draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-01.txt   draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-02.txt 
Host Identity Protocol Heer Host Identity Protocol Heer
Internet-Draft Hirschmann Automation and Internet-Draft Hirschmann Automation and Control
Intended status: Standards Track Control Intended status: Standards Track Varjonen
Expires: April 7, 2014 Varjonen Expires: December 31, 2015 University of Helsinki
University of Helsinki June 29, 2015
October 4, 2013
Host Identity Protocol Certificates Host Identity Protocol Certificates
draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-01 draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-02
Abstract Abstract
The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital
certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the
certificate parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed certificate parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed
verification. Additionally, this document specifies the verification. Additionally, this document specifies the
representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3) and representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3) and
Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates. Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates.
The concrete use cases of certificates, including how certificates The concrete use cases of certificates, including how certificates
are obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful are obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful
or failed verification, are specific to the scenario in which the or failed verification, are specific to the scenario in which the
certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario- certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario-
specific aspects is left to the documents that use the CERT specific aspects is left to the documents that use the CERT
parameter. parameter.
This document extends I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis. This document extends [RFC7401].
Status of this Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 7, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English. than English.
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by
means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a
private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The
Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] defines Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC7401] defines a new cryptographic
a new cryptographic namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each
identity of each host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign
digitally sign data and issue certificates with their private key. data and issue certificates with their private key. This document
This document specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital
digital certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in
Section 5.2 of [I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis], and thus, extends Section 5.2 of [RFC7401], and thus, extends [RFC7401].
[I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis].
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119]. 2119 [RFC2119].
2. CERT Parameter 2. CERT Parameter
The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital
certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics. certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics.
However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to
transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic
way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases
is intentionally not discussed in this document. Hence, the use of is intentionally not discussed in this document. Hence, the use of
the CERT parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT the CERT parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT
parameter. parameter.
The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP
skipping to change at page 4, line 27 skipping to change at page 4, line 22
Type 768 Type 768
Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding
Cert group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters Cert group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters
Cert count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly Cert count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly
in several consecutive HIP control packets. in several consecutive HIP control packets.
Cert ID The sequence number for this certificate Cert ID The sequence number for this certificate
Cert Type Indicates the type of the certificate Cert Type Indicates the type of the certificate
Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple
of 8 bytes. of 8 bytes.
The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC7401] as the
[I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] as the signature and hash signature and hash algorithms.
algorithms.
The following certificate types are defined: The following certificate types are defined:
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
| Cert format | Type number | | Cert format | Type number |
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
| Reserved | 0 | | Reserved | 0 |
| X.509 v3 | 1 | | X.509 v3 | 1 |
| SPKI | 2 | | SPKI | 2 |
| Hash and URL of X.509 v3 | 3 | | Hash and URL of X.509 v3 | 3 |
| Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 | | Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 |
| LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 5 | | LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 5 |
| LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 | | LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 |
| Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 7 | | Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 7 |
| Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 | | Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 |
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and subject in the X.509 v3 extension alternative names. and subject in the X.509 v3 extension alternative names.
Format of X509v3 extensions: Format of X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:hit-of-issuer IP Address:hit-of-issuer
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:hit-of-subject IP Address:hit-of-subject
Example X509v3 extensions: Example X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056 IP Address:2001:24:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:1C:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3 IP Address:2001:2C:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3
Appendix B shows a full example X.509 v3 certificate with HIP Appendix B shows a full example X.509 v3 certificate with HIP
content. content.
As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are (PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are
anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this
scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by
intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In
this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor
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hosts, HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can hosts, HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can
represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In the following, we define represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In the following, we define
the representation of those identifiers for SPKI given as the representation of those identifiers for SPKI given as
S-expressions. Note that the S-expressions are only the human- S-expressions. Note that the S-expressions are only the human-
readable representation of SPKI certificates. Full HIs are presented readable representation of SPKI certificates. Full HIs are presented
in the public key sequences of SPKI certificates. in the public key sequences of SPKI certificates.
As an example, the Host Identity Tag of a host is expressed as As an example, the Host Identity Tag of a host is expressed as
follows: follows:
Format: (hash hit hit-of-host) Format: (hash hit hit-of-host)
Example: (hash hit 2001:13:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50) Example: (hash hit 2001:23:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50)
Appendix A shows a full example of a SPKI certificate with HIP Appendix A shows a full example of a SPKI certificate with HIP
content. content.
5. Revocation of Certificates 5. Revocation of Certificates
Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in Section Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in
5 of [RFC5280]. Revocation of SPKI certificates is handled as Section 5 of [RFC5280]. Revocation of SPKI certificates is handled
defined in Section 5 of [RFC2693]. as defined in Section 5 of [RFC2693].
6. Error Signaling 6. Error Signaling
If the Initiator does not send the certificate that the Responder If the Initiator does not send the certificate that the Responder
requires, the Responder may take actions (e.g. reject the requires, the Responder may take actions (e.g. reject the
connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by
sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type
CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED. CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED.
If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal
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INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50 INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50
Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate. Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate.
Notification Data MAY contain n groups of 2 octets (n calculated Notification Data MAY contain n groups of 2 octets (n calculated
from the NOTIFICATION parameter length), in order Cert group and from the NOTIFICATION parameter length), in order Cert group and
Cert ID of the CERT parameter that caused the failure. Cert ID of the CERT parameter that caused the failure.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity
Protocol [I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]. This parameter is defined Protocol [RFC7401]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type
in Section 2 with type 768. The parameter type number is also 768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC7401].
defined in [I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis].
The CERT parameter has an 8-bit unsigned integer field for different The CERT parameter has an 8-bit unsigned integer field for different
certificate types, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new certificate types, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new
sub-registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host sub-registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the
Certificate type registry are given in Section 2. New values for the Certificate type registry are given in Section 2. New values for the
Certificate types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF Certificate types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF
Review. Review.
In Section 6, this document defines two new types for the "NOTIFY In Section 6, this document defines two new types for the "NOTIFY
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[RFC2693] and for X.509 v3 in [RFC5280]. [RFC2693] and for X.509 v3 in [RFC5280].
9. Acknowledgements 9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T. The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T.
Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes
most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3. most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3.
10. Normative References 10. Normative References
[I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]
Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
"Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
<draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-13>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas, [RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas,
B., and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693, B., and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,
September 1999. September 1999.
[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol [RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC
RFC 4514, June 2006. 4514, June 2006.
[RFC4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access [RFC4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516, Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516, June
June 2006. 2006.
[RFC4843] Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix [RFC4843] Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix
for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers
(ORCHID)", RFC 4843, April 2007. (ORCHID)", RFC 4843, April 2007.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, [RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC
RFC 5996, September 2010. 5996, September 2010.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, [RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", RFC 7401,
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical April 2015.
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", July 2002. [X.690] ITU-T, , "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC
8825-1:2002, Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding
rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding
Rules (DER)", July 2002.
Appendix A. SPKI certificate example Appendix A. SPKI certificate example
This section shows an SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The This section shows an SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The
example has been indented for readability. example has been indented for readability.
(sequence (sequence
(public_key (public_key
(rsa-pkcs1-sha1 (rsa-pkcs1-sha1
(e #010001#) (e #010001#)
(n |yDwznOwX0w+zvQbpWoTnfWrUPLKW2NFrpXbsIcH/QBSLb (n |yDwznOwX0w+zvQbpWoTnfWrUPLKW2NFrpXbsIcH/QBSLb
k1RKTZhLasFwvtSHAjqh220W8gRiQAGIqKplyrDEqSrJp k1RKTZhLasFwvtSHAjqh220W8gRiQAGIqKplyrDEqSrJp
OdIsHIQ8BQhJAyILWA1Sa6f5wAnWozDfgdXoKLNdT8ZNB OdIsHIQ8BQhJAyILWA1Sa6f5wAnWozDfgdXoKLNdT8ZNB
mzluPiw4ozc78p6MHElH75Hm3yHaWxT+s83M=| mzluPiw4ozc78p6MHElH75Hm3yHaWxT+s83M=|
) )
) )
) )
(cert (cert
(issuer (issuer
(hash hit 2001:15:2453:698a:9aa:253a:dcb5:981e) (hash hit 2001:25:2453:698a:9aa:253a:dcb5:981e)
) )
(subject (subject
(hash hit 2001:12:ccd6:4715:72a3:2ab1:77e4:4acc) (hash hit 2001:22:ccd6:4715:72a3:2ab1:77e4:4acc)
) )
(not-before "2011-01-12_13:43:09") (not-before "2011-01-12_13:43:09")
(not-after "2011-01-22_13:43:09") (not-after "2011-01-22_13:43:09")
) )
(signature (signature
(hash sha1 |h5fC8HUMATTtK0cjYqIgeN3HCIMA|) (hash sha1 |h5fC8HUMATTtK0cjYqIgeN3HCIMA|)
|u8NTRutINI/AeeZgN6bngjvjYPtVahvY7MhGfenTpT7MCgBy |u8NTRutINI/AeeZgN6bngjvjYPtVahvY7MhGfenTpT7MCgBy
NoZglqH5Cy2vH6LrQFYWx0MjWoYwHKimEuBKCNd4TK6hrCyAI NoZglqH5Cy2vH6LrQFYWx0MjWoYwHKimEuBKCNd4TK6hrCyAI
CIDJAZ70TyKXgONwDNWPOmcc3lFmsih8ezkoBseFWHqRGISIm CIDJAZ70TyKXgONwDNWPOmcc3lFmsih8ezkoBseFWHqRGISIm
MLdeaMciP4lVfxPY2AQKdMrBc=| MLdeaMciP4lVfxPY2AQKdMrBc=|
skipping to change at page 11, line 31 skipping to change at page 10, line 25
fa:98:87:0d:22:ab:d8:6a:61:74:a9:ee:0b:ae:cd: fa:98:87:0d:22:ab:d8:6a:61:74:a9:ee:0b:ae:cd:
18:6f:05:ab:69:66:42:46:00:a2:c0:0c:3a:28:67: 18:6f:05:ab:69:66:42:46:00:a2:c0:0c:3a:28:67:
09:cc:52:27:da:79:3e:67:d7:d8:d0:7c:f1:a1:26: 09:cc:52:27:da:79:3e:67:d7:d8:d0:7c:f1:a1:26:
fa:38:8f:73:f5:b0:20:c6:f2:0b:7d:77:43:aa:c7: fa:38:8f:73:f5:b0:20:c6:f2:0b:7d:77:43:aa:c7:
98:91:7e:1e:04:31:0d:ca:94:55:20:c4:4f:ba:b1: 98:91:7e:1e:04:31:0d:ca:94:55:20:c4:4f:ba:b1:
df:d4:61:9d:dd:b9:b5:47:94:6c:06:91:69:30:42: df:d4:61:9d:dd:b9:b5:47:94:6c:06:91:69:30:42:
9c:0a:8b:e3:00:ce:49:ab:e3 9c:0a:8b:e3:00:ce:49:ab:e3
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions: X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:13:8d83:41c5:dc9f:38ed:e742:7281 IP Address:2001:23:8d83:41c5:dc9f:38ed:e742:7281
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:1c:6e02:d3e0:9b90:8417:673e:99db IP Address:2001:2c:6e02:d3e0:9b90:8417:673e:99db
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
83:68:b4:38:63:a6:ae:57:68:e2:4d:73:5d:8f:11:e4:ba:30: 83:68:b4:38:63:a6:ae:57:68:e2:4d:73:5d:8f:11:e4:ba:30:
a0:19:ca:86:22:e9:6b:e9:36:96:af:95:bd:e8:02:b9:72:2f: a0:19:ca:86:22:e9:6b:e9:36:96:af:95:bd:e8:02:b9:72:2f:
30:a2:62:ac:b2:fa:3d:25:c5:24:fd:8d:32:aa:01:4f:a5:8a: 30:a2:62:ac:b2:fa:3d:25:c5:24:fd:8d:32:aa:01:4f:a5:8a:
f5:06:52:56:0a:86:55:39:2b:ee:7a:7b:46:14:d7:5d:15:82: f5:06:52:56:0a:86:55:39:2b:ee:7a:7b:46:14:d7:5d:15:82:
4d:74:06:ca:b7:8c:54:c1:6b:33:7f:77:82:d8:95:e1:05:ca: 4d:74:06:ca:b7:8c:54:c1:6b:33:7f:77:82:d8:95:e1:05:ca:
e2:0d:22:1d:86:fc:1c:c4:a4:cf:c6:bc:ab:ec:b8:2a:1e:4b: e2:0d:22:1d:86:fc:1c:c4:a4:cf:c6:bc:ab:ec:b8:2a:1e:4b:
04:7e:49:9c:8f:9d:98:58:9c:63:c5:97:b5:41:94:f7:ef:93: 04:7e:49:9c:8f:9d:98:58:9c:63:c5:97:b5:41:94:f7:ef:93:
57:29 57:29
Appendix C. Change log Appendix C. Change log
Contents of draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-00: Contents of draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-00:
o RFC6253 was submitted as draft-RFC. o RFC6253 was submitted as draft-RFC.
Authors' Addresses Changes from version 01 to 02:
o Updated the references.
Authors' Addresses
Tobias Heer Tobias Heer
Hirschmann Automation and Control Hirschmann Automation and Control
Stuttgarter Strasse 45-51 Stuttgarter Strasse 45-51
Neckartenzlingen 72654 Neckartenzlingen 72654
Germany Germany
Email: tobias.heer@belden.com Email: tobias.heer@belden.com
Samu Varjonen Samu Varjonen
University of Helsinki University of Helsinki
 End of changes. 26 change blocks. 
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