draft-ietf-babel-dtls-04.txt   draft-ietf-babel-dtls-05.txt 
Network Working Group A. Decimo Network Working Group A. Decimo
Internet-Draft IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot Internet-Draft IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
Updates: 6126bis (if approved) D. Schinazi Intended status: Standards Track D. Schinazi
Intended status: Standards Track Google LLC Expires: December 8, 2019 Google LLC
Expires: August 10, 2019 J. Chroboczek J. Chroboczek
IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
February 6, 2019 June 6, 2019
Babel Routing Protocol over Datagram Transport Layer Security Babel Routing Protocol over Datagram Transport Layer Security
draft-ietf-babel-dtls-04 draft-ietf-babel-dtls-05
Abstract Abstract
The Babel Routing Protocol does not contain any means to authenticate The Babel Routing Protocol does not contain any means to authenticate
neighbours or protect messages sent between them. This documents neighbours or protect messages sent between them. This document
specifies a mechanism to ensure these properties, using Datagram specifies a mechanism to ensure these properties, using Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS). This document updates RFC 6126bis. Transport Layer Security (DTLS).
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 10, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 8, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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2. Operation of the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Operation of the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. DTLS Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. DTLS Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Protocol Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Protocol Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4. Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.4. Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.5. Neighbour table entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.5. Neighbour table entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.6. Simultaneous operation of both Babel over DTLS and 2.6. Simultaneous operation of both Babel over DTLS and
unprotected Babel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 unprotected Babel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Interface Maximum Transmission Unit Issues . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Interface Maximum Transmission Unit Issues . . . . . . . . . 6
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Appendix A. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Babel Routing Protocol [RFC6126bis] does not contain any means to The Babel Routing Protocol [RFC6126bis] does not contain any means to
authenticate neighbours or protect messages sent between them. authenticate neighbours or protect messages sent between them.
Because of this, an attacker is able to send maliciously crafted Because of this, an attacker is able to send maliciously crafted
Babel messages which could lead a network to route traffic to an Babel messages which could lead a network to route traffic to an
attacker or to an under-resourced target causing denial of service. attacker or to an under-resourced target causing denial of service.
This documents specifies a mechanism to prevent such attacks, using This document specifies a mechanism to prevent such attacks, using
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347]. Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347].
1.1. Specification of Requirements 1.1. Specification of Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
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The protocol described in this document protects Babel packets with The protocol described in this document protects Babel packets with
DTLS. As such, it inherits the features offered by DTLS, notably DTLS. As such, it inherits the features offered by DTLS, notably
authentication, integrity, replay protection, confidentiality and authentication, integrity, replay protection, confidentiality and
asymmetric keying. It is therefore expected to be applicable in a asymmetric keying. It is therefore expected to be applicable in a
wide range of environments. wide range of environments.
There exists another mechanism for securing Babel, namely Babel HMAC There exists another mechanism for securing Babel, namely Babel HMAC
authentication [BABEL-HMAC]. HMAC only offers basic features, namely authentication [BABEL-HMAC]. HMAC only offers basic features, namely
authentication, integrity and replay protection with a small number authentication, integrity and replay protection with a small number
of symmetric keys. of symmetric keys. A comparison of Babel security mechanisms and
their applicability can be found in [RFC6126bis].
Since HMAC authentication is simpler, requires fewer changes to the
Babel protocol, and avoids a dependency on DTLS, its use is
RECOMMENDED in deployments where both protocols are equally
applicable.
2. Operation of the Protocol 2. Operation of the Protocol
Babel over DTLS requires some changes to how Babel operates. First, Babel over DTLS requires some changes to how Babel operates. First,
DTLS is a client-server protocol, while Babel is a peer-to-peer DTLS is a client-server protocol, while Babel is a peer-to-peer
protocol. Second, DTLS can only protect unicast communication, while protocol. Second, DTLS can only protect unicast communication, while
Babel packets can be sent over to both unicast and multicast Babel packets can be sent over to both unicast and multicast
destinations. destinations.
2.1. DTLS Connection Initiation 2.1. DTLS Connection Initiation
Babel over DTLS operates on a different port than unencrypted Babel. Babel over DTLS operates on a different port than unencrypted Babel.
All Babel over DTLS nodes MUST act as DTLS servers on a DTLS port, All Babel over DTLS nodes MUST act as DTLS servers on a given UDP
and MUST listen for unencrypted Babel traffic on an unencrypted port, port, and MUST listen for unencrypted Babel traffic on another UDP
which MUST be distinct from the DTLS port. The default port for port, which MUST be distinct from the first one. The default port
Babel over DTLS is registered with IANA as the "babel-dtls" port (UDP for Babel over DTLS is registered with IANA as the "babel-dtls" port
port TBD, see Section 4), and the unencrypted port is registered as (UDP port TBD, see Section 4), and the port exchanging unencrypted
the "babel" port (UDP port 6696). Nodes SHOULD use these default Babel traffic is registered as the "babel" port (UDP port 6696).
ports.
When a Babel node discovers a new neighbor (generally by receiving an When a Babel node discovers a new neighbour (generally by receiving
unencrypted multicast Babel packet), it compares the neighbour's IPv6 an unencrypted multicast Babel packet), it compares the neighbour's
link-local address with its own, using network byte ordering. If a IPv6 link-local address with its own, using network byte ordering.
node's address is lower than the recently discovered neighbor's If a node's address is lower than the recently discovered neighbour's
address, it acts as a client and connects to the neighbor. In other address, it acts as a client and connects to the neighbour. In other
words, the node with the lowest address is the DTLS client for this words, the node with the lowest address is the DTLS client for this
pairwise relationship. As an example, fe80::1:2 is considered lower pairwise relationship. As an example, fe80::1:2 is considered lower
than fe80::2:1. than fe80::2:1.
The node acting as DTLS client initiates its DTLS connection from an The node acting as DTLS client initiates its DTLS connection from an
ephemeral UDP port. Nodes SHOULD ensure that new client DTLS ephemeral UDP port. Nodes SHOULD ensure that new client DTLS
connections use different ephemeral ports from recently used connections use different ephemeral ports from recently used
connections to allow servers to differentiate between the new and old connections to allow servers to differentiate between the new and old
DTLS connections. Alternatively, nodes MAY use DTLS connection DTLS connections. Alternatively, nodes MAY use DTLS connection
identifiers [DTLS-CID] as a higher-entropy mechanism to distinguish identifiers [DTLS-CID] as a higher-entropy mechanism to distinguish
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source IP address is an IPv6 link-local address; if it is not, it source IP address is an IPv6 link-local address; if it is not, it
MUST reject the connection. Nodes use mutual authentication MUST reject the connection. Nodes use mutual authentication
(authenticating both client and server); servers MUST send a (authenticating both client and server); servers MUST send a
CertificateRequest message and subsequently authenticate the client. CertificateRequest message and subsequently authenticate the client.
Implementations MUST support authenticating peers against a local Implementations MUST support authenticating peers against a local
store of credentials. If either node fails to authenticate its peer store of credentials. If either node fails to authenticate its peer
against its local policy, it MUST abort the DTLS handshake. Nodes against its local policy, it MUST abort the DTLS handshake. Nodes
MUST only negotiate DTLS version 1.2 or higher. Nodes MUST use DTLS MUST only negotiate DTLS version 1.2 or higher. Nodes MUST use DTLS
replay protection to prevent attackers from replaying stale replay protection to prevent attackers from replaying stale
information. Nodes SHOULD drop packets that have been reordered by information. Nodes SHOULD drop packets that have been reordered by
more than several IHU intervals, to avoid letting attackers make more than two IHU intervals, to avoid letting attackers make stale
stale information last longer. information last longer.
2.2. Protocol Encoding 2.2. Protocol Encoding
Babel over DTLS sends all unicast Babel packets protected by DTLS. Babel over DTLS sends all unicast Babel packets protected by DTLS.
The entire Babel packet, from the Magic byte at the start of the The entire Babel packet, from the Magic byte at the start of the
Babel header to the last byte of the Babel packet trailer, is sent Babel header to the last byte of the Babel packet trailer, is sent
protected by DTLS. protected by DTLS.
2.3. Transmission 2.3. Transmission
When sending packets, Babel over DTLS nodes MUST NOT send any TLVs When sending packets, Babel over DTLS nodes MUST NOT send any TLVs
over the unprotected "babel" port, with the exception of Hello TLVs over the unprotected "babel" port, with the exception of Hello TLVs
without the Unicast flag set. Babel over DTLS nodes MUST NOT send without the Unicast flag set. Babel over DTLS nodes MUST NOT send
any unprotected unicast packets. This ensures the confidentiality of any unprotected unicast packets. This ensures the confidentiality of
the information sent in Babel packets (e.g. the network topology) by the information sent in Babel packets (e.g., the network topology) by
only sending it encrypted by DTLS. Unless some out-of-band neighbor only sending it encrypted by DTLS. Unless some out-of-band neighbour
discovery mechanism is available, nodes SHOULD periodically send discovery mechanism is available, nodes SHOULD periodically send
unprotected multicast Hellos to ensure discovery of new neighbours. unprotected multicast Hellos to ensure discovery of new neighbours.
In order to maintain bidirectional reachability, nodes can either In order to maintain bidirectional reachability, nodes can either
rely entirely on unprotected multicast Hellos, or send protected rely entirely on unprotected multicast Hellos, or send protected
unicast Hellos in addition to the multicast Hellos. unicast Hellos in addition to the multicast Hellos.
Since Babel over DTLS only protects unicast packets, implementors may Since Babel over DTLS only protects unicast packets, implementors may
implement Babel over DTLS by modifying an implementation of Babel implement Babel over DTLS by modifying an implementation of Babel
without DTLS support, and replacing any TLV previously sent over without DTLS support, and replacing any TLV previously sent over
multicast with a separate TLV sent over unicast for each neighbour. multicast with a separate TLV sent over unicast for each neighbour.
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2.4. Reception 2.4. Reception
Babel over DTLS nodes can receive Babel packets either protected over Babel over DTLS nodes can receive Babel packets either protected over
a DTLS connection, or unprotected directly over the "babel" port. To a DTLS connection, or unprotected directly over the "babel" port. To
ensure the security properties of this mechanism, unprotected packets ensure the security properties of this mechanism, unprotected packets
are treated differently. Nodes MUST silently ignore any unprotected are treated differently. Nodes MUST silently ignore any unprotected
packet sent over unicast. When parsing an unprotected packet, a node packet sent over unicast. When parsing an unprotected packet, a node
MUST silently ignore all TLVs that are not of type Hello. Nodes MUST MUST silently ignore all TLVs that are not of type Hello. Nodes MUST
also silently ignore any unprotected Hello with the Unicast flag set. also silently ignore any unprotected Hello with the Unicast flag set.
Note that receiving an unprotected packet can still be used to Note that receiving an unprotected packet can still be used to
discover new neighbors, even when all TLVs in that packet are discover new neighbours, even when all TLVs in that packet are
silently ignored. silently ignored.
2.5. Neighbour table entry 2.5. Neighbour table entry
It is RECOMMENDED for nodes to associate the state of their DTLS It is RECOMMENDED for nodes to associate the state of their DTLS
connection with their neighbour table. When a neighbour entry is connection with their neighbour table. When a neighbour entry is
flushed from the neighbour table (Appendix A of [RFC6126bis]), its flushed from the neighbour table (Appendix A of [RFC6126bis]), its
associated DTLS state SHOULD be discarded. The node SHOULD send a associated DTLS state SHOULD be discarded. The node SHOULD send a
DTLS close_notify alert to the neighbour if it believes the link is DTLS close_notify alert to the neighbour if it believes the link is
still viable. still viable.
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2.6. Simultaneous operation of both Babel over DTLS and unprotected 2.6. Simultaneous operation of both Babel over DTLS and unprotected
Babel Babel
Implementations MAY implement both Babel over DTLS and unprotected Implementations MAY implement both Babel over DTLS and unprotected
Babel. However, accepting unprotected Babel packets (other than Babel. However, accepting unprotected Babel packets (other than
multicast Hellos) loses the security properties of Babel over DTLS. multicast Hellos) loses the security properties of Babel over DTLS.
A node MAY allow configuration options to allow unprotected Babel on A node MAY allow configuration options to allow unprotected Babel on
some interfaces but not others; this effectively gives nodes on that some interfaces but not others; this effectively gives nodes on that
interface the same access as authenticated nodes, and SHOULD NOT be interface the same access as authenticated nodes, and SHOULD NOT be
done unless that interface has a mechanism to authenticate nodes at a done unless that interface has a mechanism to authenticate nodes at a
lower layer (e.g. IPsec). lower layer (e.g., IPsec).
3. Interface Maximum Transmission Unit Issues 3. Interface Maximum Transmission Unit Issues
Compared to unprotected Babel, DTLS adds header, authentication tag Compared to unprotected Babel, DTLS adds header, authentication tag
and possibly block-size padding overhead to every packet. This and possibly block-size padding overhead to every packet. This
reduces the size of the Babel payload that can be carried. This reduces the size of the Babel payload that can be carried. This
document does not relax the packet size requirements in Section 4 of document does not relax the packet size requirements in Section 4 of
[RFC6126bis], but recommends that DTLS overhead be taken into account [RFC6126bis], but recommends that DTLS overhead be taken into account
when computing maximum packet size. when computing maximum packet size.
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speaker MUST be able to receive packets that are as large as any speaker MUST be able to receive packets that are as large as any
attached interface's MTU adjusted for UDP and IP headers or 512 attached interface's MTU adjusted for UDP and IP headers or 512
octets, whichever is larger. Note that this requirement on reception octets, whichever is larger. Note that this requirement on reception
does not take into account the overhead of DTLS because the peer may does not take into account the overhead of DTLS because the peer may
not have the ability to compute the overhead of DTLS and the packet not have the ability to compute the overhead of DTLS and the packet
may be fragmented by lower layers. may be fragmented by lower layers.
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
If this document is approved, IANA is requested to register a UDP If this document is approved, IANA is requested to register a UDP
port number, called "babel-dtls", for use by Babel over DTLS. The port number, called "babel-dtls", for use by Babel over DTLS.
IANA registry will include a reference to this document. Details of the request to IANA are as follows:
o Assignee: David Schinazi, dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com
o Contact Person: David Schinazi, dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com
o Transport Protocols: UDP only
o Service Code: None
o Service Name: babel-dtls
o Desired Port Number: 6699
o Description: Babel Routing Protocol over DTLS
o Reference: This document
o Defined TXT Keys: None
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
Confidential interaction between two Babel peers requires Datagram Confidential interaction between two Babel peers requires Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) with a cipher suite offering Transport Layer Security (DTLS) with a cipher suite offering
confidentiality protection. The guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST be confidentiality protection. The guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST be
followed to avoid attacks on DTLS. followed to avoid attacks on DTLS.
A malicious client might attempt to perform a high number of DTLS A malicious client might attempt to perform a high number of DTLS
handshakes with a server. As the clients are not uniquely identified handshakes with a server. As the clients are not uniquely identified
skipping to change at page 7, line 16 skipping to change at page 7, line 31
6.1. Normative References 6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6126bis] [RFC6126bis]
Chroboczek, J. and D. Schinazi, "The Babel Routing Chroboczek, J. and D. Schinazi, "The Babel Routing
Protocol", Internet Draft draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-07, Protocol", Internet Draft draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-09,
November 2018. November 2018.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347, Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>. January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
6.2. Informative References 6.2. Informative References
[BABEL-HMAC] [BABEL-HMAC]
Do, C., Kolodziejak, W., and J. Chroboczek, "Babel Do, C., Kolodziejak, W., and J. Chroboczek, "Babel
Cryptographic Authentication", Internet Draft draft-ietf- Cryptographic Authentication", Internet Draft draft-ietf-
babel-hmac-03, November 2018. babel-hmac-04, November 2018.
[DTLS-CID] [DTLS-CID]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., Fossati, T., and T. Gondrom, Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., Fossati, T., and T. Gondrom,
"Connection Identifiers for DTLS 1.2", Internet Draft "Connection Identifiers for DTLS 1.2", Internet Draft
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-02, October 2018. draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, October 2018.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J., [RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250, Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>. June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
skipping to change at page 8, line 36 skipping to change at page 8, line 48
Information Extension avoids transmitting the server's certificate Information Extension avoids transmitting the server's certificate
and certificate chain if the client has cached that information from and certificate chain if the client has cached that information from
a previous TLS handshake. TLS False Start [RFC7918] can reduce round a previous TLS handshake. TLS False Start [RFC7918] can reduce round
trips by allowing the TLS second flight of messages trips by allowing the TLS second flight of messages
(ChangeCipherSpec) to also contain the (encrypted) Babel packet. (ChangeCipherSpec) to also contain the (encrypted) Babel packet.
Appendix B. Acknowledgments Appendix B. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Donald Eastlake, Thomas Fossati, The authors would like to thank Donald Eastlake, Thomas Fossati,
Gabriel Kerneis, Antoni Przygienda, Barbara Stark, Markus Stenberg, Gabriel Kerneis, Antoni Przygienda, Barbara Stark, Markus Stenberg,
Dave Taht, Martin Thomson, and Sean Turner for their input and Dave Taht, Martin Thomson, Sean Turner and Martin Vigoureux for their
contributions. The performance considerations in this document were input and contributions. The performance considerations in this
inspired from the ones for DNS over DTLS [RFC8094]. document were inspired from the ones for DNS over DTLS [RFC8094].
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Antonin Decimo Antonin Decimo
IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
Paris Paris
France France
Email: antonin.decimo@gmail.com Email: antonin.decimo@gmail.com
David Schinazi David Schinazi
Google LLC Google LLC
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, California 94043 Mountain View, California 94043
USA USA
Email: dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com Email: dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com
Juliusz Chroboczek Juliusz Chroboczek
IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
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