDoS attacks.

   This document describes a mechanisms mechanism that enables the Home Network
   Authority (HNA) to outsource the naming service to the Outsourcing
   Infrastructure.
   Infrastructure via a Distribution Master (DM).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 11, 2019. May 20, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology
     2.1.  Alternative solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Architecture Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.
   4.  Architecture Overview Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Example: Homenet Zone   7
     4.1.  Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing   7
     4.2.  Distribution Master Communication Channels  . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Synchronization  Control Channel between HNA and the Synchronization Server DM  .  11
     5.1.  Synchronization with a Hidden Primary . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  Securing Synchronization . .  11
     5.1.  Information to build the Public Homenet Zone. . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust. . . . . .  12
     5.3.  Information to set the Synchronization Channel, . . .  13
     5.3.  HNA Security Policies . .  12
     5.4.  Deleting the delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture . . . . . .  13
     5.5.  Messages Exchange Description . . . . . .  14
     6.1.  Zone Signing" . . . . . . . .  13
       5.5.1.  Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone. .  13
       5.5.2.  Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust .  14
       5.5.3.  Providing information for the Synchronization Channel  14
       5.5.4.  HNA instructing deleting the delegation . . . . . . .  15
     5.6.  Securing the Control Channel between HNA and DM . . . . .  15
     6.2.  Secure Delegation"
     5.7.  Implementation Tips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Handling Different Views
   6.  DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . . . . . . . .  17
     6.1.  Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM .  18
   7.  DM Distribution Channel . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.1.  Misleading Reasons for Local Scope DNS Zone" . . . . . .  17
     7.2.  Consequences" . . . .  18
   8.  HNA Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.3.  Guidance and Recommendations . .  18
   9.  DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.4.
   10. Homenet Reverse Zone  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   8.
   11. Renumbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.1.  20
     11.1.  Hidden Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     8.2.  Synchronization Server
     11.2.  Distribution Master  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   9.
   12. Operational considerations for Offline/Disconnected
       resolution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   13. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   10.
   14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     10.1.
     14.1.  HNA DM channels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     14.2.  Names are less secure than IP addresses  . . . . . . . .  23
     10.2.
     14.3.  Names are less volatile than IP addresses  . . . . . . .  23
     10.3.
     14.4.  DNS Reflection Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     10.4.  "Reflection  23
     14.5.  Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary . . . . .  24
     10.5.
     14.6.  Reflection Attacks involving the Synchronization Server DM  . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.6.
     14.7.  Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative
            Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     10.7.
     14.8.  Flooding Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     10.8.
     14.9.  Replay Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   11.
   15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   12.  27
   16. Acknowledgment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   13. References
   17. Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     13.1.  Normative References
     17.1.  Envisioned deployment scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       17.1.1.  CPE Vendor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     13.2.  Informative References
       17.1.2.  Agnostic CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     17.2.  Example: Homenet Zone  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     17.3.  Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing  . . .  31
   Authors' Addresses
   18. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32

1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.
     18.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     18.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36

1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Introduction

   IPv6 provides global end to end IP reachability. connectivity.  End users prefer to
   use names instead of long and complex IPv6 addresses when accessing
   services hosted in the home network.

   Customer Edge Routers and other Customer Premises Equipment (CPEs)
   are already providing IPv6 connectivity to the home network, and
   generally provide IPv6 addresses or prefixes to the nodes of the home
   network.  In addition,

   [RFC7368] recommends that home networks be resilient to connectivity
   disruption from the ISP.  The public names should be resolvable
   within the home network and on the Internet, even when there are
   disruptions.  This could be achieved by a dedicated device inside the home
   network that builds,
   serves or manage the publishes, and manages a Public Homenet Zone,
   thus providing bindings between
   names and public names, IP addresses.

   CPEs are addresses, and other
   RR types.

   The management of course good candidates to manage the binding between names and IP addresses of nodes.  However, this could also can be
   performed by another device a role that the Customer Premises
   Equipment (CPE) does.  Other devices in the home network that is not a CPE.
   In addition, could
   fulfill this role e.g. a given NAS server, but for simplicity, this
   document assumes the function is located on one of the CPE devices.

   A home network may have multiple nodes that may
   implement this functionality. CPEs.  Since management of the
   Public Homenet Zone involves DNS specific mechanisms that cannot be
   distributed over multiple servers (primary server), when multiple
   nodes can potentially manage the Public Homenet Zone, a single node
   needs to be selected. selected per outsourced zone.  This selected node is
   designated as providing the Homenet Naming Authority (HNA). (HNA) function.

   The process by which a single HNA is selected per zone is not in
   scope for this document.

   CPEs, Homenet Naming Authority, which may host the HNA function, as well as home network devices
   devices, are usually low powered devices not designed not for terminating
   heavy traffic.  As a result, hosting an authoritative DNS service on
   visible to the Internet may expose the home network to resource
   exhaustion and other attacks.  This may isolate  Additionally, the home network from names could become
   unavailable during disruptions of the upstream Internet and
   also impact the services hosted by the such an home network device,
   thus affecting overall home network communication. connectivity.

   In order to avoid resource exhaustion and other attacks, this
   document describes an architecture that outsources the authoritative
   naming service of the home network.  More specifically, the Homenet
   Naming Authority HNA
   builds the Public Homenet Zone and outsources it to an Outsourcing Infrastructure.
   Infrastructure via a Distribution Master (DM).  The Outsourcing
   Infrastructure in is in charge of publishing the corresponding Public
   Homenet Zone on the Internet.  The transfer of DNS zone information
   is achieved using standard DNS mechanisms involving primary and
   secondary DNS servers, with the HNA hosted primary being a stealth
   primary, and the Distribution Master a secondary.

   Section 4.1 provides an architecture description that describes the
   relation between the Homenet Naming Authority HNA and the Outsourcing Architecture.  In order
   to keep the Public Homenet Zone up-to-date Section 5 6 describes how
   the Homenet Zone HNA and the Public Outsourcing Infrastructure synchronizes the Pubic
   Homenet Zone
   can be synchronized. Zone.

   The proposed architecture aims at deploying is explicitly designed to enable fully
   functional DNSSEC, and the Public Homenet Zone is expected to be
   signed with a secure delegation.  The  DNSSEC key management and zone
   signing and secure delegation may be
   performed either by the Homenet Naming Authority or is handled by the
   Outsourcing Infrastructure.  Section 6 discusses these two
   alternatives.  Section 7 discusses the consequences of publishing
   multiple representations of the same zone also commonly designated as
   views.  This section provides guidance to limit the risks associated
   with multiple views. HNA.

   Section 7.4 10 discusses management of the one or more reverse
   zone. zones.
   Section 8 11 discusses how renumbering should be handled.  Finally,
   Section 9 13 and Section 10 14 respectively discuss privacy and security
   considerations when outsourcing the Public Homenet Zone.

3.  Terminology

   o  Customer Premises Equipment: (CPE) is a router providing
      connectivity to the home network.

   o

   The Public Homenet Naming Authority: (HNA) Zone is a home network node responsible expected to manage the Homenet Zone. contain public information
   only in a single universal view.  This includes building the Homenet
      Zone, as well as managing the distribution of that Homenet Zone
      through document does not define how
   the Outsourcing Infrastructure.

   o  Registered Homenet Domain: information required to construct this view is derived.

   It is also not in the Domain Name associated scope of this document to define names for
   exclusive use within the boundaries of the local home network.

   o  Homenet Zone:
   Instead, local scope information is the DNS zone associated with expected to be provided to the
   home network using local scope naming services. mDNS [RFC6762] DNS-SD
   [RFC6763] are two examples of these services.  Currently mDNS is
   limited to a single link network.
      It  However, future protocols and
   architectures [I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming] are expected to
   leverage this constraint as pointed out in [RFC7558].

2.1.  Alternative solutions

   An alternative existing solution in IPv4 is designated by its Registered Homenet Domain. to have a single zone,
   where a host uses a RESTful HTTP service to register a single name
   into a common public zone.  This zone is
      built by the HNA and contains the bindings between names often called "Dynamic DNS", and IP
      addresses
   there are a number of commercial providers, including Dyn, Gandi etc.
   These solutions were typically used by a host behind the nodes CPE to make
   it's CPE IPv4 address visible, usually in order to enable incoming
   connections.

   For a small number (one to three) of hosts, use of such a system
   provides an alternative to the home network. architecture described in this
   document.

   The HNA synchronizes
      the Homenet Zone with alternative does suffer from some severe limitations:

   o  the Synchronization Server via a hidden
      primary / secondary architecture.  The Outsourcing Infrastructure
      may process CPE/HNA router is unaware of the Homenet Zone - for example providing DNSSEC
      signing - process, and cannot respond
      to generate the Public Homenet Zone. queries for these names when there are disruptions in
      connectivity.  This Public
      Homenet Zone is then transmitted to makes the Public Authoritative
      Server(s) that publish it home user or application dependent
      on having to resolve different names in the Internet. event of outages or
      disruptions.

   o  Public Homenet Zone: is  the public version CPE/HNA router cannot control the process.  Any host can do
      this regardless of whether or not the Homenet Zone.
      It is expected to be signed with DNSSEC.  It is hosted by home network administrator
      wants the
      Public Authoritative Server(s), which are authoritative for this
      zone.  The Public Homenet Zone and name published or not.  There is therefore no possible
      audit trail.

   o  the Homenet Zone might credentials for the dynamic DNS server need to be
      different.  For example some names might securely
      transferred to all hosts that wish to use it.  This is not become reachable from a
      problem for a technical user to do with one or two hosts, but it
      does not scale to multiple hosts and becomes a problem for non-
      technical users.

   o  "all the Internet, good names are taken" - current services put everyone's
      names into some small set of zones, and thus not be hosted in there are often conflicts.

      Distinguishing similar names by delegation of zones was among the Public Homenet Zone.
      Another example
      primary design goals of difference may also occur when the Public
      Homenet Zone DNS system.

   o  The RESTful services do not always support all RR types.  The
      homenet user is signed whereas dependent on the Homenet Zone service provider supporting new
      types.  By providing full DNS delegation, this document enables
      all RR types and also future extensions.

   There is no technical reason why a RESTful cloud service could not signed.
   provide solutions to many of these problems, but this document
   describes a DNS based solution.

3.  Terminology

   o  Outsourcing Infrastructure:  Customer Premises Equipment: (CPE) is a router providing
      connectivity to the home network.

   o  Homenet Zone: is the combination DNS zone for use within the boundaries of the
      Synchronization Server
      home network: home.arpa, see [RFC8375]).  This zone is not
      considered public and the Public Authoritative Server(s). is out of scope for this document.

   o  Public Authoritative Servers: are  Registered Homenet Domain: is the authoritative name servers
      hosting Domain Name associated with the
      home network.

   o  Public Homenet Zone.  Name resolution requests for Zone: contains the
      Homenet Domain names in the home network that
      are sent expected to these servers.  For resiliency be publicly resolvable on the
      Public Homenet Zone SHOULD be hosted on multiple servers. Internet.

   o  Synchronization Server:  Homenet Naming Authority: (HNA) is a function responsible for
      managing the server with which the HNA
      synchronizes the Public Homenet Zone.  The Synchronization Server is
      configured as a secondary and  This includes populating the HNA acts as primary.  There MAY
      be multiple Synchronization Servers, but
      Public Homenet Zone, signing the text assumes a single
      server.  In addition, zone for DNSSEC, as well as
      managing the text assumes distribution of that Homenet Zone to the Synchronization Server
      is a separate entity.  This Outsourcing
      Infrastructure.

   o  Outsourcing Infrastructure: is not a requirement, and when the HNA
      signs the zone, infrastructure responsible for
      receiving the synchronization function might also be
      operated by Public Homenet Zone and publishing it on the
      Internet.  It is mainly composed of a Distribution Master and
      Public Authoritative Servers.

   o  Homenet Reverse Zone: The reverse zone file associated with the
      Homenet Zone.

   o  Reverse  Public Authoritative Servers: are the authoritative name
      server(s) hosting servers
      for the Public Homenet Reverse Zone.  Queries for
      reverse  Name resolution of requests for the
      Homenet Domain are sent to this server.
      Similarly to Public Authoritative Servers, for resiliency, these servers.  For resiliency the
      Public Homenet Reverse Zone SHOULD be hosted on multiple servers.

   o  Reverse Synchronization Server:  Homenet Authoritative Servers: are authoritative name servers
      within the Homenet network.

   o  Distribution Master (DM): is the server with (set of) server(s) to which the
      HNA synchronizes the Public Homenet Reverse Zone.  It is configured as a
      secondary and the HNA acts as primary.  There MAY be multiple
      Reverse Synchronization Servers, but the text assumes a single
      server.  In addition, the text assumes the Reverse Synchronization
      Server is a separate entity.  This is not a requirement, Zone, and when
      the HNA signs the zone, which then
      distributes the synchronization function might also be
      operated by relevant information to the Reverse Public Authoritative
      Servers.

   o  Hidden Primary: designates the primary server of the HNA, that
      synchronizes the  Homenet Zone Reverse Zone: The reverse zone file associated with the Synchronization Server.  A
      primary / secondary architecture is used between
      Public Homenet Zone.

   o  Reverse Public Authoritative Servers: equivalent to Public
      Authoritative Servers specifically for reverse resolution.

   o  Reverse Distribution Master: equivalent to Distribution Master
      specifically for reverse resolution.

   o  Homenet DNSSEC Resolver: a resolver that performs a DNSSEC
      resolution on the HNA and home network for the
      Synchronization Server. Public Homenet Zone.  The hidden primary
      resolution is not expected to
      serve end user queries for performed requesting the Homenet Zone as Authoritative
      Servers.

   o  DNSSEC Resolver: a regular primary
      server would. resolver that performs a DNSSEC resolution on
      the Internet for the Public Homenet Zone.  The hidden primary resolution is only known to its associated
      Synchronization Server.
      performed requesting the Public Authoritative Servers.

4.  Architecture Description

   Architecture Description

   This section describes provides an overview of the architecture for outsourcing
   the authoritative naming service from the HNA to the Outsourcing Infrastructure.
   Infrastructure in Section 4.1 describes the architecture, 4.1.  Section 4.2 Section 17.2 and Section 4.3 17.3
   illustrates this architecture and shows
   how with the example of a Public Homenet
   Zone should be built by the HNA.  It also lists the as well as necessary parameters the HNA needs to be able parameter to outsource configure the
   authoritative naming service.  These two sections are informational
   and non-normative. HNA.

4.1.  Architecture Overview

   Figure Figure 1 provides an overview illustrates the architecture where the HNA outsources
   the publication of the architecture. Public Homenet Zone to the Outsourcing
   Infrastructure.

   The home network Public Homenet Zone is designated identified by the Registered Homenet
   Domain Name - example.com in Figure 1. example.com.

   ".local" as well as ".home.arpa" are explicitly not considered as
   Public Homenet zones.

   The HNA builds SHOULD build the Public Homenet Zone in a single view
   populated with all resource records that are expected to be published
   on the Internet.

   Resource records associated with services or devices that are not
   expected to be resolvable from outside the home network. network, or resource
   records bound to non-globally reachable IP addresses e.g.  ULA, MUST
   NOT be part of the Public Homenet Zone.

   How the Public Homenet Zone is built populated is out of the scope of this
   document.  The node providing the HNA function may also host or
   interact with multiple services to determine name-to-address
   mappings, such as a web GUI, DHCP [RFC6644] or mDNS [RFC6762].  These
   services may coexist and may be used to populate the Public Homenet
   Zone.  This document
   assumes the Homenet Zone has been populated with domain names that
   are intended to be publicly published and that are publicly
   reachable.  More specifically, names associated with services or
   devices that are not expected to be reachable from outside the home
   network or names bound to non-globally reachable IP addresses MUST
   NOT be part of

   The HNA also signs the Public Homenet Zone.  The HNA handles all
   operations and keying material required for DNSSEC, so there is no
   provision made in this architecture for transferring private DNSSEC
   related keying material between the HNA and the DM.

   Once the Public Homenet Zone has been built, the HNA does not host an
   authoritative naming service, but instead outsources it to
   the Outsourcing Infrastructure.  The Outsourcing Infrastructure takes as described in Figure 1.

   The HNA acts as a hidden primary while the
   Homenet Zone DM behaves as an input and publishes a secondary
   responsible to distribute the Public Homenet Zone.  If
   the HNA does not sign the Homenet Zone, Zone to the multiple
   Public Authoritative Servers that Outsourcing Infrastructure may instead sign it on behalf of the HNA.  Figure 1
   provides is
   responsible for.

   The DM has 3 communication channels: * a more detailed description of DM Control Channel (see
   section Section 5) to configure the HNA and the Outsourcing
   Infrastructure, but overall, it is expected that * a DM Synchronization Channel (see section Section 6
   to synchronize the Public Homenet Zone on the HNA provides and on the
   Homenet Zone.  Then DM.  *
   one or more Distribution Channels (see section Section 7 that
   distributes the Public Homenet Zone is derived from the DM to the Public
   Authoritative Server serving the Public Homenet Zone and published on the Internet.

   As

   There MAY be multiple DM's, and multiple servers per DM.  This text
   assumes a result, DNS queries from the DNS resolvers single DM server for simplicity, but there is no reason why
   each channel need to be implemented on the Internet are
   answered by the Outsourcing Infrastructure and do not reach same server, or indeed use
   the HNA.
   Figure 1 illustrates the case of same code base.

   It is important to note that while the resolution of node1.example.com.

   home network +-------------------+                Internet
                |                   |
                | HNA          |
                |                   |         +-----------------------+
   +-------+    |+-----------------+|         | Public Authoritative  |
   |       |    || Homenet Zone    ||         | Server(s)             |
   | node1 |    ||                 ||         |+---------------------+|
   |       |    ||                 ||         || Public Homenet Zone ||
   +-------+    || Homenet Domain  ||=========||                     ||
                || Name            ||   ^     ||  (example.com)      ||
   node1.\      || (example.com)   ||   |     |+---------------------+|
   example.com  |+-----------------+|   |     +-----------------------+
                +-------------------+   |        ^   |
                              Synchronization    |   |
                                                 |   |
       DNSSEC resolution for node1.example.com   |   v
                                              +-----------------------+
                                              |                       |
                                              |    DNSSEC Resolver    |
                                              |                       |
                                              +-----------------------+

             Figure 1: Homenet Naming Architecture Description

   The Outsourcing Infrastructure is described in Figure 2.  The
   Synchronization Server receives the Homenet Zone configured as an input.  The
   received zone may be transformed
   authoritative server, it is not expected to answer to output DNS requests
   from the public Internet for the Public Homenet Zone.
   Various operations may be performed here, however this document only
   considers zone signing as a potential operation.  This should occur
   only when  The function
   of the HNA outsources this operation is limited to building the Synchronization
   Server.  On zone and synchronization with
   the other hand, if DM.

   The addresses associated with the HNA signs SHOULD NOT be mentioned in the
   NS records of the Public Homenet Zone itself, zone, unless additional security
   provisions necessary to protect the zone would be collected HNA from external attack have
   been taken.

   The Outsourcing Infrastructure is also responsible for ensuring the
   DS record has been updated in the parent zone.

   Resolution is performed by the Synchronization Server DNSSEC resolvers.  When the resolution
   is performed outside the home network, the DNSSEC Resolver resolves
   the DS record on the Global DNS and
   directly transferred the name associated to the Public
   Homenet Zone (example.com) on the Public Authoritative Server(s).  These
   policies are discussed Servers.

   When the resolution is performed from within the home network, the
   Homenet DNSSEC Resolver may proceed similarly.  On the other hand, to
   provide resilience to the Public Homenet Zone in case of disruption,
   the Homenet DNSSEC Resolver SHOULD be able to perform the resolution
   on the authoritative name service of the home network implemented by
   the Homenet Authoritative Servers.  These servers are not expected to
   be mentioned in the Public Homenet Zone, nor to be accessible from
   the Internet.  As such their information as well as the corresponding
   signed DS record MAY be provided by the HNA to the Homenet DNSSEC
   Resolvers e.g. using HNCP.  Such configuration is outside the scope
   of this document.

   How the Homenet Authoritative Servers are provisioned is also out of
   scope of this specification.  It could be implemented using primary
   secondaries servers, or via rsync.  In some cases, the HNA and detailed
   Homenet Authoritative Servers may be combined together which would
   result in Section 6 a common instantiation of an authoritative server on the
   WAN and Section 7. inner interface.  Other mechanisms may also be used.

           Home network                 |         Internet

           +------------------------------------------------------+
                                        |
                                        | +----------------------------+
                                        | | Outsourcing Infrastructure |
           +------------------------------------------------------+

           +----------------------+        +----------------------+
                             Control    | |                            |
    +-----------------------+Channel    | |   Synchronization  +-----------------------+ |
    |         HNA           |<-------------->| Distribution Master   | |
    |+---------------------+|           | |  |+---------------------+| |
    || Public Homenet Zone ||Synchronization || Public Homenet Zone || |
    || (example.com)       ||Channel    | |  ||  (example.com)      || |
    |+---------------------+|<-------------->|+---------------------+| |
    +----------------------+|           | |  +-----------------------+ |
                                        | |           ^ Distribution   |
                                        | |           | Channel        |
    +-----------------------+           | |           v                |
    | Homenet Authoritative |           |       Server |  +-----------------------+ |
    | Server(s)             |           | |  | Public Authoritative  | |
    |+---------------------+|           | | +------------------+  |   X    |+--------------------+| Server(s)             | |
    ||Public Homenet Zone  ||           | |  |+---------------------+| |
    || (example.com)       ||           | |   ^  || Public Homenet Zone||
   =========>| Zone || |
    |+---------------------+|           | |  ||  (example.com)      ||
     ^ |
    +-----------------------+           | |  |+---------------------+| |
               ^   |    ||                    ||                    | |  +-----------------------+ | (example.com)
               |   |                    |    || (example.com)      || +----------^---|-------------+
               |   | +------------------+                    |            |    |+--------------------+|   |     +----------------------+
               |    +----------------------+   |                       Homenet to Public Zone
   Synchronization                 transformation
   from the HNA           name resolution       |   |
               |   v                    |            |   v
     +----------------------+           | +-----------------------+
     |       Homenet        |           | |       Internet        |
     |    DNSSEC Resolver   |           | |    DNSSEC Resolver    |
     +----------------------+           | +-----------------------+

           Figure 2: Outsourcing Infrastructure Description

4.2.  Example: 1: Homenet Zone Naming Architecture Name Resolution

4.2.  Distribution Master Communication Channels

   This section is not normative and intends to illustrate how the HNA
   builds details the Homenet Zone.

   As depicted in Figure 1 interfaces and Figure 2, channels of the Public Homenet Zone DM, that is
   hosted on
   the Public Authoritative Server(s), whereas Control Channel, the Homenet
   Zone is hosted on Synchronization Channel and the HNA.  Motivations for keeping these two zones
   identical are detailed in Section 7, Distribution
   Channel.

   The Control Channel and this section considers that the Synchronization Channel are the
   interfaces used between the HNA builds and the zone that will be effectively published on Outsourcing Infrastructure.
   The entity within the
   Public Authoritative Server(s).  In other words "Homenet Outsourcing Infrastructure responsible to Public
   Zone transformation"
   handle these communications is the identity also commonly designated as "no
   operation" (NOP).

   In that case, the Homenet Zone should configure its Name Server RRset
   (NS) DM and Start of Authority (SOA) with communications between the values associated with
   HNA and the
   Public Authoritative Server(s).  This is illustrated DM SHOULD be protected and mutually authenticated.  While
   section Section 5.6 discusses in Figure 3.
   public.primary.example.net is more depth the FQDN of different security
   protocols that could be used to secure, this specification RECOMMENDS
   the Public Authoritative
   Server(s), and IP1, IP2, IP3, IP4 are use of TLS with mutually authentication based on certificates to
   secure the associated IP addresses.
   Then channel between the HNA should add and the additional new nodes that enter DM.

   The Control Channel is used to set up the home
   network, remove those Synchronization Channel.
   We assume that should be removed, and sign the Homenet
   Zone.

   $ORIGIN example.com
   $TTL 1h

   @  IN  SOA  public.primary.example.net
          hostmaster.example.com. (
          2013120710 ; serial number of this zone file
          1d         ; secondary refresh
          2h         ; secondary retry time in case of HNA initiates the Control Channel connection with
   the DM and as such has a problem
          4w         ; secondary expiration time
          1h         ; maximum caching time in case prior knowledge of failed
                     ; lookups
          )

   @   NS  public.authoritative.servers.example.net

   public.primary.example.net   A @IP1
   public.primary.example.net   A @IP2
   public.primary.example.net   AAAA @IP3
   public.primary.example.net   AAAA @IP4

                          Figure 3: Homenet Zone

   The SOA RRset is defined in [RFC1033], [RFC1035] the DM identity (X509
   certificate), the IP address and [RFC2308].  This
   SOA is specific, port to use and protocol to set
   secure session.  We also assume the DM has knowledge of the identity
   of the HNA (X509 certificate) as well as it is used for the synchronization Registered Homenet
   Domain.

   The information exchanged between the
   Hidden Primary HNA and the Synchronization Server and published on DM is using DNS
   messages.  DNS messages can be protected using various kind of
   transport layers, among others, UDP:53/DTLS, TLS/TCP:53, HTTPS:443.
   There was consideration to using a standard TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG(0)
   [RFC2931] to perform a dynamic DNS update to the DM.  There are a
   number of issues with this.  The main one is that the Dynamic DNS Public Authoritative Server(s)..

   o  MNAME: indicates
   update would also update the primary.  In our case zone's NS records, while the zone goal is published
      on to
   update the Public Authoritative Server(s), and its name MUST be
      included.  If multiple Public Authoritative Server(s) are
      involved, one Distribution Master's configuration files.  The visible NS
   records SHOULD remain pointing at the cloud provider's anycast
   addresses.  Revealing the address of them MUST be chosen.  More specifically, the HNA
      MUST NOT include in the name of DNS is not
   desireable.

   This specification also assumes the Hidden Primary.

   o  RNAME: indicates same transport protocol and ports
   used by the email address DM to reach serve the administrator.
      [RFC2142] recommends using hostmaster@domain Control Channel and replacing the '@'
      sign by '.'.

   o  REFRESH and RETRY: indicate respectively in seconds how often
      secondaries need the HNA to check serve
   the primary, Synchronization Channel are the same.

   The Distribution Channel is internal to the Outsourcing
   Infrastructure and as such is not the time primary concern of this
   specification.

5.  Control Channel between two
      refresh when a refresh has failed.  Default values indicated by
      [RFC1033] are 3600 (1 hour) for refresh HNA and 600 (10 minutes) for
      retry.  This value might be too long for highly dynamic content.
      However, DM

   The DM Control Channel is used by the Public Authoritative Server(s) HNA and the HNA are
      expected Outsourcing
   Infrastructure to exchange information related to implement NOTIFY [RFC1996].  So whilst shorter refresh
      timers might increase the bandwidth usage for secondaries hosting
      large number configuration
   of zones, it will have little practical impact on the
      elapsed time required delegation which includes:

5.1.  Information to achieve synchronization between build the
      Outsourcing Infrastructure and Public Homenet Zone.

   More specifically, the Hidden Master.  As a result, Public Homenet Zone contains information that
   is related to the default values are acceptable.

   o  EXPIRE: infrastructure serving the zone.  In our case, the
   infrastructure serving the Public Homenet Zone is the upper limit data SHOULD Outsourcing
   Infrastructure, so this information MUST reflect that Outsourcing
   Infrastructure and MUST be kept in absence of
      refresh. provided to the HNA.

   The default value indicated by [RFC1033] is 3600000
      (approx. 42 days). information includes at least names and IP addresses of the
   Public Authoritative Servers.  In home network architectures, term of RRset information this
   corresponds, for the HNA
      provides both Registered Homenet Domain the DNS synchronization and MNAME of the access to SOA,
   the home
      network.  This device may be plugged NS and unplugged by the end user
      without notification, thus we recommend a long expiry timer.

   o  MINIMUM: indicates the minimum TTL.  The default value indicated
      by [RFC1033] is 86400 (1 day).  For home network, this value MAY
      be reduced, associated A and 3600 (1 hour) seems more appropriate.

   <<!-- ## Considerations on multiple Registered Homenet Domain Names
   ## are left for future versions When multiple Registered Homenet
   Domains are used -like example.com, example.net, example.org, a DNS
   Homenet Zone file per Registered Homenet Domain SHOULD be generated.
   In order to synchronize the zone contents, AAA RRsets.  Optionally the HNA may Outsourcing
   Infrastructure MAY also provide all
   bindings in each zone files. operational parameters such as other
   fields of SOA (SERIAL, RNAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM).
   As a result, any update MUST be
   performed on all zone files, i.e. the information is necessary for all Registered Homenet Domains.
   To limit thees updates when multiple Registered Homenet Domains are
   involved, the HNA MAY fill all bindings in a specific zone file to proceed and
   redirect all other zones the
   information is associated to that zone.  This can be achieved with
   redirecting mechanisms like CNAME {{RFC2181}}, {{RFC1034}}, DNAME
   {{RFC6672}} or CNAME+DNAME {{I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname}}. This the Outsourcing Infrastructure, this
   information exchange is
   an implementation issue mandatory.

5.2.  Information to determine whether redirection mechanisms
   MAY be preferred for large Homenet Zones, or when build the number DNSSEC chain of
   Registered Homenet Domain becomes quite large. -->>

4.3.  Example: trust.

   The HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing

   This section specifies SHOULD provide the various parameters required by hash of the HNA to
   configure KSK (DS RRset), so the naming architecture of that
   Outsourcing Infrastructure provides this document.  This section is
   informational, and is intended value to clarify the information handled by parent zone.  A
   common deployment use case is that the HNA Outsourcing Infrastructure is
   the registrar of the Registered Homenet Domain, and as such, its
   relationship with the various settings registry of the parent zone enables it to
   update the parent zone.  When such relation exists, the HNA should be done.

   Synchronization Server may be configured with
   able to request the following
   parameters.  These parameters are Outsourcing Infrastructure to update the DS RRset
   in the parent zone.  A direct update is especially necessary to establish a secure
   channel between
   initialize the chain of trust.

   Though the HNA and may also later directly update the Synchronization Server as well values of the DS
   via the Control Channel, it is RECOMMENDED to use other mechanisms
   such as CDS and CDNSKEY [RFC7344] are used for key roll overs.

   As some deployment may not provide an Outsourcing Infrastructure that
   will be able to
   specify update the DNS zone that is DS in the scope parent zone, this information
   exchange is OPTIONAL.

   By accepting the DS, the DM commits in taking care of advertising the
   DS to the parent zone.  Upon refusal, the DM MUST clearly indicate
   the DM does not have the capacity to proceed to the update.

5.3.  Information to set the communication:

   o Synchronization Server: Channel,

   That information sets the primary/secondary relation between the HNA
   and the DM.  The associated FQDNs or HNA works as a primary authoritative DNS server, and
   MUST provide the corresponding IP addresses address.

   The specified IP address on the HNA side and the currently used IP
   address of the Synchronization Server. DM defines the IP addresses are optional involved in the
   Synchronization Channel.  Ports and transport protocol are the
      FQDN is sufficient.  To secure same
   as those used by the binding name and IP addresses,
      a DNSSEC exchange is required.  Otherwise, Control Channel.  By default, the same IP addresses should
      be entered manually.

   o  Authentication Method: How
   address used by the HNA authenticates itself to the
      Synchronization Server.  This MAY depend on is considered by the implementation but DM.  Exchange of this should cover at least IPsec, DTLS and TSIG

   o  Authentication data: Associated Data.  PSK only requires a single
      argument.  If other authentication mechanisms based on
      certificates are used, then HNA private keys, certificates and
      certification authority should be specified.

   o  Public Authoritative Server(s):
   information is OPTIONAL.

5.4.  Deleting the delegation

   The FQDN or IP addresses purpose of the
      Public Authoritative Server(s).  It MAY correspond previous sections were to the data
      that will be set exchange information in the NS RRsets and SOA
   order to set a delegation.  The HNA MUST also be able to delete a
   delegation with a specific DM.  Upon an instruction of deleting the
   delegation, the DM MUST stop serving the Public Homenet Zone.  IP
      addresses

5.5.  Messages Exchange Description

   There are optional and the FQDN is sufficient.  To secure the
      binding multiple ways these information could be exchanged between name
   the HNA and IP addresses, the DM.  This specification defines a DNSSEC exchange is
      required.  Otherwise, mechanism that re-
   use the IP addresses should be entered manually.

   o  Registered Homenet Domain: DNS exchanges format.  The domain name used to establish the
      secure channel.  This name intention is used by the Synchronization Server
      and to reuse standard
   libraries especially to check the HNA for format of the primary / secondary configuration exchanged fields as
   well as to index the NOTIFY queries of the HNA when the HNA has been
      renumbered.

     Setting minimize the Homenet Zone requires additional libraries needed for the following information.

   o  Registered Homenet Domain: HNA.  The Domain Name
   re-use of DNS exchanges achieves these goals.  Note that while
   information is provided using DNS exchanges, the zone.  Multiple
      Registered Homenet Domains may exchanged
   information is not expected to be provided.  This will generate
      the creation of multiple Public Homenet Zones.

   o  Public Authoritative Server(s): set in any zone file, instead this
   information is expected to be processed appropriately.

   The Public Authoritative Server(s)
      associated with the Registered Homenet Domain.  Multiple Public
      Authoritative Server(s) may Control Channel is not expected to be provided.

5.  Synchronization between HNA and a long term session.  After
   a predefined timer the Synchronization Server Control Channel is expected to be terminated.
   The Homenet Reverse Zone and Control Channel MAY Be re-opened at any time later.

   The provisioning process SHOULD provide a method of securing the Homenet Zone
   control channel, so that the content of messages can be
   authenticated.  This authentication MAY be updated either
   with DNS UPDATE [RFC2136] or using a primary / secondary
   synchronization.  The primary / secondary mechanism is preferred as
   it scales better based on certificates for
   both the DM and avoids DoS attacks: First each HNA.  The DM may also create the primary notifies initial
   configuration for the secondary that delegation zone in the parent zone must be updated and leaves during the secondary
   provisioning process.

5.5.1.  Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone.

   The information provided by the DM to proceed with the update when possible.  Then, a NOTIFY message HNA is
   sent retrieved by the primary, which is HNA
   with a small packet that is less likely AXFR exchange.  The AXFR message enables the response to
   load
   contain any type of RRsets.  The response might be extended in the secondary.  Finally,
   future if additional information will be needed.  Alternatively, the AXFR query performed
   information provided by the
   secondary HNA to the DM is a small packet sent over TCP (section 4.2 [RFC5936]),
   which mitigates reflection attacks using a forged NOTIFY.  On pushed by the
   other hand, DNS UPDATE (which can be transported over UDP), requires
   more processing than HNA via a NOTIFY, and does not allow
   DNS update exchange.

   To retrieve the server necessary information to
   perform asynchronous updates.

   This document RECOMMENDS use of a primary / secondary mechanism
   instead of build the use of Public Homenet
   Zone, the HNA MUST send an DNS UPDATE.  This section details request of type AXFR associated to the primary /
   secondary mechanism.

5.1.  Synchronization with
   Registered Homenet Domain.  The DM MUST respond with a Hidden Primary

   Uploading and dynamically updating the zone file on the
   Synchronization Server can be seen as template.
   The zone provisioning between the
   HNA (Hidden Primary) and the Synchronization Server (Secondary
   Server).  This can be handled either in band template MUST contain a RRset of type SOA, one or out multiple
   RRset of band.

   Note that there type NS and at least one RRset of type A or AAAA.  The SOA
   RR is no standard way used to indicate to distribute a DNS primary
   between multiple devices.  As a result, if multiple devices are
   candidate for hosting the Hidden Primary, some specific mechanisms
   should be designed so the home network only selects a single HNA for the Hidden Primary.  Selection mechanisms based on HNCP [RFC7788] are
   good candidates.

   The Synchronization Server is configured as a secondary for value of the MNAME of the
   Public Homenet Domain Name.  This secondary configuration has been
   previously agreed between Zone.  The NAME of the end user and SOA RR MUST be the provider Registered
   Homenet Domain.  The MNAME value of the
   Synchronization Server.  In order to set SOA RDATA is the primary / secondary
   architecture, value
   provided by the HNA acts as a Hidden Primary Server, which is a
   regular authoritative DNS Server listening on Outsourcing Infrastructure to the WAN interface.

   The Hidden Primary Server SHOULD accept SOA [RFC1033], AXFR
   [RFC1034], HNA.  Other RDATA
   values (RNAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and IXFR [RFC1995] queries from its configured secondary
   DNS server(s). MINIMUM) are provided by
   the Outsourcing Infrastructure as suggestions.  The Hidden Primary Server SHOULD send NOTIFY messages
   [RFC1996] in order NS RRsets are
   used to update carry the Public DNS server zones as updates
   occur.  Because, Authoritative Servers of the Homenet Zones are likely to Outsourcing
   Infrastructure.  Their associated NAME MUST be small, the HNA
   MUST implement AXFR and SHOULD implement IXFR.

   Hidden Primary Server differs from a regular authoritative server for Registered Homenet
   Domain.  The TTL and RDATA are those expected to be published on the home network by:

   o  Interface Binding:
   Public Homenet Zone.  The RRsets of Type A and AAAA MUST have their
   NAME matching the Hidden Primary Server listens on NSDNAME of one of the WAN
      Interface, whereas a regular authoritative server for NS RRsets.

   Upon receiving the home
      network would listen response, the HNA MUST validate the conditions on
   the home network interface.

   o  Limited exchanges: SOA, NS and A or AAAA RRsets.  If an error occurs, the purpose of HNA MUST
   stop proceeding and MUST report an error.  Otherwise, the Hidden Primary Server is to
      synchronize with HNA builds
   the Synchronization Server, not to serve any
      zones to end users.  As a result, exchanges are performed with
      specific nodes (the Synchronization Server).  Further, exchange
      types are limited.  The only legitimate exchanges are: NOTIFY
      initiated Public Homenet Zone by setting the Hidden Primary and IXFR or AXFR exchanges
      initiated MNAME value of the SOA as
   indicated by the Synchronization Server.  On SOA provided by the other hand,
      regular authoritative servers would respond to any hosts, and any
      DNS query would be processed. AXFR response.  The HNA SHOULD filter IXFR/AXFR
      traffic
   set the value of NAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and drop traffic not initiated MINIMUM of the SOA
   to those provided by the Synchronization
      Server. AXFR response.  The HNA MUST listen for DNS on TCP and UDP and MUST at
      least allow SOA lookups of insert the NS
   and corresponding A or AAAA RRset in its Public Homenet Zone.

5.2.  Securing Synchronization

   Exchange between  The
   HNA MUST ignore other RRsets.  If an error message is returned by the Synchronization Server and
   DM, the HNA MUST proceed as a regular DNS resolution.  Error messages
   SHOULD be
   secured, at least logged for integrity protection and for authentication.

   TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG(0) [RFC2931] MAY be used to secure further analysis.  If the DNS
   communications between resolution does not
   succeed, the HNA outsourcing operation is aborted and the Synchronization Server.  TSIG
   uses a symmetric key which can be managed by TKEY [RFC2930].
   Management HNA MUST close
   the Control Channel.

5.5.2.  Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust

   To provide the key involved DS RRset to initialize the DNSSEC chain of trust the
   HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE [RFC2136] message.  The NAME in SIG(0) is performed through the SOA
   MUST be set to the parent zone
   updates.  How keys are rolled over with SIG(0) is out-of-scope of
   this document. the Registered Homenet Domain -
   that is where the DS records should be inserted.  The advantage DS RRset MUST
   be placed in the Update section of these mechanisms is that they are
   only associated with the DNS application.  Not relying on shared
   libraries eases testing UPDATE query, and integration.  On the other hand, using
   TSIG, TKEY or SIG(0) requires these mechanisms NAME
   SHOULD be set to the Registered Homenet Domain.  The rdata of the DS
   RR SHOULD correspond to the DS record to be implemented on inserted in the HNA, which adds code and complexity.  Another disadvantage parent
   zone.

   A NOERROR response from the MD is
   that TKEY does a commitment to update the parent
   zone with the provided DS.  An error indicates the MD will not provide authentication mechanisms.

   Protocols like TLS [RFC5246] / DTLS [RFC6347] MAY update
   the DS, and other method should be used to secure by the transactions between HNA.

5.5.3.  Providing information for the Synchronization Server and Channel

   To provide the HNA.  The
   advantage of TLS/DTLS is that this technology is widely deployed, and
   most IP address of the devices already embed TLS/DTLS libraries, possibly also
   taking advantage of hardware acceleration.  Further, TLS/DTLS
   provides authentication facilities and can use certificates to
   authenticate primary, the Synchronization Server and HNA MAY send a DNS
   UPDATE message.  The NAME in the HNA.  On SOA MUST be the other
   hand, using TLS/DTLS requires implementing DNS exchanges over TLS/
   DTLS, as well as a new service port.  This document therefore does
   NOT RECOMMEND this option.

   IPsec [RFC4301] IKEv2 [RFC7296] MAY also be used to secure
   transactions between the HNA and parent zone of the Synchronization Server.
   Similarly
   Registered Homenet Domain.  The Update section MUST be a RRset of
   Type NS.  The NAME associated to TLS/DTLS, most HNAs already embed an IPsec stack, and
   IKEv2 supports multiple authentication mechanisms via the EAP
   framework.  In addition, IPsec can NS RRSet MUST be used to protect DNS exchanges
   between the HNA and Registered
   Domain Name.  The RDATA MUST be a FQDN that designates the Synchronization Server without any
   modifications of IP
   addresses associated to the DNS server or client.  DNS integration over
   IPsec only requires an additional security policy primary.  There may be multiple IP
   addresses.  These IP addresses MUST be provided in the Security
   Policy Database (SPD).  One disadvantage of IPsec additional
   section.  The reason to provide these IP addresses is that NATs it is NOT
   RECOMMENDED to publish these IP addresses.  As a result, it is not
   expected to resolve them.  IP addresses are provided via RRsets of
   type A or AAAA.  The NAME associated to RRsets of type A and
   firewall traversal may AAAA
   MUST be problematic.  However, in our case, the HNA
   is connected to Registered Homenet Domain.

   A NOERROR response indicates the Internet, and IPsec communication between DM has configured the HNA secondary and
   is committed to serve as a secondary.  An error indicates the Synchronization Server should DM is
   not configured as a secondary.

   The regular DNS error message SHOULD be impacted by middle
   boxes.

   <<!-- As mentioned above, TSIG, IPsec and TLS/DTLS MAY be used returned to
   secure transactions between the HNA and the Public Authentication
   Servers.  The HNA and the Synchronization Server SHOULD implement
   TSIG and IPsec.  -->>

   How the PSK can be used by any of the TSIG, TLS/DTLS when an
   error occurs.  In particular a FORMERR is returned when a format
   error is found, this error includes when unexpected RRSets are added
   or IPsec
   protocols: Authentication based on certificates implies when RRsets are missing.  A SERVFAIL error is returned when a mutual
   authentication
   internal error is encountered. a NOTZONE error is returned when
   update and thus requires Zone sections are not coherent, a NOTAUTH error is
   returned when the HNA DM is not authoritative for the Zone section.  A
   REFUSED error is returned when the DM refuses to manage a private key, a
   public key, or certificates, as well as Certificate Authorities.
   This adds complexity proceed to the
   configuration especially on and the requested action.

5.5.4.  HNA side.
   For this reason, we RECOMMEND that instructing deleting the HNA MAY use PSK or certificate
   base authentication, and that delegation

   To instruct to delete the Synchronization Server MUST support
   PSK and certificate based authentication.

   Note also that authentication of message exchanges between delegation the HNA
   and MAY send a DNS UPDATE
   Delete message.  The NAME in the Synchronization Server SHOULD NOT use SOA MUST be the external IP address parent zone of the HNA
   Registered Homenet Domain.  The Update section MUST be a RRset of
   Type NS.  The NAME associated to index the appropriate keys.  As detailed in Section 8, NS RRSet MUST be the IP addresses of Registered
   Domain Name.  As indictaed by [RFC2136] section 2.5.2 the Synchronization Server and delete
   instruction is set by setting the Hidden Primary
   are subject TTL to change, for example while 0, the network is being
   renumbered.  This means that CLass to ANY, the necessary keys
   RDLENGTH to authenticate
   transaction SHOULD NOT 0 and the RDATA MUST be indexed using empty.

5.6.  Securing the IP address, Control Channel between HNA and DM

   The control channel between the HNA and the DM MUST be secured at
   both the HNA and the DM.

   Secure protocols (like TLS [RFC5246] / DTLS [RFC6347]) SHOULD be
   resilient to IP address changes.

5.3.  HNA Security Policies

   This section details security policies related used
   to secure the Hidden Primary
   / Secondary synchronization.

   The Hidden Primary, as described in this document SHOULD drop any
   queries from transactions between the home network.  This could be implemented via port
   binding and/or firewall rules. DM and the HNA.

   The precise mechanism deployed advantage of TLS/DTLS is out that this technology is widely deployed,
   and most of scope the devices already embed TLS/DTLS libraries, possibly
   also taking advantage of hardware acceleration.  Further, TLS/DTLS
   provides authentication facilities and can use certificates to
   authenticate the DM and the HNA.  On the other hand, using TLS/DTLS
   requires implementing DNS exchanges over TLS/DTLS, as well as a new
   service port.  This document RECOMMENDS this document. option.

   The Hidden Primary HNA SHOULD drop any DNS
   queries arriving authenticate inbound connections from the DM using
   standard mechanisms, such as a public certificate with baked-in root
   certificates on the WAN interface HNA, or via DANE {!RFC6698}}.

   The DM SHOULD authenticate the HNA and check that inbound messages
   are not issued from the
   Synchronization Server.  The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any outgoing
   packets other than DNS NOTIFY query, SOA response, IXFR response or
   AXFR responses.  The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any incoming packets
   other than DNS NOTIFY response, SOA query, IXFR query or AXFR query. appropriate client.  The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any non protected IXFR DM MAY use a self-signed CA
   certificate mechanism per HNA, or AXFR
   exchange,depending on how the synchronization is secured.

6.  DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture

   [RFC7368] in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to public certificates for this
   purpose.

   IPsec [RFC4301] IKEv2 [RFC7296] MAY also be deployed on both used to secure
   transactions between the authoritative server HNA and the resolver.  The resolver side is out
   of scope of this document, DM.  Similarly to TLS/DTLS, most
   HNAs already embed an IPsec stack, and only IKEv2 supports multiple
   authentication mechanisms via the authoritative part EAP framework.  In addition, IPsec
   can be used to protect DNS exchanges between the HNA and the DM
   without any modifications of the DNS server is considered.

   Deploying DNSSEC or client.  DNS
   integration over IPsec only requires signing an additional security policy in
   the zone Security Policy Database (SPD).  One disadvantage of IPsec is
   that NATs and configuring a secure
   delegation.  As described in Section 4.1, signing can firewall traversal may be performed
   either by problematic.  However, in our
   case, the HNA or by is connected to the Outsourcing Infrastructure.  Section 6.1
   details Internet, and IPsec communication
   between the implications of these two alternatives.  Similarly, HNA and the
   secure delegation can DM should not be performed impacted by middle boxes.

   How the HNA or PSK can be used by any of the Outsourcing
   Infrastructure.  Section 6.2 discusses these two alternatives.

6.1.  Zone Signing"

   This section discusses the pros TSIG, TLS/DTLS or IPsec
   protocols: Authentication based on certificates implies a mutual
   authentication and cons when zone signing is
   performed by thus requires the HNA to manage a private key, a
   public key, or by certificates, as well as Certificate Authorities.
   This adds complexity to the Outsourcing Infrastructure.  It is
   RECOMMENDED that configuration especially on the HNA signs side.
   For this reason, we RECOMMEND that the zone unless there is a strong
   argument against this, such as a HNA MAY use PSK or certificate
   based authentication, and that is not capable of signing the zone.  In DM MUST support PSK and
   certificate based authentication.

   Note also that case zone signing MAY be performed by the
   Outsourcing Infrastructure on behalf authentication of the HNA.

   Reasons for signing the zone by message exchanges between the HNA are:

   o  1) Keeping
   and the Homenet Zone and DM SHOULD NOT use the Public Homenet Zone equal external IP address of the HNA to
      securely optimize DNS resolution. index
   the appropriate keys.  As detailed in Section 11, the Public Zone is signed
      with DNSSEC, RRsets are authenticated, IP addresses of
   the DM and thus DNS responses can
      be validated even though they the Hidden Primary are not provided by subject to change, for example
   while the
      authoritative server. network is being renumbered.  This provides the HNA means that the ability necessary
   keys to
      respond on behalf of the Public Authoritative Server(s).  This
      could authenticate transaction SHOULD NOT be useful for example if, in indexed using the future, IP
   address, and SHOULD be resilient to IP address changes.

5.7.  Implementation Tips

   The Hidden Primary Server on the HNA announces
      to differs from a regular
   authoritative server for the home network that due to:

   o  Interface Binding: the HNA can act as Hidden Primary Server will almost certainly
      listen on the WAN Interface, whereas a local regular authoritative
      primary or equivalent
      server for the Homenet Zone.  Currently home network would listen on the HNA internal home
      network interface.

   o  Limited exchanges: the purpose of the Hidden Primary Server is
      not expected to receive authoritative DNS queries, as its IP
      address is not mentioned in the Public Homenet Zone.  On
      synchronize with the other
      hand most HNAs host a resolving function, and could be configured DM, not to perform a local lookup serve any zones to end users, or
      the Homenet Zone instead of
      initiating public Internet.

   As a DNS exchange result, exchanges are performed with specific nodes (the DM).
   Further, exchange types are limited.  The only legitimate exchanges
   are: NOTIFY initiated by the Public Authoritative Server(s).
      Note that outsourcing Hidden Primary and IXFR or AXFR
   exchanges initiated by the zone signing operation means that all
      DNSSEC queries SHOULD be cached to perform a local lookup,
      otherwise a resolution with DM.  On the Public Authoritative Server(s) other hand, regular
   authoritative servers would respond to any hosts, and any DNS query
   would be performed.

   o  2) Keeping processed.  The HNA SHOULD filter IXFR/AXFR traffic and drop
   traffic not initiated by the DM.  The HNA MUST listen for DNS on TCP
   and UDP and MUST at least allow SOA lookups of the Homenet Zone Zone.

6.  DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM

   The DM Synchronization Channel is used for communication between the
   HNA and the DM for synchronizing the Public Homenet Zone equal to
      securely address Zone.  Note that
   the connectivity disruption independence detailed
      in [RFC7368] section 4.4.1 Control Channel and 3.7.5.  As local lookups the Synchronization Channel are
      possible in case of network disruption, communications within by
   construction different channels even though there they MAY use the
      home network can still rely on
   same IP addresses.  In fact the DNSSEC service.  Note that
      outsourcing Control Channel is set between the zone signing operation does not address
      connectivity disruption independence with DNSSEC.  Instead local
      lookup would provide DNS
   HNA working as opposed to DNSSEC responses a client using port YYYY (a high range port) toward a
   service provided by the Public Authoritative Server(s).

   o  3) Keeping MD at port XX (well known port).  On the Homenet Zone and
   other hand, the Public Homenet Zone equal to
      guarantee coherence Synchronization Channel is set between DNS responses.  Using the MD working
   as a unique zone is
      one way to guarantee uniqueness client using port ZZZZ ( a high range port) toward a service a
   service provided by the HNA at port XX.  As a result, even though the
   same couple of IP addresses may be involved the responses among servers and
      places.  Issues generated by different views are discussed in more
      details in Section 7.

   4) Privacy Control Channel and Integrity of
   the DNSSEC Homenet Zone Synchronization Channel are better
   guaranteed.  When always disc tint channels.

   Uploading and dynamically updating the Zone is signed by zone file on the HNA, it makes
   modification of DM can be
   seen as zone provisioning between the HNA (Hidden Primary) and the DM
   (Secondary Server).  This can be handled via AXFR + DNS data - for example for flow redirection -
   impossible. UPDATE.

   This document RECOMMENDS use of a primary / secondary mechanism
   instead of the use of DNS UPDATE.  The primary / secondary mechanism
   is RECOMMENDED as it scales better and avoids DoS attacks.  Note that
   even when UPDATE messages are used, these messages are using a
   distinct channel as those used to set the configuration.

   Note that there is no standard way to distribute a DNS primary
   between multiple devices.  As a result, signing if multiple devices are
   candidate for hosting the Homenet Zone by Hidden Primary, some specific mechanisms
   should be designed so the home network only selects a single HNA
   provides better protection for end user privacy.

   Reasons for signing
   the zone by the Outsourcing Infrastructure are:

   1) Hidden Primary.  Selection mechanisms based on HNCP [RFC7788] are
   good candidates.

   The HNA may not be capable of signing the zone, most likely
   because its firmware does not support this function.  However this
   reason is expected to become less and less valid over time.

   2) Outsourcing DNSSEC management operations.  Management operations
   involve key roll-over, acts as a Hidden Primary Server, which can be performed automatically by is a regular
   authoritative DNS Server listening on the
   HNA and transparently WAN interface.

   The DM is configured as a secondary for the Homenet Domain Name.
   This secondary configuration has been previously agreed between the
   end user.  Avoiding DNSSEC management
   is mostly motivated by bad software implementations.

   3) Reducing user and the impact provider of HNA replacement the Outsourcing Infrastructure as part
   of either the provisioning or due to receipt of UPDATE messages on
   the Public DM Control Channel.

   The Homenet Zone.
   Unless the HNA private keys can Reverse Zone MAY also be extracted and stored off-device,
   HNA hardware replacement will result in an emergency key roll-over.
   This can be mitigated by updated either with DNS UPDATE
   [RFC2136] or using relatively small TTLs.

   4) Reducing configuration impact on a primary / secondary synchronization.

6.1.  Securing the end user.  Unless there are
   zero configuration mechanisms in place to provide credentials Synchronization Channel between
   the new HNA and the DM

   The Synchronization Server, authentication
   associations between Channel used standard DNS request.

   First the HNA and primary notifies the Synchronization Server would
   need to secondary that the zone must be re-configured.  As HNA replacement is not expected
   updated and eaves the secondary to
   happen regularly, end users may not be at ease proceed with such
   configuration settings.  However, mechanisms as described in
   [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] use DHCP Options
   to outsource the configuration and avoid this issue.

   5) The Outsourcing Infrastructure update when
   possible/ convenient.

   Then, a NOTIFY message is more likely to handle private
   keys more securely than sent by the HNA.  However, having all private keys in
   one place may also nullify primary, which is a small
   packet that benefit.

6.2.  Secure Delegation"

   Secure delegation is achieved only if less likely to load the DS RRset is properly set in secondary.

   Finally, the parent zone.  Secure delegation can be AXFR [RFC1034] or IXFR [RFC1995] query performed by the HNA or
   the Outsourcing Infrastructures (that
   secondary is the Synchronization Server
   or the Public Authoritative Server(s)). a small packet sent over TCP (section 4.2 [RFC5936]),
   which mitigates reflection attacks using a forged NOTIFY.

   The DS RRset can be updated manually with nsupdate for example.  This
   requires the HNA or AXFR request from the Outsourcing Infrastructure DM to be
   authenticated by the HNA SHOULD be secured.  DNS server hosting over
   TLS [RFC7858] is RECOMMENDED.

   When using TLS, the parent of HNA MAY authenticate inbound connections from the Public
   Homenet Zone.  Such
   DM using standard mechanisms, such as a trust channel between public certificate with
   baked-in root certificates on the HNA, or via DANE {!RFC6698}}

   The HNA and the parent
   DNS server may be hard to maintain with HNAs, and thus may be easier MAY apply a simple IP filter on inbound AXFR requests to establish with
   ensure they only arrive from the Outsourcing Infrastructure. DM Synchronization Channel.  In fact, the
   Public Authoritative Server(s) may use Automating DNSSEC Delegation
   Trust Maintenance [RFC7344].

7.  Handling Different Views

   The Homenet Zone provides information about this
   case, the home network.  Some
   users may be tempted to have provide responses dependent on HNA SHOULD regularly check (via DNS resolution) that the
   origin
   address of the DNS query.  More specifically, some users may be
   tempted to provide a different view DM in the filter is still valid.

7.  DM Distribution Channel

   The DM Distribution Channel is used for DNS queries originating from communication between the home network DM
   and for DNS queries coming from the Internet.  Each
   view could then be associated with a dedicated Homenet Zone.

   <!--Regarding {{fig-naming-arch}}, an example of an implementation of
   two distinct view could be Public Authoritative Servers.  The architecture and
   communication used for the Homenet Zone that describes DM Distribution Channels is outside the
   homenet view
   scope of this document, and there are many existing solutions
   available e.g. rsynch, DNS AXFR, REST, DB copy.

8.  HNA Security Policies

   This section details security policies related to the Public Homenet Zone that contains the Internet
   view, with these two zones being different.-->

   Note that Hidden Primary
   / Secondary synchronization.

   The Hidden Primary, as described in this document does not specify how DNS SHOULD drop any
   queries originating from the home network are addressed to the Homenet Zone. network.  This could be done implemented via hosting the port
   binding and/or firewall rules.  The precise mechanism deployed is out
   of scope of this document.  The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any DNS resolver
   queries arriving on the HNA for example.

   This section is WAN interface that are not normative.  Section 7.1 details why some nodes
   may only be reachable issued from the home network and not from the global
   Internet.  Section 7.2 briefly describes the consequences of having
   distinct views such as a "home network view" and an "Internet view".
   Finally, Section 7.3 provides guidance
   DM.  The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any outgoing packets other than
   DNS NOTIFY query, SOA response, IXFR response or AXFR responses.  The
   Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any incoming packets other than DNS NOTIFY
   response, SOA query, IXFR query or AXFR query.  The Hidden Primary
   SHOULD drop any non protected IXFR or AXFR exchange,depending on how to resolve names that
   are only significant in
   the home network, without creating different
   views.

7.1.  Misleading Reasons for Local Scope DNS Zone"

   The motivation for supporting different views synchronization is secured.

9.  DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture

   [RFC7368] in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to provide different
   answers dependent be deployed on both
   the origin authoritative server and the resolver.  The resolver side is out
   of scope of this document, and only the DNS query, for reasons such
   as:

   1: An end user may want to have services not published on authoritative part of the
   Internet.  Services like
   server is considered.

   This document assumes the HNA administration interface that
   provides signs the GUI to administer your HNA might not seem advisable to
   publish on Public Homenet Zone.

   Secure delegation is achieved only if the Internet.  Similarly, services like DS RRset is properly set in
   the mapper that
   registers parent zone.  Secure delegation is performed by the devices of your home network may also not be desirable
   to be published on HNA or the Internet.  In both cases, these services
   should only
   Outsourcing Infrastructures.

   The DS RRset can be known updated manually with nsupdate for example.  This
   requires the HNA or used the Outsourcing Infrastructure to be
   authenticated by the network administrator.  To
   restrict DNS server hosting the access parent of such services, the home network administrator Public
   Homenet Zone.  Such a trust channel between the HNA and the parent
   DNS server may choose be hard to publish these pieces of information only within the
   home network, where it might maintain with HNAs, and thus may be assumed that easier
   to establish with the users are more
   trusted than on Outsourcing Infrastructure.  In fact, the Internet.  Even though this assumption may not be
   valid, at least this
   Public Authoritative Server(s) may reduce use Automating DNSSEC Delegation
   Trust Maintenance [RFC7344].

10.  Homenet Reverse Zone

   This section is focused on the surface Homenet Reverse Zone.

   Firstly, all considerations for the Public Homenet Zone apply to the
   Homenet Reverse Zone.  The main difference between the Homenet
   Reverse Zone and the Homenet Zone is that the parent zone of any attack.

   2: Services within the home network may be reachable using non global
   Homenet Reverse Zone is most likely managed by the ISP.  As the ISP
   also provides the IP addresses.  IPv4 and NAT prefix to the HNA, it may be one reason.  On able to
   authenticate the other hand
   IPv6 may favor link-local or site-local IP addresses.  These IP
   addresses are not significant HNA using mechanisms outside the boundaries scope of this
   document e.g. the home physical attachment point to the ISP network.  As a result, they MAY be published in  If
   the home network
   view, and SHOULD NOT be published in Reverse DM is managed by the Public Homenet Zone.

7.2.  Consequences"

   Enabling different views leads ISP, credentials to a non-coherent naming system.
   Depending on where resolution is performed, some services will not be
   available.  This authenticate the
   HNA for the zone synchronization may be especially inconvenient with devices with
   multiple interfaces that are attached both to the Internet via a
   3G/4G interface set automatically and
   transparently to the home network via a WLAN interface.
   Devices may also cache the results of name resolution, and these
   cached entries end user.
   [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] describes how
   automatic configuration may no longer be valid if a mobile device moves
   between a homenet connection and an internet connection e.g. a device
   temporarily loses wifi signal and switches to 3G.

   Regarding local-scope performed.

   With IPv6, the domain space for IP addresses, such devices addresses is so large that reverse
   zone may end up be confronted with poor
   connectivity.  Suppose, for example, that DNS resolution is performed
   via scalability issues.  How the WLAN interface attached reverse zone
   is generated is out of scope of this document.
   [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] provides guidance on how to address
   scalability issues.

11.  Renumbering

   This section details how renumbering is handled by the HNA, Hidden Primary
   server or the DM.  Both types of renumbering are discussed i.e.
   "make-before-break" and "break-before-make".

   In the response provides
   local-scope IP addresses, but make-before-break renumbering scenario, the communication new prefix is initiated on
   advertised, the
   3G/4G interface.  Communications with local-scope addresses will be
   unreachable on network is configured to prepare the Internet, thus aborting transition to
   the communication.  The
   same situation occurs if new prefix.  During a device is flip / flopping between various
   WLAN networks.

   Regarding DNSSEC, if the HNA does not sign period of time, the Homenet Zone two prefixes old and
   outsources the signing process,
   new coexist, before the two views are different, because
   one old prefix is protected with DNSSEC whereas completely removed.  In the other
   break-before-make renumbering scenario, the new prefix is not.  Devices with
   multiple interfaces will have difficulty securing advertised
   making the naming
   resolution, as responses originating from old prefix obsolete.

   Renumbering has been extensively described in [RFC4192] and analyzed
   in [RFC7010] and the home network may not reader is expected to be
   signed.

   For devices familiar with all its interfaces attached to them
   before reading this section.

11.1.  Hidden Primary

   In a single
   administrative domain, that is to say the home network, or renumbering scenario, the
   Internet.  Incoherence between DNS responses may still also occur if
   the device Hidden Primary is able to perform DNS resolutions both using the DNS
   resolving server of the home network, or one of the ISP.  DNS
   resolution performed via the HNA or the ISP resolver may be different
   than those performed over the Internet.

7.3.  Guidance and Recommendations

   As documented in Section 7.2, informed it is RECOMMENDED to avoid different
   views.  If being
   renumbered.  In most cases, this occurs because the whole home
   network administrators choose to implement multiple views,
   impacts on devices' resolution SHOULD be evaluated. is being renumbered.  As a consequence, result, the Public Homenet Zone is expected to
   will also be an exact copy of updated.  Although the new and old IP addresses may be
   stored in the Public Homenet Zone.  As a result, services Zone, we recommend that are not expected
   to only the newly
   reachable IP addresses be published on published.

   To avoid reachability disruption, IP connectivity information
   provided by the Internet DNS SHOULD be coherent with the IP plane.  In our
   case, this means the old IP address SHOULD NOT be part provided via the
   DNS when it is not reachable anymore.  Let for example TTL be the TTL
   associated with a RRset of the Public Homenet Zone, local-scope addresses SHOULD NOT it may be part of cached
   for TTL seconds.  Let T_NEW be the time the new IP address replaces
   the old IP address in the Homenet Zone, and when possible, T_OLD_UNREACHABLE the HNA SHOULD sign
   time the Homenet Zone.

   The Homenet Zone is expected to host public information only.  It old IP is not reachable anymore.

   In the scope case of the DNS service to define local home network
   boundaries.  Instead, local scope information make-before-break, seamless reachability is expected to be
   provided to the home network using local scope naming services. mDNS
   [RFC6762] DNS-SD [RFC6763] are two examples of these services.
   Currently mDNS as long as T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW > 2 * TTL.  If this is limited to
   not satisfied, then devices associated with the old IP address in the
   home network may become unreachable for 2 * TTL - (T_OLD_UNREACHABLE
   - T_NEW).  In the case of a single link network.  However, future
   protocols are expected break-before-make, T_OLD_UNREACHABLE =
   T_NEW, and the device may become unreachable up to leverage this constraint as pointed out in
   [RFC7558].

7.4. 2 * TTL.

   Once the Public Homenet Reverse Zone

   This section is focused file has been updated on the Homenet Reverse Zone.

   Firstly, all considerations for Hidden
   Primary, the Homenet Zone apply Hidden Primary needs to inform the Homenet
   Reverse Zone.  The main difference between Outsourcing
   Infrastructure that the Public Homenet Reverse Zone has been updated and the Homenet Zone is that
   the parent IP address to use to retrieve the updated zone of has also been
   updated.  Both notifications are performed using regular DNS
   exchanges.  Mechanisms to update an IP address provided by lower
   layers with protocols like SCTP [RFC4960], MOBIKE [RFC4555] are not
   considered in this document.

   The Hidden Primary SHOULD inform the DM that the Public Homenet Reverse Zone is most likely managed
   has been updated by sending a NOTIFY payload with the ISP.  As the ISP also provides the new IP prefix to address.
   In addition, this NOTIFY payload SHOULD be authenticated using SIG(0)
   or TSIG.  When the HNA, DM receives the NOTIFY payload, it may be able to MUST
   authenticate it.  Note that the HNA using
   mechanisms outside cryptographic key used for the scope of this document e.g.
   authentication SHOULD be indexed by the physical
   attachment point to Registered Homenet Domain
   contained in the ISP network.  If the Reverse Synchronization
   Server is managed by the ISP, credentials to authenticate NOTIFY payload as well as the HNA for RRSIG.  In other
   words, the zone synchronization may IP address SHOULD NOT be set automatically and transparently
   to used as an index.  If
   authentication succeeds, the end user.  [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]
   describes how automatic configuration may be performed.

   With IPv6, DM MUST also notice the domain space for IP addresses is so large that reverse
   zone may be confronted with scalability issues.  How the reverse zone
   is generated is out of scope of this document.
   [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] provides guidance on how to address
   scalability issues.

8.  Renumbering

   This section details how renumbering is handled has
   been modified and perform a reachability check before updating its
   primary configuration.  The routability check MAY performed by
   sending a SOA request to the Hidden Primary
   server or using the Synchronization Server.  Both types source IP
   address of renumbering are
   discussed i.e. "make-before-break" and "break-before-make".

   In the make-before-break renumbering scenario, the new prefix NOTIFY.  This exchange is
   advertised, the network also secured, and if an
   authenticated response is configured to prepare received from the transition to Hidden Primary with the
   new prefix.  During a period of time, IP address, the two prefixes old DM SHOULD update its configuration file and
   new coexist, before
   retrieve the old prefix is completely removed.  In Public Homenet Zone using an AXFR or a IXFR exchange.

   Note that the
   break-before-make renumbering scenario, primary reason for providing the new prefix IP address is advertised
   making that the old prefix obsolete.

   Renumbering has been extensively described
   Hidden Primary is not publicly announced in [RFC4192] and analyzed the DNS.  If the Hidden
   Primary were publicly announced in [RFC7010] and the reader is expected to be familiar with them
   before reading this section.

8.1.  Hidden Primary

   In a renumbering scenario, DNS, then the Hidden Primary is informed IP address
   update could have been performed using the DNS as described in
   Section 11.2.

11.2.  Distribution Master

   Renumbering of the Distribution Master results in it is being
   renumbered.  In most cases, this occurs because changing its IP
   address.  As the whole home
   network DM is being renumbered.  As a result, secondary, the Homenet Zone will also destination of DNS NOTIFY
   payloads MUST be updated.  Although the new changed, and old IP addresses may any configuration/firewalling that
   restricts DNS AXFR/IXFR operations MUST be stored updated.

   If the DM is configured in the Homenet Zone, we recommend that only Hidden Primary configuration file
   using a FQDN, then the update of the newly reachable IP
   addresses be published.

   To avoid reachability disruption, IP connectivity information
   provided address is performed by DNS.
   More specifically, before sending the DNS SHOULD be coherent with NOTIFY, the IP plane.  In our
   case, this means Hidden Primary
   performs a DNS resolution to retrieve the old IP address SHOULD NOT be provided via of the
   secondary.

   As described in Section 11.1, the DM DNS when it is not reachable anymore.  Let for example TTL information SHOULD be
   coherent with the IP plane.  The TTL
   associated with a RRset of the Homenet Zone, it may be cached for TTL
   seconds.  Let T_NEW Distribution Master name
   SHOULD be adjusted appropriately prior to changing the time the new IP address replaces address.

   Some DNS infrastructure uses the old IP address in the Homenet Zone, and T_OLD_UNREACHABLE the time to designate the
   old
   secondary, in which case, other mechanisms must be found.  The reason
   for using IP is not reachable anymore.

   In the case addresses instead of the make-before-break, seamless reachability names is
   provided as long as T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW > 2 * TTL.  If this generally to reach an
   internal interface that is not satisfied, then devices associated with the old IP address designated by a FQDN, and to avoid
   potential bootstrap problems.  Such scenarios are considered as out
   of scope in the case of home network may become unreachable networks.

12.  Operational considerations for 2 * TTL - (T_OLD_UNREACHABLE
   - T_NEW).  In Offline/Disconnected resolution

   This section is non-normative.  It provides suggestions on
   operational consideration.  TBD.

13.  Privacy Considerations

   Outsourcing the case of a break-before-make, T_OLD_UNREACHABLE =
   T_NEW, and DNS Authoritative service from the device may become unreachable up HNA to 2 * TTL.

   Once the a third
   party raises a few privacy related concerns.

   The Public Homenet Zone file has been updated on contains a full description of the Hidden Primary, services
   hosted in the Hidden Primary needs network.  These services may not be expected to inform be
   publicly shared although their names remain accessible through the Outsourcing Infrastructure
   that
   Internet.  Even though DNS makes information public, the Homenet Zone has been updated and that DNS does not
   expect to make the IP address complete list of services public.  In fact, making
   information public still requires the key (or FQDN) of each service
   to use be known by the resolver in order to retrieve information about
   the updated zone has also been updated.  Both
   notifications are performed using regular DNS exchanges.  Mechanisms
   to update an IP address provided by lower layers with protocols like
   SCTP [RFC4960], MOBIKE [RFC4555] are not considered services.  More specifically, making mywebsite.example.com public
   in this document.

   The Hidden Primary SHOULD inform the Synchronization Server that DNS, is not sufficient to make resolvers aware of the
   Homenet Zone has been updated by sending a NOTIFY payload with
   existence web site.  However, an attacker may walk the
   new IP address.  In addition, reverse DNS
   zone, or use other reconnaissance techniques to learn this NOTIFY payload
   information as described in [RFC7707].

   In order to prevent the complete Public Homenet Zone being published
   on the Internet, AXFR queries SHOULD be
   authenticated using SIG(0) or TSIG. blocked on the Public
   Authoritative Server(s).  Similarly, to avoid zone-walking NSEC3
   [RFC5155] SHOULD be preferred over NSEC [RFC4034].  When the Synchronization Server
   receives Public
   Homenet Zone is outsourced, the NOTIFY payload, it MUST authenticate it.  Note end user should be aware that it
   provides a complete description of the
   cryptographic key used for services available on the authentication SHOULD be indexed by home
   network.  More specifically, names usually provides a clear
   indication of the Registered Homenet Domain contained in service and possibly even the NOTIFY payload as well device type, and as
   the RRSIG.  In other words, Public Homenet Zone contains the IP address SHOULD NOT be used as
   an index.  If authentication succeeds, addresses associated with the Synchronization Server
   MUST
   service, they also notice limit the IP address has been modified and perform a
   reachability check before updating its primary configuration.  The
   routability check MAY performed by sending a SOA request to scope of the
   Hidden Primary using scan space.

   In addition to the source IP address of Public Homenet Zone, the NOTIFY.  This
   exchange is third party can also secured, and if an authenticated response is
   received from
   monitor the Hidden Primary traffic associated with the new IP address, the
   Synchronization Server SHOULD update its configuration file and
   retrieve the Public Homenet Zone using Zone.  This
   traffic may provide an AXFR or a IXFR exchange.

   Note that indication of the primary reason for providing services an end user
   accesses, plus how and when they use these services.  Although,
   caching may obfuscate this information inside the IP address home network, it is
   likely that the
   Hidden Primary is outside your home network this information will not publicly announced in the DNS.  If the Hidden
   Primary were publicly announced be
   cached.

14.  Security Considerations

   The Homenet Naming Architecture described in this document solves
   exposing the DNS, then the IP address
   update could have been performed using the HNA's DNS service as described in
   Section 8.2.

8.2.  Synchronization Server

   Renumbering of a DoS attack vector.

14.1.  HNA DM channels

   The HNA DM channels are specified to include their own security
   mechanisms that are designed to provide the Synchronization Server results in minimum attacke surface,
   and to authenticate transactions where necessary.

14.2.  Names are less secure than IP addresses

   This document describes how an end user can make their services and
   devices from his home network reachable on the
   Synchronization Server changing its Internet by using
   names rather than IP address.  The Synchronization
   Server is a secondary, so its renumbering does not impact addresses.  This exposes the Homenet
   Zone.  In fact, exchanges home network to the Synchronization Server
   attackers, since names are
   restricted expected to the Homenet Zone synchronization. include less entropy than IP
   addresses.  In our case, fact, with IP addresses, the
   Hidden Primary MUST be able Interface Identifier is
   64 bits long leading to send NOTIFY payloads up to the
   Synchronization Server.

   If the Synchronization Server is configured in the Hidden Primary
   configuration file using 2^64 possibilities for a FQDN, then the update of given
   subnetwork.  This is not to mention that the IP address subnet prefix is
   performed by DNS.  More specifically, before sending the NOTIFY, the
   Hidden Primary performs a DNS resolution also of
   64 bits long, thus providing up to retrieve 2^64 possibilities.  On the IP address
   of other
   hand, names used either for the secondary.

   As described in Section 8.1, home network domain or for the Synchronization Server DNS
   information SHOULD be coherent with
   devices present less entropy (livebox, router, printer, nicolas,
   jennifer, ...) and thus potentially exposes the devices to dictionary
   attacks.

14.3.  Names are less volatile than IP plane.  Let TTL addresses

   IP addresses may be the TTL
   associated with the Synchronization Server FQDN, T_NEW the used to locate a device, a host or a service.
   However, home networks are not expected to be assigned a time the
   new
   invariant prefix by ISPs.  As a result, observing IP address replaces the old one and T_OLD_UNREACHABLE addresses only
   provides some ephemeral information about who is accessing the time
   service.  On the Synchronization Server is other hand, names are not reachable anymore with its old IP
   address.  Seamless reachability is provided expected to be as long volatile
   as
   T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW > 2 * TTL.  If this condition is not met,
   the Synchronization Server IP addresses.  As a result, logging names over time may be unreachable during 2 * TTL -
   (T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW).  In the case of more
   valuable than logging IP addresses, especially to profile an end
   user's characteristics.

   PTR provides a break-before-make,
   T_OLD_UNREACHABLE = T_NEW, and it may become unreachable up way to 2 *
   TTL.

   Some DNS infrastructure uses the bind an IP address to designate a name.  In that sense,
   responding to PTR DNS queries may affect the
   secondary, in which case, other mechanisms must be found.  The reason
   for using IP addresses instead of names is generally to reach an
   internal interface end user's privacy.  For
   that is reason end users may choose not designated by a FQDN, to respond to PTR DNS queries
   and MAY instead return a NXDOMAIN response.

14.4.  DNS Reflection Attacks

   An attacker performs a reflection attack when it sends traffic to avoid
   potential bootstrap problems.  Such scenarios are considered as out
   of scope one
   or more intermediary nodes (reflectors), that in turn send back
   response traffic to the case victim.  Motivations for using an
   intermediary node might be anonymity of home networks.

   []( <!- <section {#sec-dnssec-outsrc" title="DNSSEC outsourcing
   configuration}

    In this document we assume that the Outsourcing Infrastructure MAY sign the Homenet Zone. Multiple variants MAY be proposed by attacker, as well as
   amplification of the Outsourcing Infrastructure. The Outsourcing Infrastructure MAY propose signing traffic.  Typically, when the DNS Homenet Zone with keys generated by intermediary node
   is a DNSSEC server, the Outsourcing Infrastructure attacker sends a DNSSEC query and which are unknown the victim
   is likely to receive a DNSSEC response.  This section analyzes how
   the HNA. Alternatively different components may be involved as a reflector in a
   reflection attack.  Section 14.5 considers the Outsourcing Infrastructure MAY propose that Hidden Primary,
   Section 14.6 the end user provides Synchronization Server, and Section 14.7 the private keys. Although not considered in this document, some end users MAY still prefer to sign their zone with their own keys that they do not communicate to Public
   Authoritative Server(s).

14.5.  Reflection Attack involving the Outsourcing Infrastructure. All these alternatives result from a negotiation between Hidden Primary

   With the end user and specified architecture, the Outsourcing Infrastructure. This negotiation is performed out-of-band and Hidden Primary is out of scope of this document.

    In this document, we consider that the Outsourcing Infrastructure has all the necessary cryptographic elements only expected
   to perform zone signing and key management operations.

    Note that Outsourcing Infrastructure described in this document implements various functions, and thus different entities receive DNS queries of type SOA, AXFR or IXFR.  This section
   analyzes how these DNS queries may be involved.
    <list hangIndent="6" style="hanging
            <t hangText="- used by an attacker to perform
   a reflection attack.

   DNS Slave functionsynchronizes the Homenet Zone
            between the HNA queries of type AXFR and the Outsourcing Infrastructures. The DNS Homenet Zone SHOULD  NOT be published directly on the Public Authoritative Servers, IXFR use TCP and the Public Authoritative Server(s MUST NOT respond as such are less
   subject to  any DNS reflection attacks.  This makes SOA queries for that zone. Instead, the Outsourcing Infrastructure chooses only
   remaining practical vector of attacks for reflection attacks, based
   on UDP.

   SOA queries are not associated with a dedicated set large amplification factor
   compared to queries of servers type "ANY" or to serve the Public Homenet Zone: the Public Authoritative Server(s.
            <t hangText="- DNS Zone Signing functionsigns query of non existing FQDNs.
   This reduces the probability a DNS Zone Homenet Zone query of type SOA will be involved
   in a DDoS attack.

   SOA queries are expected to generate follow a very specific pattern, which
   makes rate limiting techniques an Public Homenet Zone.
            <t hangText="- Public Authoritative Server hosts efficient way to limit such
   attacks, and associated impact on the naming service for the Public Homenet Zone. Any DNS query associated with of the Homenet Zone SHOULD home
   network.

   Motivations for such a flood might be a reflection attack, but could
   also be a resource exhaustion attack performed using the specific servers designated as against the Public Authoritative Servers
    </list>

   ->)

9.  Privacy Considerations

   Outsourcing Hidden
   Primary.  The Hidden Primary only expects to exchange traffic with
   the DNS Authoritative service from DM, that is its associated secondary.  Even though secondary
   servers may be renumbered as mentioned in Section 11, the HNA Hidden
   Primary is likely to perform a third
   party raises a few privacy related concerns.

   The Homenet Zone contains a full description of DNSSEC resolution and find out the services hosted
   associated secondary's IP addresses in use.  As a result, the network.  These services may not be expected Hidden
   Primary is likely to be publicly
   shared although their names remain accessible through limit the Internet.
   Even though DNS makes information public, origin of its incoming traffic based
   on the DNS does not expect origin IP address.

   With filtering rules based on IP address, SOA flooding attacks are
   limited to
   make forged packets with the complete list IP address of services public.  In fact, making
   information public still requires the key (or FQDN) of each service
   to be known by secondary
   server.  In other words, the resolver in order to retrieve information about only victims are the services.  More specifically, making mywebsite.example.com public
   in Hidden Primary
   itself or the DNS, secondary.  There is not sufficient a need for the Hidden Primary to make resolvers aware
   limit that flood to limit the impact of the
   existence web site.  However, an attacker may walk reflection attack on the reverse DNS
   zone, or use other reconnaissance techniques to learn this
   information as described in [RFC7707].

   In order
   secondary, and to prevent limit the complete Homenet Zone being published resource needed to carry on the
   Internet, AXFR queries SHOULD be blocked on traffic
   by the Public Authoritative
   Server(s).  Similarly, to avoid zone-walking NSEC3 [RFC5155] SHOULD
   be preferred over NSEC [RFC4034].  When HNA hosting the Homenet Zone is
   outsourced, Hidden Primary.  On the end user other hand, mitigation
   should be aware that it provides a complete
   description of performed appropriately, so as to limit the services available impact on the home network.  More
   specifically, names usually provides a clear indication of
   legitimate SOA sent by the
   service and possibly even secondary.

   The main reason for the device type, and as DM sending a SOA query is to update the Homenet Zone
   contains SOA
   RRset after the IP addresses associated with TTL expires, to check the service, they also
   limit serial number upon the scope
   receipt of a NOTIFY query from the scan space.

   In addition Hidden Primary, or to re-send the Homenet Zone,
   SOA request when the third party can also monitor response has not been received.  When a flood of
   SOA queries is received by the
   traffic associated with Hidden Primary, the Homenet Zone.  This traffic Hidden Primary may provide
   an indication of the services
   assume it is involved in an end user accesses, plus how and attack.

   There are few legitimate time slots when
   they use these services.  Although, caching may obfuscate this
   information inside the home network, it secondary is expected to
   send a SOA query.  Suppose T_NOTIFY is likely that outside your
   home network this information will not be cached.

10.  Security Considerations

   The Homenet Naming Architecture described in this document solves
   exposing the HNA's DNS service as time a DoS attack vector.

10.1.  Names are less secure than IP addresses

   This document describes how an end user can make their services and
   devices from his home network reachable on NOTIFY is sent by
   the Internet by using
   names rather than IP addresses.  This exposes Hidden Primary, T_SOA the home network last time the SOA has been queried, TTL
   the TTL associated to
   attackers, since names the SOA, and T_REFRESH the refresh time defined
   in the SOA RRset.  The specific time SOA queries are expected to include less entropy than IP
   addresses.  In fact, with IP addresses, the Interface Identifier is
   64 bits long leading to up to 2^64 possibilities can be
   for example T_NOTIFY, T_SOA + 2/3 TTL, T_SOA + TTL, T_SOA +
   T_REFRESH., and.  Outside a given
   subnetwork.  This is not to mention few minutes following these specific time
   slots, the probability that the subnet prefix HNA discards a legitimate SOA query
   is also of
   64 bits long, thus providing up to 2^64 possibilities.  On very low.  Within these time slots, the other
   hand, names used either for probability the home network domain or for secondary
   may have its legitimate query rejected is higher.  If a legitimate
   SOA is discarded, the
   devices present less entropy (livebox, router, printer, nicolas,
   jennifer, ...) secondary will re-send SOA query every "retry
   time" second until "expire time" seconds occurs, where "retry time"
   and thus potentially exposes "expire time" have been defined in the devices to dictionary
   attacks.

10.2.  Names are less volatile than IP addresses

   IP addresses may be used to locate a device, a host or a service.
   However, home networks are not expected to be assigned a time
   invariant prefix by ISPs. SOA.

   As a result, observing IP addresses only
   provides some ephemeral information about who it is accessing the
   service.  On the other hand, names are not expected RECOMMENDED to be as volatile
   as IP addresses.  As set rate limiting policies to
   protect HNA resources.  If a result, logging names over time may be flood lasts more
   valuable than logging IP addresses, especially to profile an end
   user's characteristics.

   PTR provides a way to bind an IP address the expired time
   defined by the SOA, it is RECOMMENDED to re-initiate a name.  In that sense,
   responding to PTR DNS queries may affect
   synchronization between the end user's privacy.  For
   that reason end users may choose not to respond to PTR DNS queries Hidden Primary and MAY instead return a NXDOMAIN response.

10.3.  DNS the secondaries.

14.6.  Reflection Attacks

   An attacker performs involving the DM

   The DM acts as a reflection attack when it sends traffic to one
   or more intermediary nodes (reflectors), that in turn send back
   response traffic secondary coupled with the Hidden Primary.  The
   secondary expects to receive NOTIFY query, SOA responses, AXFR and
   IXFR responses from the victim.  Motivations for using an
   intermediary node might be anonymity of Hidden Primary.

   Sending a NOTIFY query to the attacker, secondary generates a NOTIFY response
   as well as
   amplification of initiating an SOA query exchange from the traffic.  Typically, when secondary to the intermediary node
   Hidden Primary.  As mentioned in [RFC1996], this is a DNSSEC server, the attacker sends known "benign
   denial of service attack".  As a DNSSEC query and result, the victim
   is likely DM SHOULD enforce rate
   limiting on sending SOA queries and NOTIFY responses to receive a DNSSEC response.  This section analyzes how
   the different components may be involved as a reflector in a
   reflection attack.  Section 10.4 considers the Hidden Primary,
   Section 10.5
   Primary.  Most likely, when the Synchronization Server, secondary is flooded with valid and
   signed NOTIFY queries, it is under a replay attack which is discussed
   in Section 10.6 14.9.  The key thing here is that the Public
   Authoritative Server(s).

10.4.  "Reflection Attack involving secondary is likely
   to be designed to be able to process much more traffic than the
   Hidden Primary

   With hosted on a HNA.

   This paragraph details how the specified architecture, secondary may limit the NOTIFY
   queries.  Because the Hidden Primary is only expected
   to receive DNS queries of type SOA, AXFR or IXFR.  This section
   analyzes how these DNS queries may be used by an attacker to perform
   a reflection attack.

   DNS queries of type AXFR and IXFR use TCP and as such are less
   subject to reflection attacks.  This makes SOA queries renumbered, the only
   remaining practical vector of attacks for reflection attacks, secondary
   SHOULD NOT perform permanent IP filtering based on UDP.

   SOA queries are not associated with IP addresses.  In
   addition, a large amplification factor
   compared to queries of type "ANY" or given secondary may be shared among multiple Hidden
   Primaries which make filtering rules based on IP harder to query of non existing FQDNs.
   This reduces set.  The
   time at which a NOTIFY is sent by the probability Hidden Primary is not
   predictable.  However, a DNS query flood of type SOA will NOTIFY messages may be involved
   in easily
   detected, as a DDoS attack.

   SOA queries are NOTIFY originated from a given Homenet Zone is
   expected to follow have a very specific pattern, which
   makes limited number of unique source IP addresses,
   even when renumbering is occurring.  As a result, the secondary, MAY
   rate limiting techniques an efficient way to limit such
   attacks, and associated impact on the naming service of the home
   network.

   Motivations for such a flood might be a reflection attack, but could
   also be a resource exhaustion attack performed against incoming NOTIFY queries.

   On the Hidden
   Primary.  The Primary side, it is recommended that the Hidden Primary only expects to exchange traffic with
   sends a NOTIFY as long as the zone has not been updated by the Synchronization Server, that is its associated
   secondary.  Even
   though secondary servers  Multiple SOA queries may be renumbered as mentioned in Section 8, indicate the Hidden Primary secondary is likely to perform a DNSSEC resolution and find
   out under
   attack.

14.7.  Reflection Attacks involving the associated secondary's IP addresses in use.  As a result, Public Authoritative Servers

   Reflection attacks involving the
   Hidden Primary Public Authoritative Server(s) are
   similar to attacks on any Outsourcing Infrastructure.  This is likely not
   specific to limit the origin architecture described in this document, and thus are
   considered as out of scope.

   In fact, one motivation of its incoming traffic
   based on the origin IP address.

   With filtering rules based on IP address, SOA flooding attacks are
   limited architecture described in this
   document is to forged packets with expose the IP address Public Authoritative Server(s) to attacks
   instead of the secondary
   server.  In other words, HNA, as it is believed that the only victims are Public Authoritative
   Server(s) will be better able to defend itself.

14.8.  Flooding Attack

   The purpose of flooding attacks is mostly resource exhaustion, where
   the Hidden Primary
   itself resource can be bandwidth, memory, or the secondary.  There is a need CPU for example.

   One goal of the Hidden Primary to
   limit that flood architecture described in this document is to limit
   the impact surface of the reflection attack on the
   secondary, and to limit the resource needed HNA.  This is done by outsourcing the
   DNS service to carry on the traffic
   by Public Authoritative Server(s).  By doing so, the
   HNA hosting limits its DNS interactions between the Hidden Primary.  On Primary and the other hand, mitigation
   should be performed appropriately, so as to limit
   DM.  This limits the impact on number of entities the
   legitimate SOA sent by HNA interacts with as
   well as the secondary. scope of DNS exchanges - NOTIFY, SOA, AXFR, IXFR.

   The main reason for the Synchronization Server sending a SOA query is
   to update the SOA RRset after the TTL expires, to check the serial
   number upon the receipt use of a NOTIFY query from the Hidden Primary, an authenticated channel with SIG(0) or
   to re-send TSIG between the SOA request when
   HNA and the response has not been received.
   When a flood DM, enables detection of SOA queries is received by illegitimate DNS queries, so
   appropriate action may be taken - like dropping the Hidden Primary, queries.  If
   signatures are validated, then most likely, the
   Hidden Primary may assume it HNA is involved under a replay
   attack, as detailed in an attack.

   There are few legitimate time slots when Section 14.9

   In order to limit the secondary resource required for authentication, it is expected
   recommended to
   send a SOA query.  Suppose T_NOTIFY is the time use TSIG that uses symmetric cryptography over SIG(0)
   that uses asymmetric cryptography.

14.9.  Replay Attack

   Replay attacks consist of an attacker either resending or delaying a NOTIFY is
   legitimate message that has been sent by an authorized user or
   process.  As the Hidden Primary, T_SOA the last time the SOA has been queried, TTL
   the TTL associated to the SOA, Primary and T_REFRESH the refresh time defined
   in the SOA RRset.  The specific time SOA queries DM use an authenticated
   channel, replay attacks are mostly expected can be
   for example T_NOTIFY, T_SOA + 2/3 TTL, T_SOA + TTL, T_SOA +
   T_REFRESH., and.  Outside a few minutes following these specific time
   slots, the probability that to use forged DNS queries
   in order to provide valid traffic.

   From the HNA discards perspective of an attacker, using a legitimate SOA correctly authenticated
   DNS query
   is very low.  Within these time slots, the probability the secondary may have its legitimate query rejected is higher.  If a legitimate
   SOA is discarded, the secondary will re-send SOA query every "retry
   time" second until "expire time" seconds occurs, where "retry time" not be detected as an attack and "expire time" have been defined in the SOA.

   As thus may generate a result, it is RECOMMENDED to set rate limiting policies to
   protect HNA resources.  If
   response.  Generating and sending a flood lasts response consumes more resources
   than either dropping the expired time
   defined query by the SOA, it is RECOMMENDED to re-initiate a
   synchronization between defender, or generating the Hidden Primary
   query by the attacker, and thus could be used for resource exhaustion
   attacks.  In addition, as the secondaries.

10.5.  Reflection Attacks involving authentication is performed at the Synchronization Server

   The Synchronization Server acts as a secondary coupled with DNS
   layer, the
   Hidden Primary.  The secondary expects source IP address could be impersonated in order to receive NOTIFY query, SOA
   responses, AXFR and IXFR responses from the Hidden Primary.

   Sending
   perform a NOTIFY query reflection attack.

   Section 14.4 details how to the secondary generates a NOTIFY response
   as well as initiating an SOA query exchange from the secondary mitigate reflection attacks and
   Section 14.8 details how to mitigate resource exhaustion.  Both
   sections assume a context of DoS with a flood of DNS queries.  This
   section suggests a way to limit the
   Hidden Primary. attack surface of replay attacks.

   As mentioned in [RFC1996], this SIG(0) and TSIG use inception and expiration time, the time frame
   for replay attack is limited.  SIG(0) and TSIG recommends a known "benign
   denial fudge
   value of service attack". 5 minutes.  This value has been set as a compromise between
   possibly loose time synchronization between devices and the valid
   lifetime of the message.  As a result, better time synchronization
   policies could reduce the Synchronization Server
   SHOULD enforce rate limiting on sending SOA queries and NOTIFY
   responses time window of the attack.

   [](<!- <section title="DNSSEC is recommended to authenticate DNS
   hosted data

   Deploying DNSSEC is recommended, since in some cases the Hidden Primary.  Most likely, when information
   stored in the secondary DNS is
   flooded with valid used by the ISP or an IT department to grant
   access.  For example some servers may perform PTR DNS queries to
   grant access based on host names.  DNSSEC mitigates lack of trust in
   DNS, and signed NOTIFY queries, it is under RECOMMENDED to deploy DNSSEC on HNAs.

       -->)

15.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

16.  Acknowledgment

   The authors wish to thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on
   the early versions of the draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues
   with the IPv6 routed home concept and placing the scope of this
   document in a replay
   attack which is discussed wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and
   injecting a healthy debate on the merits of the idea; Ulrik de Bie
   for providing alternative solutions; Paul Mockapetris, Christian
   Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on
   HNA and low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC
   capabilities of small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as
   dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael
   Abrahamson, Michael Richardson and Ray Bellis for their feedback on
   handling different views as well as clarifying the impact of
   outsourcing the zone signing operation outside the HNA; Mark Andrew
   and Peter Koch for clarifying the renumbering.

17.  Annex

17.1.  Envisioned deployment scenarios

   A number of deployment have been envisionned, this section aims at
   providing a brief description.  The use cases are not limitatives and
   this section is not normative.

17.1.1.  CPE Vendor

   A specific vendor with specific relations with a registrar or a
   registry may sell a CPE that is provisioned with provisioned domain
   name.  Such domain name does not need to be necessary human readable.

   One possible way is that the vendor also provisions the HNA with a
   private and public keys as well as a certificate.  Note that these
   keys are not expected to be used for DNSSEC signing.  Instead these
   keys are solely used by the HNA to proceed to the authentication.
   Normally the keys should be necessary and sufficient to proceed to
   the authentication.  The reason to combine the domain name and the
   key is that outsourcing infrastructure are likely handle names better
   than keys and that domain names might be used as a login which
   enables the key to be regenerated.

   When the home network owner plugs the CPE at home, the relation
   between HNA and DM is expected to work out-of-the-box.

17.1.2.  Agnostic CPE

   An CPE that is not preconfigured may also take advanatge to the
   protocol defined in this document but some configuration steps will
   be needed.

   1.  The owner of the home network buys a domain name to a registrar,
       and as such creates an account on that registrar

   2.  Either the registrar is also providing the outsourcing
       infrastructure or the home network needs to create a specific
       account on the outsourcing infrastructure.  * If the outsourcing
       provider is the registrar, the outsourcing has by design a proof
       of ownership of the domain name by the homenet owner.  In this
       case, it is expected the infrastructure provides the necessary
       parameters to the home network owner to configure the HNA.  A
       good way to provide the parameters would be the home network be
       able to copy/paste a JSON object.  What matters at that point is
       the outsourcing infrastructure being able to generate
       authentication credentials for the HNA to authenticate itself to
       the outsourcing infrastructure.  This obviously requires the home
       network to provide the public key gnerated by the HNA in a CSR.

   o  If the outsourcing infrastructure is not the registrar, then the
      proof of ownership needs to be established using protocols like
      ACME for example that will end in the generation of a certificate.
      ACME is used here to the purpose of automating the generation of
      the certificate, the CA may be a specific CA or the outsourcing
      infrastructure.  With that being done, the outsourcing
      infrastructure has a roof of ownership and can proceed as above.

17.2.  Example: Homenet Zone

   This section is not normative and intends to illustrate how the HNA
   builds the Homenet Zone.

   As depicted in Figure 1, the Public Homenet Zone is hosted on the
   Public Authoritative Server(s), whereas the Homenet Zone is hosted on
   the HNA.  This section considers that the HNA builds the zone that
   will be effectively published on the Public Authoritative Server(s).
   In other words "Homenet to Public Zone transformation" is the
   identity also commonly designated as "no operation" (NOP).

   In that case, the Homenet Zone should configure its Name Server RRset
   (NS) and Start of Authority (SOA) with the values associated with the
   Public Authoritative Server(s).  This is illustrated in Figure 2.
   public.primary.example.net is the FQDN of the Public Authoritative
   Server(s), and IP1, IP2, IP3, IP4 are the associated IP addresses.

   Then the HNA should add the additional new nodes that enter the home
   network, remove those that should be removed, and sign the Homenet
   Zone.

   $ORIGIN example.com
   $TTL 1h

   @  IN  SOA  public.primary.example.net
          hostmaster.example.com. (
          2013120710 ; serial number of this zone file
          1d         ; secondary refresh
          2h         ; secondary retry time in case of a problem
          4w         ; secondary expiration time
          1h         ; maximum caching time in case of failed
                     ; lookups
          )

   @   NS  public.authoritative.servers.example.net

   public.primary.example.net   A @IP1
   public.primary.example.net   A @IP2
   public.primary.example.net   AAAA @IP3
   public.primary.example.net   AAAA @IP4

                          Figure 2: Homenet Zone

   The SOA RRset is defined in Section 10.8.  The key thing here [RFC1033], [RFC1035] and [RFC2308].  This
   SOA is
   that the secondary specific, as it is likely to be designed to be able to process
   much more traffic than used for the synchronization between the
   Hidden Primary hosted on a HNA.

   This paragraph details how and the secondary may limit DM and published on the NOTIFY
   queries.  Because DNS Public
   Authoritative Server(s)..

   o  MNAME: indicates the Hidden Primary may be renumbered, primary.  In our case the secondary
   SHOULD NOT perform permanent IP filtering based zone is published
      on IP addresses.  In
   addition, a given secondary may the Public Authoritative Server(s), and its name MUST be shared among
      included.  If multiple Hidden
   Primaries which make filtering rules based on IP harder to set.  The
   time at which a NOTIFY is sent by the Hidden Primary is not
   predictable.  However, a flood Public Authoritative Server(s) are
      involved, one of NOTIFY messages may them MUST be easily
   detected, as a NOTIFY originated from a given Homenet Zone is
   expected to have a very limited number of unique source IP addresses,
   even when renumbering is occurring.  As a result, chosen.  More specifically, the secondary, MAY
   rate limit incoming NOTIFY queries.

   On HNA
      MUST NOT include the Hidden Primary side, it is recommended that name of the Hidden Primary
   sends a NOTIFY as long as Primary.

   o  RNAME: indicates the zone has not been updated by email address to reach the
   secondary.  Multiple SOA queries may administrator.
      [RFC2142] recommends using hostmaster@domain and replacing the '@'
      sign by '.'.

   o  REFRESH and RETRY: indicate respectively in seconds how often
      secondaries need to check the secondary is under
   attack.

10.6.  Reflection Attacks involving primary, and the Public Authoritative Servers

   Reflection attacks involving time between two
      refresh when a refresh has failed.  Default values indicated by
      [RFC1033] are 3600 (1 hour) for refresh and 600 (10 minutes) for
      retry.  This value might be too long for highly dynamic content.
      However, the Public Authoritative Server(s) and the HNA are
   similar
      expected to attacks implement NOTIFY [RFC1996].  So whilst shorter refresh
      timers might increase the bandwidth usage for secondaries hosting
      large number of zones, it will have little practical impact on any Outsourcing Infrastructure.  This is not
   specific the
      elapsed time required to achieve synchronization between the architecture described in this document,
      Outsourcing Infrastructure and thus the Hidden Master.  As a result,
      the default values are
   considered as out of scope.

   In fact, one motivation of acceptable.

   o  EXPIRE: is the architecture described upper limit data SHOULD be kept in this
   document absence of
      refresh.  The default value indicated by [RFC1033] is to expose 3600000
      (approx. 42 days).  In home network architectures, the Public Authoritative Server(s) HNA
      provides both the DNS synchronization and the access to attacks
   instead of the HNA, as it is believed that home
      network.  This device may be plugged and unplugged by the Public Authoritative
   Server(s) will end user
      without notification, thus we recommend a long expiry timer.

   o  MINIMUM: indicates the minimum TTL.  The default value indicated
      by [RFC1033] is 86400 (1 day).  For home network, this value MAY
      be reduced, and 3600 (1 hour) seems more appropriate.

   <<!-- ## Considerations on multiple Registered Homenet Domain Names
   ## are left for future versions When multiple Registered Homenet
   Domains are used -like example.com, example.net, example.org, a DNS
   Homenet Zone file per Registered Homenet Domain SHOULD be better able generated.
   In order to defend itself.

10.7.  Flooding Attack

   The purpose of flooding attacks is mostly resource exhaustion, where synchronize the resource can zone contents, the HNA may provide all
   bindings in each zone files.  As a result, any update MUST be bandwidth, memory, or CPU
   performed on all zone files, i.e. for example.

   One goal of all Registered Homenet Domains.
   To limit thees updates when multiple Registered Homenet Domains are
   involved, the architecture described HNA MAY fill all bindings in this document is a specific zone file and
   redirect all other zones to limit
   the surface of attack on the HNA. that zone.  This can be achieved with
   redirecting mechanisms like CNAME {{RFC2181}}, {{RFC1034}}, DNAME
   {{RFC6672}} or CNAME+DNAME {{I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname}}. This is done by outsourcing the
   DNS service
   an implementation issue to determine whether redirection mechanisms
   MAY be preferred for large Homenet Zones, or when the Public Authoritative Server(s).  By doing so, the number of
   Registered Homenet Domain becomes quite large. -->>

17.3.  Example: HNA limits its DNS interactions between the Hidden Primary and the
   Synchronization Server. necessary parameters for outsourcing

   This limits section specifies the number of entities various parameters required by the HNA
   interacts with as well as to
   configure the scope of DNS exchanges - NOTIFY, SOA,
   AXFR, IXFR.

   The use naming architecture of an authenticated channel with SIG(0) or TSIG between the
   HNA this document.  This section is
   informational, and is intended to clarify the Synchronization Server, enables detection of illegitimate
   DNS queries, so appropriate action may be taken - like dropping information handled by
   the
   queries.  If signatures are validated, then most likely, HNA and the HNA is
   under a replay attack, as detailed in Section 10.8

   In order various settings to limit be done.

   DM may be configured with the resource required for authentication, it is
   recommended following parameters.  These parameters
   are necessary to use TSIG that uses symmetric cryptography over SIG(0)
   that uses asymmetric cryptography.

10.8.  Replay Attack

   Replay attacks consist of an attacker either resending or delaying establish a
   legitimate message that has been sent by an authorized user or
   process.  As secure channel between the Hidden Primary HNA and the Synchronization Server use an
   authenticated channel, replay attacks are mostly expected
   DM as well as to use
   forged specify the DNS queries zone that is in order to provide valid traffic.

   From the perspective scope of an attacker, using a correctly authenticated
   DNS query may not be detected as an attack the
   communication:

   o  DM: The associated FQDNs or IP addresses of the DM.  IP addresses
      are optional and thus may generate a
   response.  Generating the FQDN is sufficient.  To secure the binding
      name and sending IP addresses, a response consumes more resources
   than either dropping DNSSEC exchange is required.  Otherwise,
      the query by IP addresses should be entered manually.

   o  Authentication Method: How the defender, or generating HNA authenticates itself to the
   query by DM.
      This MAY depend on the attacker, implementation but this should cover at
      least IPsec, DTLS and thus could be used for resource exhaustion
   attacks.  In addition, as the TSIG

   o  Authentication data: Associated Data.  PSK only requires a single
      argument.  If other authentication is performed at mechanisms based on
      certificates are used, then HNA private keys, certificates and
      certification authority should be specified.

   o  Public Authoritative Server(s): The FQDN or IP addresses of the DNS
   layer,
      Public Authoritative Server(s).  It MAY correspond to the source IP address could data
      that will be impersonated set in order to
   perform a reflection attack.

   Section 10.3 details how to mitigate reflection attacks the NS RRsets and
   Section 10.7 details how to mitigate resource exhaustion.  Both
   sections assume a context of DoS with a flood SOA of DNS queries.  This
   section suggests a way to limit the attack surface of replay attacks.

   As SIG(0) and TSIG use inception Homenet Zone.  IP
      addresses are optional and expiration time, the time frame
   for replay attack FQDN is limited.  SIG(0) and TSIG recommends a fudge
   value of 5 minutes.  This value has been set as a compromise between
   possibly loose time synchronization sufficient.  To secure the
      binding between devices name and the valid
   lifetime of the message.  As IP addresses, a result, better time synchronization
   policies could reduce the time window of the attack.

   [](<!- <section title="DNSSEC is recommended to authenticate DNS
   hosted data

   Deploying DNSSEC exchange is recommended, since in some cases
      required.  Otherwise, the information
   stored in IP addresses should be entered manually.

   o  Registered Homenet Domain: The domain name used to establish the DNS
      secure channel.  This name is used by the ISP or an IT department to grant
   access.  For example some servers may perform PTR DNS queries to
   grant access based on host names.  DNSSEC mitigates lack of trust in
   DNS, DM and it is RECOMMENDED to deploy DNSSEC on HNAs.

       -->)

11.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions the HNA for IANA.

12.  Acknowledgment

   The authors wish the
      primary / secondary configuration as well as to thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on index the early versions NOTIFY
      queries of the draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues
   with HNA when the IPv6 routed home concept and placing HNA has been renumbered.

     Setting the scope of this
   document in a wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and
   injecting a healthy debate on Homenet Zone requires the merits following information.

   o  Registered Homenet Domain: The Domain Name of the idea; Ulrik de Bie
   for providing alternative solutions; Paul Mockapetris, Christian
   Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on
   HNA and low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC
   capabilities zone.  Multiple
      Registered Homenet Domains may be provided.  This will generate
      the creation of small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as
   dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael
   Abrahamson, Michael Richardson and Ray Bellis for their feedback on
   handling different views as well as clarifying multiple Public Homenet Zones.

   o  Public Authoritative Server(s): The Public Authoritative Server(s)
      associated with the impact Registered Homenet Domain.  Multiple Public
      Authoritative Server(s) may be provided.

   Two possible methods of
   outsourcing providing the required information would be:

   JSON for forward zones [should be standardized in a similar way to
   zone signing operation outside the HNA; Mark Andrew
   and Peter Koch file layout in RFC1035]

   DHCP for clarifying the renumbering.

13. reverse zones [needs a separate draft]

18.  References

13.1.
18.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1033]  Lottor, M., "Domain Administrators Operations Guide",
              RFC 1033, DOI 10.17487/RFC1033, November 1987,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1033>.

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC1995]  Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1995, August 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1995>.

   [RFC1996]  Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone
              Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC1996,
              August 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1996>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2136]  Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
              "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
              RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>.

   [RFC2142]  Crocker, D., "Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and
              Functions", RFC 2142, DOI 10.17487/RFC2142, May 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2142>.

   [RFC2181]  Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
              Specification", RFC 2181, DOI 10.17487/RFC2181, July 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2181>.

   [RFC2308]  Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
              NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.

   [RFC2845]  Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B.
              Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
              (TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>.

   [RFC2930]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY
              RR)", RFC 2930, DOI 10.17487/RFC2930, September 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2930>.

   [RFC2931]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures
              ( SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, DOI 10.17487/RFC2931, September
              2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2931>.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.

   [RFC4192]  Baker, F., Lear, E., and R. Droms, "Procedures for
              Renumbering an IPv6 Network without a Flag Day", RFC 4192,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4192, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4192>.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
              December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.

   [RFC4555]  Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
              (MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, DOI 10.17487/RFC4555, June 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4555>.

   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
              RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
              Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC5936]  Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, Ed., "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol
              (AXFR)", RFC 5936, DOI 10.17487/RFC5936, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5936>.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC6644]  Evans, D., Droms, R., and S. Jiang, "Rebind Capability in
              DHCPv6 Reconfigure Messages", RFC 6644,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6644, July 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6644>.

   [RFC6672]  Rose, S. and W. Wijngaards, "DNAME Redirection in the
              DNS", RFC 6672, DOI 10.17487/RFC6672, June 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6672>.

   [RFC6762]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.

   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.

   [RFC7010]  Liu, B., Jiang, S., Carpenter, B., Venaas, S., and W.
              George, "IPv6 Site Renumbering Gap Analysis", RFC 7010,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7010, September 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7010>.

   [RFC7296]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
              Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.

   [RFC7344]  Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
              DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.

   [RFC7368]  Chown, T., Ed., Arkko, J., Brandt, A., Troan, O., and J.
              Weil, "IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles",
              RFC 7368, DOI 10.17487/RFC7368, October 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7368>.

   [RFC7558]  Lynn, K., Cheshire, S., Blanchet, M., and D. Migault,
              "Requirements for Scalable DNS-Based Service Discovery
              (DNS-SD) / Multicast DNS (mDNS) Extensions", RFC 7558,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7558, July 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7558>.

   [RFC7707]  Gont, F. and T. Chown, "Network Reconnaissance in IPv6
              Networks", RFC 7707, DOI 10.17487/RFC7707, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7707>.

   [RFC7788]  Stenberg, M., Barth, S., and P. Pfister, "Home Networking
              Control Protocol", RFC 7788, DOI 10.17487/RFC7788, April
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7788>.

13.2.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC8375]  Pfister, P. and T. Lemon, "Special-Use Domain
              'home.arpa.'", RFC 8375, DOI 10.17487/RFC8375, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8375>.

18.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns]
              Howard, L., "Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service
              Providers", draft-howard-dnsop-ip6rdns-00 (work in
              progress), June 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]
              Migault, D., Mrugalski, T., Griffiths, C., Weber, R., and
              W. Cloetens, "DHCPv6 Options for Homenet Naming
              Architecture", draft-ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-
              options-06 (work in progress), June 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming]
              Lemon, T., Migault, D., and S. Cheshire, "Homenet Naming
              and Service Discovery Architecture", draft-ietf-homenet-
              simple-naming-03 (work in progress), October 2018.

   [I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname]
              Sury, O., "CNAME+DNAME Name Redirection", draft-sury-
              dnsext-cname-dname-00 (work in progress), April 2010.

Authors' Addresses

   Daniel Migault
   Ericsson
   8275 Trans Canada Route
   Saint Laurent, QC  4S 0B6
   Canada

   EMail: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
   Ralf Weber
   Nominum
   2000 Seaport Blvd
   Redwood City  94063
   US

   EMail: ralf.weber@nominum.com

   Michael Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works
   470 Dawson Avenue
   Ottawa, ON  K1Z 5V7
   Canada

   EMail: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca

   Ray Hunter
   Globis Consulting BV
   Weegschaalstraat 3
   Eindhoven  5632CW
   NL

   EMail: v6ops@globis.net

   Chris Griffiths

   EMail: cgriffiths@gmail.com

   Wouter Cloetens
   SoftAtHome<
   SoftAtHome
   vaartdijk 3 701
   Wijgmaal  3018
   BE

   EMail: cgriffiths@gmail.com wouter.cloetens@softathome.com