draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-07.txt   draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-08.txt 
HOMENET D. Migault (Ed) Homenet D. Migault
Internet-Draft Ericsson Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track R. Weber Intended status: Informational R. Weber
Expires: December 27, 2018 Nominum Expires: November 11, 2019 Nominum
R. Hunter R. Hunter
Globis Consulting BV Globis Consulting BV
C. Griffiths C. Griffiths
W. Cloetens W. Cloetens
SoftAtHome SoftAtHome<
June 25, 2018 May 10, 2019
Outsourcing Home Network Authoritative Naming Service Outsourcing Home Network Authoritative Naming Service
draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-07 draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-08
Abstract Abstract
Designation of services and devices of a home network is not user Designation of services and devices of a home network is not user
friendly, and mechanisms should enable a user to designate services friendly, and mechanisms should enable a user to designate services
and devices inside a home network using names. and devices inside a home network using names.
In order to enable internal communications while the home network In order to enable internal communications while the home network
experiments Internet connectivity shortage, the naming service should experiments Internet connectivity shortage, the naming service should
be hosted on a device inside the home network. On the other hand, be hosted on a device inside the home network. On the other hand,
skipping to change at page 2, line 10 skipping to change at page 2, line 10
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 27, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 11, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
skipping to change at page 2, line 37 skipping to change at page 2, line 37
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Architecture Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Architecture Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Example: Homenet Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2. Example: Homenet Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing . . . . 10 4.3. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing . . . . 10
5. Synchronization between HNA and the Synchronization Server . 11 5. Synchronization between HNA and the Synchronization Server . 11
5.1. Synchronization with a Hidden Primary . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.1. Synchronization with a Hidden Primary . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. Securing Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2. Securing Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3. HNA Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.3. HNA Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Zone Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.1. Zone Signing" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2. Secure Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.2. Secure Delegation" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Handling Different Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7. Handling Different Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Misleading Reasons for Local Scope DNS Zone . . . . . . . 17 7.1. Misleading Reasons for Local Scope DNS Zone" . . . . . . 17
7.2. Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.2. Consequences" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.3. Guidance and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.3. Guidance and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. Homenet Reverse Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.4. Homenet Reverse Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. Renumbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8. Renumbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.1. Hidden Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 8.1. Hidden Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.2. Synchronization Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.2. Synchronization Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
11.1. Names are less secure than IP addresses . . . . . . . . 22 10.1. Names are less secure than IP addresses . . . . . . . . 23
11.2. Names are less volatile than IP addresses . . . . . . . 23 10.2. Names are less volatile than IP addresses . . . . . . . 23
11.3. DNS Reflection Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 10.3. DNS Reflection Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.3.1. Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary . . . 23 10.4. "Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary . . . . 24
11.3.2. Reflection Attacks involving the Synchronization 10.5. Reflection Attacks involving the Synchronization Server 25
Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 10.6. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative
11.3.3. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authoritative Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 10.7. Flooding Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11.4. Flooding Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 10.8. Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
11.5. Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 12. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
13. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
14.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix A. Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1. Requirements notation 1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Introduction 2. Introduction
IPv6 provides global end to end IP reachability. End users prefer to IPv6 provides global end to end IP reachability. End users prefer to
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Architecture. In order to keep the Public Homenet Zone up-to-date Architecture. In order to keep the Public Homenet Zone up-to-date
Section 5 describes how the Homenet Zone and the Public Homenet Zone Section 5 describes how the Homenet Zone and the Public Homenet Zone
can be synchronized. The proposed architecture aims at deploying can be synchronized. The proposed architecture aims at deploying
DNSSEC, and the Public Homenet Zone is expected to be signed with a DNSSEC, and the Public Homenet Zone is expected to be signed with a
secure delegation. The zone signing and secure delegation may be secure delegation. The zone signing and secure delegation may be
performed either by the Homenet Naming Authority or by the performed either by the Homenet Naming Authority or by the
Outsourcing Infrastructure. Section 6 discusses these two Outsourcing Infrastructure. Section 6 discusses these two
alternatives. Section 7 discusses the consequences of publishing alternatives. Section 7 discusses the consequences of publishing
multiple representations of the same zone also commonly designated as multiple representations of the same zone also commonly designated as
views. This section provides guidance to limit the risks associated views. This section provides guidance to limit the risks associated
with multiple views. Section 8 discusses management of the reverse with multiple views. Section 7.4 discusses management of the reverse
zone. Section 9 discusses how renumbering should be handled. zone. Section 8 discusses how renumbering should be handled.
Finally, Section 10 and Section 11 respectively discuss privacy and Finally, Section 9 and Section 10 respectively discuss privacy and
security considerations when outsourcing the Homenet Zone. security considerations when outsourcing the Homenet Zone.
3. Terminology 3. Terminology
- Customer Premises Equipment: (CPE) is a router providing o Customer Premises Equipment: (CPE) is a router providing
connectivity to the home network. connectivity to the home network.
- Homenet Naming Authority: (HNA) is a home network node o Homenet Naming Authority: (HNA) is a home network node responsible
responsible to manage the Homenet Zone. This includes building to manage the Homenet Zone. This includes building the Homenet
the Homenet Zone, as well as managing the distribution of that Zone, as well as managing the distribution of that Homenet Zone
Homenet Zone through the Outsourcing Infrastructure. through the Outsourcing Infrastructure.
- Registered Homenet Domain: is the Domain Name associated to the o Registered Homenet Domain: is the Domain Name associated to the
home network. home network.
- Homenet Zone: is the DNS zone associated with the home network. o Homenet Zone: is the DNS zone associated with the home network.
It is designated by its Registered Homenet Domain. This zone It is designated by its Registered Homenet Domain. This zone is
is built by the HNA and contains the bindings between names and built by the HNA and contains the bindings between names and IP
IP addresses of the nodes in the home network. The HNA addresses of the nodes in the home network. The HNA synchronizes
synchronizes the Homenet Zone with the Synchronization Server the Homenet Zone with the Synchronization Server via a hidden
via a hidden primary / secondary architecture. The Outsourcing primary / secondary architecture. The Outsourcing Infrastructure
Infrastructure may process the Homenet Zone - for example may process the Homenet Zone - for example providing DNSSEC
providing DNSSEC signing - to generate the Public Homenet Zone. signing - to generate the Public Homenet Zone. This Public
This Public Homenet Zone is then transmitted to the Public Homenet Zone is then transmitted to the Public Authoritative
Authoritative Server(s) that publish it on the Internet. Server(s) that publish it on the Internet.
- Public Homenet Zone: is the public version of the Homenet Zone. o Public Homenet Zone: is the public version of the Homenet Zone.
It is expected to be signed with DNSSEC. It is hosted by the It is expected to be signed with DNSSEC. It is hosted by the
Public Authoritative Server(s), which are authoritative for Public Authoritative Server(s), which are authoritative for this
this zone. The Public Homenet Zone and the Homenet Zone might zone. The Public Homenet Zone and the Homenet Zone might be
be different. For example some names might not become different. For example some names might not become reachable from
reachable from the Internet, and thus not be hosted in the the Internet, and thus not be hosted in the Public Homenet Zone.
Public Homenet Zone. Another example of difference may also Another example of difference may also occur when the Public
occur when the Public Homenet Zone is signed whereas the Homenet Zone is signed whereas the Homenet Zone is not signed.
Homenet Zone is not signed.
- Outsourcing Infrastructure: is the combination of the o Outsourcing Infrastructure: is the combination of the
Synchronization Server and the Public Authoritative Server(s). Synchronization Server and the Public Authoritative Server(s).
- Public Authoritative Servers: are the authoritative name servers o Public Authoritative Servers: are the authoritative name servers
hosting the Public Homenet Zone. Name resolution requests for hosting the Public Homenet Zone. Name resolution requests for the
the Homenet Domain are sent to these servers. For resiliency Homenet Domain are sent to these servers. For resiliency the
the Public Homenet Zone SHOULD be hosted on multiple servers. Public Homenet Zone SHOULD be hosted on multiple servers.
- Synchronization Server: is the server with which the HNA o Synchronization Server: is the server with which the HNA
synchronizes the Homenet Zone. The Synchronization Server is synchronizes the Homenet Zone. The Synchronization Server is
configured as a secondary and the HNA acts as primary. There configured as a secondary and the HNA acts as primary. There MAY
MAY be multiple Synchronization Servers, but the text assumes a be multiple Synchronization Servers, but the text assumes a single
single server. In addition, the text assumes the server. In addition, the text assumes the Synchronization Server
Synchronization Server is a separate entity. This is not a is a separate entity. This is not a requirement, and when the HNA
requirement, and when the HNA signs the zone, the signs the zone, the synchronization function might also be
synchronization function might also be operated by the Public operated by the Public Authoritative Servers.
Authoritative Servers.
- Homenet Reverse Zone: The reverse zone file associated with the o Homenet Reverse Zone: The reverse zone file associated with the
Homenet Zone. Homenet Zone.
- Reverse Public Authoritative Servers: are the authoritative name o Reverse Public Authoritative Servers: are the authoritative name
server(s) hosting the Public Homenet Reverse Zone. Queries for server(s) hosting the Public Homenet Reverse Zone. Queries for
reverse resolution of the Homenet Domain are sent to this reverse resolution of the Homenet Domain are sent to this server.
server. Similarly to Public Authoritative Servers, for Similarly to Public Authoritative Servers, for resiliency, the
resiliency, the Homenet Reverse Zone SHOULD be hosted on Homenet Reverse Zone SHOULD be hosted on multiple servers.
multiple servers.
- Reverse Synchronization Server: is the server with which the HNA o Reverse Synchronization Server: is the server with which the HNA
synchronizes the Homenet Reverse Zone. It is configured as a synchronizes the Homenet Reverse Zone. It is configured as a
secondary and the HNA acts as primary. There MAY be multiple secondary and the HNA acts as primary. There MAY be multiple
Reverse Synchronization Servers, but the text assumes a single Reverse Synchronization Servers, but the text assumes a single
server. In addition, the text assumes the Reverse server. In addition, the text assumes the Reverse Synchronization
Synchronization Server is a separate entity. This is not a Server is a separate entity. This is not a requirement, and when
requirement, and when the HNA signs the zone, the the HNA signs the zone, the synchronization function might also be
synchronization function might also be operated by the Reverse operated by the Reverse Public Authoritative Servers.
Public Authoritative Servers.
- Hidden Primary: designates the primary server of the HNA, that o Hidden Primary: designates the primary server of the HNA, that
synchronizes the Homenet Zone with the Synchronization Server. synchronizes the Homenet Zone with the Synchronization Server. A
A primary / secondary architecture is used between the HNA and primary / secondary architecture is used between the HNA and the
the Synchronization Server. The hidden primary is not expected Synchronization Server. The hidden primary is not expected to
to serve end user queries for the Homenet Zone as a regular serve end user queries for the Homenet Zone as a regular primary
primary server would. The hidden primary is only known to its server would. The hidden primary is only known to its associated
associated Synchronization Server. Synchronization Server.
4. Architecture Description 4. Architecture Description
This section describes the architecture for outsourcing the Architecture Description This section describes the architecture for
authoritative naming service from the HNA to the Outsourcing outsourcing the authoritative naming service from the HNA to the
Infrastructure. Section 4.1 describes the architecture, Section 4.2 Outsourcing Infrastructure. Section 4.1 describes the architecture,
and Section 4.3 illustrates this architecture and shows how the Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 illustrates this architecture and shows
Homenet Zone should be built by the HNA. It also lists the necessary how the Homenet Zone should be built by the HNA. It also lists the
parameters the HNA needs to be able to outsource the authoritative necessary parameters the HNA needs to be able to outsource the
naming service. These two sections are informational and non- authoritative naming service. These two sections are informational
normative. and non-normative.
4.1. Architecture Overview 4.1. Architecture Overview
Figure 1 provides an overview of the architecture. Figure 1 provides an overview of the architecture.
The home network is designated by the Registered Homenet Domain Name The home network is designated by the Registered Homenet Domain Name
-- example.com in Figure 1. The HNA builds the Homenet Zone - example.com in Figure 1. The HNA builds the Homenet Zone
associated with the home network. How the Homenet Zone is built is associated with the home network. How the Homenet Zone is built is
out of the scope of this document. The HNA may host or interact with out of the scope of this document. The HNA may host or interact with
multiple services to determine name-to-address mappings, such as a multiple services to determine name-to-address mappings, such as a
web GUI, DHCP [RFC6644] or mDNS [RFC6762]. These services may web GUI, DHCP [RFC6644] or mDNS [RFC6762]. These services may
coexist and may be used to populate the Homenet Zone. This document coexist and may be used to populate the Homenet Zone. This document
assumes the Homenet Zone has been populated with domain names that assumes the Homenet Zone has been populated with domain names that
are intended to be publicly published and that are publicly are intended to be publicly published and that are publicly
reachable. More specifically, names associated with services or reachable. More specifically, names associated with services or
devices that are not expected to be reachable from outside the home devices that are not expected to be reachable from outside the home
network or names bound to non-globally reachable IP addresses MUST network or names bound to non-globally reachable IP addresses MUST
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public.primary.example.net AAAA @IP3 public.primary.example.net AAAA @IP3
public.primary.example.net AAAA @IP4 public.primary.example.net AAAA @IP4
Figure 3: Homenet Zone Figure 3: Homenet Zone
The SOA RRset is defined in [RFC1033], [RFC1035] and [RFC2308]. This The SOA RRset is defined in [RFC1033], [RFC1035] and [RFC2308]. This
SOA is specific, as it is used for the synchronization between the SOA is specific, as it is used for the synchronization between the
Hidden Primary and the Synchronization Server and published on the Hidden Primary and the Synchronization Server and published on the
DNS Public Authoritative Server(s).. DNS Public Authoritative Server(s)..
- MNAME: indicates the primary. In our case the zone is published o MNAME: indicates the primary. In our case the zone is published
on the Public Authoritative Server(s), and its name MUST be on the Public Authoritative Server(s), and its name MUST be
included. If multiple Public Authoritative Server(s) are included. If multiple Public Authoritative Server(s) are
involved, one of them MUST be chosen. More specifically, the involved, one of them MUST be chosen. More specifically, the HNA
HNA MUST NOT include the name of the Hidden Primary. MUST NOT include the name of the Hidden Primary.
- RNAME: indicates the email address to reach the administrator. o RNAME: indicates the email address to reach the administrator.
[RFC2142] recommends using hostmaster@domain and replacing the [RFC2142] recommends using hostmaster@domain and replacing the '@'
'@' sign by '.'. sign by '.'.
- REFRESH and RETRY: indicate respectively in seconds how often o REFRESH and RETRY: indicate respectively in seconds how often
secondaries need to check the primary, and the time between two secondaries need to check the primary, and the time between two
refresh when a refresh has failed. Default values indicated by refresh when a refresh has failed. Default values indicated by
[RFC1033] are 3600 (1 hour) for refresh and 600 (10 minutes) [RFC1033] are 3600 (1 hour) for refresh and 600 (10 minutes) for
for retry. This value might be too long for highly dynamic retry. This value might be too long for highly dynamic content.
content. However, the Public Authoritative Server(s) and the However, the Public Authoritative Server(s) and the HNA are
HNA are expected to implement NOTIFY [RFC1996]. So whilst expected to implement NOTIFY [RFC1996]. So whilst shorter refresh
shorter refresh timers might increase the bandwidth usage for timers might increase the bandwidth usage for secondaries hosting
secondaries hosting large number of zones, it will have little large number of zones, it will have little practical impact on the
practical impact on the elapsed time required to achieve elapsed time required to achieve synchronization between the
synchronization between the Outsourcing Infrastructure and the Outsourcing Infrastructure and the Hidden Master. As a result,
Hidden Master. As a result, the default values are acceptable. the default values are acceptable.
EXPIRE: is the upper limit data SHOULD be kept in absence of o EXPIRE: is the upper limit data SHOULD be kept in absence of
refresh. The default value indicated by [RFC1033] is 3600000 refresh. The default value indicated by [RFC1033] is 3600000
(approx. 42 days). In home network architectures, the HNA (approx. 42 days). In home network architectures, the HNA
provides both the DNS synchronization and the access to the provides both the DNS synchronization and the access to the home
home network. This device may be plugged and unplugged by the network. This device may be plugged and unplugged by the end user
end user without notification, thus we recommend a long expiry without notification, thus we recommend a long expiry timer.
timer.
MINIMUM: indicates the minimum TTL. The default value indicated by o MINIMUM: indicates the minimum TTL. The default value indicated
[RFC1033] is 86400 (1 day). For home network, this value MAY by [RFC1033] is 86400 (1 day). For home network, this value MAY
be reduced, and 3600 (1 hour) seems more appropriate. be reduced, and 3600 (1 hour) seems more appropriate.
<<!-- ## Considerations on multiple Registered Homenet Domain Names
## are left for future versions When multiple Registered Homenet
Domains are used -like example.com, example.net, example.org, a DNS
Homenet Zone file per Registered Homenet Domain SHOULD be generated.
In order to synchronize the zone contents, the HNA may provide all
bindings in each zone files. As a result, any update MUST be
performed on all zone files, i.e. for all Registered Homenet Domains.
To limit thees updates when multiple Registered Homenet Domains are
involved, the HNA MAY fill all bindings in a specific zone file and
redirect all other zones to that zone. This can be achieved with
redirecting mechanisms like CNAME {{RFC2181}}, {{RFC1034}}, DNAME
{{RFC6672}} or CNAME+DNAME {{I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname}}. This is
an implementation issue to determine whether redirection mechanisms
MAY be preferred for large Homenet Zones, or when the number of
Registered Homenet Domain becomes quite large. -->>
4.3. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing 4.3. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing
This section specifies the various parameters required by the HNA to This section specifies the various parameters required by the HNA to
configure the naming architecture of this document. This section is configure the naming architecture of this document. This section is
informational, and is intended to clarify the information handled by informational, and is intended to clarify the information handled by
the HNA and the various settings to be done. the HNA and the various settings to be done.
Synchronization Server may be configured with the following Synchronization Server may be configured with the following
parameters. These parameters are necessary to establish a secure parameters. These parameters are necessary to establish a secure
channel between the HNA and the Synchronization Server as well as to channel between the HNA and the Synchronization Server as well as to
specify the DNS zone that is in the scope of the communication: specify the DNS zone that is in the scope of the communication:
- Synchronization Server: The associated FQDNs or IP addresses of o Synchronization Server: The associated FQDNs or IP addresses of
the Synchronization Server. IP addresses are optional and the the Synchronization Server. IP addresses are optional and the
FQDN is sufficient. To secure the binding name and IP FQDN is sufficient. To secure the binding name and IP addresses,
addresses, a DNSSEC exchange is required. Otherwise, the IP a DNSSEC exchange is required. Otherwise, the IP addresses should
addresses should be entered manually. be entered manually.
- Authentication Method: How the HNA authenticates itself to the o Authentication Method: How the HNA authenticates itself to the
Synchronization Server. This MAY depend on the implementation Synchronization Server. This MAY depend on the implementation but
but this should cover at least IPsec, DTLS and TSIG this should cover at least IPsec, DTLS and TSIG
- Authentication data: Associated Data. PSK only requires a single o Authentication data: Associated Data. PSK only requires a single
argument. If other authentication mechanisms based on argument. If other authentication mechanisms based on
certificates are used, then HNA private keys, certificates and certificates are used, then HNA private keys, certificates and
certification authority should be specified. certification authority should be specified.
- Public Authoritative Server(s): The FQDN or IP addresses of the o Public Authoritative Server(s): The FQDN or IP addresses of the
Public Authoritative Server(s). It MAY correspond to the data Public Authoritative Server(s). It MAY correspond to the data
that will be set in the NS RRsets and SOA of the Homenet Zone. that will be set in the NS RRsets and SOA of the Homenet Zone. IP
IP addresses are optional and the FQDN is sufficient. To addresses are optional and the FQDN is sufficient. To secure the
secure the binding between name and IP addresses, a DNSSEC binding between name and IP addresses, a DNSSEC exchange is
exchange is required. Otherwise, the IP addresses should be required. Otherwise, the IP addresses should be entered manually.
entered manually.
- Registered Homenet Domain: The domain name used to establish the o Registered Homenet Domain: The domain name used to establish the
secure channel. This name is used by the Synchronization secure channel. This name is used by the Synchronization Server
Server and the HNA for the primary / secondary configuration as and the HNA for the primary / secondary configuration as well as
well as to index the NOTIFY queries of the HNA when the HNA has to index the NOTIFY queries of the HNA when the HNA has been
been renumbered. renumbered.
Setting the Homenet Zone requires the following information. Setting the Homenet Zone requires the following information.
- Registered Homenet Domain: The Domain Name of the zone. Multiple o Registered Homenet Domain: The Domain Name of the zone. Multiple
Registered Homenet Domains may be provided. This will generate Registered Homenet Domains may be provided. This will generate
the creation of multiple Public Homenet Zones. the creation of multiple Public Homenet Zones.
- Public Authoritative Server(s): The Public Authoritative o Public Authoritative Server(s): The Public Authoritative Server(s)
Server(s) associated with the Registered Homenet Domain. associated with the Registered Homenet Domain. Multiple Public
Multiple Public Authoritative Server(s) may be provided. Authoritative Server(s) may be provided.
5. Synchronization between HNA and the Synchronization Server 5. Synchronization between HNA and the Synchronization Server
The Homenet Reverse Zone and the Homenet Zone MAY be updated either The Homenet Reverse Zone and the Homenet Zone MAY be updated either
with DNS UPDATE [RFC2136] or using a primary / secondary with DNS UPDATE [RFC2136] or using a primary / secondary
synchronization. The primary / secondary mechanism is preferred as synchronization. The primary / secondary mechanism is preferred as
it scales better and avoids DoS attacks: First the primary notifies it scales better and avoids DoS attacks: First the primary notifies
the secondary that the zone must be updated and leaves the secondary the secondary that the zone must be updated and leaves the secondary
to proceed with the update when possible. Then, a NOTIFY message is to proceed with the update when possible. Then, a NOTIFY message is
sent by the primary, which is a small packet that is less likely to sent by the primary, which is a small packet that is less likely to
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The Hidden Primary Server SHOULD accept SOA [RFC1033], AXFR The Hidden Primary Server SHOULD accept SOA [RFC1033], AXFR
[RFC1034], and IXFR [RFC1995] queries from its configured secondary [RFC1034], and IXFR [RFC1995] queries from its configured secondary
DNS server(s). The Hidden Primary Server SHOULD send NOTIFY messages DNS server(s). The Hidden Primary Server SHOULD send NOTIFY messages
[RFC1996] in order to update Public DNS server zones as updates [RFC1996] in order to update Public DNS server zones as updates
occur. Because, the Homenet Zones are likely to be small, the HNA occur. Because, the Homenet Zones are likely to be small, the HNA
MUST implement AXFR and SHOULD implement IXFR. MUST implement AXFR and SHOULD implement IXFR.
Hidden Primary Server differs from a regular authoritative server for Hidden Primary Server differs from a regular authoritative server for
the home network by: the home network by:
- Interface Binding: the Hidden Primary Server listens on the WAN o Interface Binding: the Hidden Primary Server listens on the WAN
Interface, whereas a regular authoritative server for the home Interface, whereas a regular authoritative server for the home
network would listen on the home network interface. network would listen on the home network interface.
- Limited exchanges: the purpose of the Hidden Primary Server is to o Limited exchanges: the purpose of the Hidden Primary Server is to
synchronize with the Synchronization Server, not to serve any synchronize with the Synchronization Server, not to serve any
zones to end users. As a result, exchanges are performed with zones to end users. As a result, exchanges are performed with
specific nodes (the Synchronization Server). Further, exchange specific nodes (the Synchronization Server). Further, exchange
types are limited. The only legitimate exchanges are: NOTIFY types are limited. The only legitimate exchanges are: NOTIFY
initiated by the Hidden Primary and IXFR or AXFR exchanges initiated by the Hidden Primary and IXFR or AXFR exchanges
initiated by the Synchronization Server. On the other hand, initiated by the Synchronization Server. On the other hand,
regular authoritative servers would respond to any hosts, and regular authoritative servers would respond to any hosts, and any
any DNS query would be processed. The HNA SHOULD filter IXFR/ DNS query would be processed. The HNA SHOULD filter IXFR/AXFR
AXFR traffic and drop traffic not initiated by the traffic and drop traffic not initiated by the Synchronization
Synchronization Server. The HNA MUST listen for DNS on TCP and Server. The HNA MUST listen for DNS on TCP and UDP and MUST at
UDP and MUST at least allow SOA lookups of the Homenet Zone. least allow SOA lookups of the Homenet Zone.
5.2. Securing Synchronization 5.2. Securing Synchronization
Exchange between the Synchronization Server and the HNA MUST be Exchange between the Synchronization Server and the HNA MUST be
secured, at least for integrity protection and for authentication. secured, at least for integrity protection and for authentication.
TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG(0) [RFC2931] MAY be used to secure the DNS TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG(0) [RFC2931] MAY be used to secure the DNS
communications between the HNA and the Synchronization Server. TSIG communications between the HNA and the Synchronization Server. TSIG
uses a symmetric key which can be managed by TKEY [RFC2930]. uses a symmetric key which can be managed by TKEY [RFC2930].
Management of the key involved in SIG(0) is performed through zone Management of the key involved in SIG(0) is performed through zone
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framework. In addition, IPsec can be used to protect DNS exchanges framework. In addition, IPsec can be used to protect DNS exchanges
between the HNA and the Synchronization Server without any between the HNA and the Synchronization Server without any
modifications of the DNS server or client. DNS integration over modifications of the DNS server or client. DNS integration over
IPsec only requires an additional security policy in the Security IPsec only requires an additional security policy in the Security
Policy Database (SPD). One disadvantage of IPsec is that NATs and Policy Database (SPD). One disadvantage of IPsec is that NATs and
firewall traversal may be problematic. However, in our case, the HNA firewall traversal may be problematic. However, in our case, the HNA
is connected to the Internet, and IPsec communication between the HNA is connected to the Internet, and IPsec communication between the HNA
and the Synchronization Server should not be impacted by middle and the Synchronization Server should not be impacted by middle
boxes. boxes.
<<!-- As mentioned above, TSIG, IPsec and TLS/DTLS MAY be used to
secure transactions between the HNA and the Public Authentication
Servers. The HNA and the Synchronization Server SHOULD implement
TSIG and IPsec. -->>
How the PSK can be used by any of the TSIG, TLS/DTLS or IPsec How the PSK can be used by any of the TSIG, TLS/DTLS or IPsec
protocols: Authentication based on certificates implies a mutual protocols: Authentication based on certificates implies a mutual
authentication and thus requires the HNA to manage a private key, a authentication and thus requires the HNA to manage a private key, a
public key, or certificates, as well as Certificate Authorities. public key, or certificates, as well as Certificate Authorities.
This adds complexity to the configuration especially on the HNA side. This adds complexity to the configuration especially on the HNA side.
For this reason, we RECOMMEND that the HNA MAY use PSK or certificate For this reason, we RECOMMEND that the HNA MAY use PSK or certificate
base authentication, and that the Synchronization Server MUST support base authentication, and that the Synchronization Server MUST support
PSK and certificate based authentication. PSK and certificate based authentication.
Note also that authentication of message exchanges between the HNA Note also that authentication of message exchanges between the HNA
and the Synchronization Server SHOULD NOT use the external IP address and the Synchronization Server SHOULD NOT use the external IP address
of the HNA to index the appropriate keys. As detailed in Section 9, of the HNA to index the appropriate keys. As detailed in Section 8,
the IP addresses of the Synchronization Server and the Hidden Primary the IP addresses of the Synchronization Server and the Hidden Primary
are subject to change, for example while the network is being are subject to change, for example while the network is being
renumbered. This means that the necessary keys to authenticate renumbered. This means that the necessary keys to authenticate
transaction SHOULD NOT be indexed using the IP address, and SHOULD be transaction SHOULD NOT be indexed using the IP address, and SHOULD be
resilient to IP address changes. resilient to IP address changes.
5.3. HNA Security Policies 5.3. HNA Security Policies
This section details security policies related to the Hidden Primary This section details security policies related to the Hidden Primary
/ Secondary synchronization. / Secondary synchronization.
The Hidden Primary, as described in this document SHOULD drop any The Hidden Primary, as described in this document SHOULD drop any
queries from the home network. This could be implemented via port queries from the home network. This could be implemented via port
binding and/or firewall rules. The precise mechanism deployed is out binding and/or firewall rules. The precise mechanism deployed is out
of scope of this document. of scope of this document. The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any DNS
queries arriving on the WAN interface that are not issued from the
The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any DNS queries arriving on the WAN Synchronization Server. The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any outgoing
interface that are not issued from the Synchronization Server. packets other than DNS NOTIFY query, SOA response, IXFR response or
AXFR responses. The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any incoming packets
The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any outgoing packets other than DNS other than DNS NOTIFY response, SOA query, IXFR query or AXFR query.
NOTIFY query, SOA response, IXFR response or AXFR responses.
The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any incoming packets other than DNS
NOTIFY response, SOA query, IXFR query or AXFR query.
The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any non protected IXFR or AXFR The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any non protected IXFR or AXFR
exchange,depending on how the synchronization is secured. exchange,depending on how the synchronization is secured.
6. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture 6. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture
[RFC7368] in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to be deployed on both [RFC7368] in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to be deployed on both
the authoritative server and the resolver. The resolver side is out the authoritative server and the resolver. The resolver side is out
of scope of this document, and only the authoritative part of the of scope of this document, and only the authoritative part of the
server is considered. server is considered.
Deploying DNSSEC requires signing the zone and configuring a secure Deploying DNSSEC requires signing the zone and configuring a secure
delegation. As described in Section 4.1, signing can be performed delegation. As described in Section 4.1, signing can be performed
either by the HNA or by the Outsourcing Infrastructure. Section 6.1 either by the HNA or by the Outsourcing Infrastructure. Section 6.1
details the implications of these two alternatives. Similarly, the details the implications of these two alternatives. Similarly, the
secure delegation can be performed by the HNA or by the Outsourcing secure delegation can be performed by the HNA or by the Outsourcing
Infrastructure. Section 6.2 discusses these two alternatives. Infrastructure. Section 6.2 discusses these two alternatives.
6.1. Zone Signing 6.1. Zone Signing"
This section discusses the pros and cons when zone signing is This section discusses the pros and cons when zone signing is
performed by the HNA or by the Outsourcing Infrastructure. It is performed by the HNA or by the Outsourcing Infrastructure. It is
RECOMMENDED that the HNA signs the zone unless there is a strong RECOMMENDED that the HNA signs the zone unless there is a strong
argument against this, such as a HNA that is not capable of signing argument against this, such as a HNA that is not capable of signing
the zone. In that case zone signing MAY be performed by the the zone. In that case zone signing MAY be performed by the
Outsourcing Infrastructure on behalf of the HNA. Outsourcing Infrastructure on behalf of the HNA.
Reasons for signing the zone by the HNA are: Reasons for signing the zone by the HNA are:
- 1: Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Homenet Zone equal to o 1) Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Homenet Zone equal to
securely optimize DNS resolution. As the Public Zone is signed securely optimize DNS resolution. As the Public Zone is signed
with DNSSEC, RRsets are authenticated, and thus DNS responses with DNSSEC, RRsets are authenticated, and thus DNS responses can
can be validated even though they are not provided by the be validated even though they are not provided by the
authoritative server. This provides the HNA the ability to authoritative server. This provides the HNA the ability to
respond on behalf of the Public Authoritative Server(s). This respond on behalf of the Public Authoritative Server(s). This
could be useful for example if, in the future, the HNA could be useful for example if, in the future, the HNA announces
announces to the home network that the HNA can act as a local to the home network that the HNA can act as a local authoritative
authoritative primary or equivalent for the Homenet Zone. primary or equivalent for the Homenet Zone. Currently the HNA is
Currently the HNA is not expected to receive authoritative DNS not expected to receive authoritative DNS queries, as its IP
queries, as its IP address is not mentioned in the Public address is not mentioned in the Public Homenet Zone. On the other
Homenet Zone. On the other hand most HNAs host a resolving hand most HNAs host a resolving function, and could be configured
function, and could be configured to perform a local lookup to to perform a local lookup to the Homenet Zone instead of
the Homenet Zone instead of initiating a DNS exchange with the initiating a DNS exchange with the Public Authoritative Server(s).
Public Authoritative Server(s). Note that outsourcing the zone Note that outsourcing the zone signing operation means that all
signing operation means that all DNSSEC queries SHOULD be DNSSEC queries SHOULD be cached to perform a local lookup,
cached to perform a local lookup, otherwise a resolution with otherwise a resolution with the Public Authoritative Server(s)
the Public Authoritative Server(s) would be performed. would be performed.
- 2: Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Homenet Zone equal to o 2) Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Homenet Zone equal to
securely address the connectivity disruption independence securely address the connectivity disruption independence detailed
detailed in [RFC7368] section 4.4.1 and 3.7.5. As local in [RFC7368] section 4.4.1 and 3.7.5. As local lookups are
lookups are possible in case of network disruption, possible in case of network disruption, communications within the
communications within the home network can still rely on the home network can still rely on the DNSSEC service. Note that
DNSSEC service. Note that outsourcing the zone signing outsourcing the zone signing operation does not address
operation does not address connectivity disruption independence connectivity disruption independence with DNSSEC. Instead local
with DNSSEC. Instead local lookup would provide DNS as opposed lookup would provide DNS as opposed to DNSSEC responses provided
to DNSSEC responses provided by the Public Authoritative by the Public Authoritative Server(s).
Server(s).
- 3: Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Homenet Zone equal to o 3) Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Homenet Zone equal to
guarantee coherence between DNS responses. Using a unique zone guarantee coherence between DNS responses. Using a unique zone is
is one way to guarantee uniqueness of the responses among one way to guarantee uniqueness of the responses among servers and
servers and places. Issues generated by different views are places. Issues generated by different views are discussed in more
discussed in more details in Section 7. details in Section 7.
- 2: Privacy and Integrity of the DNSSEC Homenet Zone are better 4) Privacy and Integrity of the DNSSEC Homenet Zone are better
guaranteed. When the Zone is signed by the HNA, it makes guaranteed. When the Zone is signed by the HNA, it makes
modification of the DNS data -- for example for flow modification of the DNS data - for example for flow redirection -
redirection -- impossible. As a result, signing the Homenet impossible. As a result, signing the Homenet Zone by the HNA
Zone by the HNA provides better protection for end user provides better protection for end user privacy.
privacy.
Reasons for signing the zone by the Outsourcing Infrastructure are: Reasons for signing the zone by the Outsourcing Infrastructure are:
- 1: The HNA may not be capable of signing the zone, most likely 1) The HNA may not be capable of signing the zone, most likely
because its firmware does not support this function. However because its firmware does not support this function. However this
this reason is expected to become less and less valid over reason is expected to become less and less valid over time.
time.
- 2: Outsourcing DNSSEC management operations. Management 2) Outsourcing DNSSEC management operations. Management operations
operations involve key roll-over, which can be performed involve key roll-over, which can be performed automatically by the
automatically by the HNA and transparently for the end user. HNA and transparently for the end user. Avoiding DNSSEC management
Avoiding DNSSEC management is mostly motivated by bad software is mostly motivated by bad software implementations.
implementations.
- 3: Reducing the impact of HNA replacement on the Public Homenet 3) Reducing the impact of HNA replacement on the Public Homenet Zone.
Zone. Unless the HNA private keys can be extracted and stored Unless the HNA private keys can be extracted and stored off-device,
off-device, HNA hardware replacement will result in an HNA hardware replacement will result in an emergency key roll-over.
emergency key roll-over. This can be mitigated by using This can be mitigated by using relatively small TTLs.
relatively small TTLs.
- 4: Reducing configuration impact on the end user. Unless there 4) Reducing configuration impact on the end user. Unless there are
are zero configuration mechanisms in place to provide zero configuration mechanisms in place to provide credentials between
credentials between the new HNA and the Synchronization Server, the new HNA and the Synchronization Server, authentication
authentication associations between the HNA and the associations between the HNA and the Synchronization Server would
Synchronization Server would need to be re-configured. As HNA need to be re-configured. As HNA replacement is not expected to
replacement is not expected to happen regularly, end users may happen regularly, end users may not be at ease with such
not be at ease with such configuration settings. However, configuration settings. However, mechanisms as described in
mechanisms as described in [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] use DHCP Options
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] use DHCP to outsource the configuration and avoid this issue.
Options to outsource the configuration and avoid this issue.
- 5: The Outsourcing Infrastructure is more likely to handle private 5) The Outsourcing Infrastructure is more likely to handle private
keys more securely than the HNA. However, having all private keys more securely than the HNA. However, having all private keys in
keys in one place may also nullify that benefit. one place may also nullify that benefit.
6.2. Secure Delegation 6.2. Secure Delegation"
Secure delegation is achieved only if the DS RRset is properly set in Secure delegation is achieved only if the DS RRset is properly set in
the parent zone. Secure delegation can be performed by the HNA or the parent zone. Secure delegation can be performed by the HNA or
the Outsourcing Infrastructures (that is the Synchronization Server the Outsourcing Infrastructures (that is the Synchronization Server
or the Public Authoritative Server(s)). or the Public Authoritative Server(s)).
The DS RRset can be updated manually with nsupdate for example. This The DS RRset can be updated manually with nsupdate for example. This
requires the HNA or the Outsourcing Infrastructure to be requires the HNA or the Outsourcing Infrastructure to be
authenticated by the DNS server hosting the parent of the Public authenticated by the DNS server hosting the parent of the Public
Homenet Zone. Such a trust channel between the HNA and the parent Homenet Zone. Such a trust channel between the HNA and the parent
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Public Authoritative Server(s) may use Automating DNSSEC Delegation Public Authoritative Server(s) may use Automating DNSSEC Delegation
Trust Maintenance [RFC7344]. Trust Maintenance [RFC7344].
7. Handling Different Views 7. Handling Different Views
The Homenet Zone provides information about the home network. Some The Homenet Zone provides information about the home network. Some
users may be tempted to have provide responses dependent on the users may be tempted to have provide responses dependent on the
origin of the DNS query. More specifically, some users may be origin of the DNS query. More specifically, some users may be
tempted to provide a different view for DNS queries originating from tempted to provide a different view for DNS queries originating from
the home network and for DNS queries coming from the Internet. Each the home network and for DNS queries coming from the Internet. Each
view could then be associated with a dedicated Homenet Zone. Note view could then be associated with a dedicated Homenet Zone.
that this document does not specify how DNS queries originating from
the home network are addressed to the Homenet Zone. This could be <!--Regarding {{fig-naming-arch}}, an example of an implementation of
done via hosting the DNS resolver on the HNA for example. two distinct view could be the Homenet Zone that describes the
homenet view and the Public Homenet Zone that contains the Internet
view, with these two zones being different.-->
Note that this document does not specify how DNS queries originating
from the home network are addressed to the Homenet Zone. This could
be done via hosting the DNS resolver on the HNA for example.
This section is not normative. Section 7.1 details why some nodes This section is not normative. Section 7.1 details why some nodes
may only be reachable from the home network and not from the global may only be reachable from the home network and not from the global
Internet. Section 7.2 briefly describes the consequences of having Internet. Section 7.2 briefly describes the consequences of having
distinct views such as a "home network view" and an "Internet view". distinct views such as a "home network view" and an "Internet view".
Finally, Section 7.3 provides guidance on how to resolve names that Finally, Section 7.3 provides guidance on how to resolve names that
are only significant in the home network, without creating different are only significant in the home network, without creating different
views. views.
7.1. Misleading Reasons for Local Scope DNS Zone 7.1. Misleading Reasons for Local Scope DNS Zone"
The motivation for supporting different views is to provide different The motivation for supporting different views is to provide different
answers dependent on the origin of the DNS query, for reasons such answers dependent on the origin of the DNS query, for reasons such
as: as:
- 1: An end user may want to have services not published on the 1: An end user may want to have services not published on the
Internet. Services like the HNA administration interface that Internet. Services like the HNA administration interface that
provides the GUI to administer your HNA might not seem provides the GUI to administer your HNA might not seem advisable to
advisable to publish on the Internet. Similarly, services like publish on the Internet. Similarly, services like the mapper that
the mapper that registers the devices of your home network may registers the devices of your home network may also not be desirable
also not be desirable to be published on the Internet. In both to be published on the Internet. In both cases, these services
cases, these services should only be known or used by the should only be known or used by the network administrator. To
network administrator. To restrict the access of such restrict the access of such services, the home network administrator
services, the home network administrator may choose to publish may choose to publish these pieces of information only within the
these pieces of information only within the home network, where home network, where it might be assumed that the users are more
it might be assumed that the users are more trusted than on the trusted than on the Internet. Even though this assumption may not be
Internet. Even though this assumption may not be valid, at valid, at least this may reduce the surface of any attack.
least this may reduce the surface of any attack.
- 2: Services within the home network may be reachable using non 2: Services within the home network may be reachable using non global
global IP addresses. IPv4 and NAT may be one reason. On the IP addresses. IPv4 and NAT may be one reason. On the other hand
other hand IPv6 may favor link-local or site-local IP IPv6 may favor link-local or site-local IP addresses. These IP
addresses. These IP addresses are not significant outside the addresses are not significant outside the boundaries of the home
boundaries of the home network. As a result, they MAY be network. As a result, they MAY be published in the home network
published in the home network view, and SHOULD NOT be published view, and SHOULD NOT be published in the Public Homenet Zone.
in the Public Homenet Zone.
7.2. Consequences 7.2. Consequences"
Enabling different views leads to a non-coherent naming system. Enabling different views leads to a non-coherent naming system.
Depending on where resolution is performed, some services will not be Depending on where resolution is performed, some services will not be
available. This may be especially inconvenient with devices with available. This may be especially inconvenient with devices with
multiple interfaces that are attached both to the Internet via a multiple interfaces that are attached both to the Internet via a
3G/4G interface and to the home network via a WLAN interface. 3G/4G interface and to the home network via a WLAN interface.
Devices may also cache the results of name resolution, and these Devices may also cache the results of name resolution, and these
cached entries may no longer be valid if a mobile device moves cached entries may no longer be valid if a mobile device moves
between a homenet connection and an internet connection e.g. a device between a homenet connection and an internet connection e.g. a device
temporarily loses wifi signal and switches to 3G. temporarily loses wifi signal and switches to 3G.
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The Homenet Zone is expected to host public information only. It is The Homenet Zone is expected to host public information only. It is
not the scope of the DNS service to define local home network not the scope of the DNS service to define local home network
boundaries. Instead, local scope information is expected to be boundaries. Instead, local scope information is expected to be
provided to the home network using local scope naming services. mDNS provided to the home network using local scope naming services. mDNS
[RFC6762] DNS-SD [RFC6763] are two examples of these services. [RFC6762] DNS-SD [RFC6763] are two examples of these services.
Currently mDNS is limited to a single link network. However, future Currently mDNS is limited to a single link network. However, future
protocols are expected to leverage this constraint as pointed out in protocols are expected to leverage this constraint as pointed out in
[RFC7558]. [RFC7558].
8. Homenet Reverse Zone 7.4. Homenet Reverse Zone
This section is focused on the Homenet Reverse Zone. This section is focused on the Homenet Reverse Zone.
Firstly, all considerations for the Homenet Zone apply to the Homenet Firstly, all considerations for the Homenet Zone apply to the Homenet
Reverse Zone. The main difference between the Homenet Reverse Zone Reverse Zone. The main difference between the Homenet Reverse Zone
and the Homenet Zone is that the parent zone of the Homenet Reverse and the Homenet Zone is that the parent zone of the Homenet Reverse
Zone is most likely managed by the ISP. As the ISP also provides the Zone is most likely managed by the ISP. As the ISP also provides the
IP prefix to the HNA, it may be able to authenticate the HNA using IP prefix to the HNA, it may be able to authenticate the HNA using
mechanisms outside the scope of this document e.g. the physical mechanisms outside the scope of this document e.g. the physical
attachment point to the ISP network. If the Reverse Synchronization attachment point to the ISP network. If the Reverse Synchronization
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the zone synchronization may be set automatically and transparently the zone synchronization may be set automatically and transparently
to the end user. [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] to the end user. [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]
describes how automatic configuration may be performed. describes how automatic configuration may be performed.
With IPv6, the domain space for IP addresses is so large that reverse With IPv6, the domain space for IP addresses is so large that reverse
zone may be confronted with scalability issues. How the reverse zone zone may be confronted with scalability issues. How the reverse zone
is generated is out of scope of this document. is generated is out of scope of this document.
[I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] provides guidance on how to address [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] provides guidance on how to address
scalability issues. scalability issues.
9. Renumbering 8. Renumbering
This section details how renumbering is handled by the Hidden Primary This section details how renumbering is handled by the Hidden Primary
server or the Synchronization Server. Both types of renumbering are server or the Synchronization Server. Both types of renumbering are
discussed i.e. "make-before-break" and "break-before-make". discussed i.e. "make-before-break" and "break-before-make".
In the make-before-break renumbering scenario, the new prefix is In the make-before-break renumbering scenario, the new prefix is
advertised, the network is configured to prepare the transition to advertised, the network is configured to prepare the transition to
the new prefix. During a period of time, the two prefixes old and the new prefix. During a period of time, the two prefixes old and
new coexist, before the old prefix is completely removed. In the new coexist, before the old prefix is completely removed. In the
break-before-make renumbering scenario, the new prefix is advertised break-before-make renumbering scenario, the new prefix is advertised
making the old prefix obsolete. making the old prefix obsolete.
Renumbering has been extensively described in [RFC4192] and analyzed Renumbering has been extensively described in [RFC4192] and analyzed
in [RFC7010] and the reader is expected to be familiar with them in [RFC7010] and the reader is expected to be familiar with them
before reading this section. before reading this section.
9.1. Hidden Primary 8.1. Hidden Primary
In a renumbering scenario, the Hidden Primary is informed it is being In a renumbering scenario, the Hidden Primary is informed it is being
renumbered. In most cases, this occurs because the whole home renumbered. In most cases, this occurs because the whole home
network is being renumbered. As a result, the Homenet Zone will also network is being renumbered. As a result, the Homenet Zone will also
be updated. Although the new and old IP addresses may be stored in be updated. Although the new and old IP addresses may be stored in
the Homenet Zone, we recommend that only the newly reachable IP the Homenet Zone, we recommend that only the newly reachable IP
addresses be published. addresses be published.
To avoid reachability disruption, IP connectivity information To avoid reachability disruption, IP connectivity information
provided by the DNS SHOULD be coherent with the IP plane. In our provided by the DNS SHOULD be coherent with the IP plane. In our
case, this means the old IP address SHOULD NOT be provided via the case, this means the old IP address SHOULD NOT be provided via the
DNS when it is not reachable anymore. Let for example TTL be the TTL DNS when it is not reachable anymore. Let for example TTL be the TTL
associated with a RRset of the Homenet Zone, it may be cached for TTL associated with a RRset of the Homenet Zone, it may be cached for TTL
seconds. Let T_NEW be the time the new IP address replaces the old seconds. Let T_NEW be the time the new IP address replaces the old
IP address in the Homenet Zone, and T_OLD_UNREACHABLE the time the IP address in the Homenet Zone, and T_OLD_UNREACHABLE the time the
old IP is not reachable anymore. In the case of the make-before- old IP is not reachable anymore.
break, seamless reachability is provided as long as T_OLD_UNREACHABLE
- T_NEW > 2 * TTL. If this is not satisfied, then devices associated In the case of the make-before-break, seamless reachability is
with the old IP address in the home network may become unreachable provided as long as T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW > 2 * TTL. If this is
for 2 * TTL - (T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW). In the case of a break- not satisfied, then devices associated with the old IP address in the
before-make, T_OLD_UNREACHABLE = T_NEW, and the device may become home network may become unreachable for 2 * TTL - (T_OLD_UNREACHABLE
unreachable up to 2 * TTL. - T_NEW). In the case of a break-before-make, T_OLD_UNREACHABLE =
T_NEW, and the device may become unreachable up to 2 * TTL.
Once the Homenet Zone file has been updated on the Hidden Primary, Once the Homenet Zone file has been updated on the Hidden Primary,
the Hidden Primary needs to inform the Outsourcing Infrastructure the Hidden Primary needs to inform the Outsourcing Infrastructure
that the Homenet Zone has been updated and that the IP address to use that the Homenet Zone has been updated and that the IP address to use
to retrieve the updated zone has also been updated. Both to retrieve the updated zone has also been updated. Both
notifications are performed using regular DNS exchanges. Mechanisms notifications are performed using regular DNS exchanges. Mechanisms
to update an IP address provided by lower layers with protocols like to update an IP address provided by lower layers with protocols like
SCTP [RFC4960], MOBIKE [RFC4555] are not considered in this document. SCTP [RFC4960], MOBIKE [RFC4555] are not considered in this document.
The Hidden Primary SHOULD inform the Synchronization Server that the The Hidden Primary SHOULD inform the Synchronization Server that the
skipping to change at page 21, line 14 skipping to change at page 21, line 22
Hidden Primary using the source IP address of the NOTIFY. This Hidden Primary using the source IP address of the NOTIFY. This
exchange is also secured, and if an authenticated response is exchange is also secured, and if an authenticated response is
received from the Hidden Primary with the new IP address, the received from the Hidden Primary with the new IP address, the
Synchronization Server SHOULD update its configuration file and Synchronization Server SHOULD update its configuration file and
retrieve the Homenet Zone using an AXFR or a IXFR exchange. retrieve the Homenet Zone using an AXFR or a IXFR exchange.
Note that the primary reason for providing the IP address is that the Note that the primary reason for providing the IP address is that the
Hidden Primary is not publicly announced in the DNS. If the Hidden Hidden Primary is not publicly announced in the DNS. If the Hidden
Primary were publicly announced in the DNS, then the IP address Primary were publicly announced in the DNS, then the IP address
update could have been performed using the DNS as described in update could have been performed using the DNS as described in
Section 9.2. Section 8.2.
9.2. Synchronization Server 8.2. Synchronization Server
Renumbering of the Synchronization Server results in the Renumbering of the Synchronization Server results in the
Synchronization Server changing its IP address. The Synchronization Synchronization Server changing its IP address. The Synchronization
Server is a secondary, so its renumbering does not impact the Homenet Server is a secondary, so its renumbering does not impact the Homenet
Zone. In fact, exchanges to the Synchronization Server are Zone. In fact, exchanges to the Synchronization Server are
restricted to the Homenet Zone synchronization. In our case, the restricted to the Homenet Zone synchronization. In our case, the
Hidden Primary MUST be able to send NOTIFY payloads to the Hidden Primary MUST be able to send NOTIFY payloads to the
Synchronization Server. Synchronization Server.
If the Synchronization Server is configured in the Hidden Primary If the Synchronization Server is configured in the Hidden Primary
configuration file using a FQDN, then the update of the IP address is configuration file using a FQDN, then the update of the IP address is
performed by DNS. More specifically, before sending the NOTIFY, the performed by DNS. More specifically, before sending the NOTIFY, the
Hidden Primary performs a DNS resolution to retrieve the IP address Hidden Primary performs a DNS resolution to retrieve the IP address
of the secondary. of the secondary.
As described in Section 9.1, the Synchronization Server DNS As described in Section 8.1, the Synchronization Server DNS
information SHOULD be coherent with the IP plane. Let TTL be the TTL information SHOULD be coherent with the IP plane. Let TTL be the TTL
associated with the Synchronization Server FQDN, T_NEW the time the associated with the Synchronization Server FQDN, T_NEW the time the
new IP address replaces the old one and T_OLD_UNREACHABLE the time new IP address replaces the old one and T_OLD_UNREACHABLE the time
the Synchronization Server is not reachable anymore with its old IP the Synchronization Server is not reachable anymore with its old IP
address. Seamless reachability is provided as long as address. Seamless reachability is provided as long as
T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW > 2 * TTL. If this condition is not met, T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW > 2 * TTL. If this condition is not met,
the Synchronization Server may be unreachable during 2 * TTL - the Synchronization Server may be unreachable during 2 * TTL -
(T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW). In the case of a break-before-make, (T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW). In the case of a break-before-make,
T_OLD_UNREACHABLE = T_NEW, and it may become unreachable up to 2 * T_OLD_UNREACHABLE = T_NEW, and it may become unreachable up to 2 *
TTL. TTL.
Some DNS infrastructure uses the IP address to designate the Some DNS infrastructure uses the IP address to designate the
secondary, in which case, other mechanisms must be found. The reason secondary, in which case, other mechanisms must be found. The reason
for using IP addresses instead of names is generally to reach an for using IP addresses instead of names is generally to reach an
internal interface that is not designated by a FQDN, and to avoid internal interface that is not designated by a FQDN, and to avoid
potential bootstrap problems. Such scenarios are considered as out potential bootstrap problems. Such scenarios are considered as out
of scope in the case of home networks. of scope in the case of home networks.
10. Privacy Considerations []( <!- <section {#sec-dnssec-outsrc" title="DNSSEC outsourcing
configuration}
In this document we assume that the Outsourcing Infrastructure MAY sign the Homenet Zone. Multiple variants MAY be proposed by the Outsourcing Infrastructure. The Outsourcing Infrastructure MAY propose signing the DNS Homenet Zone with keys generated by the Outsourcing Infrastructure and which are unknown to the HNA. Alternatively the Outsourcing Infrastructure MAY propose that the end user provides the private keys. Although not considered in this document, some end users MAY still prefer to sign their zone with their own keys that they do not communicate to the Outsourcing Infrastructure. All these alternatives result from a negotiation between the end user and the Outsourcing Infrastructure. This negotiation is performed out-of-band and is out of scope of this document.
In this document, we consider that the Outsourcing Infrastructure has all the necessary cryptographic elements to perform zone signing and key management operations.
Note that Outsourcing Infrastructure described in this document implements various functions, and thus different entities may be involved.
<list hangIndent="6" style="hanging
<t hangText="- DNS Slave functionsynchronizes the Homenet Zone
between the HNA and the Outsourcing Infrastructures. The DNS Homenet Zone SHOULD NOT be published directly on the Public Authoritative Servers, and the Public Authoritative Server(s MUST NOT respond to any DNS queries for that zone. Instead, the Outsourcing Infrastructure chooses a dedicated set of servers to serve the Public Homenet Zone: the Public Authoritative Server(s.
<t hangText="- DNS Zone Signing functionsigns the DNS Zone Homenet Zone to generate an Public Homenet Zone.
<t hangText="- Public Authoritative Server hosts the naming service for the Public Homenet Zone. Any DNS query associated with the Homenet Zone SHOULD be performed using the specific servers designated as the Public Authoritative Servers
</list>
->)
9. Privacy Considerations
Outsourcing the DNS Authoritative service from the HNA to a third Outsourcing the DNS Authoritative service from the HNA to a third
party raises a few privacy related concerns. party raises a few privacy related concerns.
The Homenet Zone contains a full description of the services hosted The Homenet Zone contains a full description of the services hosted
in the network. These services may not be expected to be publicly in the network. These services may not be expected to be publicly
shared although their names remain accessible through the Internet. shared although their names remain accessible through the Internet.
Even though DNS makes information public, the DNS does not expect to Even though DNS makes information public, the DNS does not expect to
make the complete list of services public. In fact, making make the complete list of services public. In fact, making
information public still requires the key (or FQDN) of each service information public still requires the key (or FQDN) of each service
to be known by the resolver in order to retrieve information about to be known by the resolver in order to retrieve information about
the services. More specifically, making mywebsite.example.com public the services. More specifically, making mywebsite.example.com public
in the DNS, is not sufficient to make resolvers aware of the in the DNS, is not sufficient to make resolvers aware of the
existence web site. However, an attacker may walk the reverse DNS existence web site. However, an attacker may walk the reverse DNS
zone, or use other reconnaissance techniques to learn this zone, or use other reconnaissance techniques to learn this
information as described in [RFC7707]. information as described in [RFC7707].
In order to prevent the complete Homenet Zone being published on the In order to prevent the complete Homenet Zone being published on the
Internet, AXFR queries SHOULD be blocked on the Public Authoritative Internet, AXFR queries SHOULD be blocked on the Public Authoritative
Server(s). Similarly, to avoid zone-walking NSEC3 [RFC5155] SHOULD Server(s). Similarly, to avoid zone-walking NSEC3 [RFC5155] SHOULD
be preferred over NSEC [RFC4034]. be preferred over NSEC [RFC4034]. When the Homenet Zone is
outsourced, the end user should be aware that it provides a complete
When the Homenet Zone is outsourced, the end user should be aware description of the services available on the home network. More
that it provides a complete description of the services available on specifically, names usually provides a clear indication of the
the home network. More specifically, names usually provides a clear service and possibly even the device type, and as the Homenet Zone
indication of the service and possibly even the device type, and as contains the IP addresses associated with the service, they also
the Homenet Zone contains the IP addresses associated with the limit the scope of the scan space.
service, they also limit the scope of the scan space.
In addition to the Homenet Zone, the third party can also monitor the In addition to the Homenet Zone, the third party can also monitor the
traffic associated with the Homenet Zone. This traffic may provide traffic associated with the Homenet Zone. This traffic may provide
an indication of the services an end user accesses, plus how and when an indication of the services an end user accesses, plus how and when
they use these services. Although, caching may obfuscate this they use these services. Although, caching may obfuscate this
information inside the home network, it is likely that outside your information inside the home network, it is likely that outside your
home network this information will not be cached. home network this information will not be cached.
11. Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
The Homenet Naming Architecture described in this document solves The Homenet Naming Architecture described in this document solves
exposing the HNA's DNS service as a DoS attack vector. exposing the HNA's DNS service as a DoS attack vector.
11.1. Names are less secure than IP addresses 10.1. Names are less secure than IP addresses
This document describes how an end user can make their services and This document describes how an end user can make their services and
devices from his home network reachable on the Internet by using devices from his home network reachable on the Internet by using
names rather than IP addresses. This exposes the home network to names rather than IP addresses. This exposes the home network to
attackers, since names are expected to include less entropy than IP attackers, since names are expected to include less entropy than IP
addresses. In fact, with IP addresses, the Interface Identifier is addresses. In fact, with IP addresses, the Interface Identifier is
64 bits long leading to up to 2^64 possibilities for a given 64 bits long leading to up to 2^64 possibilities for a given
subnetwork. This is not to mention that the subnet prefix is also of subnetwork. This is not to mention that the subnet prefix is also of
64 bits long, thus providing up to 2^64 possibilities. On the other 64 bits long, thus providing up to 2^64 possibilities. On the other
hand, names used either for the home network domain or for the hand, names used either for the home network domain or for the
devices present less entropy (livebox, router, printer, nicolas, devices present less entropy (livebox, router, printer, nicolas,
jennifer, ...) and thus potentially exposes the devices to dictionary jennifer, ...) and thus potentially exposes the devices to dictionary
attacks. attacks.
11.2. Names are less volatile than IP addresses 10.2. Names are less volatile than IP addresses
IP addresses may be used to locate a device, a host or a service. IP addresses may be used to locate a device, a host or a service.
However, home networks are not expected to be assigned a time However, home networks are not expected to be assigned a time
invariant prefix by ISPs. As a result, observing IP addresses only invariant prefix by ISPs. As a result, observing IP addresses only
provides some ephemeral information about who is accessing the provides some ephemeral information about who is accessing the
service. On the other hand, names are not expected to be as volatile service. On the other hand, names are not expected to be as volatile
as IP addresses. As a result, logging names over time may be more as IP addresses. As a result, logging names over time may be more
valuable than logging IP addresses, especially to profile an end valuable than logging IP addresses, especially to profile an end
user's characteristics. user's characteristics.
PTR provides a way to bind an IP address to a name. In that sense, PTR provides a way to bind an IP address to a name. In that sense,
responding to PTR DNS queries may affect the end user's privacy. For responding to PTR DNS queries may affect the end user's privacy. For
that reason end users may choose not to respond to PTR DNS queries that reason end users may choose not to respond to PTR DNS queries
and MAY instead return a NXDOMAIN response. and MAY instead return a NXDOMAIN response.
11.3. DNS Reflection Attacks 10.3. DNS Reflection Attacks
An attacker performs a reflection attack when it sends traffic to one An attacker performs a reflection attack when it sends traffic to one
or more intermediary nodes (reflectors), that in turn send back or more intermediary nodes (reflectors), that in turn send back
response traffic to the victim. Motivations for using an response traffic to the victim. Motivations for using an
intermediary node might be anonymity of the attacker, as well as intermediary node might be anonymity of the attacker, as well as
amplification of the traffic. Typically, when the intermediary node amplification of the traffic. Typically, when the intermediary node
is a DNSSEC server, the attacker sends a DNSSEC query and the victim is a DNSSEC server, the attacker sends a DNSSEC query and the victim
is likely to receive a DNSSEC response. This section analyzes how is likely to receive a DNSSEC response. This section analyzes how
the different components may be involved as a reflector in a the different components may be involved as a reflector in a
reflection attack. Section 11.3.1 considers the Hidden Primary, reflection attack. Section 10.4 considers the Hidden Primary,
Section 11.3.2 the Synchronization Server, and Section 11.3.3 the Section 10.5 the Synchronization Server, and Section 10.6 the Public
Public Authoritative Server(s). Authoritative Server(s).
11.3.1. Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary 10.4. "Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary
With the specified architecture, the Hidden Primary is only expected With the specified architecture, the Hidden Primary is only expected
to receive DNS queries of type SOA, AXFR or IXFR. This section to receive DNS queries of type SOA, AXFR or IXFR. This section
analyzes how these DNS queries may be used by an attacker to perform analyzes how these DNS queries may be used by an attacker to perform
a reflection attack. a reflection attack.
DNS queries of type AXFR and IXFR use TCP and as such are less DNS queries of type AXFR and IXFR use TCP and as such are less
subject to reflection attacks. This makes SOA queries the only subject to reflection attacks. This makes SOA queries the only
remaining practical vector of attacks for reflection attacks, based remaining practical vector of attacks for reflection attacks, based
on UDP. on UDP.
skipping to change at page 24, line 21 skipping to change at page 24, line 45
SOA queries are expected to follow a very specific pattern, which SOA queries are expected to follow a very specific pattern, which
makes rate limiting techniques an efficient way to limit such makes rate limiting techniques an efficient way to limit such
attacks, and associated impact on the naming service of the home attacks, and associated impact on the naming service of the home
network. network.
Motivations for such a flood might be a reflection attack, but could Motivations for such a flood might be a reflection attack, but could
also be a resource exhaustion attack performed against the Hidden also be a resource exhaustion attack performed against the Hidden
Primary. The Hidden Primary only expects to exchange traffic with Primary. The Hidden Primary only expects to exchange traffic with
the Synchronization Server, that is its associated secondary. Even the Synchronization Server, that is its associated secondary. Even
though secondary servers may be renumbered as mentioned in Section 9, though secondary servers may be renumbered as mentioned in Section 8,
the Hidden Primary is likely to perform a DNSSEC resolution and find the Hidden Primary is likely to perform a DNSSEC resolution and find
out the associated secondary's IP addresses in use. As a result, the out the associated secondary's IP addresses in use. As a result, the
Hidden Primary is likely to limit the origin of its incoming traffic Hidden Primary is likely to limit the origin of its incoming traffic
based on the origin IP address. based on the origin IP address.
With filtering rules based on IP address, SOA flooding attacks are With filtering rules based on IP address, SOA flooding attacks are
limited to forged packets with the IP address of the secondary limited to forged packets with the IP address of the secondary
server. In other words, the only victims are the Hidden Primary server. In other words, the only victims are the Hidden Primary
itself or the secondary. There is a need for the Hidden Primary to itself or the secondary. There is a need for the Hidden Primary to
limit that flood to limit the impact of the reflection attack on the limit that flood to limit the impact of the reflection attack on the
skipping to change at page 25, line 15 skipping to change at page 25, line 38
may have its legitimate query rejected is higher. If a legitimate may have its legitimate query rejected is higher. If a legitimate
SOA is discarded, the secondary will re-send SOA query every "retry SOA is discarded, the secondary will re-send SOA query every "retry
time" second until "expire time" seconds occurs, where "retry time" time" second until "expire time" seconds occurs, where "retry time"
and "expire time" have been defined in the SOA. and "expire time" have been defined in the SOA.
As a result, it is RECOMMENDED to set rate limiting policies to As a result, it is RECOMMENDED to set rate limiting policies to
protect HNA resources. If a flood lasts more than the expired time protect HNA resources. If a flood lasts more than the expired time
defined by the SOA, it is RECOMMENDED to re-initiate a defined by the SOA, it is RECOMMENDED to re-initiate a
synchronization between the Hidden Primary and the secondaries. synchronization between the Hidden Primary and the secondaries.
11.3.2. Reflection Attacks involving the Synchronization Server 10.5. Reflection Attacks involving the Synchronization Server
The Synchronization Server acts as a secondary coupled with the The Synchronization Server acts as a secondary coupled with the
Hidden Primary. The secondary expects to receive NOTIFY query, SOA Hidden Primary. The secondary expects to receive NOTIFY query, SOA
responses, AXFR and IXFR responses from the Hidden Primary. responses, AXFR and IXFR responses from the Hidden Primary.
Sending a NOTIFY query to the secondary generates a NOTIFY response Sending a NOTIFY query to the secondary generates a NOTIFY response
as well as initiating an SOA query exchange from the secondary to the as well as initiating an SOA query exchange from the secondary to the
Hidden Primary. As mentioned in [RFC1996], this is a known "benign Hidden Primary. As mentioned in [RFC1996], this is a known "benign
denial of service attack". As a result, the Synchronization Server denial of service attack". As a result, the Synchronization Server
SHOULD enforce rate limiting on sending SOA queries and NOTIFY SHOULD enforce rate limiting on sending SOA queries and NOTIFY
responses to the Hidden Primary. Most likely, when the secondary is responses to the Hidden Primary. Most likely, when the secondary is
flooded with valid and signed NOTIFY queries, it is under a replay flooded with valid and signed NOTIFY queries, it is under a replay
attack which is discussed in Section 11.5. The key thing here is attack which is discussed in Section 10.8. The key thing here is
that the secondary is likely to be designed to be able to process that the secondary is likely to be designed to be able to process
much more traffic than the Hidden Primary hosted on a HNA. much more traffic than the Hidden Primary hosted on a HNA.
This paragraph details how the secondary may limit the NOTIFY This paragraph details how the secondary may limit the NOTIFY
queries. Because the Hidden Primary may be renumbered, the secondary queries. Because the Hidden Primary may be renumbered, the secondary
SHOULD NOT perform permanent IP filtering based on IP addresses. In SHOULD NOT perform permanent IP filtering based on IP addresses. In
addition, a given secondary may be shared among multiple Hidden addition, a given secondary may be shared among multiple Hidden
Primaries which make filtering rules based on IP harder to set. The Primaries which make filtering rules based on IP harder to set. The
time at which a NOTIFY is sent by the Hidden Primary is not time at which a NOTIFY is sent by the Hidden Primary is not
predictable. However, a flood of NOTIFY messages may be easily predictable. However, a flood of NOTIFY messages may be easily
detected, as a NOTIFY originated from a given Homenet Zone is detected, as a NOTIFY originated from a given Homenet Zone is
expected to have a very limited number of unique source IP addresses, expected to have a very limited number of unique source IP addresses,
even when renumbering is occurring. As a result, the secondary, MAY even when renumbering is occurring. As a result, the secondary, MAY
rate limit incoming NOTIFY queries. rate limit incoming NOTIFY queries.
On the Hidden Primary side, it is recommended that the Hidden Primary On the Hidden Primary side, it is recommended that the Hidden Primary
sends a NOTIFY as long as the zone has not been updated by the sends a NOTIFY as long as the zone has not been updated by the
secondary. Multiple SOA queries may indicate the secondary is under secondary. Multiple SOA queries may indicate the secondary is under
attack. attack.
11.3.3. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative Servers 10.6. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative Servers
Reflection attacks involving the Public Authoritative Server(s) are Reflection attacks involving the Public Authoritative Server(s) are
similar to attacks on any Outsourcing Infrastructure. This is not similar to attacks on any Outsourcing Infrastructure. This is not
specific to the architecture described in this document, and thus are specific to the architecture described in this document, and thus are
considered as out of scope. considered as out of scope.
In fact, one motivation of the architecture described in this In fact, one motivation of the architecture described in this
document is to expose the Public Authoritative Server(s) to attacks document is to expose the Public Authoritative Server(s) to attacks
instead of the HNA, as it is believed that the Public Authoritative instead of the HNA, as it is believed that the Public Authoritative
Server(s) will be better able to defend itself. Server(s) will be better able to defend itself.
11.4. Flooding Attack 10.7. Flooding Attack
The purpose of flooding attacks is mostly resource exhaustion, where The purpose of flooding attacks is mostly resource exhaustion, where
the resource can be bandwidth, memory, or CPU for example. the resource can be bandwidth, memory, or CPU for example.
One goal of the architecture described in this document is to limit One goal of the architecture described in this document is to limit
the surface of attack on the HNA. This is done by outsourcing the the surface of attack on the HNA. This is done by outsourcing the
DNS service to the Public Authoritative Server(s). By doing so, the DNS service to the Public Authoritative Server(s). By doing so, the
HNA limits its DNS interactions between the Hidden Primary and the HNA limits its DNS interactions between the Hidden Primary and the
Synchronization Server. This limits the number of entities the HNA Synchronization Server. This limits the number of entities the HNA
interacts with as well as the scope of DNS exchanges - NOTIFY, SOA, interacts with as well as the scope of DNS exchanges - NOTIFY, SOA,
AXFR, IXFR. AXFR, IXFR.
The use of an authenticated channel with SIG(0) or TSIG between the The use of an authenticated channel with SIG(0) or TSIG between the
HNA and the Synchronization Server, enables detection of illegitimate HNA and the Synchronization Server, enables detection of illegitimate
DNS queries, so appropriate action may be taken - like dropping the DNS queries, so appropriate action may be taken - like dropping the
queries. If signatures are validated, then most likely, the HNA is queries. If signatures are validated, then most likely, the HNA is
under a replay attack, as detailed in Section 11.5 under a replay attack, as detailed in Section 10.8
In order to limit the resource required for authentication, it is In order to limit the resource required for authentication, it is
recommended to use TSIG that uses symmetric cryptography over SIG(0) recommended to use TSIG that uses symmetric cryptography over SIG(0)
that uses asymmetric cryptography. that uses asymmetric cryptography.
11.5. Replay Attack 10.8. Replay Attack
Replay attacks consist of an attacker either resending or delaying a Replay attacks consist of an attacker either resending or delaying a
legitimate message that has been sent by an authorized user or legitimate message that has been sent by an authorized user or
process. As the Hidden Primary and the Synchronization Server use an process. As the Hidden Primary and the Synchronization Server use an
authenticated channel, replay attacks are mostly expected to use authenticated channel, replay attacks are mostly expected to use
forged DNS queries in order to provide valid traffic. forged DNS queries in order to provide valid traffic.
From the perspective of an attacker, using a correctly authenticated From the perspective of an attacker, using a correctly authenticated
DNS query may not be detected as an attack and thus may generate a DNS query may not be detected as an attack and thus may generate a
response. Generating and sending a response consumes more resources response. Generating and sending a response consumes more resources
than either dropping the query by the defender, or generating the than either dropping the query by the defender, or generating the
query by the attacker, and thus could be used for resource exhaustion query by the attacker, and thus could be used for resource exhaustion
attacks. In addition, as the authentication is performed at the DNS attacks. In addition, as the authentication is performed at the DNS
layer, the source IP address could be impersonated in order to layer, the source IP address could be impersonated in order to
perform a reflection attack. perform a reflection attack.
Section 11.3 details how to mitigate reflection attacks and Section 10.3 details how to mitigate reflection attacks and
Section 11.4 details how to mitigate resource exhaustion. Both Section 10.7 details how to mitigate resource exhaustion. Both
sections assume a context of DoS with a flood of DNS queries. This sections assume a context of DoS with a flood of DNS queries. This
section suggests a way to limit the attack surface of replay attacks. section suggests a way to limit the attack surface of replay attacks.
As SIG(0) and TSIG use inception and expiration time, the time frame As SIG(0) and TSIG use inception and expiration time, the time frame
for replay attack is limited. SIG(0) and TSIG recommends a fudge for replay attack is limited. SIG(0) and TSIG recommends a fudge
value of 5 minutes. This value has been set as a compromise between value of 5 minutes. This value has been set as a compromise between
possibly loose time synchronization between devices and the valid possibly loose time synchronization between devices and the valid
lifetime of the message. As a result, better time synchronization lifetime of the message. As a result, better time synchronization
policies could reduce the time window of the attack. policies could reduce the time window of the attack.
12. IANA Considerations [](<!- <section title="DNSSEC is recommended to authenticate DNS
hosted data
Deploying DNSSEC is recommended, since in some cases the information
stored in the DNS is used by the ISP or an IT department to grant
access. For example some servers may perform PTR DNS queries to
grant access based on host names. DNSSEC mitigates lack of trust in
DNS, and it is RECOMMENDED to deploy DNSSEC on HNAs.
-->)
11. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no actions for IANA.
13. Acknowledgment 12. Acknowledgment
The authors wish to thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on The authors wish to thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on
the early versions of the draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues the early versions of the draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues
with the IPv6 routed home concept and placing the scope of this with the IPv6 routed home concept and placing the scope of this
document in a wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and document in a wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and
injecting a healthy debate on the merits of the idea; Ulrik de Bie injecting a healthy debate on the merits of the idea; Ulrik de Bie
for providing alternative solutions; Paul Mockapetris, Christian for providing alternative solutions; Paul Mockapetris, Christian
Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on
HNA and low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC HNA and low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC
capabilities of small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as capabilities of small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as
dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael
Abrahamson, Michael Richardson and Ray Bellis for their feedback on Abrahamson, Michael Richardson and Ray Bellis for their feedback on
handling different views as well as clarifying the impact of handling different views as well as clarifying the impact of
outsourcing the zone signing operation outside the HNA; Mark Andrew outsourcing the zone signing operation outside the HNA; Mark Andrew
and Peter Koch for clarifying the renumbering. and Peter Koch for clarifying the renumbering.
14. References 13. References
14.1. Normative References 13.1. Normative References
[RFC1033] Lottor, M., "Domain Administrators Operations Guide",
RFC 1033, DOI 10.17487/RFC1033, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1033>.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987, STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>. November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995, [RFC1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
skipping to change at page 28, line 27 skipping to change at page 29, line 19
[RFC2136] Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound, [RFC2136] Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997, RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>.
[RFC2142] Crocker, D., "Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and [RFC2142] Crocker, D., "Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and
Functions", RFC 2142, DOI 10.17487/RFC2142, May 1997, Functions", RFC 2142, DOI 10.17487/RFC2142, May 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2142>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2142>.
[RFC2181] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
Specification", RFC 2181, DOI 10.17487/RFC2181, July 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2181>.
[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS [RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998, NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.
[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B. [RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B.
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
(TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000, (TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>.
[RFC2930] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY [RFC2930] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY
skipping to change at page 28, line 49 skipping to change at page 29, line 45
[RFC2931] Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures [RFC2931] Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures
( SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, DOI 10.17487/RFC2931, September ( SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, DOI 10.17487/RFC2931, September
2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2931>. 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2931>.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005, RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.
[RFC4192] Baker, F., Lear, E., and R. Droms, "Procedures for
Renumbering an IPv6 Network without a Flag Day", RFC 4192,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4192, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4192>.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301, Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>. December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
[RFC4555] Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol [RFC4555] Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
(MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, DOI 10.17487/RFC4555, June 2006, (MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, DOI 10.17487/RFC4555, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4555>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4555>.
[RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", [RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007, RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
skipping to change at page 29, line 36 skipping to change at page 30, line 36
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347, Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>. January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC6644] Evans, D., Droms, R., and S. Jiang, "Rebind Capability in [RFC6644] Evans, D., Droms, R., and S. Jiang, "Rebind Capability in
DHCPv6 Reconfigure Messages", RFC 6644, DHCPv6 Reconfigure Messages", RFC 6644,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6644, July 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6644, July 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6644>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6644>.
[RFC6672] Rose, S. and W. Wijngaards, "DNAME Redirection in the
DNS", RFC 6672, DOI 10.17487/RFC6672, June 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6672>.
[RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762, [RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.
[RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service [RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013, Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7788] Stenberg, M., Barth, S., and P. Pfister, "Home Networking
Control Protocol", RFC 7788, DOI 10.17487/RFC7788, April
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7788>.
14.2. Informational References
[I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns]
Howard, L., "Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service
Providers", draft-howard-dnsop-ip6rdns-00 (work in
progress), June 2014.
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]
Migault, D., Mrugalski, T., Griffiths, C., Weber, R., and
W. Cloetens, "DHCPv6 Options for Homenet Naming
Architecture", draft-ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-
options-03 (work in progress), October 2015.
[RFC1033] Lottor, M., "Domain Administrators Operations Guide",
RFC 1033, DOI 10.17487/RFC1033, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1033>.
[RFC4192] Baker, F., Lear, E., and R. Droms, "Procedures for
Renumbering an IPv6 Network without a Flag Day", RFC 4192,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4192, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4192>.
[RFC7010] Liu, B., Jiang, S., Carpenter, B., Venaas, S., and W. [RFC7010] Liu, B., Jiang, S., Carpenter, B., Venaas, S., and W.
George, "IPv6 Site Renumbering Gap Analysis", RFC 7010, George, "IPv6 Site Renumbering Gap Analysis", RFC 7010,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7010, September 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC7010, September 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7010>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7010>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating [RFC7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344, DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.
[RFC7368] Chown, T., Ed., Arkko, J., Brandt, A., Troan, O., and J. [RFC7368] Chown, T., Ed., Arkko, J., Brandt, A., Troan, O., and J.
Weil, "IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles", Weil, "IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles",
RFC 7368, DOI 10.17487/RFC7368, October 2014, RFC 7368, DOI 10.17487/RFC7368, October 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7368>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7368>.
[RFC7558] Lynn, K., Cheshire, S., Blanchet, M., and D. Migault, [RFC7558] Lynn, K., Cheshire, S., Blanchet, M., and D. Migault,
"Requirements for Scalable DNS-Based Service Discovery "Requirements for Scalable DNS-Based Service Discovery
(DNS-SD) / Multicast DNS (mDNS) Extensions", RFC 7558, (DNS-SD) / Multicast DNS (mDNS) Extensions", RFC 7558,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7558, July 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7558, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7558>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7558>.
[RFC7707] Gont, F. and T. Chown, "Network Reconnaissance in IPv6 [RFC7707] Gont, F. and T. Chown, "Network Reconnaissance in IPv6
Networks", RFC 7707, DOI 10.17487/RFC7707, March 2016, Networks", RFC 7707, DOI 10.17487/RFC7707, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7707>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7707>.
Appendix A. Document Change Log [RFC7788] Stenberg, M., Barth, S., and P. Pfister, "Home Networking
Control Protocol", RFC 7788, DOI 10.17487/RFC7788, April
[RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication] 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7788>.
-08
- 1: Clarification of the meaning of CPE. The architecture does not
consider a single CPE. The CPE represents multiple functions.
-07:
- 1: Ray Hunter is added as a co-author.
-06:
- 2: Ray Hunter is added in acknowledgment.
- 3: Adding Renumbering section with comments from Dallas meeting
- 4: Replacing Master / Primary - Slave / Secondary
Security Consideration has been updated with Reflection
attacks, flooding attacks, and replay attacks.
-05:
*Clarifying on handling different views:
- 1: How the CPE may be involved in the resolution and responds
without necessarily requesting the Public Authoritative
Server(s) (and eventually the Hidden Primary)
- 2: How to handle local scope resolution that is link-local, site-
local and NAT IP addresses as well as Private domain names that
the administrator does not want to publish outside the home
network.
Adding a Privacy Considerations Section
Clarification on pro/cons outsourcing zone-signing
Documenting how to handle reverse zones
Adding reference to RFC 2308
-04:
*Clarifications on zone signing
*Rewording
*Adding section on different views
*architecture clarifications
-03:
*Simon's comments taken into consideration
*Adding SOA, PTR considerations
*Removing DNSSEC performance paragraphs on low power devices
*Adding SIG(0) as a mechanism for authenticating the servers
*Goals clarification: the architecture described in the document 1)
does not describe new protocols, and 2) can be adapted to specific
cases for advance users.
-02:
*remove interfaces: "Public Authoritative Server Naming Interface" is
replaced by "Public Authoritative Server(s)y(ies)". "Public
Authoritative Server Management Interface" is replaced by
"Synchronization Server".
-01.3:
*remove the authoritative / resolver services of the CPE.
Implementation dependent
*remove interactions with mdns and dhcp. Implementation dependent.
*remove considerations on low powered devices
*remove position toward homenet arch
*remove problem statement section
-01.2:
* add a CPE description to show that the architecture can fit CPEs
* specification of the architecture for very low powered devices.
* integrate mDNS and DHCP interactions with the Homenet Naming
Architecture.
* Restructuring the draft. 1) We start from the homenet-arch draft to
derive a Naming Architecture, then 2) we show why CPE need mechanisms
that do not expose them to the Internet, 3) we describe the
mechanisms.
* I remove the terminology and expose it in the figures A and B.
* remove the Front End Homenet Naming Architecture to Homenet Naming
-01:
* Added C. Griffiths as co-author. 13.2. Informative References
* Updated section 5.4 and other sections of draft to update section [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns]
on Hidden Primary / Slave functions with CPE as Hidden Primary/ Howard, L., "Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service
Homenet Server. Providers", draft-howard-dnsop-ip6rdns-00 (work in
progress), June 2014.
* For next version, address functions of MDNS within Homenet Lan and [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]
publishing details northbound via Hidden Primary. Migault, D., Mrugalski, T., Griffiths, C., Weber, R., and
W. Cloetens, "DHCPv6 Options for Homenet Naming
Architecture", draft-ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-
options-06 (work in progress), June 2018.
-00: First version published. [I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname]
Sury, O., "CNAME+DNAME Name Redirection", draft-sury-
dnsext-cname-dname-00 (work in progress), April 2010.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Daniel Migault Daniel Migault
Ericsson Ericsson
8400 Boulevard Decarie 8275 Trans Canada Route
Montreal, QC H4P 2N2 Saint Laurent, QC 4S 0B6
Canada Canada
Phone: +1 (514) 452-2160 EMail: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
Ralf Weber Ralf Weber
Nominum Nominum
2000 Seaport Blvd #400 2000 Seaport Blvd
Redwood City, CA 94063 Redwood City 94063
US US
Email: ralf.weber@nominum.com EMail: ralf.weber@nominum.com
URI: http://www.nominum.com
Ray Hunter Ray Hunter
Globis Consulting BV Globis Consulting BV
Weegschaalstraat 3 Weegschaalstraat 3
5632CW Eindhoven Eindhoven 5632CW
The Netherlands NL
Email: v6ops@globis.net EMail: v6ops@globis.net
URI: http://www.globis.net
Chris Griffiths Chris Griffiths
Email: cgriffiths@gmail.com EMail: cgriffiths@gmail.com
Wouter Cloetens Wouter Cloetens
SoftAtHome SoftAtHome<
vaartdijk 3 701 vaartdijk 3 701
3018 Wijgmaal Wijgmaal 3018
Belgium BE
Email: wouter.cloetens@softathome.com EMail: cgriffiths@gmail.com
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