draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-02.txt   draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-03.txt 
v6ops Working Group E. Levy-Abegnoli v6ops Working Group E. Levy-Abegnoli
Internet-Draft G. Van de Velde Internet-Draft G. Van de Velde
Intended status: Informational C. Popoviciu Intended status: Informational C. Popoviciu
Expires: September 6, 2009 Cisco Systems Expires: November 29, 2009 Cisco Systems
J. Mohacsi J. Mohacsi
NIIF/Hungarnet NIIF/Hungarnet
March 5, 2009 May 28, 2009
IPv6 RA-Guard IPv6 RA-Guard
<draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-02.txt> <draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-03.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Abstract Abstract
It is particularly easy to experience "rogue" routers on an unsecured It is particularly easy to experience "rogue" routers on an unsecured
link. Devices acting as a rougue router may send illegitimate RAs. link [reference4]. Devices acting as a rougue router may send
Section 6 of SeND [RFC3971] provides a full solution to this problem, illegitimate RAs. Section 6 of SeND [RFC3971] provides a full
by enabling routers certification. This solution does, however, solution to this problem, by enabling routers certification. This
require all nodes on an L2 network segment to support SeND, as well solution does, however, require all nodes on an L2 network segment to
as it carries some deployment challenges. End-nodes must be support SeND, as well as it carries some deployment challenges. End-
provisioned with certificate anchors. The solution works better when nodes must be provisioned with certificate anchors. The solution
end-nodes have access to a Certificate Revocation List server, and to works better when end-nodes have access to a Certificate Revocation
a Network Time Protocol server, both typically off-link, which brings List server, and to a Network Time Protocol server, both typically
some bootstrap issues. off-link, which brings some bootstrap issues.
When using IPv6 within a single L2 network segment it is possible and When using IPv6 within a single L2 network segment it is possible and
sometimes desirable to enable layer 2 devices to drop rogue RAs sometimes desirable to enable layer 2 devices to drop rogue RAs
before they reach end-nodes. In order to distinguish valid from before they reach end-nodes. In order to distinguish valid from
rogue RAs, the L2 devices can use a spectrum of criterias, from a rogue RAs, the L2 devices can use a spectrum of criterias, from a
static scheme that blocks RAs received on un-trusted ports, or from static scheme that blocks RAs received on un-trusted ports, or from
un-trusted sources, to a more dynamic scheme that uses SeND to un-trusted sources, to a more dynamic scheme that uses SeND to
challenge RA sources. challenge RA sources.
This document reviews various techniques applicable on the L2 devices This document reviews various techniques applicable on the L2 devices
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1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Model and Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Model and Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Stateless RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Stateless RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Stateful RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Stateful RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. SeND-based RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. SeND-based RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. RA-Guard Use Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. RA-Guard Use Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
When operating IPv6 in a shared L2 network segment without complete When operating IPv6 in a shared L2 network segment without complete
SeND support by all devices connected or without the availability of SeND support by all devices connected or without the availability of
the infrastructure necessary to support SeND, there is always the the infrastructure necessary to support SeND, there is always the
risk of facing operational problems due to rogue Router risk of facing operational problems due to rogue Router
Advertisements generated maliciously or unintentionally by Advertisements generated maliciously or unintentionally by
unauthorized or improperly configured routers connecting to the unauthorized or improperly configured routers connecting to the
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possible instances of accidently filtered legitimate RA's assuming possible instances of accidently filtered legitimate RA's assuming
the RA-Guard filter enforcement follows strictly the RA-Guard the RA-Guard filter enforcement follows strictly the RA-Guard
criteria's. criteria's.
8. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
The authors dedicate this document to the memory of Jun-ichiro Hagino The authors dedicate this document to the memory of Jun-ichiro Hagino
(itojun) for his contributions to the development and deployment of (itojun) for his contributions to the development and deployment of
IPv6. IPv6.
9. Normative References 9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005. Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, [RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861, "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
September 2007. September 2007.
9.2. Informative References
[reference1] [reference1]
LORIA/INRIA, "NDPMon - IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol LORIA/INRIA, "NDPMon - IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol
Monitor (http://ndpmon.sourceforge.net/)", November 2007. Monitor (http://ndpmon.sourceforge.net/)", November 2007.
[reference2] [reference2]
KAME Project, "rafixd - developed at KAME - An active KAME Project, "rafixd - developed at KAME - An active
rogue RA nullifier (http://www.kame.net/dev/cvsweb2.cgi/ rogue RA nullifier (http://www.kame.net/dev/cvsweb2.cgi/
kame/kame/kame/rafixd/)", November 2007. kame/kame/kame/rafixd/)", November 2007.
[reference3] [reference3]
Hagino (itojun), Jun-ichiro., "Discussion of the various Hagino (itojun), Jun-ichiro., "Discussion of the various
solutions (http://ipv6samurais.com/ipv6samurais/ solutions (http://ipv6samurais.com/ipv6samurais/
demystified/rogue-RA.html)", 2007. demystified/rogue-RA.html)", 2007.
[reference4]
Chown, Tim. and Stig. Venaas, "Rogue IPv6 Router
Advertisement Problem (draft-ietf-v6ops-rogue-ra-00.txt)",
May 2009.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Eric Levy Abegnoli Eric Levy Abegnoli
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Village d'Entreprises Green Side - 400, Avenue Roumanille Village d'Entreprises Green Side - 400, Avenue Roumanille
Biot - Sophia Antipolis, PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D'AZUR 06410 Biot - Sophia Antipolis, PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D'AZUR 06410
France France
Phone: +33 49 723 2620 Phone: +33 49 723 2620
Email: elevyabe@cisco.com Email: elevyabe@cisco.com
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