draft-ietf-v6ops-mech-v2-07.txt   rfc4213.txt 
INTERNET-DRAFT E. Nordmark Network Working Group E. Nordmark
March 29, 2005 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Request for Comments: 4213 Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Obsoletes: 2893 R. E. Gilligan Obsoletes: 2893 R. Gilligan
Intransa, Inc. Category: Standards Track Intransa, Inc.
October 2005
Basic Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers Basic Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers
<draft-ietf-v6ops-mech-v2-07.txt>
Status of this Memo
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and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
RFC 3668.
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This draft expires on September 29, 2005. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies IPv4 compatibility mechanisms that can be This document specifies IPv4 compatibility mechanisms that can be
implemented by IPv6 hosts and routers. Two mechanisms are specified, implemented by IPv6 hosts and routers. Two mechanisms are specified,
"dual stack" and configured tunneling. Dual stack implies providing dual stack and configured tunneling. Dual stack implies providing
complete implementations of both versions of the Internet Protocol complete implementations of both versions of the Internet Protocol
(IPv4 and IPv6) and configured tunneling provides a means to carry (IPv4 and IPv6), and configured tunneling provides a means to carry
IPv6 packets over unmodified IPv4 routing infrastructures. IPv6 packets over unmodified IPv4 routing infrastructures.
This document obsoletes RFC 2893. This document obsoletes RFC 2893.
Contents Table of Contents
Status of this Memo.......................................... 1
1. Introduction............................................. 3
1.1. Terminology......................................... 3
2. Dual IP Layer Operation.................................. 5
2.1. Address Configuration............................... 5
2.2. DNS................................................. 5
3. Configured Tunneling Mechanisms.......................... 6
3.1. Encapsulation....................................... 8
3.2. Tunnel MTU and Fragmentation........................ 8
3.2.1. Static Tunnel MTU.............................. 9
3.2.2. Dynamic Tunnel MTU............................. 10
3.3. Hop Limit........................................... 11
3.4. Handling ICMPv4 errors.............................. 12
3.5. IPv4 Header Construction............................ 14
3.6. Decapsulation....................................... 15
3.7. Link-Local Addresses................................ 18
3.8. Neighbor Discovery over Tunnels..................... 19
4. Threat Related to Source Address Spoofing................ 20
5. IANA Considerations...................................... 21
6. Security Considerations.................................. 21
7. Acknowledgments.......................................... 23
8. References............................................... 23
8.1. Normative References................................ 23
8.2. Informative References.............................. 23
9. Authors' Addresses....................................... 25
10. Changes from RFC 2893................................... 26 1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Terminology ................................................3
2. Dual IP Layer Operation .........................................4
2.1. Address Configuration ......................................5
2.2. DNS ........................................................5
3. Configured Tunneling Mechanisms .................................6
3.1. Encapsulation ..............................................7
3.2. Tunnel MTU and Fragmentation ...............................8
3.2.1. Static Tunnel MTU ...................................9
3.2.2. Dynamic Tunnel MTU ..................................9
3.3. Hop Limit .................................................11
3.4. Handling ICMPv4 Errors ....................................11
3.5. IPv4 Header Construction ..................................13
3.6. Decapsulation .............................................14
3.7. Link-Local Addresses ......................................17
3.8. Neighbor Discovery over Tunnels ...........................18
4. Threat Related to Source Address Spoofing ......................18
5. Security Considerations ........................................19
6. Acknowledgements ...............................................21
7. References .....................................................21
7.1. Normative References ......................................21
7.2. Informative References ....................................21
8. Changes from RFC 2893 ..........................................23
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The key to a successful IPv6 transition is compatibility with the The key to a successful IPv6 transition is compatibility with the
large installed base of IPv4 hosts and routers. Maintaining large installed base of IPv4 hosts and routers. Maintaining
compatibility with IPv4 while deploying IPv6 will streamline the task compatibility with IPv4 while deploying IPv6 will streamline the task
of transitioning the Internet to IPv6. This specification defines of transitioning the Internet to IPv6. This specification defines
two mechanisms that IPv6 hosts and routers may implement in order to two mechanisms that IPv6 hosts and routers may implement in order to
be compatible with IPv4 hosts and routers. be compatible with IPv4 hosts and routers.
The mechanisms in this document are designed to be employed by IPv6 The mechanisms in this document are designed to be employed by IPv6
hosts and routers that need to interoperate with IPv4 hosts and hosts and routers that need to interoperate with IPv4 hosts and
utilize IPv4 routing infrastructures. We expect that most nodes in utilize IPv4 routing infrastructures. We expect that most nodes in
the Internet will need such compatibility for a long time to come, the Internet will need such compatibility for a long time to come,
and perhaps even indefinitely. and perhaps even indefinitely.
The mechanisms specified here are: The mechanisms specified here are:
- Dual IP layer (also known as Dual Stack): A technique for - Dual IP layer (also known as dual stack): A technique for
providing complete support for both Internet protocols -- IPv4 providing complete support for both Internet protocols -- IPv4 and
and IPv6 -- in hosts and routers. IPv6 -- in hosts and routers.
- Configured tunneling of IPv6 over IPv4: A technique for - Configured tunneling of IPv6 over IPv4: A technique for
establishing point-to-point tunnels by encapsulating IPv6 establishing point-to-point tunnels by encapsulating IPv6 packets
packets within IPv4 headers to carry them over IPv4 routing within IPv4 headers to carry them over IPv4 routing
infrastructures. infrastructures.
The mechanisms defined here are intended to be the core of a The mechanisms defined here are intended to be the core of a
"transition toolbox" -- a growing collection of techniques which "transition toolbox" -- a growing collection of techniques that
implementations and users may employ to ease the transition. The implementations and users may employ to ease the transition. The
tools may be used as needed. Implementations and sites decide which tools may be used as needed. Implementations and sites decide which
techniques are appropriate to their specific needs. techniques are appropriate to their specific needs.
This document defines the basic set of transition mechanisms, but This document defines the basic set of transition mechanisms, but
these are not the only tools available. Additional transition and these are not the only tools available. Additional transition and
compatibility mechanisms are specified in other documents. compatibility mechanisms are specified in other documents.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The following terms are used in this document: The following terms are used in this document:
Types of Nodes Types of Nodes
IPv4-only node: IPv4-only node:
A host or router that implements only IPv4. An IPv4- A host or router that implements only IPv4. An IPv4-only node
only node does not understand IPv6. The installed base does not understand IPv6. The installed base of IPv4 hosts and
of IPv4 hosts and routers existing before the transition routers existing before the transition begins are IPv4-only
begins are IPv4-only nodes. nodes.
IPv6/IPv4 node: IPv6/IPv4 node:
A host or router that implements both IPv4 and IPv6. A host or router that implements both IPv4 and IPv6.
IPv6-only node: IPv6-only node:
A host or router that implements IPv6, and does not A host or router that implements IPv6 and does not implement
implement IPv4. The operation of IPv6-only nodes is not IPv4. The operation of IPv6-only nodes is not addressed in
addressed in this memo. this memo.
IPv6 node: IPv6 node:
Any host or router that implements IPv6. IPv6/IPv4 and Any host or router that implements IPv6. IPv6/IPv4 and IPv6-
IPv6-only nodes are both IPv6 nodes. only nodes are both IPv6 nodes.
IPv4 node: IPv4 node:
Any host or router that implements IPv4. IPv6/IPv4 and Any host or router that implements IPv4. IPv6/IPv4 and IPv4-
IPv4-only nodes are both IPv4 nodes. only nodes are both IPv4 nodes.
Techniques Used in the Transition Techniques Used in the Transition
IPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling: IPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling:
The technique of encapsulating IPv6 packets within IPv4 The technique of encapsulating IPv6 packets within IPv4 so that
so that they can be carried across IPv4 routing they can be carried across IPv4 routing infrastructures.
infrastructures.
Configured tunneling: Configured tunneling:
IPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling where the IPv4 tunnel endpoint IPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling where the IPv4 tunnel endpoint
address(es) are determined by configuration information address(es) are determined by configuration information on
on tunnel endpoints. All tunnels are assumed to be tunnel endpoints. All tunnels are assumed to be bidirectional.
bidirectional. The tunnel provides a (virtual) point- The tunnel provides a (virtual) point-to-point link to the IPv6
to-point link to the IPv6 layer, using the configured layer, using the configured IPv4 addresses as the lower-layer
IPv4 addresses as the lower layer endpoint addresses. endpoint addresses.
Other transition mechanisms, including other tunneling mechanisms, Other transition mechanisms, including other tunneling mechanisms,
are outside the scope of this document. are outside the scope of this document.
The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this
document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Dual IP Layer Operation 2. Dual IP Layer Operation
The most straightforward way for IPv6 nodes to remain compatible with The most straightforward way for IPv6 nodes to remain compatible with
IPv4-only nodes is by providing a complete IPv4 implementation. IPv6 IPv4-only nodes is by providing a complete IPv4 implementation. IPv6
nodes that provide complete IPv4 and IPv6 implementations are called nodes that provide complete IPv4 and IPv6 implementations are called
"IPv6/IPv4 nodes." IPv6/IPv4 nodes have the ability to send and "IPv6/IPv4 nodes". IPv6/IPv4 nodes have the ability to send and
receive both IPv4 and IPv6 packets. They can directly interoperate receive both IPv4 and IPv6 packets. They can directly interoperate
with IPv4 nodes using IPv4 packets, and also directly interoperate with IPv4 nodes using IPv4 packets, and also directly interoperate
with IPv6 nodes using IPv6 packets. with IPv6 nodes using IPv6 packets.
Even though a node may be equipped to support both protocols, one or Even though a node may be equipped to support both protocols, one or
the other stack may be disabled for operational reasons. Here we use the other stack may be disabled for operational reasons. Here we use
a rather loose notion of "stack". A stack being enabled has IP a rather loose notion of "stack". A stack being enabled has IP
addresses assigned etc, but whether or not any particular application addresses assigned, but whether or not any particular application is
is available on the stacks is explicitly not defined. Thus IPv6/IPv4 available on the stacks is explicitly not defined. Thus, IPv6/IPv4
nodes may be operated in one of three modes: nodes may be operated in one of three modes:
- With their IPv4 stack enabled and their IPv6 stack disabled. - With their IPv4 stack enabled and their IPv6 stack disabled.
- With their IPv6 stack enabled and their IPv4 stack disabled. - With their IPv6 stack enabled and their IPv4 stack disabled.
- With both stacks enabled. - With both stacks enabled.
IPv6/IPv4 nodes with their IPv6 stack disabled will operate like IPv6/IPv4 nodes with their IPv6 stack disabled will operate like
IPv4-only nodes. Similarly, IPv6/IPv4 nodes with their IPv4 stacks IPv4-only nodes. Similarly, IPv6/IPv4 nodes with their IPv4 stacks
disabled will operate like IPv6-only nodes. IPv6/IPv4 nodes MAY disabled will operate like IPv6-only nodes. IPv6/IPv4 nodes MAY
provide a configuration switch to disable either their IPv4 or IPv6 provide a configuration switch to disable either their IPv4 or IPv6
stack. stack.
The configured tunneling technique, which is described in section 3, The configured tunneling technique, which is described in Section 3,
may or may not be used in addition to the dual IP layer operation. may or may not be used in addition to the dual IP layer operation.
2.1. Address Configuration 2.1. Address Configuration
Because the nodes support both protocols, IPv6/IPv4 nodes may be Because the nodes support both protocols, IPv6/IPv4 nodes may be
configured with both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. IPv6/IPv4 nodes use configured with both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. IPv6/IPv4 nodes use
IPv4 mechanisms (e.g., DHCP) to acquire their IPv4 addresses, and IPv4 mechanisms (e.g., DHCP) to acquire their IPv4 addresses, and
IPv6 protocol mechanisms (e.g., stateless address autoconfiguration IPv6 protocol mechanisms (e.g., stateless address autoconfiguration
and/or DHCPv6) to acquire their IPv6 addresses. [RFC2462] and/or DHCPv6) to acquire their IPv6 addresses.
2.2. DNS 2.2. DNS
The Domain Naming System (DNS) is used in both IPv4 and IPv6 to map The Domain Naming System (DNS) is used in both IPv4 and IPv6 to map
between hostnames and IP addresses. A new resource record type named between hostnames and IP addresses. A new resource record type named
"AAAA" has been defined for IPv6 addresses [RFC3596]. Since "AAAA" has been defined for IPv6 addresses [RFC3596]. Since
IPv6/IPv4 nodes must be able to interoperate directly with both IPv4 IPv6/IPv4 nodes must be able to interoperate directly with both IPv4
and IPv6 nodes, they must provide resolver libraries capable of and IPv6 nodes, they must provide resolver libraries capable of
dealing with IPv4 "A" records as well as IPv6 "AAAA" records. Note dealing with IPv4 "A" records as well as IPv6 "AAAA" records. Note
that the lookup of A versus AAAA records is independent of whether that the lookup of A versus AAAA records is independent of whether
the DNS packets are carried in IPv4 or IPv6 packets, and that there the DNS packets are carried in IPv4 or IPv6 packets and that there is
is no assumption that the DNS servers know the IPv4/IPv6 capabilities no assumption that the DNS servers know the IPv4/IPv6 capabilities of
of the requesting node. the requesting node.
The issues and operational guidelines for using IPv6 with DNS are The issues and operational guidelines for using IPv6 with DNS are
described at more length in other documents [DNSOPV6]. described at more length in other documents, e.g., [DNSOPV6].
DNS resolver libraries on IPv6/IPv4 nodes MUST be capable of handling DNS resolver libraries on IPv6/IPv4 nodes MUST be capable of handling
both AAAA and A records. However, when a query locates an AAAA both AAAA and A records. However, when a query locates an AAAA
record holding an IPv6 address, and an A record holding an IPv4 record holding an IPv6 address, and an A record holding an IPv4
address, the resolver library MAY order the results returned to the address, the resolver library MAY order the results returned to the
application in order to influence the version of IP packets used to application in order to influence the version of IP packets used to
communicate with that specific node -- IPv6 first, or IPv4 first. communicate with that specific node -- IPv6 first, or IPv4 first.
The applications SHOULD be able to specify whether they want IPv4, The applications SHOULD be able to specify whether they want IPv4,
IPv6 or both records [RFC3493]. That defines which address families IPv6, or both records [RFC3493]. That defines which address families
the resolver looks up. If there isn't an application choice, or if the resolver looks up. If there is not an application choice, or if
the application has requested both, the resolver library MUST NOT the application has requested both, the resolver library MUST NOT
filter out any records. filter out any records.
Since most applications try the addresses in the order they are Since most applications try the addresses in the order they are
returned by the resolver, this can affect the IP version "preference" returned by the resolver, this can affect the IP version "preference"
of applications. of applications.
The actual ordering mechanisms are out of scope of this memo. The actual ordering mechanisms are out of scope of this memo.
Address selection is described at more length in [RFC3484]. Address selection is described at more length in [RFC3484].
3. Configured Tunneling Mechanisms 3. Configured Tunneling Mechanisms
In most deployment scenarios, the IPv6 routing infrastructure will be In most deployment scenarios, the IPv6 routing infrastructure will be
built up over time. While the IPv6 infrastructure is being deployed, built up over time. While the IPv6 infrastructure is being deployed,
the existing IPv4 routing infrastructure can remain functional, and the existing IPv4 routing infrastructure can remain functional and
can be used to carry IPv6 traffic. Tunneling provides a way to can be used to carry IPv6 traffic. Tunneling provides a way to
utilize an existing IPv4 routing infrastructure to carry IPv6 utilize an existing IPv4 routing infrastructure to carry IPv6
traffic. traffic.
IPv6/IPv4 hosts and routers can tunnel IPv6 datagrams over regions of IPv6/IPv4 hosts and routers can tunnel IPv6 datagrams over regions of
IPv4 routing topology by encapsulating them within IPv4 packets. IPv4 routing topology by encapsulating them within IPv4 packets.
Tunneling can be used in a variety of ways: Tunneling can be used in a variety of ways:
- Router-to-Router. IPv6/IPv4 routers interconnected by an IPv4 - Router-to-Router. IPv6/IPv4 routers interconnected by an IPv4
infrastructure can tunnel IPv6 packets between themselves. In infrastructure can tunnel IPv6 packets between themselves. In
this case, the tunnel spans one segment of the end-to-end path this case, the tunnel spans one segment of the end-to-end path
that the IPv6 packet takes. that the IPv6 packet takes.
- Host-to-Router. IPv6/IPv4 hosts can tunnel IPv6 packets to an - Host-to-Router. IPv6/IPv4 hosts can tunnel IPv6 packets to an
intermediary IPv6/IPv4 router that is reachable via an IPv4 intermediary IPv6/IPv4 router that is reachable via an IPv4
infrastructure. This type of tunnel spans the first segment of infrastructure. This type of tunnel spans the first segment of
the packet's end-to-end path. the packet's end-to-end path.
- Host-to-Host. IPv6/IPv4 hosts that are interconnected by an - Host-to-Host. IPv6/IPv4 hosts that are interconnected by an IPv4
IPv4 infrastructure can tunnel IPv6 packets between themselves. infrastructure can tunnel IPv6 packets between themselves. In
In this case, the tunnel spans the entire end-to-end path that this case, the tunnel spans the entire end-to-end path that the
the packet takes. packet takes.
- Router-to-Host. IPv6/IPv4 routers can tunnel IPv6 packets to - Router-to-Host. IPv6/IPv4 routers can tunnel IPv6 packets to
their final destination IPv6/IPv4 host. This tunnel spans only their final destination IPv6/IPv4 host. This tunnel spans only
the last segment of the end-to-end path. the last segment of the end-to-end path.
Configured tunneling can be used in all of the above cases, but is Configured tunneling can be used in all of the above cases, but it is
most likely to be used router-to-router due to the need to explicitly most likely to be used router-to-router due to the need to explicitly
configure the tunneling endpoints. configure the tunneling endpoints.
The underlying mechanisms for tunneling are: The underlying mechanisms for tunneling are:
- The entry node of the tunnel (the encapsulator) creates an - The entry node of the tunnel (the encapsulator) creates an
encapsulating IPv4 header and transmits the encapsulated packet. encapsulating IPv4 header and transmits the encapsulated packet.
- The exit node of the tunnel (the decapsulator) receives the - The exit node of the tunnel (the decapsulator) receives the
encapsulated packet, reassembles the packet if needed, removes encapsulated packet, reassembles the packet if needed, removes the
the IPv4 header, and processes the received IPv6 packet. IPv4 header, and processes the received IPv6 packet.
- The encapsulator may need to maintain soft state information for - The encapsulator may need to maintain soft-state information for
each tunnel recording such parameters as the MTU of the tunnel each tunnel recording such parameters as the MTU of the tunnel in
in order to process IPv6 packets forwarded into the tunnel. order to process IPv6 packets forwarded into the tunnel.
In configured tunneling, the tunnel endpoint addresses are determined In configured tunneling, the tunnel endpoint addresses are determined
in the encapsulator from configuration information stored for each in the encapsulator from configuration information stored for each
tunnel. When an IPv6 packet is transmitted over a tunnel, the tunnel. When an IPv6 packet is transmitted over a tunnel, the
destination and source addresses for the encapsulating IPv4 header destination and source addresses for the encapsulating IPv4 header
are set as described in Section 3.5. are set as described in Section 3.5.
The determination of which packets to tunnel is usually made by The determination of which packets to tunnel is usually made by
routing information on the encapsulator. This is usually done via a routing information on the encapsulator. This is usually done via a
routing table, which directs packets based on their destination routing table, which directs packets based on their destination
address using the prefix mask and match technique. address using the prefix mask and match technique.
The decapsulator matches the received protocol-41 packets to the The decapsulator matches the received protocol-41 packets to the
tunnels it has configured, and allows only the packets where IPv4 tunnels it has configured, and allows only the packets in which IPv4
source addresses match the tunnels configured on the decapsulator. source addresses match the tunnels configured on the decapsulator.
Therefore the operator must ensure that the tunnel's IPv4 address Therefore, the operator must ensure that the tunnel's IPv4 address
configuration is the same both at the encapsulator and the configuration is the same both at the encapsulator and the
decapsulator. decapsulator.
3.1. Encapsulation 3.1. Encapsulation
The encapsulation of an IPv6 datagram in IPv4 is shown below: The encapsulation of an IPv6 datagram in IPv4 is shown below:
+-------------+ +-------------+
| IPv4 | | IPv4 |
| Header | | Header |
skipping to change at page 8, line 45 skipping to change at page 8, line 17
- Determine when to fragment and when to report an ICMPv6 "packet - Determine when to fragment and when to report an ICMPv6 "packet
too big" error back to the source. too big" error back to the source.
- How to reflect ICMPv4 errors from routers along the tunnel path - How to reflect ICMPv4 errors from routers along the tunnel path
back to the source as ICMPv6 errors. back to the source as ICMPv6 errors.
Those issues are discussed in the following sections. Those issues are discussed in the following sections.
3.2. Tunnel MTU and Fragmentation 3.2. Tunnel MTU and Fragmentation
Naively the encapsulator could view encapsulation as IPv6 using IPv4 Naively, the encapsulator could view encapsulation as IPv6 using IPv4
as a link layer with a very large MTU (65535-20 bytes at most; 20 as a link layer with a very large MTU (65535-20 bytes at most; 20
bytes "extra" are needed for the encapsulating IPv4 header). The bytes "extra" are needed for the encapsulating IPv4 header). The
encapsulator would only need to report ICMPv6 "packet too big" errors encapsulator would only need to report ICMPv6 "packet too big" errors
back to the source for packets that exceed this MTU. However, such a back to the source for packets that exceed this MTU. However, such a
scheme would be inefficient or non-interoperable for three reasons scheme would be inefficient or non-interoperable for three reasons
and therefore MUST NOT be used: and therefore MUST NOT be used:
1) It would result in more fragmentation than needed. IPv4 layer 1) It would result in more fragmentation than needed. IPv4 layer
fragmentation should be avoided due to the performance problems fragmentation should be avoided due to the performance problems
caused by the loss unit being smaller than the retransmission caused by the loss unit being smaller than the retransmission unit
unit [KM97]. [KM97].
2) Any IPv4 fragmentation occurring inside the tunnel, i.e. between 2) Any IPv4 fragmentation occurring inside the tunnel, i.e., between
the encapsulator and the decapsulator, would have to be the encapsulator and the decapsulator, would have to be
reassembled at the tunnel endpoint. For tunnels that terminate reassembled at the tunnel endpoint. For tunnels that terminate at
at a router, this would require additional memory and other a router, this would require additional memory and other resources
resources to reassemble the IPv4 fragments into a complete IPv6 to reassemble the IPv4 fragments into a complete IPv6 packet
packet before that packet could be forwarded onward. before that packet could be forwarded.
3) The encapsulator has no way of knowing that the decapsulator is 3) The encapsulator has no way of knowing that the decapsulator is
able to defragment such IPv4 packets (see Section 3.7 for able to defragment such IPv4 packets (see Section 3.6 for
details), and has no way of knowing that the decapsulator is details), and has no way of knowing that the decapsulator is able
able to handle such a large IPv6 Maximum Receive Unit (MRU). to handle such a large IPv6 Maximum Receive Unit (MRU).
Hence, the encapsulator MUST NOT treat the tunnel as an interface Hence, the encapsulator MUST NOT treat the tunnel as an interface
with an MTU of 64 kilobytes, but instead either use the fixed static with an MTU of 64 kilobytes, but instead either use the fixed static
MTU or OPTIONAL dynamic MTU determination based on the IPv4 path MTU MTU or OPTIONAL dynamic MTU determination based on the IPv4 path MTU
to the tunnel endpoint. to the tunnel endpoint.
If both the mechanisms are implemented, the decision which to use If both the mechanisms are implemented, the decision of which to use
SHOULD be configurable on a per-tunnel endpoint basis. SHOULD be configurable on a per-tunnel endpoint basis.
3.2.1. Static Tunnel MTU 3.2.1. Static Tunnel MTU
A node using static tunnel MTU treats the tunnel interface as having A node using static tunnel MTU treats the tunnel interface as having
a fixed interface MTU. By default, the MTU MUST be between 1280 and a fixed-interface MTU. By default, the MTU MUST be between 1280 and
1480 bytes (inclusive), but it SHOULD be 1280 bytes. If the default 1480 bytes (inclusive), but it SHOULD be 1280 bytes. If the default
is not 1280 bytes, the implementation MUST have a configuration knob is not 1280 bytes, the implementation MUST have a configuration knob
which can be used to change the MTU value. that can be used to change the MTU value.
A node must be able to accept a fragmented IPv6 packet that, after A node must be able to accept a fragmented IPv6 packet that, after
reassembly, is as large as 1500 octets [RFC2460]. This memo also reassembly, is as large as 1500 octets [RFC2460]. This memo also
includes requirements (see Section 3.6) for the amount of IPv4 includes requirements (see Section 3.6) for the amount of IPv4
reassembly and IPv6 MRU that MUST be supported by all the reassembly and IPv6 MRU that MUST be supported by all the
decapsulators. These ensure correct interoperability with any fixed decapsulators. These ensure correct interoperability with any fixed
MTUs between 1280 and 1480 bytes. MTUs between 1280 and 1480 bytes.
A larger fixed MTU than supported by these requirements, must not be A larger fixed MTU than supported by these requirements must not be
configured unless it has been administratively ensured that the configured unless it has been administratively ensured that the
decapsulator can reassemble or receive packets of that size. decapsulator can reassemble or receive packets of that size.
The selection of a good tunnel MTU depends on many factors; at least: The selection of a good tunnel MTU depends on many factors, at least:
- Whether the IPv4 protocol-41 packets will be transported over - Whether the IPv4 protocol-41 packets will be transported over
media which may have a lower path MTU (e.g., IPv4 Virtual media that may have a lower path MTU (e.g., IPv4 Virtual Private
Private Networks); then picking too high a value might lead to Networks); then picking too high a value might lead to IPv4
IPv4 fragmentation. fragmentation.
- Whether the tunnel is used to transport IPv6 tunneled packets - Whether the tunnel is used to transport IPv6 tunneled packets
(e.g., a mobile node with an IPv6-in-IPv4 configured tunnel, and (e.g., a mobile node with an IPv6-in-IPv4 configured tunnel, and
an IPv6-in-IPv6 tunnel interface); then picking too low a value an IPv6-in-IPv6 tunnel interface); then picking too low a value
might lead to IPv6 fragmentation. might lead to IPv6 fragmentation.
If layered encapsulation is believed to be present, it may be prudent If layered encapsulation is believed to be present, it may be prudent
to consider supporting dynamic MTU determination instead as it is to consider supporting dynamic MTU determination instead as it is
able to minimize fragmentation and optimize packet sizes. able to minimize fragmentation and optimize packet sizes.
When using the static tunnel MTU the Don't Fragment bit MUST NOT be When using the static tunnel MTU, the Don't Fragment bit MUST NOT be
set in the encapsulating IPv4 header. As a result the encapsulator set in the encapsulating IPv4 header. As a result, the encapsulator
should not receive any ICMPv4 "packet too big" messages as a result should not receive any ICMPv4 "packet too big" messages as a result
of the packets it has encapsulated. of the packets it has encapsulated.
3.2.2. Dynamic Tunnel MTU 3.2.2. Dynamic Tunnel MTU
The dynamic MTU determination is OPTIONAL. However, if it is The dynamic MTU determination is OPTIONAL. However, if it is
implemented, it SHOULD have the behavior described in this document. implemented, it SHOULD have the behavior described in this document.
The fragmentation inside the tunnel can be reduced to a minimum by The fragmentation inside the tunnel can be reduced to a minimum by
having the encapsulator track the IPv4 Path MTU across the tunnel, having the encapsulator track the IPv4 path MTU across the tunnel,
using the IPv4 Path MTU Discovery Protocol [RFC1191] and recording using the IPv4 Path MTU Discovery Protocol [RFC1191] and recording
the resulting path MTU. The IPv6 layer in the encapsulator can then the resulting path MTU. The IPv6 layer in the encapsulator can then
view a tunnel as a link layer with an MTU equal to the IPv4 path MTU, view a tunnel as a link layer with an MTU equal to the IPv4 path MTU,
minus the size of the encapsulating IPv4 header. minus the size of the encapsulating IPv4 header.
Note that this does not eliminate IPv4 fragmentation in the case when Note that this does not eliminate IPv4 fragmentation in the case when
the IPv4 path MTU would result in an IPv6 MTU less than 1280 bytes. the IPv4 path MTU would result in an IPv6 MTU less than 1280 bytes.
(Any link layer used by IPv6 has to have an MTU of at least 1280 (Any link layer used by IPv6 has to have an MTU of at least 1280
bytes [RFC2460].) In this case the IPv6 layer has to "see" a link bytes [RFC2460].) In this case, the IPv6 layer has to "see" a link
layer with an MTU of 1280 bytes and the encapsulator has to use IPv4 layer with an MTU of 1280 bytes and the encapsulator has to use IPv4
fragmentation in order to forward the 1280 byte IPv6 packets. fragmentation in order to forward the 1280 byte IPv6 packets.
The encapsulator SHOULD employ the following algorithm to determine The encapsulator SHOULD employ the following algorithm to determine
when to forward an IPv6 packet that is larger than the tunnel's path when to forward an IPv6 packet that is larger than the tunnel's path
MTU using IPv4 fragmentation, and when to return an ICMPv6 "packet MTU using IPv4 fragmentation, and when to return an ICMPv6 "packet
too big" message per [RFC1981]: too big" message per [RFC1981]:
if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than 1280 if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than 1280
if packet is larger than 1280 bytes if packet is larger than 1280 bytes
skipping to change at page 11, line 30 skipping to change at page 10, line 43
Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with
MTU = (IPv4 path MTU - 20). MTU = (IPv4 path MTU - 20).
Drop packet. Drop packet.
else else
Encapsulate and set the Don't Fragment flag Encapsulate and set the Don't Fragment flag
in the IPv4 header. in the IPv4 header.
endif endif
endif endif
Encapsulators that have a large number of tunnels may choose between Encapsulators that have a large number of tunnels may choose between
dynamic versus static tunnel MTU on a per-tunnel endpoint basis. In dynamic versus static tunnel MTUs on a per-tunnel endpoint basis. In
cases where the number of tunnels that any one node is using is cases where the number of tunnels that any one node is using is
large, it is helpful to observe that this state information can be large, it is helpful to observe that this state information can be
cached and discarded when not in use. cached and discarded when not in use.
Note that using dynamic tunnel MTU is subject to IPv4 PMTU blackholes Note that using dynamic tunnel MTU is subject to IPv4 path MTU
should the ICMPv4 "packet too big" messages be dropped by firewalls blackholes should the ICMPv4 "packet too big" messages be dropped by
or not generated by the routers. [RFC1435, RFC2923] firewalls or not generated by the routers [RFC1435, RFC2923].
3.3. Hop Limit 3.3. Hop Limit
IPv6-over-IPv4 tunnels are modeled as "single-hop" from the IPv6 IPv6-over-IPv4 tunnels are modeled as "single-hop" from the IPv6
perspective. The tunnel is opaque to users of the network, and is not perspective. The tunnel is opaque to users of the network, and it is
detectable by network diagnostic tools such as traceroute. not detectable by network diagnostic tools such as traceroute.
The single-hop model is implemented by having the encapsulators and The single-hop model is implemented by having the encapsulators and
decapsulators process the IPv6 hop limit field as they would if they decapsulators process the IPv6 hop limit field as they would if they
were forwarding a packet on to any other datalink. That is, they were forwarding a packet on to any other datalink. That is, they
decrement the hop limit by 1 when forwarding an IPv6 packet. (The decrement the hop limit by 1 when forwarding an IPv6 packet. (The
originating node and final destination do not decrement the hop originating node and final destination do not decrement the hop
limit.) limit.)
The TTL of the encapsulating IPv4 header is selected in an The TTL of the encapsulating IPv4 header is selected in an
implementation dependent manner. The current suggested value is implementation-dependent manner. The current suggested value is
published in the "Assigned Numbers" RFC [RFC3232][ASSIGNED]. published in the "Assigned Numbers" RFC [RFC3232][ASSIGNED].
Implementations MAY provide a mechanism to allow the administrator to Implementations MAY provide a mechanism to allow the administrator to
configure the IPv4 TTL as the IP Tunnel MIB [RFC2667]. configure the IPv4 TTL as the IP Tunnel MIB [RFC4087].
3.4. Handling ICMPv4 errors 3.4. Handling ICMPv4 Errors
In response to encapsulated packets it has sent into the tunnel, the In response to encapsulated packets it has sent into the tunnel, the
encapsulator might receive ICMPv4 error messages from IPv4 routers encapsulator might receive ICMPv4 error messages from IPv4 routers
inside the tunnel. These packets are addressed to the encapsulator inside the tunnel. These packets are addressed to the encapsulator
because it is the IPv4 source of the encapsulated packet. because it is the IPv4 source of the encapsulated packet.
ICMPv4 error handling is only applicable to dynamic MTU ICMPv4 error handling is only applicable to dynamic MTU
determination, even though the functions could be used with static determination, even though the functions could be used with static
MTU tunnels as well. MTU tunnels as well.
The ICMPv4 "packet too big" error messages are handled according to The ICMPv4 "packet too big" error messages are handled according to
IPv4 Path MTU Discovery [RFC1191] and the resulting path MTU is IPv4 Path MTU Discovery [RFC1191] and the resulting path MTU is
recorded in the IPv4 layer. The recorded path MTU is used by IPv6 to recorded in the IPv4 layer. The recorded path MTU is used by IPv6 to
determine if an ICMPv6 "packet too big" error has to be generated as determine if an ICMPv6 "packet too big" error has to be generated as
described in section 3.2.2. described in Section 3.2.2.
The handling of other types of ICMPv4 error messages depends on how The handling of other types of ICMPv4 error messages depends on how
much information is available from the encapsulated packet that much information is available from the encapsulated packet that
caused the error. caused the error.
Many older IPv4 routers return only 8 bytes of data beyond the IPv4 Many older IPv4 routers return only 8 bytes of data beyond the IPv4
header of the packet in error, which is not enough to include the header of the packet in error, which is not enough to include the
address fields of the IPv6 header. More modern IPv4 routers are address fields of the IPv6 header. More modern IPv4 routers are
likely to return enough data beyond the IPv4 header to include the likely to return enough data beyond the IPv4 header to include the
entire IPv6 header and possibly even the data beyond that. entire IPv6 header and possibly even the data beyond that. See
[RFC1812].
If sufficient data bytes from the offending packet are available, the If sufficient data bytes from the offending packet are available, the
encapsulator MAY extract the encapsulated IPv6 packet and use it to encapsulator MAY extract the encapsulated IPv6 packet and use it to
generate an ICMPv6 message directed back to the originating IPv6 generate an ICMPv6 message directed back to the originating IPv6
node, as shown below: node, as shown below:
+--------------+ +--------------+
| IPv4 Header | | IPv4 Header |
| dst = encaps | | dst = encaps |
| node | | node |
skipping to change at page 13, line 31 skipping to change at page 12, line 36
Error | Header | generate an Error | Header | generate an
+--------------+ ICMPv6 +--------------+ ICMPv6
| | error message | | error message
~ Data ~ back to the source. ~ Data ~ back to the source.
| | | |
- - +--------------+ - - - - +--------------+ - -
ICMPv4 Error Message Returned to Encapsulating Node ICMPv4 Error Message Returned to Encapsulating Node
When receiving ICMPv4 errors as above and the errors are not "packet When receiving ICMPv4 errors as above and the errors are not "packet
too big" it would be useful to log the error as an error related to too big", it would be useful to log the error as an error related to
the tunnel. Also, if sufficient headers are available, then the the tunnel. Also, if sufficient headers are available, then the
originating node MAY send an ICMPv6 error of type "unreachable" with originating node MAY send an ICMPv6 error of type "unreachable" with
code "address unreachable" to the IPv6 source. (The "address code "address unreachable" to the IPv6 source. (The "address
unreachable" code is appropriate since, from the perspective of IPv6, unreachable" code is appropriate since, from the perspective of IPv6,
the tunnel is a link and that code is used for link-specific errors the tunnel is a link and that code is used for link-specific errors
[RFC2463]). [RFC2463]).
Note that when the IPv4 path MTU is exceeded, and sufficient bytes of Note that when the IPv4 path MTU is exceeded, and sufficient bytes of
payload associated with the ICMPv4 errors are not available, or payload associated with the ICMPv4 errors are not available, or
ICMPv4 errors do not cause the generation of ICMPv6 errors in case ICMPv4 errors do not cause the generation of ICMPv6 errors in case
there is enough payload, there will be at least two packet drops there is enough payload, there will be at least two packet drops
instead of at least one (the case of a single layer of MTU instead of at least one (the case of a single layer of MTU
discovery). Consider a case where an IPv6 host is connected to an discovery). Consider a case where an IPv6 host is connected to an
IPv4/IPv6 router, which is connected to a network where an ICMPv4 IPv4/IPv6 router, which is connected to a network where an ICMPv4
error about too big packet size is generated. First the router needs error about too big packet size is generated. First, the router
to learn the tunnel (IPv4) MTU which causes at least one packet loss, needs to learn the tunnel (IPv4) MTU that causes at least one packet
and then the host needs to learn the (IPv6) MTU from the router which loss, and then the host needs to learn the (IPv6) MTU from the router
causes at least one packet loss. Still, in all cases there can be that causes at least one packet loss. Still, in all cases there can
more than one packet loss if there are multiple large packets in be more than one packet loss if there are multiple large packets in
flight at the same time. flight at the same time.
3.5. IPv4 Header Construction 3.5. IPv4 Header Construction
When encapsulating an IPv6 packet in an IPv4 datagram, the IPv4 When encapsulating an IPv6 packet in an IPv4 datagram, the IPv4
header fields are set as follows: header fields are set as follows:
Version: Version:
4 4
IP Header Length in 32-bit words: IP Header Length in 32-bit words:
5 (There are no IPv4 options in the encapsulating 5 (There are no IPv4 options in the encapsulating header.)
header.)
Type of Service: Type of Service:
0 unless otherwise specified. (See [RFC2983] and 0 unless otherwise specified. (See [RFC2983] and [RFC3168]
[RFC3168] section 9.1 for issues relating to the Type- Section 9.1 for issues relating to the Type-of-Service byte and
of-Service byte and tunneling.) tunneling.)
Total Length: Total Length:
Payload length from IPv6 header plus length of IPv6 and Payload length from IPv6 header plus length of IPv6 and IPv4
IPv4 headers (i.e., IPv6 payload length plus a constant headers (i.e., IPv6 payload length plus a constant 60 bytes).
60 bytes).
Identification: Identification:
Generated uniquely as for any IPv4 packet transmitted by Generated uniquely as for any IPv4 packet transmitted by the
the system. system.
Flags: Flags:
Set the Don't Fragment (DF) flag as specified in section Set the Don't Fragment (DF) flag as specified in Section 3.2.
3.2. Set the More Fragments (MF) bit as necessary if Set the More Fragments (MF) bit as necessary if fragmenting.
fragmenting.
Fragment offset: Fragment Offset:
Set as necessary if fragmenting. Set as necessary if fragmenting.
Time to Live: Time to Live:
Set in an implementation-specific manner, as described Set in an implementation-specific manner, as described in
in section 3.3. Section 3.3.
Protocol: Protocol:
41 (Assigned payload type number for IPv6). 41 (Assigned payload type number for IPv6).
Header Checksum: Header Checksum:
Calculate the checksum of the IPv4 header. [RFC791] Calculate the checksum of the IPv4 header [RFC791].
Source Address: Source Address:
An IPv4 address of the encapsulator: either configured An IPv4 address of the encapsulator: either configured by the
by the administrator or an address of the outgoing administrator or an address of the outgoing interface.
interface.
Destination Address: Destination Address:
IPv4 address of the tunnel endpoint. IPv4 address of the tunnel endpoint.
When encapsulating the packets, the node must ensure that it will use When encapsulating the packets, the node must ensure that it will use
the correct source address so that the packets are acceptable to the the correct source address so that the packets are acceptable to the
decapsulator as described in Section 3.6. Configuring the source decapsulator as described in Section 3.6. Configuring the source
address is appropriate particularly in cases in which automatic address is appropriate particularly in cases in which automatic
selection of source address may produce different results in a selection of source address may produce different results in a
skipping to change at page 15, line 42 skipping to change at page 14, line 40
specify the source address of a tunnel. specify the source address of a tunnel.
3.6. Decapsulation 3.6. Decapsulation
When an IPv6/IPv4 host or a router receives an IPv4 datagram that is When an IPv6/IPv4 host or a router receives an IPv4 datagram that is
addressed to one of its own IPv4 addresses or a joined multicast addressed to one of its own IPv4 addresses or a joined multicast
group address, and the value of the protocol field is 41, the packet group address, and the value of the protocol field is 41, the packet
is potentially a tunnel packet and needs to be verified to belong to is potentially a tunnel packet and needs to be verified to belong to
one of the configured tunnel interfaces (by checking one of the configured tunnel interfaces (by checking
source/destination addresses), reassembled (if fragmented at the IPv4 source/destination addresses), reassembled (if fragmented at the IPv4
level), have the IPv4 header removed and the resulting IPv6 datagram level), and have the IPv4 header removed and the resulting IPv6
be submitted to the IPv6 layer code on the node. datagram be submitted to the IPv6 layer code on the node.
The decapsulator MUST verify that the tunnel source address is The decapsulator MUST verify that the tunnel source address is
correct before further processing packets, to mitigate the problems correct before further processing packets, to mitigate the problems
with address spoofing (see section 4). This check also applies to with address spoofing (see Section 4). This check also applies to
packets which are delivered to transport protocols on the packets that are delivered to transport protocols on the
decapsulator. This is done by verifying that the source address is decapsulator. This is done by verifying that the source address is
the IPv4 address of the encapsulator, as configured on the the IPv4 address of the encapsulator, as configured on the
decapsulator. Packets for which the IPv4 source address does not decapsulator. Packets for which the IPv4 source address does not
match MUST be discarded and an ICMP message SHOULD NOT be generated; match MUST be discarded and an ICMP message SHOULD NOT be generated;
however, if the implementation normally sends an ICMP message when however, if the implementation normally sends an ICMP message when
receiving an unknown protocol packet, such an error message MAY be receiving an unknown protocol packet, such an error message MAY be
sent (e.g., ICMPv4 Protocol 41 Unreachable). sent (e.g., ICMPv4 Protocol 41 Unreachable).
A side effect of this address verification is that the node will A side effect of this address verification is that the node will
silently discard packets with a wrong source address, and packets silently discard packets with a wrong source address and packets that
which were received by the node but not directly addressed to it were received by the node but not directly addressed to it (e.g.,
(e.g., broadcast addresses). broadcast addresses).
Independent of any other forms of IPv4 ingress filtering the Independent of any other forms of IPv4 ingress filtering the
administrator of the node may have configured, the implementation MAY administrator of the node may have configured, the implementation MAY
perform ingress filtering, i.e., check that the packet is arriving perform ingress filtering, i.e., check that the packet is arriving
from the interface in the direction of the route towards the tunnel from the interface in the direction of the route toward the tunnel
end-point, similar to a Strict Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) check end-point, similar to a Strict Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) check
[RFC3704]. As this may cause problems on tunnels which are routed [RFC3704]. As this may cause problems on tunnels that are routed
through multiple links, it is RECOMMENDED that this check, if done, through multiple links, it is RECOMMENDED that this check, if done,
is disabled by default. The packets caught by this check SHOULD be is disabled by default. The packets caught by this check SHOULD be
discarded; an ICMP message SHOULD NOT be generated by default. discarded; an ICMP message SHOULD NOT be generated by default.
The decapsulator MUST be capable of having, on the tunnel interfaces, The decapsulator MUST be capable of having, on the tunnel interfaces,
an IPv6 MRU of at least the maximum of of 1500 bytes and the largest an IPv6 MRU of at least the maximum of 1500 bytes and the largest
(IPv6) interface MTU on the decapsulator. (IPv6) interface MTU on the decapsulator.
The decapsulator MUST be capable of reassembling an IPv4 packet that The decapsulator MUST be capable of reassembling an IPv4 packet that
is (after the reassembly) the maximum of 1500 bytes and the largest is (after the reassembly) the maximum of 1500 bytes and the largest
(IPv4) interface MTU on the decapsulator. The 1500 byte number is a (IPv4) interface MTU on the decapsulator. The 1500-byte number is a
result of encapsulators that use the static MTU scheme in section result of encapsulators that use the static MTU scheme in Section
3.2.1, while encapsulators that use the dynamic scheme in section 3.2.1, while encapsulators that use the dynamic scheme in Section
3.2.2 can cause up to the largest interface MTU on the decapsulator 3.2.2 can cause up to the largest interface MTU on the decapsulator
to be received. (Note that it is strictly the interface MTU on the to be received. (Note that it is strictly the interface MTU on the
last IPv4 router *before* the decapsulator that matters, but for most last IPv4 router *before* the decapsulator that matters, but for most
links the MTU is the same between all neighbors.) links the MTU is the same between all neighbors.)
This reassembly limit allows dynamic tunnel MTU determination by the This reassembly limit allows dynamic tunnel MTU determination by the
encapsulator to take advantage of larger IPv4 path MTUs. An encapsulator to take advantage of larger IPv4 path MTUs. An
implementation MAY have a configuration knob which can be used to set implementation MAY have a configuration knob that can be used to set
a larger value of the tunnel reassembly buffers than the above a larger value of the tunnel reassembly buffers than the above
number, but it MUST NOT be set below the above number. number, but it MUST NOT be set below the above number.
The decapsulation is shown below: The decapsulation is shown below:
+-------------+ +-------------+
| IPv4 | | IPv4 |
| Header | | Header |
+-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+
| IPv6 | | IPv6 | | IPv6 | | IPv6 |
skipping to change at page 17, line 33 skipping to change at page 16, line 35
The decapsulator performs IPv4 reassembly before decapsulating the The decapsulator performs IPv4 reassembly before decapsulating the
IPv6 packet. IPv6 packet.
When decapsulating the packet, the IPv6 header is not modified. When decapsulating the packet, the IPv6 header is not modified.
(However, see [RFC2983] and [RFC3168] section 9.1 for issues relating (However, see [RFC2983] and [RFC3168] section 9.1 for issues relating
to the Type of Service byte and tunneling.) If the packet is to the Type of Service byte and tunneling.) If the packet is
subsequently forwarded, its hop limit is decremented by one. subsequently forwarded, its hop limit is decremented by one.
The encapsulating IPv4 header is discarded, and the resulting packet The encapsulating IPv4 header is discarded, and the resulting packet
is checked for validity when submitted to the IPv6 layer. When is checked for validity when submitted to the IPv6 layer. When
reconstructing the IPv6 packet the length MUST be determined from the reconstructing the IPv6 packet, the length MUST be determined from
IPv6 payload length since the IPv4 packet might be padded (thus have the IPv6 payload length since the IPv4 packet might be padded (thus
a length which is larger than the IPv6 packet plus the IPv4 header have a length that is larger than the IPv6 packet plus the IPv4
being removed). header being removed).
After the decapsulation the node MUST silently discard a packet with After the decapsulation, the node MUST silently discard a packet with
an invalid IPv6 source address. The list of invalid source addresses an invalid IPv6 source address. The list of invalid source addresses
SHOULD include at least: SHOULD include at least:
- all multicast addresses (FF00::/8) - all multicast addresses (FF00::/8)
- the loopback address (::1) - the loopback address (::1)
- all the IPv4-compatible IPv6 addresses [RFC3513] (::/96), - all the IPv4-compatible IPv6 addresses [RFC3513] (::/96),
excluding the unspecified address for Duplicate Address excluding the unspecified address for Duplicate Address Detection
Detection (::/128) (::/128)
- all the IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:0:0/96) - all the IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:0:0/96)
In addition, the node should be configured to perform ingress In addition, the node should be configured to perform ingress
filtering [RFC2827][RFC3704] on the IPv6 source address, similar to filtering [RFC2827][RFC3704] on the IPv6 source address, similar to
on any of its interfaces, e.g.: on any of its interfaces, e.g.:
1) if the tunnel is towards the Internet, the node should be 1) if the tunnel is toward the Internet, the node should be
configured to check that the site's IPv6 prefixes are not used configured to check that the site's IPv6 prefixes are not used as
as the source addresses, or the source addresses, or
2) if the tunnel is towards an edge network, the node should be 2) if the tunnel is toward an edge network, the node should be
configured to check that the source address belongs to that edge configured to check that the source address belongs to that edge
network. network.
The prefix lists in the former typically need to be manually The prefix lists in the former typically need to be manually
configured; the latter could be verified automatically, e.g., by configured; the latter could be verified automatically, e.g., by
using a strict unicast RPF check, as long as an interface can be using a strict unicast RPF check, as long as an interface can be
designated to be towards an edge. designated to be toward an edge.
It is RECOMMENDED that the implementations provide a single knob to It is RECOMMENDED that the implementations provide a single knob to
make it easier to for the administrators to enable strict ingress make it easier to for the administrators to enable strict ingress
filtering towards edge networks. filtering toward edge networks.
3.7. Link-Local Addresses 3.7. Link-Local Addresses
The configured tunnels are IPv6 interfaces (over the IPv4 "link The configured tunnels are IPv6 interfaces (over the IPv4 "link
layer") and thus MUST have link-local addresses. The link-local layer") and thus MUST have link-local addresses. The link-local
addresses are used by, e.g., routing protocols operating over the addresses are used by, e.g., routing protocols operating over the
tunnels. tunnels.
The interface identifier [RFC3513] for such an interface may be based The interface identifier [RFC3513] for such an interface may be based
on the 32-bit IPv4 address of an underlying interface, or formed on the 32-bit IPv4 address of an underlying interface, or formed
using some other means, as long as it's unique from the other tunnel using some other means, as long as it is unique from the other tunnel
endpoint with a reasonably high probability. endpoint with a reasonably high probability.
Note that it may be desirable to form the link-local address in a Note that it may be desirable to form the link-local address in a
fashion that minimizes the probability and the effect of having to fashion that minimizes the probability and the effect of having to
renumber the link-local address in the event of a topology or renumber the link-local address in the event of a topology or
hardware change. hardware change.
If an IPv4 address is used for forming the IPv6 link-local address, If an IPv4 address is used for forming the IPv6 link-local address,
the interface identifier is the IPv4 address, prepended by zeros. the interface identifier is the IPv4 address, prepended by zeros.
Note that the "Universal/Local" bit is zero, indicating that the Note that the "Universal/Local" bit is zero, indicating that the
skipping to change at page 19, line 22 skipping to change at page 18, line 21
+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+ +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+
3.8. Neighbor Discovery over Tunnels 3.8. Neighbor Discovery over Tunnels
Configured tunnel implementations MUST at least accept and respond to Configured tunnel implementations MUST at least accept and respond to
the probe packets used by Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) the probe packets used by Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD)
[RFC2461]. The implementations SHOULD also send NUD probe packets to [RFC2461]. The implementations SHOULD also send NUD probe packets to
detect when the configured tunnel fails at which point the detect when the configured tunnel fails at which point the
implementation can use an alternate path to reach the destination. implementation can use an alternate path to reach the destination.
Note that Neighbor Discovery allows that the sending of NUD probes be Note that Neighbor Discovery allows that the sending of NUD probes be
omitted for router to router links if the routing protocol tracks omitted for router-to-router links if the routing protocol tracks
bidirectional reachability. bidirectional reachability.
For the purposes of Neighbor Discovery the configured tunnels For the purposes of Neighbor Discovery, the configured tunnels
specified in this document are assumed to NOT have a link-layer specified in this document are assumed to NOT have a link-layer
address, even though the link-layer (IPv4) does have an address. address, even though the link-layer (IPv4) does have an address.
This means that: This means that:
- the sender of Neighbor Discovery packets SHOULD NOT include - the sender of Neighbor Discovery packets SHOULD NOT include Source
Source Link Layer Address options or Target Link Layer Address Link Layer Address options or Target Link Layer Address options on
options on the tunnel link. the tunnel link.
- the receiver MUST, while otherwise processing the Neighbor - the receiver MUST, while otherwise processing the Neighbor
Discovery packet, silently ignore the content of any Source Link Discovery packet, silently ignore the content of any Source Link
Layer Address options or Target Link Layer Address options Layer Address options or Target Link Layer Address options
received on the tunnel link. received on the tunnel link.
Not using a link layer address options is consistent with how Not using link-layer address options is consistent with how Neighbor
Neighbor Discovery is used on other point-to-point links. Discovery is used on other point-to-point links.
4. Threat Related to Source Address Spoofing 4. Threat Related to Source Address Spoofing
The specification above contains rules that apply tunnel source The specification above contains rules that apply tunnel source
address verification in particular and ingress filtering address verification in particular and ingress filtering
[RFC2827][RFC3704] in general to packets before they are [RFC2827][RFC3704] in general to packets before they are
decapsulated. When IP-in-IP tunneling (independent of IP versions) decapsulated. When IP-in-IP tunneling (independent of IP versions)
is used it is important that this can not be used to bypass any is used, it is important that this not be used to bypass any ingress
ingress filtering in use for non-tunneled packets. Thus the rules in filtering in use for non-tunneled packets. Thus, the rules in this
this document are derived based on should ingress filtering be used document are derived based on should ingress filtering be used for
for IPv4 and IPv6, the use of tunneling should not provide an easy IPv4 and IPv6, the use of tunneling should not provide an easy way to
way to circumvent the filtering. circumvent the filtering.
In this case, without specific ingress filtering checks in the In this case, without specific ingress filtering checks in the
decapsulator, it would be possible for an attacker to inject a packet decapsulator, it would be possible for an attacker to inject a packet
with: with:
- Outer IPv4 source: real IPv4 address of attacker - Outer IPv4 source: real IPv4 address of attacker
- Outer IPv4 destination: IPv4 address of decapsulator - Outer IPv4 destination: IPv4 address of decapsulator
- Inner IPv6 source: Alice which is either the decapsulator or a - Inner IPv6 source: Alice, which is either the decapsulator or a
node close to it. node close to it
- Inner IPv6 destination: Bob - Inner IPv6 destination: Bob
Even if all IPv4 routers between the attacker and the decapsulator Even if all IPv4 routers between the attacker and the decapsulator
implement IPv4 ingress filtering, and all IPv6 routers between the implement IPv4 ingress filtering, and all IPv6 routers between the
decapsulator and Bob implement IPv6 ingress filtering, the above decapsulator and Bob implement IPv6 ingress filtering, the above
spoofed packets will not be filtered out. As a result Bob will spoofed packets will not be filtered out. As a result, Bob will
receive a packet that looks like it was sent from Alice even though receive a packet that looks like it was sent from Alice even though
the sender was some unrelated node. the sender was some unrelated node.
The solution to this is to have the decapsulator only accept The solution to this is to have the decapsulator accept only
encapsulated packets from the explicitly configured source address encapsulated packets from the explicitly configured source address
(i.e., the other end of the tunnel) as specified in section 3.6. (i.e., the other end of the tunnel) as specified in Section 3.6.
While this does not provide complete protection in the case ingress While this does not provide complete protection in the case ingress
filtering has not been deployed, it does provide a significant filtering has not been deployed, it does provide a significant
increase in security. The issue and the remainder threats are increase in security. The issue and the remainder threats are
discussed at more length in Security Considerations. discussed at more length in Security Considerations.
5. IANA Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This memo makes no request to IANA. [[ RFC-editor: please remove this
section upon publication. ]]
6. Security Considerations
Generic security considerations of using IPv6 are discussed in a Generic security considerations of using IPv6 are discussed in a
separate document [V6SEC]. separate document [V6SEC].
An implementation of tunneling needs to be aware that while a tunnel An implementation of tunneling needs to be aware that although a
is a link (as defined in [RFC2460]), the threat model for a tunnel tunnel is a link (as defined in [RFC2460]), the threat model for a
might be rather different than for other links, since the tunnel tunnel might be rather different than for other links, since the
potentially includes all of the Internet. tunnel potentially includes all of the Internet.
Several mechanisms (e.g., Neighbor Discovery) depend on Hop Count Several mechanisms (e.g., Neighbor Discovery) depend on Hop Count
being 255 and/or the addresses being link-local for ensuring that a being 255 and/or the addresses being link local for ensuring that a
packet originated on-link, in a semi-trusted environment. Tunnels packet originated on-link, in a semi-trusted environment. Tunnels
are more vulnerable to a breach of this assumption than physical are more vulnerable to a breach of this assumption than physical
links, as an attacker anywhere in the Internet can send an IPv6-in- links, as an attacker anywhere in the Internet can send an IPv6-in-
IPv4 packet to the tunnel decapsulator, causing injection of an IPv4 packet to the tunnel decapsulator, causing injection of an
encapsulted IPv6 packet to the configured tunnel interface unless the encapsulted IPv6 packet to the configured tunnel interface unless the
decapsulation checks are able to discard packets injected in such a decapsulation checks are able to discard packets injected in such a
manner. manner.
Therefore, this memo specifies that the decapsulators make these Therefore, this memo specifies that the decapsulators make these
steps (as described in Section 3.6) to mitigate this threat: steps (as described in Section 3.6) to mitigate this threat:
- IPv4 source address of the packet MUST be the same as configured - IPv4 source address of the packet MUST be the same as configured
for the tunnel end-point, for the tunnel end-point;
- Independent of any IPv4 ingress filtering the administrator may - Independent of any IPv4 ingress filtering the administrator may
have configured, the implementation MAY perform IPv4 ingress have configured, the implementation MAY perform IPv4 ingress
filtering to check that the IPv4 packets are received from an filtering to check that the IPv4 packets are received from an
expected interface (but as this may cause some problems, it may expected interface (but as this may cause some problems, it may be
be disabled by default), disabled by default);
- IPv6 packets with several, obviously invalid IPv6 source - IPv6 packets with several, obviously invalid IPv6 source addresses
addresses received from the tunnel MUST be discarded (see received from the tunnel MUST be discarded (see Section 3.6 for
Section 3.6 for details), and details); and
- IPv6 ingress filtering should be performed (typically requiring - IPv6 ingress filtering should be performed (typically requiring
configuration from the operator), to check that the tunneled configuration from the operator), to check that the tunneled IPv6
IPv6 packets are received from an expected interface. packets are received from an expected interface.
Especially the first verification is vital: to avoid this check, the Especially the first verification is vital: to avoid this check, the
attacker must be able to know the source of the tunnel (ranging from attacker must be able to know the source of the tunnel (ranging from
difficult to predictable) and be able to spoof it (easier). difficult to predictable) and be able to spoof it (easier).
If the remainder threats of tunnel source verification are considered If the remainder threats of tunnel source verification are considered
to be significant, a tunneling scheme with authentication should be to be significant, a tunneling scheme with authentication should be
used instead, for example IPsec [RFC2401] (preferable) or Generic used instead, e.g., IPsec [RFC2401] (preferable) or Generic Routing
Routing Encapsulation with a pre-configured secret key [RFC2890]. As Encapsulation with a pre-configured secret key [RFC2890]. As the
the configured tunnels are set up more or less manually, setting up configured tunnels are set up more or less manually, setting up the
the keying material is probably not a problem. However, setting up keying material is probably not a problem. However, setting up
secure IPsec IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels is described in another document secure IPsec IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels is described in another document
[V64IPSEC]. [V64IPSEC].
If the tunneling is done inside an administrative domain, proper If the tunneling is done inside an administrative domain, proper
ingress filtering at the edge of the domain can also eliminate the ingress filtering at the edge of the domain can also eliminate the
threat from outside of the domain. Therefore shorter tunnels are threat from outside of the domain. Therefore, shorter tunnels are
preferable to longer ones, possibly spanning the whole Internet. preferable to longer ones, possibly spanning the whole Internet.
Additionally, an implementation MUST treat interfaces to different In addition, an implementation MUST treat interfaces to different
links as separate, e.g., to ensure that Neighbor Discovery packets links as separate, e.g., to ensure that Neighbor Discovery packets
arriving on one link does not effect other links. This is especially arriving on one link do not affect other links. This is especially
important for tunnel links. important for tunnel links.
When dropping packets due to failing to match the allowed IPv4 source When dropping packets due to failing to match the allowed IPv4 source
addresses for a tunnel the node should not "acknowledge" the addresses for a tunnel the node should not "acknowledge" the
existence of a tunnel, otherwise this could be used to probe the existence of a tunnel, otherwise this could be used to probe the
acceptable tunnel endpoint addresses. For that reason, the acceptable tunnel endpoint addresses. For that reason, the
specification says that such packets MUST be discarded, and an ICMP specification says that such packets MUST be discarded, and an ICMP
error message SHOULD NOT be generated, unless the implementation error message SHOULD NOT be generated, unless the implementation
normally sends ICMP destination unreachable messages for unknown normally sends ICMP destination unreachable messages for unknown
protocols; in such a case, the same code MAY be sent. As should be protocols; in such a case, the same code MAY be sent. As should be
obvious, the not returning the same ICMP code if an error is returned obvious, not returning the same ICMP code if an error is returned for
for other protocols may hint that the IPv6 stack (or the protocol 41 other protocols may hint that the IPv6 stack (or the protocol 41
tunneling processing) has been enabled -- the behaviour should be tunneling processing) has been enabled -- the behaviour should be
consistent on how the implementation otherwise behaves to be consistent on how the implementation otherwise behaves to be
transparent to probing. transparent to probing.
7. Acknowledgments 6. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the members of the IPv6 working group, the We would like to thank the members of the IPv6 working group, the
Next Generation Transition (ngtrans) working group, and the v6ops Next Generation Transition (ngtrans) working group, and the v6ops
working group for their many contributions and extensive review of working group for their many contributions and extensive review of
this document. Special thanks are due to (in alphabetical order) Jim this document. Special thanks are due to (in alphabetical order) Jim
Bound, Ross Callon, Tim Chown, Alex Conta, Bob Hinden, Bill Manning, Bound, Ross Callon, Tim Chown, Alex Conta, Bob Hinden, Bill Manning,
John Moy, Mohan Parthasarathy, Chirayu Patel, Pekka Savola, and Fred John Moy, Mohan Parthasarathy, Chirayu Patel, Pekka Savola, and Fred
Templin for many helpful suggestions. Pekka Savola helped in editing Templin for many helpful suggestions. Pekka Savola helped in editing
the final revisions of the specification. the final revisions of the specification.
8. References 7. References
8.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC791] J. Postel, "Internet Protocol", RFC 791, September 1981. [RFC791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, September
1981.
[RFC1191] Mogul, J., and S. Deering., "Path MTU Discovery", RFC 1191, [RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
November 1990. November 1990.
[RFC1981] McCann, J., S. Deering, and J. Mogul. "Path MTU Discovery [RFC1981] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery
for IP version 6", RFC 1981, August 1996. for IP version 6", RFC 1981, August 1996.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2460] Deering, S., and Hinden, R. "Internet Protocol, Version 6 [RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998. (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[RFC2463] A. Conta, S. Deering, "Internet Control Message Protocol [RFC2463] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message
(ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6
Specification", RFC 2463, December 1998. (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2463, December 1998.
8.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[ASSIGNED] IANA, "Assigned numbers online database", [ASSIGNED] IANA, "Assigned numbers online database",
http://www.iana.org/numbers.html http://www.iana.org/numbers.html
[DNSOPV6] Durand, A., Ihren, J., and Savola P., "Operational [DNSOPV6] Durand, A., Ihren, J., and Savola P., "Operational
Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS", draft-ietf-dnsop- Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS", Work in
ipv6-dns-issues-10.txt, work-in-progress, October 2004. Progress, October 2004.
[KM97] Kent, C., and J. Mogul, "Fragmentation Considered Harmful".
In Proc. SIGCOMM '87 Workshop on Frontiers in Computer
Communications Technology. August 1987.
[V6SEC] P. Savola, "IPv6 Transition/Co-existence Security [KM97] Kent, C., and J. Mogul, "Fragmentation Considered
Considerations", draft-savola-v6ops-security-overview- Harmful". In Proc. SIGCOMM '87 Workshop on Frontiers in
03.txt, work-in-progress, October 2004. Computer Communications Technology. August 1987.
[V64IPSEC] Graveman, R., et al., "Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-over-IPv4 [V6SEC] Savola, P., "IPv6 Transition/Co-existence Security
Tunnels", draft-tschofenig-v6ops-secure-tunnels-03.txt, Considerations", Work in Progress, October 2004.
work-in-progress, December 2004.
[RFC1122] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - Communication [V64IPSEC] Graveman, R., et al., "Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-over-
Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, October 1989. IPv4 Tunnels", Work in Progress, December 2004.
[RFC1435] S. Knowles, "IESG Advice from Experience with Path MTU [RFC1435] Knowles, S., "IESG Advice from Experience with Path MTU
Discovery", RFC 1435, March 1993. Discovery", RFC 1435, March 1993.
[RFC1812] F. Baker, "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers", RFC 1812, [RFC1812] Baker, F., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers", RFC
June 1995. 1812, June 1995.
[RFC2401] Kent, S., Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the [RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[RFC2461] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and Simpson, W. "Neighbor [RFC2461] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor
Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December 1998. Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December
1998.
[RFC2462] Thomson, S., and Narten, T. "IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration," RFC 2462, December 1998.
[RFC2667] D. Thaler, "IP Tunnel MIB", RFC 2667, August 1999. [RFC2462] Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462, December 1998.
[RFC2827] Ferguson, P., and Senie, D., "Network Ingress Filtering: [RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", RFC 2827, May 2000. Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.
[RFC2890] Dommety, G., "Key and Sequence Number Extensions to GRE", [RFC2890] Dommety, G., "Key and Sequence Number Extensions to GRE",
RFC 2890, September 2000. RFC 2890, September 2000.
[RFC2923] K. Lahey, "TCP Problems with Path MTU Discovery", RFC 2923, [RFC2923] Lahey, K., "TCP Problems with Path MTU Discovery", RFC
September 2000. 2923, September 2000.
[RFC2983] D. Black, "Differentiated Services and Tunnels", RFC 2983,
October 2000.
[RFC3056] B. Carpenter, and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains via
IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.
[RFC3168] K. Ramakrishnan, S. Floyd, D. Black, "The Addition of
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP", RFC 3168,
September 2001.
[RFC3232] Reynolds, J., "Assigned Numbers: RFC 1700 is Replaced by an [RFC2983] Black, D., "Differentiated Services and Tunnels", RFC
On-line Database", RFC 3232, January 2002. 2983, October 2000.
[RFC3484] R. Draves, "Default Address Selection for IPv6", RFC 3484, [RFC3056] Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains
February 2003. via IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.
[RFC3493] Gilligan, R., et al, "Basic Socket Interface Extensions for [RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
IPv6", RFC 3493, February 2003. of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP", RFC
3168, September 2001.
[RFC3513] Hinden, R., and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing [RFC3232] Reynolds, J., "Assigned Numbers: RFC 1700 is Replaced by
Architecture", RFC 3513, April 2003. an On-line Database", RFC 3232, January 2002.
[RFC3596] Thomson, S., C. Huitema, V. Ksinant, and M. Souissi, "DNS [RFC3484] Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet
Extensions to support IP version 6", RFC 3596, October 2003. Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 3484, February 2003.
[RFC3704] Baker, F., and Savola P., "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed [RFC3493] Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., McCann, J., and W.
Networks", RFC 3704, BCP 84, March 2004. Stevens, "Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6", RFC
3493, February 2003.
9. Authors' Addresses [RFC3513] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6) Addressing Architecture", RFC 3513, April 2003.
Erik Nordmark [RFC3596] Thomson, S., Huitema, C., Ksinant, V., and M. Souissi,
Sun Microsystems Laboratories "DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6", RFC 3596,
180, avenue de l'Europe October 2003.
38334 SAINT ISMIER Cedex, France
Tel : +33 (0)4 76 18 88 03
Fax : +33 (0)4 76 18 88 88
Email : erik.nordmark@sun.com
Robert E. Gilligan [RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
Intransa, Inc. Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004.
2870 Zanker Rd., Suite 100
San Jose, CA 95134
Tel : +1 408 678 8600 [RFC4087] Thaler, D., "IP Tunnel MIB", RFC 4087, June 2005.
Fax : +1 408 678 8800
Email : gilligan@intransa.com, gilligan@leaf.com
10. Changes from RFC 2893 8. Changes from RFC 2893
The motivation for the bulk of these changes are to simplify the The motivation for the bulk of these changes are to simplify the
document to only contain the mechanisms of wide-spread use. document to only contain the mechanisms of wide-spread use.
RFC 2893 contains a mechanism called automatic tunneling. But a much RFC 2893 contains a mechanism called automatic tunneling. But a much
more general mechanism is specified in RFC 3056 [RFC3056] which gives more general mechanism is specified in RFC 3056 [RFC3056] which gives
each node with a (global) IPv4 address a /48 IPv6 prefix i.e., enough each node with a (global) IPv4 address a /48 IPv6 prefix i.e., enough
for a whole site. for a whole site.
The following changes have been performed since RFC 2893: The following changes have been performed since RFC 2893:
- Removed references to A6 and retained AAAA. - Removed references to A6 and retained AAAA.
- Removed automatic tunneling and use of IPv4-compatible - Removed automatic tunneling and use of IPv4-compatible addresses.
addresses.
- Removed default Configured Tunnel using IPv4 "Anycast Address" - Removed default Configured Tunnel using IPv4 "Anycast Address"
- Removed Source Address Selection section since this is now - Removed Source Address Selection section since this is now covered
covered by another document ([RFC3484]). by another document ([RFC3484]).
- Removed brief mention of 6over4. - Removed brief mention of 6over4.
- Split into normative and non-normative references and other - Split into normative and non-normative references and other
reference cleanup. reference cleanup.
- Dropped "or equal" in if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than or - Dropped "or equal" in if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than or
equal to 1280 equal to 1280.
- Dropped this: However, IPv6 may be used in some environments - Dropped this: However, IPv6 may be used in some environments where
where interoperability with IPv4 is not required. IPv6 nodes interoperability with IPv4 is not required. IPv6 nodes that are
that are designed to be used in such environments need not use designed to be used in such environments need not use or even
or even implement these mechanisms. implement these mechanisms.
- Described Static MTU and Dynamic MTU cases separately; clarified - Described Static MTU and Dynamic MTU cases separately; clarified
that the dynamic path MTU mechanism is OPTIONAL but if it is that the dynamic path MTU mechanism is OPTIONAL but if it is
implemented it should follow the rules in section 3.2.2. implemented it should follow the rules in section 3.2.2.
- Specified Static MTU to default to a MTU of 1280 to 1480 bytes, - Specified Static MTU to default to a MTU of 1280 to 1480 bytes,
and that this may be configurable. Discussed the issues with and that this may be configurable. Discussed the issues with
using Static MTU at more length. using Static MTU at more length.
- Specified minimal rules for IPv4 reassembly and IPv6 MRU to - Specified minimal rules for IPv4 reassembly and IPv6 MRU to
enhance interoperability and to minimize blacholes. enhance interoperability and to minimize blacholes.
- Restated the "currently underway" language about Type-of- - Restated the "currently underway" language about Type-of-Service,
Service, and loosely point at [RFC2983] and [RFC3168]. and loosely point at [RFC2983] and [RFC3168].
- Fixed reference to Assigned Numbers to be to online version - Fixed reference to Assigned Numbers to be to online version (with
(with proper pointer to "Assigned Numbers is obsolete" RFC). proper pointer to "Assigned Numbers is obsolete" RFC).
- Clarified text about ingress filtering e.g. that it applies to - Clarified text about ingress filtering e.g., that it applies to
packet delivered to transport protocols on the decapsulator as packet delivered to transport protocols on the decapsulator as
well as packets being forwarded by the decapsulator, and how the well as packets being forwarded by the decapsulator, and how the
decapsulator's checks help when IPv4 and IPv6 ingress filtering decapsulator's checks help when IPv4 and IPv6 ingress filtering is
is in place. in place.
- Removed unidirectional tunneling; assume all tunnels are - Removed unidirectional tunneling; assume all tunnels are
bidirectional, between endpoint addresses (not nodes). bidirectional, between endpoint addresses (not nodes).
- Removed the guidelines for advertising addresses in DNS as - Removed the guidelines for advertising addresses in DNS as
slightly out of scope, referring to another document for the slightly out of scope, referring to another document for the
details. details.
- Removed the SHOULD requirement that the link-local addresses - Removed the SHOULD requirement that the link-local addresses
should be formed based on IPv4 addresses. should be formed based on IPv4 addresses.
skipping to change at page 27, line 37 skipping to change at page 25, line 18
- Added stronger wording for source address checks: both IPv4 and - Added stronger wording for source address checks: both IPv4 and
IPv6 source addresses MUST be checked, and RPF-like ingress IPv6 source addresses MUST be checked, and RPF-like ingress
filtering is optional. filtering is optional.
- Rewrote security considerations to be more precise about the - Rewrote security considerations to be more precise about the
threats of tunneling. threats of tunneling.
- Added a note about considering using TTL=255 when encapsulating. - Added a note about considering using TTL=255 when encapsulating.
- Added more discussion in Section 3.2 why using an "infinite" - Added more discussion in Section 3.2 why using an "infinite" IPv6
IPv6 MTU leads to likely interoperability problems. MTU leads to likely interoperability problems.
- Added an explicit requirement that if both MTU determination - Added an explicit requirement that if both MTU determination
methods are used, choosing one should be possible on a per- methods are used, choosing one should be possible on a per-tunnel
tunnel basis. basis.
- Clarified that ICMPv4 error handling is only applicable to - Clarified that ICMPv4 error handling is only applicable to dynamic
dynamic MTU determination. MTU determination.
- Removed/clarified DNS record filtering; an API is a SHOULD and - Removed/clarified DNS record filtering; an API is a SHOULD and if
if it does not exist, MUST NOT filter anything. Decree ordering it does not exist, MUST NOT filter anything. Decree ordering out
out of scope, but refer to RFC3484. of scope, but refer to RFC3484.
- Add a note that the destination IPv4 address could also be a - Add a note that the destination IPv4 address could also be a
multicast address. multicast address.
- Make it RECOMMENDED to provide a toggle to perform strict - Make it RECOMMENDED to provide a toggle to perform strict ingress
ingress filtering on an interface. filtering on an interface.
- Generalize the text on the data in ICMPv4 messages. - Generalize the text on the data in ICMPv4 messages.
- Made a lot of miscellaneous editorial cleanups. - Made a lot of miscellaneous editorial cleanups.
Intellectual Property Statement Authors' Addresses
Erik Nordmark
Sun Microsystems
17 Network Circle
Menlo Park, CA 94025
USA
Phone: +1 650 786 2921
EMail: erik.nordmark@sun.com
Robert E. Gilligan
Intransa, Inc.
2870 Zanker Rd., Suite 100
San Jose, CA 95134 USA
Phone : +1 408 678 8600
Fax : +1 408 678 8800
EMail: bob.gilligan@acm.org
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
skipping to change at page 28, line 36 skipping to change at page 27, line 45
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr. http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf- this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
ipr@ietf.org. ipr@ietf.org.
Disclaimer of Validity Acknowledgement
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society. Internet Society.
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