draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-09.txt   rfc8002.txt 
Host Identity Protocol T. Heer Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Heer
Internet-Draft Albstadt-Sigmaringen University Request for Comments: 8002 Albstadt-Sigmaringen University
Obsoletes: 6253 (if approved) S. Varjonen Obsoletes: 6253 S. Varjonen
Updates: 7401 (if approved) University of Helsinki Updates: 7401 University of Helsinki
Intended status: Standards Track July 6, 2016 Category: Standards Track October 2016
Expires: January 7, 2017 ISSN: 2070-1721
Host Identity Protocol Certificates Host Identity Protocol Certificates
draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-09
Abstract Abstract
The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital
certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the
certificate parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed certificate parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed
verification. Additionally, this document specifies the verification. Additionally, this document specifies the
representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3). representations of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in X.509 version 3 (v3).
The concrete use cases of certificates, including how certificates The concrete use cases of certificates, including how certificates
are obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful are obtained and requested and which actions are taken upon
or failed verification, are specific to the scenario in which the successful or failed verification, are specific to the scenario in
certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario- which the certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these
specific aspects is left to the documents that use the CERT scenario-specific aspects is left to the documents that use the CERT
parameter. parameter.
This document updates RFC7401 and obsoletes RFC6253. This document updates RFC 7401 and obsoletes RFC 6253.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 7, 2017. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8002.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
skipping to change at page 2, line 17 skipping to change at page 2, line 20
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. CERT Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities . . . . . . . 5
4. Revocation of Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Error Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Differences from RFC 6253 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. X.509 v3 Certificate Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by
means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a means of a digital signature and thus enable the holder of a private
private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The Host
Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC7401] defines a new cryptographic Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC7401] defines a new cryptographic
namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each
host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign
data and issue certificates with their private key. This document data and issue certificates with their private key. This document
specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital
certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in
Section 5.2 of [RFC7401], and thus, updates [RFC7401]. Section 5.2 of [RFC7401] and thus updates [RFC7401].
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
2119 [RFC2119]. RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. CERT Parameter 2. CERT Parameter
The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital
certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics. certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics.
However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to
transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic
way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases
is intentionally not discussed in this document. Hence, the use of is intentionally not discussed in this document. Hence, the use of
the CERT parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT the CERT parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT
parameter. parameter.
The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP
SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter. SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter.
The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it
in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can
increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when
processing storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain processing storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain
multiple CERT parameters each carrying one certificate. These multiple CERT parameters, each carrying one certificate. These
parameters MAY be related or unrelated. Related certificates are parameters MAY be related or unrelated. Related certificates are
managed in CERT groups. A CERT group specifies a group of related managed in CERT groups. A CERT group specifies a group of related
CERT parameters that SHOULD be interpreted in a certain order (e.g., CERT parameters that SHOULD be interpreted in a certain order (e.g.,
for expressing certificate chains). Ungrouped certificates exhibit a for expressing certificate chains). Ungrouped certificates exhibit a
unique CERT group field and set the CERT count to 1. CERT parameters unique CERT group field and set the CERT count to 1. CERT parameters
with the same group number in the CERT group field indicate a logical with the same group number in the CERT group field indicate a logical
grouping. The CERT count field indicates the number of CERT grouping. The CERT count field indicates the number of CERT
parameters in the group. parameters in the group.
CERT parameters that belong to the same CERT group MAY be contained CERT parameters that belong to the same CERT group MAY be contained
skipping to change at page 3, line 33 skipping to change at page 4, line 19
be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according
to their CERT group field. CERT groups MAY only span multiple to their CERT group field. CERT groups MAY only span multiple
packets if the CERT group does not fit the packet. A HIP packet MUST packets if the CERT group does not fit the packet. A HIP packet MUST
NOT contain more than one incomplete CERT group that continues in the NOT contain more than one incomplete CERT group that continues in the
next HIP control packet. next HIP control packet.
The CERT ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in The CERT ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in
a CERT group. The numbers in the CERT ID field MUST start from 1 up a CERT group. The numbers in the CERT ID field MUST start from 1 up
to CERT count. to CERT count.
The CERT Group and CERT ID namespaces are managed locally by each The CERT group and CERT ID namespaces are managed locally by each
host that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets. host that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| CERT group | CERT count | CERT ID | CERT type | | CERT group | CERT count | CERT ID | CERT type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Certificate / | Certificate /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding (variable length) | / | Padding (variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 768 Type 768
Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
CERT group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters Padding.
CERT group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters.
CERT count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly CERT count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly
in several consecutive HIP control packets. in several consecutive HIP control packets.
CERT ID The sequence number for this certificate.
CERT ID The sequence number for this certificate CERT Type Indicates the type of the certificate.
CERT Type Indicates the type of the certificate
Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple
of 8 bytes. Any added padding bytes MUST be zeroed by of 8 bytes. Any added padding bytes MUST be zeroed
the sender, and their values SHOULD NOT be checked by by the sender, and their values SHOULD NOT be checked
the receiver. by the receiver.
The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC7401] as the The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC7401] as the
signature and hash algorithms. signature and hash algorithms.
The following certificate types are defined: The following certificate types are defined:
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
| CERT format | Type number | | CERT format | Type number |
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
| Reserved | 0 | | Reserved | 0 |
| X.509 v3 | 1 | | X.509 v3 | 1 |
| Obsoleted | 2 | | Obsoleted | 2 |
| Hash and URL of X.509 v3 | 3 | | Hash and URL of X.509 v3 | 3 |
| Obsoleted | 4 | | Obsoleted | 4 |
| LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 5 | | LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 5 |
| Obsoleted | 6 | | Obsoleted | 6 |
| Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 7 | | Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 7 |
| Obsoleted | 8 | | Obsoleted | 8 |
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
The next sections outline the use of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in The next sections outline the use of HITs in X.509 v3. X.509 v3
X.509 v3. X.509 v3 certificates and the handling procedures are certificates and the handling procedures are defined in [RFC5280].
defined in [RFC5280]. The wire format for X.509 v3 is the The wire format for X.509 v3 is the Distinguished Encoding Rules
Distinguished Encoding Rules format as defined in [X.690]. format as defined in [X.690].
Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encoding (3) is used as Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encoding (3) is used as
defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC7296]. Using hash and URL encodings defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC7296]. Using hash and URL encodings
results in smaller HIP control packets than by including the result in smaller HIP control packets than by including the
certificate(s), but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check certificate(s) but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check
a local cache against the hash. a local cache against the hash.
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) URL encoding (5) is used Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) URL encoding (5) is used
as defined in [RFC4516]. Using LDAP URL encoding results in smaller as defined in [RFC4516]. Using LDAP URL encoding results in smaller
HIP control packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the HIP control packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the
certificate or check a local cache against the URL. certificate or check a local cache against the URL.
Distinguished Name (DN) encoding (7) is represented by the string Distinguished Name (DN) encoding (7) is represented by the string
representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in
[RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control [RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control
packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or
check a local cache against the DN. check a local cache against the DN.
3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities 3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities
If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in X.509 If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in X.509
v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC7343]. v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC7343].
When the Host Identifier (HI) is used to sign the certificate, the When the Host Identifier (HI) is used to sign the certificate, the
respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Issuer Alternative Name respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Issuer Alternative Name
(IAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress as defined in (IAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress as defined in
[RFC5280]. When the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified [RFC5280]. When the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified
by a HIT and HI, the respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Subject by a HIT and an HI, the respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the
Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the GeneralName form Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the GeneralName form
iPAddress, and the full HI is presented as the subject's public key iPAddress, and the full HI is presented as the subject's public key
info as defined in [RFC5280]. info as defined in [RFC5280].
The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as the
and subject in the X.509 v3 extension alternative names. issuer and subject in the X.509 v3 extension alternative names.
Format of X509v3 extensions: Format of X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:hit-of-issuer IP Address:hit-of-issuer
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:hit-of-subject IP Address:hit-of-subject
Example X509v3 extensions: Example X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:24:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056 IP Address:2001:24:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056
skipping to change at page 5, line 41 skipping to change at page 6, line 31
IP Address:2001:2c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3 IP Address:2001:2c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3
Appendix A shows a full example X.509 v3 certificate with HIP Appendix A shows a full example X.509 v3 certificate with HIP
content. content.
As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are (PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are
anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this
scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by
intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In
this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware nor
can it be configured to compute HITs and include them in the can it be configured to compute HITs and include them in the
certificates. certificates.
When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need
to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their
certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to certificates) but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to
the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote
peer. This chain of certificates SHOULD be sent in a CERT group as peer. This chain of certificates SHOULD be sent in a CERT group as
specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's
certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public
keys. keys.
4. Revocation of Certificates 4. Revocation of Certificates
Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in
Section 5 of [RFC5280] with two exceptions. First, any HIP Section 5 of [RFC5280] with two exceptions. First, any HIP
certificate serial number that appears on the CRL is treated as certificate serial number that appears on the Certificate Revocation
invalid regardless of the reason code. Second, the certificateHold List (CRL) is treated as invalid regardless of the reason code.
is not supported. Second, the certificateHold is not supported.
5. Error Signaling 5. Error Signaling
If the Initiator does not send all the certificates that the If the Initiator does not send all the certificates that the
Responder requires, the Responder may take actions (e.g. reject the Responder requires, the Responder may take actions (e.g., reject the
connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by
sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type
CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED. CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED.
If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal
this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY
message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE. message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value
------------------------------------ ----- ------------------------------------ -----
CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED 48 CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED 48
The Responder is unwilling to set up an association, The Responder is unwilling to set up an association,
as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials. as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials.
INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50 INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50
Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate. Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate.
Notification Data MAY contain CERT group and CERT ID octet Notification Data MAY contain a CERT group and CERT ID octet
(in this order) of the CERT parameter that caused the (in this order) of the CERT parameter that caused the
failure. failure.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity This document defines the CERT parameter for HIP [RFC7401]. The CERT
Protocol [RFC7401]. The CERT parameter type number (768) is defined parameter type number (768) is defined in [RFC7401].
in [RFC7401].
The CERT parameter has an 8-bit unsigned integer field for different The CERT parameter has an 8-bit unsigned integer field for different
certificate types, for which IANA has created and maintains a sub- certificate types, for which IANA has created and maintains a
registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host Identity subregistry entitled "HIP Certificate Types" under "Host Identity
Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Values for the Certificate type registry Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Values for the "HIP Certificate Types"
are given in Section 2. New values for the Certificate types from registry are given in Section 2. New values for the Certificate
the unassigned space are assigned through IETF Review. types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF Review.
In Section 5, this document defines two types for the "NOTIFY message In Section 5, this document defines two types for the "NOTIFY Message
types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Types" subregistry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters".
As this document obsoletes [RFC6253], references to [RFC6253] in IANA As this document obsoletes [RFC6253], references to [RFC6253] in IANA
registries must be replaced by references to this document. This registries have been replaced by references to this document. This
document changes Certificate type registry in Section 2. document changes the "HIP Certificate Types" registry in Section 2.
The following updates to the "HIP Certificate Types" registry must be The following updates to the "HIP Certificate Types" registry have
made. been made.
The references must be updated from [RFC6253] to this document. The references have been updated from [RFC6253] to this document.
This document obsoleted the type numbers "2", "4", "6", "8" for This document obsoleted the type numbers "2", "4", "6", and "8"
the SPKI certificates. for the Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple
consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks, as IP-layer consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks, as IP-layer
fragmentation allows, for example, the sending of fragments in the fragmentation allows, for example, the sending of fragments in the
wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet
processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g., CPU or processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g., CPU or
memory). Hence, hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard memory). Hence, hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard
certificate groups with outstanding certificates if state space is certificate groups with outstanding certificates if state space is
scarce. scarce.
Although, CERT parameter is allowed in the first Initiator (I1) Although the CERT parameter is allowed in the I1 packet, it is NOT
packet it is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can increase the processing RECOMMENDED because it can increase the processing times of I1s,
times of I1s, which can be problematic when processing storms of I1s. which can be problematic when processing storms of I1s. Furthermore,
Furthermore, Initiator has to take into consideration that the the Initiator has to take into consideration that the Responder can
Responder can drop the CERT parameter in I1 without processing the drop the CERT parameter in I1 without processing the parameter.
parameter.
Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow denial-of-service Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks, where the target host may be subjected to bogus work. (DoS) attacks, where the target host may be subjected to bogus work.
Security considerations for X.509 v3 are discussed in [RFC5280]. Security considerations for X.509 v3 are discussed in [RFC5280].
8. Differences from RFC 6253 8. Differences from RFC 6253
This section summarizes the technical changes made from [RFC6253]. This section summarizes the technical changes made from [RFC6253].
This section is informational, intended to help implementors of the This section is informational and is intended to help implementors of
previous protocol version. If any text in this section contradicts the previous protocol version. If any text in this section
text in other portions of this specification, the text found outside contradicts text in other portions of this specification, the text
of this section should be considered normative. found outside of this section should be considered normative.
The following changes have been made.
o Support for Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates
has been removed.
9. Acknowledgements The following change has been made.
The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T. o Support for SPKI certificates has been removed.
Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes
most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3.
10. References 9. References
10.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol [RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
4514, June 2006. RFC 4514, DOI 10.17487/RFC4514, June 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4514>.
[RFC4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access [RFC4516] Smith, M., Ed. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516, June Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516,
2006. DOI 10.17487/RFC4516, June 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4516>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>. 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7343] Laganier, J. and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix for Overlay [RFC7343] Laganier, J. and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix for Overlay
Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers Version 2 Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers Version 2
(ORCHIDv2)", RFC 7343, DOI 10.17487/RFC7343, September (ORCHIDv2)", RFC 7343, DOI 10.17487/RFC7343, September
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7343>. 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7343>.
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson, [RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
"Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", RFC 7401, Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
April 2015. RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
[X.690] ITU-T, , "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC [X.690] ITU-T, , "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
8825-1:2002, Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690 | ISO/IEC 8825-1,
Rules (DER)", July 2002. August 2015.
10.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[RFC6253] Heer, T. and S. Varjonen, "Host Identity Protocol [RFC6253] Heer, T. and S. Varjonen, "Host Identity Protocol
Certificates", RFC 6253, DOI 10.17487/RFC6253, May 2011, Certificates", RFC 6253, DOI 10.17487/RFC6253, May 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6253>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6253>.
Appendix A. X.509 v3 certificate example Appendix A. X.509 v3 Certificate Example
This section shows a X.509 v3 certificate with encoded HITs. This section shows an X.509 v3 certificate with encoded HITs.
Certificate: Certificate:
Data: Data:
Version: 3 (0x2) Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 12705268244493839545 (0xb0522e27291b2cb9) Serial Number: 12705268244493839545 (0xb0522e27291b2cb9)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: DC=Example, DC=com, CN=Example issuing host Issuer: DC=Example, DC=com, CN=Example issuing host
Validity Validity
Not Before: Feb 25 11:28:29 2016 GMT Not Before: Feb 25 11:28:29 2016 GMT
Not After : Feb 24 11:28:29 2017 GMT Not After : Feb 24 11:28:29 2017 GMT
skipping to change at page 10, line 43 skipping to change at page 13, line 5
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GwYDVR0RBBQwEocQIAEAJ9z8DLj4hdU/TmNItzAbBgNVHRIEFDAShxAgAQAt+Hhk GwYDVR0RBBQwEocQIAEAJ9z8DLj4hdU/TmNItzAbBgNVHRIEFDAShxAgAQAt+Hhk
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KjsamdmvEPwIkl/Y0BDWuQyG2oU7RLWXkBACT1ofrgcwa/XmEpNy4hDJjiwAi9bw KjsamdmvEPwIkl/Y0BDWuQyG2oU7RLWXkBACT1ofrgcwa/XmEpNy4hDJjiwAi9bw
BcP/kSRpbVtaDEAoAfJbRbibrp5z6d2D4IXXrWyxgaygMDedYL2SO9KhIYeLxNla BcP/kSRpbVtaDEAoAfJbRbibrp5z6d2D4IXXrWyxgaygMDedYL2SO9KhIYeLxNla
XCFWPgJ+82+l3kB1gPVBaFyyYfsdmqWXqNSpgkWGeTxjdj39hqD4FIRVwYz6 XCFWPgJ+82+l3kB1gPVBaFyyYfsdmqWXqNSpgkWGeTxjdj39hqD4FIRVwYz6
-----END CERTIFICATE----- -----END CERTIFICATE-----
Appendix B. Change log Acknowledgments
Contents of draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-00:
o RFC6253 was submitted as draft-RFC.
Changes from version 01 to 02:
o Updated the references.
Changes from version 02 to 03:
o Fixed the nits raised by the working group.
Changes from version 03 to 04:
o Added "obsoletes RFC 6253".
Changes from version 04 to 05:
o Updates to contact details.
o Correct updates and obsoletes headers.
o Removed the pre5378 disclaimer.
o Updated references.
o Removed the SPKI references from the document.
Changes from version 05 to 06:
o Addressed the Int-Dir review comments from Korhonen.
Changes from version 06 to 07:
o Addressed the GenArt, OPSdir, SecDir, and IANA comments.
Changes from version 07 to 08:
o Addresses one editorial nit for CERT group numbers.
Changes from version 08 to 09:
o Rewrote the IANA section. The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu, and
T. Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject.
D. Mattes most notably contributed the non-HIP-aware use case in
Section 3.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Tobias Heer Tobias Heer
Albstadt-Sigmaringen University Albstadt-Sigmaringen University
Poststr. 6 Poststr. 6
72458 Albstadt 72458 Albstadt
Germany Germany
Email: heer@hs-albsig.de Email: heer@hs-albsig.de
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