draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-03.txt   draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-04.txt 
v6ops Working Group E. Levy-Abegnoli v6ops Working Group E. Levy-Abegnoli
Internet-Draft G. Van de Velde Internet-Draft G. Van de Velde
Intended status: Informational C. Popoviciu Intended status: Informational C. Popoviciu
Expires: November 29, 2009 Cisco Systems Expires: June 1, 2010 Cisco Systems
J. Mohacsi J. Mohacsi
NIIF/Hungarnet NIIF/Hungarnet
May 28, 2009 November 28, 2009
IPv6 RA-Guard IPv6 RA-Guard
<draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-03.txt> <draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-04.txt>
Abstract
It is particularly easy to experience "rogue" routers on an unsecured
link [reference4]. Devices acting as a rougue router may send
illegitimate RAs. Section 6 of SeND [RFC3971] provides a full
solution to this problem, by enabling routers certification. This
solution does, however, require all nodes on an L2 network segment to
support SeND, as well as it carries some deployment challenges. End-
nodes must be provisioned with certificate anchors. The solution
works better when end-nodes have access to a Certificate Revocation
List server, and to a Network Time Protocol server, both typically
off-link, which brings some bootstrap issues.
When using IPv6 within a single L2 network segment it is possible and
sometimes desirable to enable layer 2 devices to drop rogue RAs
before they reach end-nodes. In order to distinguish valid from
rogue RAs, the L2 devices can use a spectrum of criterias, from a
static scheme that blocks RAs received on un-trusted ports, or from
un-trusted sources, to a more dynamic scheme that uses SeND to
challenge RA sources.
This document reviews various techniques applicable on the L2 devices
to reduce the threat of rogue RAs.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may contain material provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly
available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the
copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF
Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the
IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from
the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this
document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and
derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards
Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to
translate it into languages other than English.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 29, 2009. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 1, 2010.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Abstract include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
It is particularly easy to experience "rogue" routers on an unsecured described in the BSD License.
link [reference4]. Devices acting as a rougue router may send
illegitimate RAs. Section 6 of SeND [RFC3971] provides a full
solution to this problem, by enabling routers certification. This
solution does, however, require all nodes on an L2 network segment to
support SeND, as well as it carries some deployment challenges. End-
nodes must be provisioned with certificate anchors. The solution
works better when end-nodes have access to a Certificate Revocation
List server, and to a Network Time Protocol server, both typically
off-link, which brings some bootstrap issues.
When using IPv6 within a single L2 network segment it is possible and
sometimes desirable to enable layer 2 devices to drop rogue RAs
before they reach end-nodes. In order to distinguish valid from
rogue RAs, the L2 devices can use a spectrum of criterias, from a
static scheme that blocks RAs received on un-trusted ports, or from
un-trusted sources, to a more dynamic scheme that uses SeND to
challenge RA sources.
This document reviews various techniques applicable on the L2 devices This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
to reduce the threat of rogue RAs. Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Model and Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Model and Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Stateless RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Stateless RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Stateful RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Stateful RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. SeND-based RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. SeND-based RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. RA-Guard Use Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. RA-Guard Use Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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