draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-02.txt   draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-03.txt 
Host Identity Protocol Heer Host Identity Protocol Heer
Internet-Draft Hirschmann Automation and Control Internet-Draft Hirschmann Automation and Control
Intended status: Standards Track Varjonen Intended status: Standards Track Varjonen
Expires: December 31, 2015 University of Helsinki Expires: January 28, 2016 University of Helsinki
June 29, 2015 July 27, 2015
Host Identity Protocol Certificates Host Identity Protocol Certificates
draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-02 draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-03
Abstract Abstract
The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital
certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the
certificate parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed certificate parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed
verification. Additionally, this document specifies the verification. Additionally, this document specifies the
representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3) and representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3) and
Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates. Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 28, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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Distinguished Name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are represented by the Distinguished Name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are represented by the
string representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in string representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in
[RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control [RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control
packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or
check a local cache against the DN. check a local cache against the DN.
3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities 3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities
If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in X.509 If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in X.509
v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC4843]. v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC7343].
When the Host Identifier (HI) is used to sign the certificate, the When the Host Identifier (HI) is used to sign the certificate, the
respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Issuer Alternative Name respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Issuer Alternative Name
(IAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress as defined in (IAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress as defined in
[RFC5280]. When the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified [RFC5280]. When the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified
by a HIT and HI, the respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Subject by a HIT and HI, the respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Subject
Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the GeneralName form Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the GeneralName form
iPAddress, and the full HI is presented as the subject's public key iPAddress, and the full HI is presented as the subject's public key
info as defined in [RFC5280]. info as defined in [RFC5280].
The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer
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Format of X509v3 extensions: Format of X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:hit-of-issuer IP Address:hit-of-issuer
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:hit-of-subject IP Address:hit-of-subject
Example X509v3 extensions: Example X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:24:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056 IP Address:2001:24:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:2C:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3 IP Address:2001:2c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3
Appendix B shows a full example X.509 v3 certificate with HIP Appendix B shows a full example X.509 v3 certificate with HIP
content. content.
As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are (PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are
anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this
scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by
intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In
this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor
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INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50 INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50
Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate. Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate.
Notification Data MAY contain n groups of 2 octets (n calculated Notification Data MAY contain n groups of 2 octets (n calculated
from the NOTIFICATION parameter length), in order Cert group and from the NOTIFICATION parameter length), in order Cert group and
Cert ID of the CERT parameter that caused the failure. Cert ID of the CERT parameter that caused the failure.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity As this document replaces [RFC6253], references to [RFC6253] in IANA
Protocol [RFC7401]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type registries have to be replaced by references to this document.
768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC7401].
The CERT parameter has an 8-bit unsigned integer field for different
certificate types, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new
sub-registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the
Certificate type registry are given in Section 2. New values for the
Certificate types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF
Review.
In Section 6, this document defines two new types for the "NOTIFY
message types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Parameters".
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple
consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks, as IP-layer consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks, as IP-layer
fragmentation allows, for example, the sending of fragments in the fragmentation allows, for example, the sending of fragments in the
wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet
processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g., CPU or processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g., CPU or
memory). Hence, hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard memory). Hence, hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard
certificate groups with outstanding certificates if state space is certificate groups with outstanding certificates if state space is
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[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, [RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC
5996, September 2010. 5996, September 2010.
[RFC6253] Heer, T. and S. Varjonen, "Host Identity Protocol
Certificates", RFC 6253, DOI 10.17487/RFC6253, May 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6253>.
[RFC7343] Laganier, J. and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix for Overlay
Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers Version 2
(ORCHIDv2)", RFC 7343, DOI 10.17487/RFC7343, September
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7343>.
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson, [RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
"Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", RFC 7401, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", RFC 7401,
April 2015. April 2015.
[X.690] ITU-T, , "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC [X.690] ITU-T, , "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC
8825-1:2002, Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding 8825-1:2002, Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding
rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding
Rules (DER)", July 2002. Rules (DER)", July 2002.
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