draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-06.txt   draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-07.txt 
Host Identity Protocol Heer Host Identity Protocol T. Heer
Internet-Draft Albstadt-Sigmaringen University Internet-Draft Albstadt-Sigmaringen University
Obsoletes: 6253 (if approved) Varjonen Obsoletes: 6253 (if approved) S. Varjonen
Updates: 7401 (if approved) University of Helsinki Updates: 7401 (if approved) University of Helsinki
Intended status: Standards Track December 9, 2015 Intended status: Standards Track February 26, 2016
Expires: June 11, 2016 Expires: August 29, 2016
Host Identity Protocol Certificates Host Identity Protocol Certificates
draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-06 draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-07
Abstract Abstract
The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital
certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the
certificate parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed certificate parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed
verification. Additionally, this document specifies the verification. Additionally, this document specifies the
representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3). representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3).
skipping to change at page 1, line 46 skipping to change at page 1, line 46
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 11, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 29, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
skipping to change at page 3, line 8 skipping to change at page 3, line 8
is intentionally not discussed in this document. Hence, the use of is intentionally not discussed in this document. Hence, the use of
the CERT parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT the CERT parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT
parameter. parameter.
The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP
SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter. SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter.
The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it
in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can
increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when
processing storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain processing storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain
multiple CERT parameters. These parameters MAY be related or multiple CERT parameters each carrying one certificate. These
unrelated. Related certificates are managed in Cert groups. A Cert parameters MAY be related or unrelated. Related certificates are
group specifies a group of related CERT parameters that SHOULD be managed in CERT groups. A CERT group specifies a group of related
interpreted in a certain order (e.g., for expressing certificate CERT parameters that SHOULD be interpreted in a certain order (e.g.,
chains). Ungrouped certificates exhibit a unique Cert group field for expressing certificate chains). Ungrouped certificates exhibit a
and set the Cert count to 1. CERT parameters with the same Cert unique CERT group field and set the CERT count to 1. CERT parameters
group number in the group field indicate a logical grouping. The with the same CERT group number in the group field indicate a logical
Cert count field indicates the number of CERT parameters in the grouping. The CERT count field indicates the number of CERT
group. parameters in the group.
CERT parameters that belong to the same Cert group MAY be contained CERT parameters that belong to the same CERT group MAY be contained
in multiple sequential HIP control packets. This is indicated by a in multiple sequential HIP control packets. This is indicated by a
higher Cert count than the amount of CERT parameters with matching higher CERT count than the amount of CERT parameters with matching
Cert group fields in a HIP control packet. The CERT parameters MUST CERT group fields in a HIP control packet. The CERT parameters MUST
be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according
to their Cert group field. Cert groups MAY only span multiple to their CERT group field. CERT groups MAY only span multiple
packets if the Cert group does not fit the packet. A HIP packet MUST packets if the CERT group does not fit the packet. A HIP packet MUST
NOT contain more than one incomplete Cert group that continues in the NOT contain more than one incomplete CERT group that continues in the
next HIP control packet. next HIP control packet.
The Cert ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in The CERT ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in
a Cert group. The numbers in the Cert ID field MUST start from 1 up a CERT group. The numbers in the CERT ID field MUST start from 1 up
to Cert count. to CERT count.
The Cert Group and Cert ID namespaces are managed locally by each The CERT Group and CERT ID namespaces are managed locally by each
host that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets. host that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cert group | Cert count | Cert ID | Cert type | | CERT group | CERT count | CERT ID | CERT type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Certificate / | Certificate /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding (variable length) | / | Padding (variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 768 Type 768
Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding
Cert group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters CERT group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters
Cert count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly CERT count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly
in several consecutive HIP control packets. in several consecutive HIP control packets.
Cert ID The sequence number for this certificate CERT ID The sequence number for this certificate
Cert Type Indicates the type of the certificate CERT Type Indicates the type of the certificate
Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple
of 8 bytes. of 8 bytes. Any added padding bytes MUST be zeroed by
the sender, and their values SHOULD NOT be checked by
the receiver.
The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC7401] as the The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC7401] as the
signature and hash algorithms. signature and hash algorithms.
The following certificate types are defined: The following certificate types are defined:
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
| Cert format | Type number | | CERT format | Type number |
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
| Reserved | 0 | | Reserved | 0 |
| X.509 v3 | 1 | | X.509 v3 | 1 |
| Hash and URL of X.509 v3 | 2 | | Obsoleted | 2 |
| LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 3 | | Hash and URL of X.509 v3 | 3 |
| Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 4 | | Obsoleted | 4 |
| LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 5 |
| Obsoleted | 6 |
| Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 7 |
| Obsoleted | 8 |
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
The next sections outline the use of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in The next sections outline the use of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in
X.509 v3. X.509 v3 certificates and the handling procedures are X.509 v3. X.509 v3 certificates and the handling procedures are
defined in [RFC5280]. The wire format for X.509 v3 is the defined in [RFC5280]. The wire format for X.509 v3 is the
Distinguished Encoding Rules format as defined in [X.690]. Distinguished Encoding Rules format as defined in [X.690].
Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encodings (3 and 4) are used Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encoding (3) is used as
as defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC7296]. Using hash and URL encodings defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC7296]. Using hash and URL encodings
results in smaller HIP control packets than by including the results in smaller HIP control packets than by including the
certificate(s), but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check certificate(s), but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check
a local cache against the hash. a local cache against the hash.
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) URL encodings (5 and 6) Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) URL encoding (5) is used
are used as defined in [RFC4516]. Using LDAP URL encoding results in as defined in [RFC4516]. Using LDAP URL encoding results in smaller
smaller HIP control packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the HIP control packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the
certificate or check a local cache against the URL. certificate or check a local cache against the URL.
Distinguished Name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are represented by the Distinguished Name (DN) encoding (7) is represented by the string
string representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in
[RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control [RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control
packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or
check a local cache against the DN. check a local cache against the DN.
3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities 3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities
If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in X.509 If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in X.509
v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC7343]. v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC7343].
When the Host Identifier (HI) is used to sign the certificate, the When the Host Identifier (HI) is used to sign the certificate, the
respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Issuer Alternative Name respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Issuer Alternative Name
skipping to change at page 5, line 49 skipping to change at page 5, line 49
scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by
intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In
this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor
can it be configured to compute HITs and include them in the can it be configured to compute HITs and include them in the
certificates. certificates.
When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need
to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their
certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to
the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote
peer. This chain of certificates SHOULD be sent in a Cert group as peer. This chain of certificates SHOULD be sent in a CERT group as
specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's
certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public
keys. keys.
4. Revocation of Certificates 4. Revocation of Certificates
Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in
Section 5 of [RFC5280]. Section 5 of [RFC5280] with two exceptions. First, any HIP
certificate serial number that appears on the CRL is treated as
invalid regardless of the reason code. Second, the certificateHold
is not supported.
5. Error Signaling 5. Error Signaling
If the Initiator does not send the certificate that the Responder If the Initiator does not send all the certificates that the
requires, the Responder may take actions (e.g. reject the Responder requires, the Responder may take actions (e.g. reject the
connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by
sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type
CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED. CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED.
If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal
this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY
message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE. message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value
------------------------------------ ----- ------------------------------------ -----
CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED 48 CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED 48
The Responder is unwilling to set up an association, The Responder is unwilling to set up an association,
as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials. as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials.
INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50 INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50
Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate. Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate.
Notification Data MAY contain n (n calculated from the Notification Data MAY contain CERT group and CERT ID octet
NOTIFICATION parameter length) groups of Cert group and (in this order) of the CERT parameter that caused the
Cert ID octets (in this order) of the CERT parameter that failure.
caused the failure.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
As this document obsoletes [RFC6253], references to [RFC6253] in IANA The following changes to the "HIP Certificate Types" registry should
registries have to be replaced by references to this document. This be made.
document changes Certificate type registry in Section 2.
The references should be updated from [RFC6253] to this document.
This document obsoleted the type numbers "2", "4", "6", "8" for
the SPKI certificates.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple
consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks, as IP-layer consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks, as IP-layer
fragmentation allows, for example, the sending of fragments in the fragmentation allows, for example, the sending of fragments in the
wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet
processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g., CPU or processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g., CPU or
memory). Hence, hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard memory). Hence, hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard
certificate groups with outstanding certificates if state space is certificate groups with outstanding certificates if state space is
scarce. scarce.
skipping to change at page 7, line 25 skipping to change at page 7, line 25
times of I1s, which can be problematic when processing storms of I1s. times of I1s, which can be problematic when processing storms of I1s.
Furthermore, Initiator has to take into consideration that the Furthermore, Initiator has to take into consideration that the
Responder can drop the CERT parameter in I1 without processing the Responder can drop the CERT parameter in I1 without processing the
parameter. parameter.
Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow denial-of-service Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks, where the target host may be subjected to bogus work. (DoS) attacks, where the target host may be subjected to bogus work.
Security considerations for X.509 v3 are discussed in [RFC5280]. Security considerations for X.509 v3 are discussed in [RFC5280].
8. Acknowledgements 8. Differences from RFC 6253
This section summarizes the technical changes made from [RFC6253].
This section is informational, intended to help implementors of the
previous protocol version. If any text in this section contradicts
text in other portions of this specification, the text found outside
of this section should be considered normative.
The following changes have been made.
o Support for Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates
has been removed.
9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T. The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T.
Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes
most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3. most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3.
9. References 10. References
9.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol [RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC
4514, June 2006. 4514, June 2006.
[RFC4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access [RFC4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516, June Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516, June
skipping to change at page 8, line 25 skipping to change at page 8, line 38
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson, [RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
"Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", RFC 7401, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", RFC 7401,
April 2015. April 2015.
[X.690] ITU-T, , "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC [X.690] ITU-T, , "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC
8825-1:2002, Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding 8825-1:2002, Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding
rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding
Rules (DER)", July 2002. Rules (DER)", July 2002.
9.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[RFC6253] Heer, T. and S. Varjonen, "Host Identity Protocol [RFC6253] Heer, T. and S. Varjonen, "Host Identity Protocol
Certificates", RFC 6253, DOI 10.17487/RFC6253, May 2011, Certificates", RFC 6253, DOI 10.17487/RFC6253, May 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6253>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6253>.
Appendix A. X.509 v3 certificate example Appendix A. X.509 v3 certificate example
This section shows a X.509 v3 certificate with encoded HITs. This section shows a X.509 v3 certificate with encoded HITs.
Certificate: Certificate:
Data: Data:
Version: 3 (0x2) Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 0 (0x0) Serial Number: 12705268244493839545 (0xb0522e27291b2cb9)
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN=Example issuing host, DC=example, DC=com Issuer: DC=Example, DC=com, CN=Example issuing host
Validity Validity
Not Before: Mar 11 09:01:39 2011 GMT Not Before: Feb 25 11:28:29 2016 GMT
Not After : Mar 21 09:01:39 2011 GMT Not After : Feb 24 11:28:29 2017 GMT
Subject: CN=Example subject host, DC=example, DC=com Subject: DC=Example, DC=com, CN=Example issuing host
Subject Public Key Info: Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) Public-Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit): Modulus:
00:c0:db:38:50:8e:63:ed:96:ea:c6:c4:ec:a3:36: 00:c9:b0:85:94:af:1f:3a:77:39:c9:d5:81:a5:ee:
62:e2:28:e9:74:9c:f5:2f:cb:58:0e:52:54:60:b5: d2:b5:6b:72:91:5d:22:2c:1e:59:e5:06:29:bd:a2:
fa:98:87:0d:22:ab:d8:6a:61:74:a9:ee:0b:ae:cd: 19:f6:ac:ca:eb:f7:88:d8:54:55:41:01:58:d8:87:
18:6f:05:ab:69:66:42:46:00:a2:c0:0c:3a:28:67: 64:d8:c8:cf:6e:c2:38:81:22:1a:ae:e9:a6:80:22:
03:ee:f3:1b:7e:68:11:e3:f4:7b:98:33:28:bf:40:
09:cc:52:27:da:79:3e:67:d7:d8:d0:7c:f1:a1:26: ec:4f:19:e8:10:8a:8b:07:60:f7:9f:e4:82:f8:a7:
fa:38:8f:73:f5:b0:20:c6:f2:0b:7d:77:43:aa:c7: 58:04:3d:42:07:c8:34:ca:99:6d:11:eb:73:c1:d9:
98:91:7e:1e:04:31:0d:ca:94:55:20:c4:4f:ba:b1: 96:93:55:e5:c7:ed:80:4f:8a:f2:1a:6f:83:c8:15:
df:d4:61:9d:dd:b9:b5:47:94:6c:06:91:69:30:42: a4:8f:b8:6a:fe:f3:4f:49:1a:5c:1f:89:bb:30:e6:
9c:0a:8b:e3:00:ce:49:ab:e3 98:bc:ce:a3:a2:37:85:b1:79:1c:26:e6:44:0c:b9:
3e:d8:37:81:46:f4:02:25:46:a2:ea:da:25:5c:46:
a2:a3:c5:58:80:53:1f:c5:e5:11:a0:da:d8:f2:ad:
d6:98:d4:ce:55:35:cc:0b:d3:5b:09:48:ef:57:65:
80:cb:65:79:fd:cb:4d:5b:b3:8d:1a:ff:2a:58:3e:
96:65:10:3e:04:81:78:2b:d5:ca:89:78:ea:28:5c:
bc:02:4a:54:cd:aa:a9:99:8d:d6:39:e9:5e:a9:73:
1a:5d:93:55:39:9b:72:1a:c2:a0:1f:e3:4c:b0:41:
98:97
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions: X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:23:8d83:41c5:dc9f:38ed:e742:7281
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:2c:6e02:d3e0:9b90:8417:673e:99db IP Address:2001:27:DCFC:CB8:F885:D53F:4E63:48B7
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
83:68:b4:38:63:a6:ae:57:68:e2:4d:73:5d:8f:11:e4:ba:30: IP Address:2001:2D:F878:64C1:67E3:9716:88BD:68E4
a0:19:ca:86:22:e9:6b:e9:36:96:af:95:bd:e8:02:b9:72:2f: Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
30:a2:62:ac:b2:fa:3d:25:c5:24:fd:8d:32:aa:01:4f:a5:8a: 6d:e6:a9:a6:30:c4:ab:3e:86:39:1e:de:76:4d:4e:a4:2d:63:
f5:06:52:56:0a:86:55:39:2b:ee:7a:7b:46:14:d7:5d:15:82: 4d:bb:41:bf:d3:0c:66:13:8b:4d:b2:50:59:36:fc:ae:42:9e:
4d:74:06:ca:b7:8c:54:c1:6b:33:7f:77:82:d8:95:e1:05:ca: c8:a0:41:1a:1c:94:56:05:28:82:34:4e:63:75:87:31:25:67:
e2:0d:22:1d:86:fc:1c:c4:a4:cf:c6:bc:ab:ec:b8:2a:1e:4b: 36:a6:1a:0f:b8:f7:db:03:e7:dd:a6:9a:26:c4:68:e2:cf:59:
04:7e:49:9c:8f:9d:98:58:9c:63:c5:97:b5:41:94:f7:ef:93: 54:e6:ee:cc:a7:ce:fb:56:bf:31:60:f4:cb:e7:f0:0e:50:f8:
57:29 b7:c5:3c:1a:de:74:d0:aa:83:e5:15:25:b1:bf:be:a4:7f:af:
0a:de:08:09:0e:13:1d:2a:3b:1a:99:d9:af:10:fc:08:92:5f:
d8:d0:10:d6:b9:0c:86:da:85:3b:44:b5:97:90:10:02:4f:5a:
1f:ae:07:30:6b:f5:e6:12:93:72:e2:10:c9:8e:2c:00:8b:d6:
f0:05:c3:ff:91:24:69:6d:5b:5a:0c:40:28:01:f2:5b:45:b8:
9b:ae:9e:73:e9:dd:83:e0:85:d7:ad:6c:b1:81:ac:a0:30:37:
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Appendix B. Change log Appendix B. Change log
Contents of draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-00: Contents of draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-00:
o RFC6253 was submitted as draft-RFC. o RFC6253 was submitted as draft-RFC.
Changes from version 01 to 02: Changes from version 01 to 02:
o Updated the references. o Updated the references.
skipping to change at page 10, line 11 skipping to change at page 11, line 13
o Removed the pre5378 disclaimer. o Removed the pre5378 disclaimer.
o Updated references. o Updated references.
o Removed the SPKI references from the document. o Removed the SPKI references from the document.
Changes from version 05 to 06: Changes from version 05 to 06:
o Addressed the Int-Dir review comments from Korhonen. o Addressed the Int-Dir review comments from Korhonen.
Changes from version 06 to 07:
o Addressed the GenArt, OPSdir, SecDir, and IANA comments.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Tobias Heer Tobias Heer
Albstadt-Sigmaringen University Albstadt-Sigmaringen University
Poststr. 6 Poststr. 6
72458 Albstadt 72458 Albstadt
Germany Germany
Email: heer@hs-albsig.de Email: heer@hs-albsig.de
Samu Varjonen Samu Varjonen
University of Helsinki University of Helsinki
Gustaf Haellstroemin katu 2b Gustaf Haellstroemin katu 2b
Helsinki 00560 Helsinki
Finland Finland
Email: samu.varjonen@helsinki.fi Email: samu.varjonen@helsinki.fi
 End of changes. 37 change blocks. 
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