draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-01.txt   draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-02.txt 
v6ops Working Group E. Levy-Abegnoli v6ops Working Group E. Levy-Abegnoli
Internet-Draft G. Van de Velde Internet-Draft G. Van de Velde
Expires: March 14, 2009 C. Popoviciu Intended status: Informational C. Popoviciu
Cisco Systems Expires: September 6, 2009 Cisco Systems
J. Mohacsi J. Mohacsi
NIIF/Hungarnet NIIF/Hungarnet
September 10, 2008 March 5, 2009
IPv6 RA-Guard IPv6 RA-Guard
<draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-01.txt> <draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-02.txt>
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Abstract Abstract
It is particularly easy to experience "rogue" routers on an unsecured It is particularly easy to experience "rogue" routers on an unsecured
link. Devices acting as a rougue router may send illegitimate RAs. link. Devices acting as a rougue router may send illegitimate RAs.
Section 6 of SeND [RFC3971] provides a full solution to this problem, Section 6 of SeND [RFC3971] provides a full solution to this problem,
by enabling routers certification. This solution does, however, by enabling routers certification. This solution does, however,
require all nodes on an L2 network segment to support SeND, as well require all nodes on an L2 network segment to support SeND, as well
as it carries some deployment challenges. End-nodes must be as it carries some deployment challenges. End-nodes must be
provisioned with certificate anchors. The solution works better when provisioned with certificate anchors. The solution works better when
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rogue RAs, the L2 devices can use a spectrum of criterias, from a rogue RAs, the L2 devices can use a spectrum of criterias, from a
static scheme that blocks RAs received on un-trusted ports, or from static scheme that blocks RAs received on un-trusted ports, or from
un-trusted sources, to a more dynamic scheme that uses SeND to un-trusted sources, to a more dynamic scheme that uses SeND to
challenge RA sources. challenge RA sources.
This document reviews various techniques applicable on the L2 devices This document reviews various techniques applicable on the L2 devices
to reduce the threat of rogue RAs. to reduce the threat of rogue RAs.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Model and Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Model and Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Stateless RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Stateless RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Stateful RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Stateful RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. SeND-based RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. SeND-based RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. RA-Guard Use Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. RA-Guard Use Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
When operating IPv6 in a shared L2 network segment without complete When operating IPv6 in a shared L2 network segment without complete
SeND support by all devices connected or without the availability of SeND support by all devices connected or without the availability of
the infrastructure necessary to support SeND, there is always the the infrastructure necessary to support SeND, there is always the
risk of facing operational problems due to rogue Router risk of facing operational problems due to rogue Router
Advertisements generated maliciously or unintentionally by Advertisements generated maliciously or unintentionally by
unauthorized or improperly configured routers connecting to the unauthorized or improperly configured routers connecting to the
segment. segment.
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RA-Guard mechanisms do not offer protection in environments where RA-Guard mechanisms do not offer protection in environments where
IPv6 traffic is tunneled. IPv6 traffic is tunneled.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
There are no extra IANA consideration for this document. There are no extra IANA consideration for this document.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
There are no extra Security consideration for this document. Once RA-Guard has setup the proper criterias, for example, it
identified that a port is allowed to receive RAs, or it identified
legitimiate sources of RA, or certificate base, then there is no
possible instances of accidently filtered legitimate RA's assuming
the RA-Guard filter enforcement follows strictly the RA-Guard
criteria's.
8. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
The authors dedicate this document to the memory of Jun-ichiro Hagino The authors dedicate this document to the memory of Jun-ichiro Hagino
(itojun) for his contributions to the development and deployment of (itojun) for his contributions to the development and deployment of
IPv6. IPv6.
9. Normative References 9. Normative References
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
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Email: cpopovic@cisco.com Email: cpopovic@cisco.com
Janos Mohacsi Janos Mohacsi
NIIF/Hungarnet NIIF/Hungarnet
18-22 Victor Hugo 18-22 Victor Hugo
Budapest H-1132 Budapest H-1132
Hungary Hungary
Phone: tbc Phone: tbc
Email: mohacsi@niif.hu Email: mohacsi@niif.hu
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