draft-ietf-quic-transport-06.txt   draft-ietf-quic-transport-07.txt 
QUIC J. Iyengar, Ed. QUIC J. Iyengar, Ed.
Internet-Draft Google Internet-Draft Google
Intended status: Standards Track M. Thomson, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track M. Thomson, Ed.
Expires: March 26, 2018 Mozilla Expires: April 16, 2018 Mozilla
September 22, 2017 October 13, 2017
QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport
draft-ietf-quic-transport-06 draft-ietf-quic-transport-07
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the core of the QUIC transport protocol. This This document defines the core of the QUIC transport protocol. This
document describes connection establishment, packet format, document describes connection establishment, packet format,
multiplexing and reliability. Accompanying documents describe the multiplexing and reliability. Accompanying documents describe the
cryptographic handshake and loss detection. cryptographic handshake and loss detection.
Note to Readers Note to Readers
Discussion of this draft takes place on the QUIC working group Discussion of this draft takes place on the QUIC working group
mailing list (quic@ietf.org), which is archived at mailing list (quic@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=quic . https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=quic [1].
Working Group information can be found at https://github.com/quicwg ; Working Group information can be found at https://github.com/quicwg
source code and issues list for this draft can be found at [2]; source code and issues list for this draft can be found at
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/labels/transport . https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/labels/transport [3].
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 26, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 16, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
skipping to change at page 2, line 38 skipping to change at page 2, line 38
3.3. Rich Signaling for Congestion Control and Loss Recovery . 7 3.3. Rich Signaling for Congestion Control and Loss Recovery . 7
3.4. Stream and Connection Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.4. Stream and Connection Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Authenticated and Encrypted Header and Payload . . . . . 7 3.5. Authenticated and Encrypted Header and Payload . . . . . 7
3.6. Connection Migration and Resilience to NAT Rebinding . . 8 3.6. Connection Migration and Resilience to NAT Rebinding . . 8
3.7. Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.7. Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Packet Types and Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Packet Types and Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Long Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1. Long Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Short Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.2. Short Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3. Version Negotiation Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.3. Version Negotiation Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.4. Cleartext Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.4. Cleartext Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.4.1. Client Initial Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.4.1. Client Initial Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.4.2. Server Stateless Retry Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.4.2. Server Stateless Retry Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.4.3. Server Cleartext Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.4.3. Server Cleartext Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.4.4. Client Cleartext Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.4.4. Client Cleartext Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.5. Protected Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.5. Protected Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.6. Connection ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.6. Connection ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.7. Packet Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.7. Packet Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.7.1. Initial Packet Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.7.1. Initial Packet Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.8. Handling Packets from Different Versions . . . . . . . . 19 5.8. Handling Packets from Different Versions . . . . . . . . 18
6. Frames and Frame Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6. Frames and Frame Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. Life of a Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7. Life of a Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.1. Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7.1. Matching Packets to Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.1.1. Using Reserved Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7.2. Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.2. Cryptographic and Transport Handshake . . . . . . . . . . 23 7.2.1. Sending Version Negotiation Packets . . . . . . . . . 22
7.3. Transport Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7.2.2. Handling Version Negotiation Packets . . . . . . . . 23
7.3.1. Transport Parameter Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . 26 7.2.3. Using Reserved Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.3.2. Values of Transport Parameters for 0-RTT . . . . . . 27 7.3. Cryptographic and Transport Handshake . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.3.3. New Transport Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 7.4. Transport Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.3.4. Version Negotiation Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 28 7.4.1. Transport Parameter Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.4. Stateless Retries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7.4.2. Values of Transport Parameters for 0-RTT . . . . . . 28
7.5. Proof of Source Address Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 7.4.3. New Transport Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.5.1. Client Address Validation Procedure . . . . . . . . . 31 7.4.4. Version Negotiation Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.5.2. Address Validation on Session Resumption . . . . . . 31 7.5. Stateless Retries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.5.3. Address Validation Token Integrity . . . . . . . . . 32 7.6. Proof of Source Address Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.6. Connection Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 7.6.1. Client Address Validation Procedure . . . . . . . . . 31
7.6.1. Privacy Implications of Connection Migration . . . . 33 7.6.2. Address Validation on Session Resumption . . . . . . 32
7.6.2. Address Validation for Migrated Connections . . . . . 34 7.6.3. Address Validation Token Integrity . . . . . . . . . 33
7.7. Connection Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.7. Connection Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.7.1. Draining Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.7.1. Privacy Implications of Connection Migration . . . . 33
7.7.2. Application Close . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.7.2. Address Validation for Migrated Connections . . . . . 35
7.7.3. Idle Timeout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.8. Connection Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.7.4. Immediate Close . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.8.1. Draining Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.7.5. Stateless Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 7.8.2. Idle Timeout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8. Frame Types and Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 7.8.3. Immediate Close . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.1. PADDING Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 7.8.4. Stateless Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8. Frame Types and Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.1. PADDING Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.2. RST_STREAM Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 8.2. RST_STREAM Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.3. CONNECTION_CLOSE frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 8.3. CONNECTION_CLOSE frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.4. MAX_DATA Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 8.4. APPLICATION_CLOSE frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.5. MAX_STREAM_DATA Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 8.5. MAX_DATA Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.6. MAX_STREAM_ID Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 8.6. MAX_STREAM_DATA Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.7. PING frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 8.7. MAX_STREAM_ID Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.8. BLOCKED Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 8.8. PING frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.9. STREAM_BLOCKED Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 8.9. BLOCKED Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.10. STREAM_ID_BLOCKED Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 8.10. STREAM_BLOCKED Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.11. NEW_CONNECTION_ID Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 8.11. STREAM_ID_BLOCKED Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.12. STOP_SENDING Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 8.12. NEW_CONNECTION_ID Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.13. ACK Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 8.13. STOP_SENDING Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.13.1. ACK Block Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 8.14. ACK Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.13.2. Timestamp Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 8.14.1. ACK Block Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.13.3. ACK Frames and Packet Protection . . . . . . . . . . 50 8.14.2. ACK Frames and Packet Protection . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.14. STREAM Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.15. STREAM Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
9. Packetization and Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 9. Packetization and Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
9.1. Special Considerations for PMTU Discovery . . . . . . . . 55 9.1. Special Considerations for PMTU Discovery . . . . . . . . 55
10. Streams: QUIC's Data Structuring Abstraction . . . . . . . . 55 10. Streams: QUIC's Data Structuring Abstraction . . . . . . . . 55
10.1. Stream Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 10.1. Stream Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
10.2. Life of a Stream . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 10.2. Life of a Stream . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
10.2.1. idle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 10.2.1. idle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
10.2.2. open . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 10.2.2. open . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
10.2.3. half-closed (local) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 10.2.3. half-closed (local) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
10.2.4. half-closed (remote) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 10.2.4. half-closed (remote) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
10.2.5. closed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 10.2.5. closed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.3. Solicited State Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 10.3. Solicited State Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.4. Stream Concurrency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 10.4. Stream Concurrency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10.5. Sending and Receiving Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 10.5. Sending and Receiving Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
10.6. Stream Prioritization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 10.6. Stream Prioritization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11. Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 11. Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.1. Edge Cases and Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 64 11.1. Edge Cases and Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.1.1. Response to a RST_STREAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 11.1.1. Response to a RST_STREAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.1.2. Data Limit Increments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 11.1.2. Data Limit Increments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.2. Stream Limit Increment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 11.2. Stream Limit Increment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.2.1. Blocking on Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 11.2.1. Blocking on Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.3. Stream Final Offset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 11.3. Stream Final Offset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
12. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 12. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
12.1. Connection Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 12.1. Connection Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
12.2. Stream Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 12.2. Stream Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
12.3. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 12.3. Transport Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
12.4. Application Protocol Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
13. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 13. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
13.1. Spoofed ACK Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 13.1. Spoofed ACK Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
13.2. Slowloris Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 13.2. Slowloris Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
13.3. Stream Fragmentation and Reassembly Attacks . . . . . . 71 13.3. Stream Fragmentation and Reassembly Attacks . . . . . . 71
13.4. Stream Commitment Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 13.4. Stream Commitment Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
14.1. QUIC Transport Parameter Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 72 14.1. QUIC Transport Parameter Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 72
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 14.2. QUIC Transport Error Codes Registry . . . . . . . . . . 73
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
15.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Appendix A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 15.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Appendix A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
C.1. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-05 . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
C.2. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-04 . . . . . . . . . . . 76 C.1. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-06 . . . . . . . . . . . 78
C.3. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-03 . . . . . . . . . . . 77 C.2. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-05 . . . . . . . . . . . 78
C.4. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-02 . . . . . . . . . . . 77 C.3. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-04 . . . . . . . . . . . 78
C.5. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-01 . . . . . . . . . . . 78 C.4. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-03 . . . . . . . . . . . 79
C.6. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-00 . . . . . . . . . . . 80 C.5. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-02 . . . . . . . . . . . 79
C.7. Since draft-hamilton-quic-transport-protocol-01 . . . . . 80 C.6. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-01 . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 C.7. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-00 . . . . . . . . . . . 82
C.8. Since draft-hamilton-quic-transport-protocol-01 . . . . . 82
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
QUIC is a multiplexed and secure transport protocol that runs on top QUIC is a multiplexed and secure transport protocol that runs on top
of UDP. QUIC aims to provide a flexible set of features that allow of UDP. QUIC aims to provide a flexible set of features that allow
it to be a general-purpose transport for multiple applications. it to be a general-purpose transport for multiple applications.
QUIC implements techniques learned from experience with TCP, SCTP and QUIC implements techniques learned from experience with TCP, SCTP and
other transport protocols. QUIC uses UDP as substrate so as to not other transport protocols. QUIC uses UDP as substrate so as to not
require changes to legacy client operating systems and middleboxes to require changes to legacy client operating systems and middleboxes to
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Connection ID: The 64-bit unsigned number used as an identifier for Connection ID: The 64-bit unsigned number used as an identifier for
a QUIC connection. a QUIC connection.
QUIC packet: A well-formed UDP payload that can be parsed by a QUIC QUIC packet: A well-formed UDP payload that can be parsed by a QUIC
receiver. QUIC packet size in this document refers to the UDP receiver. QUIC packet size in this document refers to the UDP
payload size. payload size.
2.1. Notational Conventions 2.1. Notational Conventions
Packet and frame diagrams use the format described in [RFC2360] Packet and frame diagrams use the format described in Section 3.1 of
Section 3.1, with the following additional conventions: [RFC2360], with the following additional conventions:
[x] Indicates that x is optional [x] Indicates that x is optional
{x} Indicates that x is encrypted {x} Indicates that x is encrypted
x (A) Indicates that x is A bits long x (A) Indicates that x is A bits long
x (A/B/C) ... Indicates that x is one of A, B, or C bits long x (A/B/C) ... Indicates that x is one of A, B, or C bits long
x (*) ... Indicates that x is variable-length x (*) ... Indicates that x is variable-length
3. A QUIC Overview 3. A QUIC Overview
This section briefly describes QUIC's key mechanisms and benefits. This section briefly describes QUIC's key mechanisms and benefits.
Key strengths of QUIC include: Key strengths of QUIC include:
o Low-latency connection establishment o Low-latency connection establishment
skipping to change at page 8, line 26 skipping to change at page 8, line 31
client continues to use the same session key for encrypting and client continues to use the same session key for encrypting and
decrypting packets. The consistent connection ID can be used to decrypting packets. The consistent connection ID can be used to
allow migration of the connection to a new server IP address as well, allow migration of the connection to a new server IP address as well,
since the Connection ID remains consistent across changes in the since the Connection ID remains consistent across changes in the
client's and the server's network addresses. client's and the server's network addresses.
3.7. Version Negotiation 3.7. Version Negotiation
QUIC version negotiation allows for multiple versions of the protocol QUIC version negotiation allows for multiple versions of the protocol
to be deployed and used concurrently. Version negotiation is to be deployed and used concurrently. Version negotiation is
described in Section 7.1. described in Section 7.2.
4. Versions 4. Versions
QUIC versions are identified using a 32-bit unsigned number. QUIC versions are identified using a 32-bit unsigned number.
The version 0x00000000 is reserved to represent an invalid version. The version 0x00000000 is reserved to represent an invalid version.
This version of the specification is identified by the number This version of the specification is identified by the number
0x00000001. 0x00000001.
Version 0x00000001 of QUIC uses TLS as a cryptographic handshake Version 0x00000001 of QUIC uses TLS as a cryptographic handshake
skipping to change at page 9, line 34 skipping to change at page 9, line 38
are referenced in subsequent mechanisms. are referenced in subsequent mechanisms.
All numeric values are encoded in network byte order (that is, big- All numeric values are encoded in network byte order (that is, big-
endian) and all field sizes are in bits. When discussing individual endian) and all field sizes are in bits. When discussing individual
bits of fields, the least significant bit is referred to as bit 0. bits of fields, the least significant bit is referred to as bit 0.
Hexadecimal notation is used for describing the value of fields. Hexadecimal notation is used for describing the value of fields.
Any QUIC packet has either a long or a short header, as indicated by Any QUIC packet has either a long or a short header, as indicated by
the Header Form bit. Long headers are expected to be used early in the Header Form bit. Long headers are expected to be used early in
the connection before version negotiation and establishment of 1-RTT the connection before version negotiation and establishment of 1-RTT
keys. Short headers are minimal version-specific headers, which can keys. Short headers are minimal version-specific headers, which are
be used after version negotiation and 1-RTT keys are established. used after version negotiation and 1-RTT keys are established.
5.1. Long Header 5.1. Long Header
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1| Type (7) | |1| Type (7) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
+ Connection ID (64) + + Connection ID (64) +
| | | |
skipping to change at page 10, line 24 skipping to change at page 10, line 24
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version (32) | | Version (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Payload (*) ... | Payload (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Long Header Format Figure 1: Long Header Format
Long headers are used for packets that are sent prior to the Long headers are used for packets that are sent prior to the
completion of version negotiation and establishment of 1-RTT keys. completion of version negotiation and establishment of 1-RTT keys.
Once both conditions are met, a sender SHOULD switch to sending Once both conditions are met, a sender switches to sending packets
short-form headers. While inefficient, long headers MAY be used for using the short header (Section 5.2). The long form allows for
packets encrypted with 1-RTT keys. The long form allows for special special packets - such as the Version Negotiation packet - to be
packets - such as the Version Negotiation packet - to be represented represented in this uniform fixed-length packet format. A long
in this uniform fixed-length packet format. A long header contains header contains the following fields:
the following fields:
Header Form: The most significant bit (0x80) of octet 0 (the first Header Form: The most significant bit (0x80) of octet 0 (the first
octet) is set to 1 for long headers. octet) is set to 1 for long headers.
Long Packet Type: The remaining seven bits of octet 0 contain the Long Packet Type: The remaining seven bits of octet 0 contain the
packet type. This field can indicate one of 128 packet types. packet type. This field can indicate one of 128 packet types.
The types specified for this version are listed in Table 1. The types specified for this version are listed in Table 1.
Connection ID: Octets 1 through 8 contain the connection ID. Connection ID: Octets 1 through 8 contain the connection ID.
Section 5.6 describes the use of this field in more detail. Section 5.6 describes the use of this field in more detail.
skipping to change at page 11, line 5 skipping to change at page 11, line 5
Version: Octets 13 to 16 contain the selected protocol version. Version: Octets 13 to 16 contain the selected protocol version.
This field indicates which version of QUIC is in use and This field indicates which version of QUIC is in use and
determines how the rest of the protocol fields are interpreted. determines how the rest of the protocol fields are interpreted.
Payload: Octets from 17 onwards (the rest of QUIC packet) are the Payload: Octets from 17 onwards (the rest of QUIC packet) are the
payload of the packet. payload of the packet.
The following packet types are defined: The following packet types are defined:
+------+-------------------------------+---------------+ +------+------------------------+---------------+
| Type | Name | Section | | Type | Name | Section |
+------+-------------------------------+---------------+ +------+------------------------+---------------+
| 0x01 | Version Negotiation | Section 5.3 | | 0x01 | Version Negotiation | Section 5.3 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x02 | Client Initial | Section 5.4.1 | | 0x02 | Client Initial | Section 5.4.1 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x03 | Server Stateless Retry | Section 5.4.2 | | 0x03 | Server Stateless Retry | Section 5.4.2 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x04 | Server Cleartext | Section 5.4.3 | | 0x04 | Server Cleartext | Section 5.4.3 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x05 | Client Cleartext | Section 5.4.4 | | 0x05 | Client Cleartext | Section 5.4.4 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x06 | 0-RTT Protected | Section 5.5 | | 0x06 | 0-RTT Protected | Section 5.5 |
| | | | +------+------------------------+---------------+
| 0x07 | 1-RTT Protected (key phase 0) | Section 5.5 |
| | | |
| 0x08 | 1-RTT Protected (key phase 1) | Section 5.5 |
+------+-------------------------------+---------------+
Table 1: Long Header Packet Types Table 1: Long Header Packet Types
The header form, packet type, connection ID, packet number and The header form, packet type, connection ID, packet number and
version fields of a long header packet are version-independent. The version fields of a long header packet are version-independent. The
types of packets defined in Table 1 are version-specific. See types of packets defined in Table 1 are version-specific. See
Section 5.8 for details on how packets from different versions of Section 5.8 for details on how packets from different versions of
QUIC are interpreted. QUIC are interpreted.
(TODO: Should the list of packet types be version-independent?)
The interpretation of the fields and the payload are specific to a The interpretation of the fields and the payload are specific to a
version and packet type. Type-specific semantics for this version version and packet type. Type-specific semantics for this version
are described in the following sections. are described in the following sections.
5.2. Short Header 5.2. Short Header
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0|C|K| Type (5)| |0|C|K| Type (5)|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
+ [Connection ID (64)] + + [Connection ID (64)] +
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Number (8/16/32) ... | Packet Number (8/16/32) ...
skipping to change at page 12, line 30 skipping to change at page 12, line 12
The short header can be used after the version and 1-RTT keys are The short header can be used after the version and 1-RTT keys are
negotiated. This header form has the following fields: negotiated. This header form has the following fields:
Header Form: The most significant bit (0x80) of octet 0 is set to 0 Header Form: The most significant bit (0x80) of octet 0 is set to 0
for the short header. for the short header.
Connection ID Flag: The second bit (0x40) of octet 0 indicates Connection ID Flag: The second bit (0x40) of octet 0 indicates
whether the Connection ID field is present. If set to 1, then the whether the Connection ID field is present. If set to 1, then the
Connection ID field is present; if set to 0, the Connection ID Connection ID field is present; if set to 0, the Connection ID
field is omitted. The Connection ID field can only be omitted if field is omitted. The Connection ID field can only be omitted if
the omit_connection_id transport parameter (Section 7.3.1) is the omit_connection_id transport parameter (Section 7.4.1) is
specified by the intended recipient of the packet. specified by the intended recipient of the packet.
Key Phase Bit: The third bit (0x20) of octet 0 indicates the key Key Phase Bit: The third bit (0x20) of octet 0 indicates the key
phase, which allows a recipient of a packet to identify the packet phase, which allows a recipient of a packet to identify the packet
protection keys that are used to protect the packet. See protection keys that are used to protect the packet. See
[QUIC-TLS] for details. [QUIC-TLS] for details.
Short Packet Type: The remaining 5 bits of octet 0 include one of 32 Short Packet Type: The remaining 5 bits of octet 0 include one of 32
packet types. Table 2 lists the types that are defined for short packet types. Table 2 lists the types that are defined for short
packets. packets.
skipping to change at page 14, line 19 skipping to change at page 13, line 41
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Supported Version 2 (32)] ... | [Supported Version 2 (32)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
... ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Supported Version N (32)] ... | [Supported Version N (32)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Version Negotiation Packet Figure 3: Version Negotiation Packet
See Section 7.1 for a description of the version negotiation process. See Section 7.2 for a description of the version negotiation process.
5.4. Cleartext Packets 5.4. Cleartext Packets
Cleartext packets are sent during the handshake prior to key Cleartext packets are sent during the handshake prior to key
negotiation. negotiation.
All cleartext packets contain the current QUIC version in the version All cleartext packets contain the current QUIC version in the version
field. field.
The payload of cleartext packets also includes an integrity check, In order to prevent tampering by version-unaware middleboxes,
which is described in [QUIC-TLS]. Cleartext packets are protected with a connection and version
specific key, as described in [QUIC-TLS]. This protection does not
provide confidentiality or integrity against on-path attackers, but
provides some level of protection against off-path attackers.
5.4.1. Client Initial Packet 5.4.1. Client Initial Packet
The Client Initial packet uses long headers with a type value of The Client Initial packet uses long headers with a type value of
0x02. It carries the first cryptographic handshake message sent by 0x02. It carries the first cryptographic handshake message sent by
the client. the client.
The client populates the connection ID field with randomly selected The client populates the connection ID field with randomly selected
values, unless it has received a packet from the server. If the values, unless it has received a packet from the server. If the
client has received a packet from the server, the connection ID field client has received a packet from the server, the connection ID field
uses the value provided by the server. uses the value provided by the server.
The packet number used for Client Initial packets is initialized with The first Client Initial packet that is sent by a client contains a
a random value each time the new contents are created for the packet. random 31-bit value. All subsequent packets contain a packet number
Retransmissions of the packet contents increment the packet number by that is incremented by one, see (Section 5.7).
one, see (Section 5.7).
The payload of a Client Initial packet consists of a STREAM frame (or The payload of a Client Initial packet consists of a STREAM frame (or
frames) for stream 0 containing a cryptographic handshake message, frames) for stream 0 containing a cryptographic handshake message,
with enough PADDING frames that the packet is at least 1200 octets with enough PADDING frames that the packet is at least 1200 octets
(see Section 9). The stream in this packet always starts at an (see Section 9). The stream in this packet always starts at an
offset of 0 (see Section 7.4) and the complete cyptographic handshake offset of 0 (see Section 7.5) and the complete cryptographic
message MUST fit in a single packet (see Section 7.2). handshake message MUST fit in a single packet (see Section 7.3).
The client uses the Client Initial Packet type for any packet that The client uses the Client Initial Packet type for any packet that
contains an initial cryptographic handshake message. This includes contains an initial cryptographic handshake message. This includes
all cases where a new packet containing the initial cryptographic all cases where a new packet containing the initial cryptographic
message needs to be created, this includes the packets sent after message needs to be created, this includes the packets sent after
receiving a Version Negotiation (Section 5.3) or Server Stateless receiving a Version Negotiation (Section 5.3) or Server Stateless
Retry packet (Section 5.4.2). Retry packet (Section 5.4.2).
5.4.2. Server Stateless Retry Packet 5.4.2. Server Stateless Retry Packet
A Server Stateless Retry packet uses long headers with a type value A Server Stateless Retry packet uses long headers with a type value
of 0x03. It carries cryptographic handshake messages and of 0x03. It carries cryptographic handshake messages and
acknowledgments. It is used by a server that wishes to perform a acknowledgments. It is used by a server that wishes to perform a
stateless retry (see Section 7.4). stateless retry (see Section 7.5).
The packet number and connection ID fields echo the corresponding The packet number and connection ID fields echo the corresponding
fields from the triggering client packet. This allows a client to fields from the triggering client packet. This allows a client to
verify that the server received its packet. verify that the server received its packet.
A Server Stateless Retry packet is never explicitly acknowledged in A Server Stateless Retry packet is never explicitly acknowledged in
an ACK frame by a client. Receiving another Client Initial packet an ACK frame by a client. Receiving another Client Initial packet
implicitly acknowledges a Server Stateless Retry packet. implicitly acknowledges a Server Stateless Retry packet.
After receiving a Server Stateless Retry packet, the client uses a After receiving a Server Stateless Retry packet, the client uses a
new Client Initial packet containing the next cryptographic handshake new Client Initial packet containing the next cryptographic handshake
message. The client retains the state of its cryptographic message. The client retains the state of its cryptographic
handshake, but discards all transport state. The new Client Initial handshake, but discards all transport state. The Client Initial
packet includes a newly randomized packet number, STREAM frames on packet that is generated in response to a Server Stateless Retry
stream 0 that start again at an offset of 0, and the original packet includes STREAM frames on stream 0 that start again at an
connection ID. offset of 0.
Continuing the cryptographic handshake is necessary to ensure that an Continuing the cryptographic handshake is necessary to ensure that an
attacker cannot force a downgrade of any cryptographic parameters. attacker cannot force a downgrade of any cryptographic parameters.
In addition to continuing the cryptographic handshake, the client In addition to continuing the cryptographic handshake, the client
MUST remember the results of any version negotiation that occurred MUST remember the results of any version negotiation that occurred
(see Section 7.1). The client MAY also retain any observed RTT or (see Section 7.2). The client MAY also retain any observed RTT or
congestion state that it has accumulated for the flow, but other congestion state that it has accumulated for the flow, but other
transport state MUST be discarded. transport state MUST be discarded.
The payload of the Server Stateless Retry packet contains STREAM The payload of the Server Stateless Retry packet contains a single
frames and could contain PADDING and ACK frames. A server can only STREAM frame on stream 0 with offset 0 containing the server's
send a single Server Stateless Retry packet in response to each cryptographic stateless retry material. It MUST NOT contain any
Client Initial packet that is receives. other frames. The next STREAM frame sent by the server will also
start at stream offset 0.
5.4.3. Server Cleartext Packet 5.4.3. Server Cleartext Packet
A Server Cleartext packet uses long headers with a type value of A Server Cleartext packet uses long headers with a type value of
0x04. It is used to carry acknowledgments and cryptographic 0x04. It is used to carry acknowledgments and cryptographic
handshake messages from the server. handshake messages from the server.
The connection ID field in a Server Cleartext packet contains a The connection ID field in a Server Cleartext packet contains a
connection ID that is chosen by the server (see Section 5.6). connection ID that is chosen by the server (see Section 5.6).
skipping to change at page 16, line 41 skipping to change at page 16, line 19
higher than the last Client Initial, 0-RTT Protected or Client higher than the last Client Initial, 0-RTT Protected or Client
Cleartext packet that was sent. The packet number is incremented for Cleartext packet that was sent. The packet number is incremented for
each subsequent packet, see Section 5.7. each subsequent packet, see Section 5.7.
The payload of this packet contains STREAM frames and could contain The payload of this packet contains STREAM frames and could contain
PADDING and ACK frames. PADDING and ACK frames.
5.5. Protected Packets 5.5. Protected Packets
Packets that are protected with 0-RTT keys are sent with long Packets that are protected with 0-RTT keys are sent with long
headers. Packets that are protected with 1-RTT keys MAY be sent with headers; all packets protected with 1-RTT keys are sent with short
long headers. The different packet types explicitly indicate the headers. The different packet types explicitly indicate the
encryption level and therefore the keys that are used to remove encryption level and therefore the keys that are used to remove
packet protection. packet protection.
Packets protected with 0-RTT keys use a type value of 0x06. The Packets protected with 0-RTT keys use a type value of 0x06. The
connection ID field for a 0-RTT packet is selected by the client. connection ID field for a 0-RTT packet is selected by the client.
The client can send 0-RTT packets after having received a packet from The client can send 0-RTT packets after receiving a Server Cleartext
the server if that packet does not complete the handshake. Even if packet (Section 5.4.3), if that packet does not complete the
the client receives a different connection ID from the server, it handshake. Even if the client receives a different connection ID in
MUST NOT update the connection ID it uses for 0-RTT packets. This the Server Cleartext packet, it MUST continue to use the connection
enables consistent routing for all 0-RTT packets. ID selected by the client for 0-RTT packets, see Section 5.6.
Packets protected with 1-RTT keys that use long headers use a type
value of 0x07 for key phase 0 and 0x08 for key phase 1; see
[QUIC-TLS] for more details on the use of key phases. The connection
ID field for these packet types MUST contain the value selected by
the server, see Section 5.6.
The version field for protected packets is the current QUIC version. The version field for protected packets is the current QUIC version.
The packet number field contains a packet number, which increases The packet number field contains a packet number, which increases
with each packet sent, see Section 5.7 for details. with each packet sent, see Section 5.7 for details.
The payload is protected using authenticated encryption. [QUIC-TLS] The payload is protected using authenticated encryption. [QUIC-TLS]
describes packet protection in detail. After decryption, the describes packet protection in detail. After decryption, the
plaintext consists of a sequence of frames, as described in plaintext consists of a sequence of frames, as described in
Section 6. Section 6.
skipping to change at page 17, line 33 skipping to change at page 17, line 6
5.6. Connection ID 5.6. Connection ID
QUIC connections are identified by their 64-bit Connection ID. All QUIC connections are identified by their 64-bit Connection ID. All
long headers contain a Connection ID. Short headers indicate the long headers contain a Connection ID. Short headers indicate the
presence of a Connection ID using the CONNECTION_ID flag. When presence of a Connection ID using the CONNECTION_ID flag. When
present, the Connection ID is in the same location in all packet present, the Connection ID is in the same location in all packet
headers, making it straightforward for middleboxes, such as load headers, making it straightforward for middleboxes, such as load
balancers, to locate and use it. balancers, to locate and use it.
The client MUST choose a random connection ID and use it in Client The client MUST choose a random connection ID and use it in Client
Initial packets (Section 5.4.1) and 0-RTT packets (Section 5.5). If Initial packets (Section 5.4.1) and 0-RTT packets (Section 5.5).
the client has received any packet from the server, it uses the
connection ID it received from the server for all packets other than
0-RTT packets.
When the server receives a Client Initial packet and decides to When the server receives a Client Initial packet and decides to
proceed with the handshake, it chooses a new value for the connection proceed with the handshake, it chooses a new value for the connection
ID and sends that in a Server Cleartext packet. The server MAY ID and sends that in a Server Cleartext packet (Section 5.4.3). The
choose to use the value that the client initially selects. server MAY choose to use the value that the client initially selects.
Once the client receives the connection ID that the server has Once the client receives the connection ID that the server has
chosen, it uses this for all subsequent packets that it sends, except chosen, it MUST use it for all subsequent Client Cleartext
for any 0-RTT packets, which all have the same connection ID. (Section 5.4.4) and 1-RTT (Section 5.5) packets but not for 0-RTT
packets (Section 5.5).
Server's Version Negotiation (Section 5.3) and Stateless Retry
(Section 5.4.2) packets MUST use connection ID selected by the
client.
5.7. Packet Numbers 5.7. Packet Numbers
The packet number is a 64-bit unsigned number and is used as part of The packet number is a 64-bit unsigned number and is used as part of
a cryptographic nonce for packet encryption. Each endpoint maintains a cryptographic nonce for packet encryption. Each endpoint maintains
a separate packet number for sending and receiving. The packet a separate packet number for sending and receiving. The packet
number for sending MUST increase by at least one after sending any number for sending MUST increase by at least one after sending any
packet, unless otherwise specified (see Section 5.7.1). packet, unless otherwise specified (see Section 5.7.1).
A QUIC endpoint MUST NOT reuse a packet number within the same A QUIC endpoint MUST NOT reuse a packet number within the same
connection (that is, under the same cryptographic keys). If the connection (that is, under the same cryptographic keys). If the
packet number for sending reaches 2^64 - 1, the sender MUST close the packet number for sending reaches 2^64 - 1, the sender MUST close the
connection without sending a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame or any further connection without sending a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame or any further
packets; a server MAY send a Stateless Reset (Section 7.7.5) in packets; a server MAY send a Stateless Reset (Section 7.8.4) in
response to further packets that it receives. response to further packets that it receives.
To reduce the number of bits required to represent the packet number To reduce the number of bits required to represent the packet number
over the wire, only the least significant bits of the packet number over the wire, only the least significant bits of the packet number
are transmitted. The actual packet number for each packet is are transmitted. The actual packet number for each packet is
reconstructed at the receiver based on the largest packet number reconstructed at the receiver based on the largest packet number
received on a successfully authenticated packet. received on a successfully authenticated packet.
A packet number is decoded by finding the packet number value that is A packet number is decoded by finding the packet number value that is
closest to the next expected packet. The next expected packet is the closest to the next expected packet. The next expected packet is the
skipping to change at page 19, line 16 skipping to change at page 18, line 35
The initial value for packet number MUST be selected from an uniform The initial value for packet number MUST be selected from an uniform
random distribution between 0 and 2^31-1. That is, the lower 31 bits random distribution between 0 and 2^31-1. That is, the lower 31 bits
of the packet number are randomized. [RFC4086] provides guidance on of the packet number are randomized. [RFC4086] provides guidance on
the generation of random values. the generation of random values.
The first set of packets sent by an endpoint MUST include the low The first set of packets sent by an endpoint MUST include the low
32-bits of the packet number. Once any packet has been acknowledged, 32-bits of the packet number. Once any packet has been acknowledged,
subsequent packets can use a shorter packet number encoding. subsequent packets can use a shorter packet number encoding.
A client that receives a Version Negotiation (Section 5.3) or Server
Stateless Retry packet (Section 5.4.2) MUST generate a new initial
packet number. This ensures that the first transmission attempt for
a Client Initial packet (Section 5.4.1) always contains a randomized
packet number, but packets that contain retransmissions increment the
packet number.
A client MUST NOT generate a new initial packet number if it discards
the server packet. This might happen if the information the client
retransmits its Client Initial packet.
5.8. Handling Packets from Different Versions 5.8. Handling Packets from Different Versions
Between different versions the following things are guaranteed to Between different versions the following things are guaranteed to
remain constant: remain constant:
o the location of the header form flag, o the location of the header form flag,
o the location of the Connection ID flag in short headers, o the location of the Connection ID flag in short headers,
o the location and size of the Connection ID field in both header o the location and size of the Connection ID field in both header
forms, forms,
o the location and size of the Version field in long headers, and o the location and size of the Version field in long headers,
o the location and size of the Packet Number field in long headers. o the location and size of the Packet Number field in long headers,
and
o the type, format and semantics of the Version Negotiation packet.
Implementations MUST assume that an unsupported version uses an Implementations MUST assume that an unsupported version uses an
unknown packet format. All other fields MUST be ignored when unknown packet format. All other fields MUST be ignored when
processing a packet that contains an unsupported version. processing a packet that contains an unsupported version.
6. Frames and Frame Types 6. Frames and Frame Types
The payload of cleartext packets and the plaintext after decryption The payload of cleartext packets and the plaintext after decryption
of protected payloads consists of a sequence of frames, as shown in of protected payloads consists of a sequence of frames, as shown in
Figure 4. Figure 4.
skipping to change at page 21, line 14 skipping to change at page 20, line 14
+-------------+-------------------+--------------+ +-------------+-------------------+--------------+
| Type Value | Frame Type Name | Definition | | Type Value | Frame Type Name | Definition |
+-------------+-------------------+--------------+ +-------------+-------------------+--------------+
| 0x00 | PADDING | Section 8.1 | | 0x00 | PADDING | Section 8.1 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x01 | RST_STREAM | Section 8.2 | | 0x01 | RST_STREAM | Section 8.2 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x02 | CONNECTION_CLOSE | Section 8.3 | | 0x02 | CONNECTION_CLOSE | Section 8.3 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x04 | MAX_DATA | Section 8.4 | | 0x03 | APPLICATION_CLOSE | Section 8.4 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x05 | MAX_STREAM_DATA | Section 8.5 | | 0x04 | MAX_DATA | Section 8.5 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x06 | MAX_STREAM_ID | Section 8.6 | | 0x05 | MAX_STREAM_DATA | Section 8.6 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x07 | PING | Section 8.7 | | 0x06 | MAX_STREAM_ID | Section 8.7 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x08 | BLOCKED | Section 8.8 | | 0x07 | PING | Section 8.8 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x09 | STREAM_BLOCKED | Section 8.9 | | 0x08 | BLOCKED | Section 8.9 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x0a | STREAM_ID_BLOCKED | Section 8.10 | | 0x09 | STREAM_BLOCKED | Section 8.10 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x0b | NEW_CONNECTION_ID | Section 8.11 | | 0x0a | STREAM_ID_BLOCKED | Section 8.11 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x0c | STOP_SENDING | Section 8.12 | | 0x0b | NEW_CONNECTION_ID | Section 8.12 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0xa0 - 0xbf | ACK | Section 8.13 | | 0x0c | STOP_SENDING | Section 8.13 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0xc0 - 0xff | STREAM | Section 8.14 | | 0xa0 - 0xbf | ACK | Section 8.14 |
| | | |
| 0xc0 - 0xff | STREAM | Section 8.15 |
+-------------+-------------------+--------------+ +-------------+-------------------+--------------+
Table 3: Frame Types Table 3: Frame Types
7. Life of a Connection 7. Life of a Connection
A QUIC connection is a single conversation between two QUIC A QUIC connection is a single conversation between two QUIC
endpoints. QUIC's connection establishment intertwines version endpoints. QUIC's connection establishment intertwines version
negotiation with the cryptographic and transport handshakes to reduce negotiation with the cryptographic and transport handshakes to reduce
connection establishment latency, as described in Section 7.2. Once connection establishment latency, as described in Section 7.3. Once
established, a connection may migrate to a different IP or port at established, a connection may migrate to a different IP or port at
either endpoint, due to NAT rebinding or mobility, as described in either endpoint, due to NAT rebinding or mobility, as described in
Section 7.6. Finally a connection may be terminated by either Section 7.7. Finally a connection may be terminated by either
endpoint, as described in Section 7.7. endpoint, as described in Section 7.8.
7.1. Version Negotiation 7.1. Matching Packets to Connections
Incoming packets are classified on receipt. Packets can either be
associated with an existing connection, be discarded, or - for
servers - potentially create a new connection.
Packets that can be associated with an existing connection are
handled according to the current state of that connection. Packets
are associated with existing connections using connection ID if it is
present; this might include connection IDs that were advertised using
NEW_CONNECTION_ID (Section 8.12). Packets without connection IDs and
long-form packets for connections that have incomplete cryptographic
handshakes are associated with an existing connection using the tuple
of source and destination IP addresses and ports.
A packet that uses the short header could be associated with an
existing connection with an incomplete cryptographic handshake. Such
a packet could be a valid packet that has been reordered with respect
to the long-form packets that will complete the cryptographic
handshake. This might happen after the final set of cryptographic
handshake messages from either peer. These packets are expected to
be correlated with a connection using the tuple of IP addresses and
ports. Packets that might be reordered in this fashion SHOULD be
buffered in anticipation of the handshake completing.
0-RTT packets might be received prior to a Client Initial packet at a
server. If the version of these packets is acceptable to the server,
it MAY buffer these packets in anticipation of receiving a reordered
Client Initial packet.
Buffering ensures that data is not lost, which improves performance;
conversely, discarding these packets could create false loss signals
for the congestion controllers. However, limiting the number and
size of buffered packets might be needed to prevent exposure to
denial of service.
For clients, any packet that cannot be associated with an existing
connection SHOULD be discarded if it is not buffered. Discarded
packets MAY be logged for diagnostic or security purposes.
For servers, packets that aren't associated with a connection
potentially create a new connection. However, only packets that use
the long packet header and that are at least the minimum size defined
for the protocol version can be initial packets. A server MAY
discard packets with a short header or packets that are smaller than
the smallest minimum size for any version that the server supports.
A server that discards a packet that cannot be associated with a
connection MAY also generate a stateless reset (Section 7.8.4).
This version of QUIC defines a minimum size for initial packets of
1200 octets (see Section 9). Versions of QUIC that define smaller
minimum initial packet sizes need to be aware that initial packets
will be discarded without action by servers that only support
versions with larger minimums. Clients that support multiple QUIC
versions can avoid this problem by ensuring that they increase the
size of their initial packets to the largest minimum size across all
of the QUIC versions they support. Servers need to recognize initial
packets that are the minimum size of all QUIC versions they support.
7.2. Version Negotiation
QUIC's connection establishment begins with version negotiation, QUIC's connection establishment begins with version negotiation,
since all communication between the endpoints, including packet and since all communication between the endpoints, including packet and
frame formats, relies on the two endpoints agreeing on a version. frame formats, relies on the two endpoints agreeing on a version.
A QUIC connection begins with a client sending a handshake packet. A QUIC connection begins with a client sending a Client Initial
The details of the handshake mechanisms are described in Section 7.2, packet (Section 5.4.1). The details of the handshake mechanisms are
but all of the initial packets sent from the client to the server described in Section 7.3, but all of the initial packets sent from
MUST use the long header format and MUST specify the version of the the client to the server MUST use the long header format - which
protocol being used. includes the version of the protocol being used - and they MUST be
padded to at least 1200 octets.
When the server receives a packet from a client with the long header The server receives this packet and determines whether it potentially
format, it compares the client's version to the versions it supports. creates a new connection (see Section 7.1). If the packet might
generate a new connection, the server then checks whether it
understands the version that the client has selected.
If the packet contains a version that is acceptable to the server,
the server proceeds with the handshake (Section 7.3). This commits
the server to the version that the client selected.
7.2.1. Sending Version Negotiation Packets
If the version selected by the client is not acceptable to the If the version selected by the client is not acceptable to the
server, the server discards the incoming packet and responds with a server, the server responds with a Version Negotiation packet
Version Negotiation packet (Section 5.3). This includes a list of (Section 5.3). This includes a list of versions that the server will
versions that the server will accept. accept.
To avoid packet amplification attacks a server MUST NOT send a A server sends a Version Negotiation packet for any packet with an
Version Negotiation packet that is larger than the packet it responds unacceptable version if that packet could create a new connection.
to. It is anticipated that this is ample space for all QUIC versions This allows a server to process packets with unsupported versions
that a single server might need to advertise. without retaining state. Though either the Client Initial packet or
the version negotiation packet that is sent in response could be
lost, the client will send new packets until it successfully receives
a response or it abandons the connection attempt.
A server sends a Version Negotiation packet for every packet that it 7.2.2. Handling Version Negotiation Packets
receives with an unacceptable version. This allows a server to
process packets with unsupported versions without retaining state.
Though either the initial client packet or the version negotiation
packet that is sent in response could be lost, the client will send
new packets until it successfully receives a response.
If the packet contains a version that is acceptable to the server, When the client receives a Version Negotiation packet, it first
the server proceeds with the handshake (Section 7.2). This commits checks that the packet number and connection ID match the values the
the server to the version that the client selected. client sent in a previous packet on the same connection. If this
check fails, the packet MUST be discarded.
When the client receives a Version Negotiation packet from the Once the Version Negotiation packet is determined to be valid, the
server, it should select an acceptable protocol version. If the client then selects an acceptable protocol version from the list
server lists an acceptable version, the client selects that version provided by the server. The client then attempts to create a
and reattempts to create a connection using that version. Though the connection using that version. Though the contents of the Client
contents of a packet might not change in response to version Initial packet the client sends might not change in response to
negotiation, a client MUST increase the packet number it uses on version negotiation, a client MUST increase the packet number it uses
every packet it sends. Packets MUST continue to use long headers and on every packet it sends. Packets MUST continue to use long headers
MUST include the new negotiated protocol version. and MUST include the new negotiated protocol version.
The client MUST use the long header format and include its selected The client MUST use the long header format and include its selected
version on all packets until it has 1-RTT keys and it has received a version on all packets until it has 1-RTT keys and it has received a
packet from the server which is not a Version Negotiation packet. packet from the server which is not a Version Negotiation packet.
A client MUST NOT change the version it uses unless it is in response A client MUST NOT change the version it uses unless it is in response
to a Version Negotiation packet from the server. Once a client to a Version Negotiation packet from the server. Once a client
receives a packet from the server which is not a Version Negotiation receives a packet from the server which is not a Version Negotiation
packet, it MUST ignore other Version Negotiation packets on the same packet, it MUST discard other Version Negotiation packets on the same
connection. Similarly, a client MUST ignore a Version Negotiation connection. Similarly, a client MUST ignore a Version Negotiation
packet if it has already received and acted on a Version Negotiation packet if it has already received and acted on a Version Negotiation
packet. packet.
A client MUST ignore a Version Negotiation packet that lists the A client MUST ignore a Version Negotiation packet that lists the
client's chosen version. client's chosen version.
Version negotiation uses unprotected data. The result of the Version negotiation packets have no cryptographic protection. The
negotiation MUST be revalidated as part of the cryptographic result of the negotiation MUST be revalidated as part of the
handshake (see Section 7.3.4). cryptographic handshake (see Section 7.4.4).
7.1.1. Using Reserved Versions 7.2.3. Using Reserved Versions
For a server to use a new version in the future, clients must For a server to use a new version in the future, clients must
correctly handle unsupported versions. To help ensure this, a server correctly handle unsupported versions. To help ensure this, a server
SHOULD include a reserved version (see Section 4) while generating a SHOULD include a reserved version (see Section 4) while generating a
Version Negotiation packet. Version Negotiation packet.
The design of version negotiation permits a server to avoid The design of version negotiation permits a server to avoid
maintaining state for packets that it rejects in this fashion. maintaining state for packets that it rejects in this fashion.
However, when the server generates a Version Negotiation packet, it However, when the server generates a Version Negotiation packet, it
cannot randomly generate a reserved version number. This is because cannot randomly generate a reserved version number. This is because
the server is required to include the same value in its transport the server is required to include the same value in its transport
parameters (see Section 7.3.4). To avoid the selected version number parameters (see Section 7.4.4). To avoid the selected version number
changing during connection establishment, the reserved version SHOULD changing during connection establishment, the reserved version SHOULD
be generated as a function of values that will be available to the be generated as a function of values that will be available to the
server when later generating its handshake packets. server when later generating its handshake packets.
A pseudorandom function that takes client address information (IP and A pseudorandom function that takes client address information (IP and
port) and the client selected version as input would ensure that port) and the client selected version as input would ensure that
there is sufficient variability in the values that a server uses. there is sufficient variability in the values that a server uses.
A client MAY send a packet using a reserved version number. This can A client MAY send a packet using a reserved version number. This can
be used to solicit a list of supported versions from a server. be used to solicit a list of supported versions from a server.
7.2. Cryptographic and Transport Handshake 7.3. Cryptographic and Transport Handshake
QUIC relies on a combined cryptographic and transport handshake to QUIC relies on a combined cryptographic and transport handshake to
minimize connection establishment latency. QUIC allocates stream 0 minimize connection establishment latency. QUIC allocates stream 0
for the cryptographic handshake. Version 0x00000001 of QUIC uses TLS for the cryptographic handshake. Version 0x00000001 of QUIC uses TLS
1.3 as described in [QUIC-TLS]; a different QUIC version number could 1.3 as described in [QUIC-TLS]; a different QUIC version number could
indicate that a different cryptographic handshake protocol is in use. indicate that a different cryptographic handshake protocol is in use.
QUIC provides this stream with reliable, ordered delivery of data. QUIC provides this stream with reliable, ordered delivery of data.
In return, the cryptographic handshake provides QUIC with: In return, the cryptographic handshake provides QUIC with:
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* a client is optionally authenticated, * a client is optionally authenticated,
* every connection produces distinct and unrelated keys, * every connection produces distinct and unrelated keys,
* keying material is usable for packet protection for both 0-RTT * keying material is usable for packet protection for both 0-RTT
and 1-RTT packets, and and 1-RTT packets, and
* 1-RTT keys have forward secrecy * 1-RTT keys have forward secrecy
o authenticated values for the transport parameters of the peer (see o authenticated values for the transport parameters of the peer (see
Section 7.3) Section 7.4)
o authenticated confirmation of version negotiation (see o authenticated confirmation of version negotiation (see
Section 7.3.4) Section 7.4.4)
o authenticated negotiation of an application protocol (TLS uses o authenticated negotiation of an application protocol (TLS uses
ALPN [RFC7301] for this purpose) ALPN [RFC7301] for this purpose)
o for the server, the ability to carry data that provides assurance o for the server, the ability to carry data that provides assurance
that the client can receive packets that are addressed with the that the client can receive packets that are addressed with the
transport address that is claimed by the client (see Section 7.5) transport address that is claimed by the client (see Section 7.6)
The initial cryptographic handshake message MUST be sent in a single The initial cryptographic handshake message MUST be sent in a single
packet. Any second attempt that is triggered by address validation packet. Any second attempt that is triggered by address validation
MUST also be sent within a single packet. This avoids having to MUST also be sent within a single packet. This avoids having to
reassemble a message from multiple packets. Reassembling messages reassemble a message from multiple packets. Reassembling messages
requires that a server maintain state prior to establishing a requires that a server maintain state prior to establishing a
connection, exposing the server to a denial of service risk. connection, exposing the server to a denial of service risk.
The first client packet of the cryptographic handshake protocol MUST The first client packet of the cryptographic handshake protocol MUST
fit within a 1232 octet QUIC packet payload. This includes overheads fit within a 1232 octet QUIC packet payload. This includes overheads
that reduce the space available to the cryptographic handshake that reduce the space available to the cryptographic handshake
protocol. protocol.
Details of how TLS is integrated with QUIC is provided in more detail Details of how TLS is integrated with QUIC is provided in more detail
in [QUIC-TLS]. in [QUIC-TLS].
7.3. Transport Parameters 7.4. Transport Parameters
During connection establishment, both endpoints make authenticated During connection establishment, both endpoints make authenticated
declarations of their transport parameters. These declarations are declarations of their transport parameters. These declarations are
made unilaterally by each endpoint. Endpoints are required to comply made unilaterally by each endpoint. Endpoints are required to comply
with the restrictions implied by these parameters; the description of with the restrictions implied by these parameters; the description of
each parameter includes rules for its handling. each parameter includes rules for its handling.
The format of the transport parameters is the TransportParameters The format of the transport parameters is the TransportParameters
struct from Figure 6. This is described using the presentation struct from Figure 6. This is described using the presentation
language from Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. language from Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].
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The "extension_data" field of the quic_transport_parameters extension The "extension_data" field of the quic_transport_parameters extension
defined in [QUIC-TLS] contains a TransportParameters value. TLS defined in [QUIC-TLS] contains a TransportParameters value. TLS
encoding rules are therefore used to encode the transport parameters. encoding rules are therefore used to encode the transport parameters.
QUIC encodes transport parameters into a sequence of octets, which QUIC encodes transport parameters into a sequence of octets, which
are then included in the cryptographic handshake. Once the handshake are then included in the cryptographic handshake. Once the handshake
completes, the transport parameters declared by the peer are completes, the transport parameters declared by the peer are
available. Each endpoint validates the value provided by its peer. available. Each endpoint validates the value provided by its peer.
In particular, version negotiation MUST be validated (see In particular, version negotiation MUST be validated (see
Section 7.3.4) before the connection establishment is considered Section 7.4.4) before the connection establishment is considered
properly complete. properly complete.
Definitions for each of the defined transport parameters are included Definitions for each of the defined transport parameters are included
in Section 7.3.1. in Section 7.4.1. Any given parameter MUST appear at most once in a
given transport parameters extension. An endpoint MUST treat receipt
of duplicate transport parameters as a connection error of type
TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR.
7.3.1. Transport Parameter Definitions 7.4.1. Transport Parameter Definitions
An endpoint MUST include the following parameters in its encoded An endpoint MUST include the following parameters in its encoded
TransportParameters: TransportParameters:
initial_max_stream_data (0x0000): The initial stream maximum data initial_max_stream_data (0x0000): The initial stream maximum data
parameter contains the initial value for the maximum data that can parameter contains the initial value for the maximum data that can
be sent on any newly created stream. This parameter is encoded as be sent on any newly created stream. This parameter is encoded as
an unsigned 32-bit integer in units of octets. This is equivalent an unsigned 32-bit integer in units of octets. This is equivalent
to an implicit MAX_STREAM_DATA frame (Section 8.5) being sent on to an implicit MAX_STREAM_DATA frame (Section 8.6) being sent on
all streams immediately after opening. all streams immediately after opening.
initial_max_data (0x0001): The initial maximum data parameter initial_max_data (0x0001): The initial maximum data parameter
contains the initial value for the maximum amount of data that can contains the initial value for the maximum amount of data that can
be sent on the connection. This parameter is encoded as an be sent on the connection. This parameter is encoded as an
unsigned 32-bit integer in units of 1024 octets. That is, the unsigned 32-bit integer in units of 1024 octets. That is, the
value here is multiplied by 1024 to determine the actual maximum value here is multiplied by 1024 to determine the actual maximum
value. This is equivalent to sending a MAX_DATA (Section 8.4) for value. This is equivalent to sending a MAX_DATA (Section 8.5) for
the connection immediately after completing the handshake. the connection immediately after completing the handshake.
initial_max_stream_id (0x0002): The initial maximum stream ID initial_max_stream_id (0x0002): The initial maximum stream ID
parameter contains the initial maximum stream number the peer may parameter contains the initial maximum stream number the peer may
initiate, encoded as an unsigned 32-bit integer. This is initiate, encoded as an unsigned 32-bit integer. This is
equivalent to sending a MAX_STREAM_ID (Section 8.6) immediately equivalent to sending a MAX_STREAM_ID (Section 8.7) immediately
after completing the handshake. after completing the handshake.
idle_timeout (0x0003): The idle timeout is a value in seconds that idle_timeout (0x0003): The idle timeout is a value in seconds that
is encoded as an unsigned 16-bit integer. The maximum value is is encoded as an unsigned 16-bit integer. The maximum value is
600 seconds (10 minutes). 600 seconds (10 minutes).
A server MUST include the following transport parameters: A server MUST include the following transport parameters:
stateless_reset_token (0x0006): The Stateless Reset Token is used in stateless_reset_token (0x0006): The Stateless Reset Token is used in
verifying a stateless reset, see Section 7.7.5. This parameter is verifying a stateless reset, see Section 7.8.4. This parameter is
a sequence of 16 octets. a sequence of 16 octets.
A client MUST NOT include a stateless reset token. A server MUST A client MUST NOT include a stateless reset token. A server MUST
treat receipt of a stateless_reset_token transport parameter as a treat receipt of a stateless_reset_token transport parameter as a
connection error of type TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR. connection error of type TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR.
An endpoint MAY use the following transport parameters: An endpoint MAY use the following transport parameters:
omit_connection_id (0x0004): The omit connection identifier omit_connection_id (0x0004): The omit connection identifier
parameter indicates that packets sent to the endpoint that parameter indicates that packets sent to the endpoint that
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every packet. every packet.
max_packet_size (0x0005): The maximum packet size parameter places a max_packet_size (0x0005): The maximum packet size parameter places a
limit on the size of packets that the endpoint is willing to limit on the size of packets that the endpoint is willing to
receive, encoded as an unsigned 16-bit integer. This indicates receive, encoded as an unsigned 16-bit integer. This indicates
that packets larger than this limit will be dropped. The default that packets larger than this limit will be dropped. The default
for this parameter is the maximum permitted UDP payload of 65527. for this parameter is the maximum permitted UDP payload of 65527.
Values below 1200 are invalid. This limit only applies to Values below 1200 are invalid. This limit only applies to
protected packets (Section 5.5). protected packets (Section 5.5).
7.3.2. Values of Transport Parameters for 0-RTT 7.4.2. Values of Transport Parameters for 0-RTT
Transport parameters from the server MUST be remembered by the client Transport parameters from the server MUST be remembered by the client
for use with 0-RTT data. If the TLS NewSessionTicket message for use with 0-RTT data. If the TLS NewSessionTicket message
includes the quic_transport_parameters extension, then those values includes the quic_transport_parameters extension, then those values
are used for the server values when establishing a new connection are used for the server values when establishing a new connection
using that ticket. Otherwise, the transport parameters that the using that ticket. Otherwise, the transport parameters that the
server advertises during connection establishment are used. server advertises during connection establishment are used.
A server can remember the transport parameters that it advertised, or A server can remember the transport parameters that it advertised, or
store an integrity-protected copy of the values in the ticket and store an integrity-protected copy of the values in the ticket and
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data is accepted by the server, the server MUST NOT reduce any limits data is accepted by the server, the server MUST NOT reduce any limits
or alter any values that might be violated by the client with its or alter any values that might be violated by the client with its
0-RTT data. In particular, a server that accepts 0-RTT data MUST NOT 0-RTT data. In particular, a server that accepts 0-RTT data MUST NOT
set values for initial_max_data or initial_max_stream_data that are set values for initial_max_data or initial_max_stream_data that are
smaller than the remembered value of those parameters. Similarly, a smaller than the remembered value of those parameters. Similarly, a
server MUST NOT reduce the value of initial_max_stream_id. server MUST NOT reduce the value of initial_max_stream_id.
A server MUST reject 0-RTT data or even abort a handshake if the A server MUST reject 0-RTT data or even abort a handshake if the
implied values for transport parameters cannot be supported. implied values for transport parameters cannot be supported.
7.3.3. New Transport Parameters 7.4.3. New Transport Parameters
New transport parameters can be used to negotiate new protocol New transport parameters can be used to negotiate new protocol
behavior. An endpoint MUST ignore transport parameters that it does behavior. An endpoint MUST ignore transport parameters that it does
not support. Absence of a transport parameter therefore disables any not support. Absence of a transport parameter therefore disables any
optional protocol feature that is negotiated using the parameter. optional protocol feature that is negotiated using the parameter.
New transport parameters can be registered according to the rules in New transport parameters can be registered according to the rules in
Section 14.1. Section 14.1.
7.3.4. Version Negotiation Validation 7.4.4. Version Negotiation Validation
The transport parameters include three fields that encode version The transport parameters include three fields that encode version
information. These retroactively authenticate the version information. These retroactively authenticate the version
negotiation (see Section 7.1) that is performed prior to the negotiation (see Section 7.2) that is performed prior to the
cryptographic handshake. cryptographic handshake.
The cryptographic handshake provides integrity protection for the The cryptographic handshake provides integrity protection for the
negotiated version as part of the transport parameters (see negotiated version as part of the transport parameters (see
Section 7.3). As a result, modification of version negotiation Section 7.4). As a result, modification of version negotiation
packets by an attacker can be detected. packets by an attacker can be detected.
The client includes two fields in the transport parameters: The client includes two fields in the transport parameters:
o The negotiated_version is the version that was finally selected o The negotiated_version is the version that was finally selected
for use. This MUST be identical to the value that is on the for use. This MUST be identical to the value that is on the
packet that carries the ClientHello. A server that receives a packet that carries the ClientHello. A server that receives a
negotiated_version that does not match the version of QUIC that is negotiated_version that does not match the version of QUIC that is
in use MUST terminate the connection with a in use MUST terminate the connection with a
VERSION_NEGOTIATION_ERROR error code. VERSION_NEGOTIATION_ERROR error code.
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When an endpoint accepts multiple QUIC versions, it can potentially When an endpoint accepts multiple QUIC versions, it can potentially
interpret transport parameters as they are defined by any of the QUIC interpret transport parameters as they are defined by any of the QUIC
versions it supports. The version field in the QUIC packet header is versions it supports. The version field in the QUIC packet header is
authenticated using transport parameters. The position and the authenticated using transport parameters. The position and the
format of the version fields in transport parameters MUST either be format of the version fields in transport parameters MUST either be
identical across different QUIC versions, or be unambiguously identical across different QUIC versions, or be unambiguously
different to ensure no confusion about their interpretation. One way different to ensure no confusion about their interpretation. One way
that a new format could be introduced is to define a TLS extension that a new format could be introduced is to define a TLS extension
with a different codepoint. with a different codepoint.
7.4. Stateless Retries 7.5. Stateless Retries
A server can process an initial cryptographic handshake messages from A server can process an initial cryptographic handshake messages from
a client without committing any state. This allows a server to a client without committing any state. This allows a server to
perform address validation (Section 7.5, or to defer connection perform address validation (Section 7.6, or to defer connection
establishment costs. establishment costs.
A server that generates a response to an initial packet without A server that generates a response to an initial packet without
retaining connection state MUST use the Server Stateless Retry packet retaining connection state MUST use the Server Stateless Retry packet
(Section 5.4.2). This packet causes a client to reset its transport (Section 5.4.2). This packet causes a client to reset its transport
state and to continue the connection attempt with new connection state and to continue the connection attempt with new connection
state while maintaining the state of the cryptographic handshake. state while maintaining the state of the cryptographic handshake.
A server MUST NOT send multiple Server Stateless Retry packets in A server MUST NOT send multiple Server Stateless Retry packets in
response to a client handshake packet. Thus, any cryptographic response to a client handshake packet. Thus, any cryptographic
handshake message that is sent MUST fit within a single packet. handshake message that is sent MUST fit within a single packet.
In TLS, the Server Stateless Retry packet type is used to carry the In TLS, the Server Stateless Retry packet type is used to carry the
HelloRetryRequest message. HelloRetryRequest message.
7.5. Proof of Source Address Ownership 7.6. Proof of Source Address Ownership
Transport protocols commonly spend a round trip checking that a Transport protocols commonly spend a round trip checking that a
client owns the transport address (IP and port) that it claims. client owns the transport address (IP and port) that it claims.
Verifying that a client can receive packets sent to its claimed Verifying that a client can receive packets sent to its claimed
transport address protects against spoofing of this information by transport address protects against spoofing of this information by
malicious clients. malicious clients.
This technique is used primarily to avoid QUIC from being used for This technique is used primarily to avoid QUIC from being used for
traffic amplification attack. In such an attack, a packet is sent to traffic amplification attack. In such an attack, a packet is sent to
a server with spoofed source address information that identifies a a server with spoofed source address information that identifies a
victim. If a server generates more or larger packets in response to victim. If a server generates more or larger packets in response to
that packet, the attacker can use the server to send more data toward that packet, the attacker can use the server to send more data toward
the victim than it would be able to send on its own. the victim than it would be able to send on its own.
Several methods are used in QUIC to mitigate this attack. Firstly, Several methods are used in QUIC to mitigate this attack. Firstly,
the initial handshake packet is padded to at least 1280 octets. This the initial handshake packet is padded to at least 1200 octets. This
allows a server to send a similar amount of data without risking allows a server to send a similar amount of data without risking
causing an amplification attack toward an unproven remote address. causing an amplification attack toward an unproven remote address.
A server eventually confirms that a client has received its messages A server eventually confirms that a client has received its messages
when the cryptographic handshake successfully completes. This might when the cryptographic handshake successfully completes. This might
be insufficient, either because the server wishes to avoid the be insufficient, either because the server wishes to avoid the
computational cost of completing the handshake, or it might be that computational cost of completing the handshake, or it might be that
the size of the packets that are sent during the handshake is too the size of the packets that are sent during the handshake is too
large. This is especially important for 0-RTT, where the server large. This is especially important for 0-RTT, where the server
might wish to provide application data traffic - such as a response might wish to provide application data traffic - such as a response
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To send additional data prior to completing the cryptographic To send additional data prior to completing the cryptographic
handshake, the server then needs to validate that the client owns the handshake, the server then needs to validate that the client owns the
address that it claims. address that it claims.
Source address validation is therefore performed during the Source address validation is therefore performed during the
establishment of a connection. TLS provides the tools that support establishment of a connection. TLS provides the tools that support
the feature, but basic validation is performed by the core transport the feature, but basic validation is performed by the core transport
protocol. protocol.
7.5.1. Client Address Validation Procedure 7.6.1. Client Address Validation Procedure
QUIC uses token-based address validation. Any time the server wishes QUIC uses token-based address validation. Any time the server wishes
to validate a client address, it provides the client with a token. to validate a client address, it provides the client with a token.
As long as the token cannot be easily guessed (see Section 7.5.3), if As long as the token cannot be easily guessed (see Section 7.6.3), if
the client is able to return that token, it proves to the server that the client is able to return that token, it proves to the server that
it received the token. it received the token.
During the processing of the cryptographic handshake messages from a During the processing of the cryptographic handshake messages from a
client, TLS will request that QUIC make a decision about whether to client, TLS will request that QUIC make a decision about whether to
proceed based on the information it has. TLS will provide QUIC with proceed based on the information it has. TLS will provide QUIC with
any token that was provided by the client. For an initial packet, any token that was provided by the client. For an initial packet,
QUIC can decide to abort the connection, allow it to proceed, or QUIC can decide to abort the connection, allow it to proceed, or
request address validation. request address validation.
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asks QUIC a second time whether the token is acceptable. In asks QUIC a second time whether the token is acceptable. In
response, QUIC can either abort the connection or permit it to response, QUIC can either abort the connection or permit it to
proceed. proceed.
A connection MAY be accepted without address validation - or with A connection MAY be accepted without address validation - or with
only limited validation - but a server SHOULD limit the data it sends only limited validation - but a server SHOULD limit the data it sends
toward an unvalidated address. Successful completion of the toward an unvalidated address. Successful completion of the
cryptographic handshake implicitly provides proof that the client has cryptographic handshake implicitly provides proof that the client has
received packets from the server. received packets from the server.
7.5.2. Address Validation on Session Resumption 7.6.2. Address Validation on Session Resumption
A server MAY provide clients with an address validation token during A server MAY provide clients with an address validation token during
one connection that can be used on a subsequent connection. Address one connection that can be used on a subsequent connection. Address
validation is especially important with 0-RTT because a server validation is especially important with 0-RTT because a server
potentially sends a significant amount of data to a client in potentially sends a significant amount of data to a client in
response to 0-RTT data. response to 0-RTT data.
A different type of token is needed when resuming. Unlike the token A different type of token is needed when resuming. Unlike the token
that is created during a handshake, there might be some time between that is created during a handshake, there might be some time between
when the token is created and when the token is subsequently used. when the token is created and when the token is subsequently used.
skipping to change at page 32, line 4 skipping to change at page 32, line 45
A server MAY provide clients with an address validation token during A server MAY provide clients with an address validation token during
one connection that can be used on a subsequent connection. Address one connection that can be used on a subsequent connection. Address
validation is especially important with 0-RTT because a server validation is especially important with 0-RTT because a server
potentially sends a significant amount of data to a client in potentially sends a significant amount of data to a client in
response to 0-RTT data. response to 0-RTT data.
A different type of token is needed when resuming. Unlike the token A different type of token is needed when resuming. Unlike the token
that is created during a handshake, there might be some time between that is created during a handshake, there might be some time between
when the token is created and when the token is subsequently used. when the token is created and when the token is subsequently used.
Thus, a resumption token SHOULD include an expiration time. It is Thus, a resumption token SHOULD include an expiration time. It is
also unlikely that the client port number is the same on two also unlikely that the client port number is the same on two
different connections; validating the port is therefore unlikely to different connections; validating the port is therefore unlikely to
be successful. be successful.
This token can be provided to the cryptographic handshake immediately This token can be provided to the cryptographic handshake immediately
after establishing a connection. QUIC might also generate an updated after establishing a connection. QUIC might also generate an updated
token if significant time passes or the client address changes for token if significant time passes or the client address changes for
any reason (see Section 7.6). The cryptographic handshake is any reason (see Section 7.7). The cryptographic handshake is
responsible for providing the client with the token. In TLS the responsible for providing the client with the token. In TLS the
token is included in the ticket that is used for resumption and token is included in the ticket that is used for resumption and
0-RTT, which is carried in a NewSessionTicket message. 0-RTT, which is carried in a NewSessionTicket message.
7.5.3. Address Validation Token Integrity 7.6.3. Address Validation Token Integrity
An address validation token MUST be difficult to guess. Including a An address validation token MUST be difficult to guess. Including a
large enough random value in the token would be sufficient, but this large enough random value in the token would be sufficient, but this
depends on the server remembering the value it sends to clients. depends on the server remembering the value it sends to clients.
A token-based scheme allows the server to offload any state A token-based scheme allows the server to offload any state
associated with validation to the client. For this design to work, associated with validation to the client. For this design to work,
the token MUST be covered by integrity protection against the token MUST be covered by integrity protection against
modification or falsification by clients. Without integrity modification or falsification by clients. Without integrity
protection, malicious clients could generate or guess values for protection, malicious clients could generate or guess values for
skipping to change at page 32, line 42 skipping to change at page 33, line 33
In TLS the address validation token is often bundled with the In TLS the address validation token is often bundled with the
information that TLS requires, such as the resumption secret. In information that TLS requires, such as the resumption secret. In
this case, adding integrity protection can be delegated to the this case, adding integrity protection can be delegated to the
cryptographic handshake protocol, avoiding redundant protection. If cryptographic handshake protocol, avoiding redundant protection. If
integrity protection is delegated to the cryptographic handshake, an integrity protection is delegated to the cryptographic handshake, an
integrity failure will result in immediate cryptographic handshake integrity failure will result in immediate cryptographic handshake
failure. If integrity protection is performed by QUIC, QUIC MUST failure. If integrity protection is performed by QUIC, QUIC MUST
abort the connection if the integrity check fails with a abort the connection if the integrity check fails with a
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION error code. PROTOCOL_VIOLATION error code.
7.6. Connection Migration 7.7. Connection Migration
QUIC connections are identified by their 64-bit Connection ID. QUIC connections are identified by their 64-bit Connection ID.
QUIC's consistent connection ID allows connections to survive changes QUIC's consistent connection ID allows connections to survive changes
to the client's IP and/or port, such as those caused by client or to the client's IP and/or port, such as those caused by client or
server migrating to a new network. Connection migration allows a server migrating to a new network. Connection migration allows a
client to retain any shared state with a connection when they move client to retain any shared state with a connection when they move
networks. This includes state that can be hard to recover such as networks. This includes state that can be hard to recover such as
outstanding requests, which might otherwise be lost with no easy way outstanding requests, which might otherwise be lost with no easy way
to retry them. to retry them.
7.6.1. Privacy Implications of Connection Migration 7.7.1. Privacy Implications of Connection Migration
Using a stable connection ID on multiple network paths allows a Using a stable connection ID on multiple network paths allows a
passive observer to correlate activity between those paths. A client passive observer to correlate activity between those paths. A client
that moves between networks might not wish to have their activity that moves between networks might not wish to have their activity
correlated by any entity other than a server. The NEW_CONNECTION_ID correlated by any entity other than a server. The NEW_CONNECTION_ID
message can be sent by a server to provide an unlinkable connection message can be sent by a server to provide an unlinkable connection
ID for use in case the client wishes to explicitly break linkability ID for use in case the client wishes to explicitly break linkability
between two points of network attachment. between two points of network attachment.
A client might need to send packets on multiple networks without A client might need to send packets on multiple networks without
receiving any response from the server. To ensure that the client is receiving any response from the server. To ensure that the client is
not linkable across each of these changes, a new connection ID and not linkable across each of these changes, a new connection ID and
packet number gap are needed for each network. To support this, a packet number gap are needed for each network. To support this, a
server sends multiple NEW_CONNECTION_ID messages. Each server sends multiple NEW_CONNECTION_ID messages. Each
NEW_CONNECTION_ID is marked with a sequence number. Connection IDs NEW_CONNECTION_ID is marked with a sequence number. Connection IDs
MUST be used in the order in which they are numbered. MUST be used in the order in which they are numbered.
A client which wishes to break linkability upon changing networks A client which wishes to break linkability upon changing networks
MUST use the connection ID provided by the server as well as MUST use the connection ID provided by the server as well as
incrementing the packet sequence number by an externally incrementing the packet sequence number by an externally
unpredictable value computed as described in Section 7.6.1.1. Packet unpredictable value computed as described in Section 7.7.1.1. Packet
number gaps are cumulative. A client might skip connection IDs, but number gaps are cumulative. A client might skip connection IDs, but
it MUST ensure that it applies the associated packet number gaps for it MUST ensure that it applies the associated packet number gaps for
connection IDs that it skips in addition to the packet number gap connection IDs that it skips in addition to the packet number gap
associated with the connection ID that it does use. associated with the connection ID that it does use.
A server that receives a packet that is marked with a new connection A server that receives a packet that is marked with a new connection
ID recovers the packet number by adding the cumulative packet number ID recovers the packet number by adding the cumulative packet number
gap to its expected packet number. A server SHOULD discard packets gap to its expected packet number. A server SHOULD discard packets
that contain a smaller gap than it advertised. that contain a smaller gap than it advertised.
For instance, a server might provide a packet number gap of 7 For instance, a server might provide a packet number gap of 7
associated with a new connection ID. If the server received packet associated with a new connection ID. If the server received packet
10 using the previous connection ID, it should expect packets on the 10 using the previous connection ID, it should expect packets on the
new connection ID to start at 18. A packet with the new connection new connection ID to start at 18. A packet with the new connection
ID and a packet number of 17 is discarded as being in error. ID and a packet number of 17 is discarded as being in error.
7.6.1.1. Packet Number Gap 7.7.1.1. Packet Number Gap
In order to avoid linkage, the packet number gap MUST be externally In order to avoid linkage, the packet number gap MUST be externally
indistinguishable from random. The packet number gap for a indistinguishable from random. The packet number gap for a
connection ID with sequence number is computed by encoding the connection ID with sequence number is computed by encoding the
sequence number as a 32-bit integer in big-endian format, and then sequence number as a 32-bit integer in big-endian format, and then
computing: computing:
Gap = HKDF-Expand-Label(packet_number_secret, Gap = HKDF-Expand-Label(packet_number_secret,
"QUIC packet sequence gap", sequence, 4) "QUIC packet sequence gap", sequence, 4)
The output of HKDF-Expand-Label is interpreted as a big-endian The output of HKDF-Expand-Label is interpreted as a big-endian
number. "packet_number_secret" is derived from the TLS key exchange, number. "packet_number_secret" is derived from the TLS key exchange,
as described in [QUIC-TLS] Section 5.6. as described in Section 5.6 of [QUIC-TLS].
7.6.2. Address Validation for Migrated Connections 7.7.2. Address Validation for Migrated Connections
TODO: see issue #161 TODO: see issue #161
7.7. Connection Termination 7.8. Connection Termination
Connections should remain open until they become idle for a pre- Connections should remain open until they become idle for a pre-
negotiated period of time. A QUIC connection, once established, can negotiated period of time. A QUIC connection, once established, can
be terminated in one of four ways: be terminated in one of three ways:
o application close (Section 7.7.2)
o idle timeout (Section 7.7.3) o idle timeout (Section 7.8.2)
o immediate close (Section 7.7.4) o immediate close (Section 7.8.3)
o stateless reset (Section 7.7.5) o stateless reset (Section 7.8.4)
7.7.1. Draining Period 7.8.1. Draining Period
After a connection is closed for any reason, an endpoint might After a connection is closed for any reason, an endpoint might
receive packets from its peer. These packets might have been sent receive packets from its peer. These packets might have been sent
prior to receiving any close signal, or they might be retransmissions prior to receiving any close signal, or they might be retransmissions
of packets for which acknowledgments were lost. of packets for which acknowledgments were lost.
The draining period persists for three times the current The draining period persists for three times the current
Retransmission Timeout (RTO) interval as defined in [QUIC-RECOVERY]. Retransmission Timeout (RTO) interval as defined in [QUIC-RECOVERY].
During this period, new packets can be acknowledged, but no new During this period, new packets can be acknowledged, but no new
application data can be sent on the connection. application data can be sent on the connection.
Different treatment is given to packets that are received while a Different treatment is given to packets that are received while a
connection is in the draining period depending on how the connection connection is in the draining period depending on how the connection
was closed. In all cases, it is possible to acknowledge packets that was closed.
are received as normal, but other reactions might be preferable
depending on how the connection was closed. An endpoint that is in a An endpoint that is in a draining period MUST NOT send packets unless
draining period MUST NOT send packets containing frames other than they contain a CONNECTION_CLOSE or APPLICATION_CLOSE frame.
ACK, PADDING, or CONNECTION_CLOSE.
Once the draining period has ended, an endpoint SHOULD discard per- Once the draining period has ended, an endpoint SHOULD discard per-
connection state. This results in new packets on the connection connection state. This results in new packets on the connection
being discarded. An endpoint MAY send a stateless reset in response being discarded. An endpoint MAY send a stateless reset in response
to any further incoming packets. to any further incoming packets.
The draining period does not apply when a stateless reset The draining period does not apply when a stateless reset
(Section 7.7.5) is used. (Section 7.8.4) is sent.
7.7.2. Application Close
An application protocol can arrange to close a connection. This
might be after negotiating a graceful shutdown. The application
protocol exchanges whatever messages that are needed to cause both
endpoints to agree to close the connection, after which the
application requests that the connection be closed. A negotiated
shutdown might not result in exchanging messages that are visible to
the transport.
In the draining period, an endpoint that has been closed by an
application SHOULD generate and send ACK frames as normal. This
allows the peer to receive acknowledgements where previous
acknowledgements were lost.
7.7.3. Idle Timeout 7.8.2. Idle Timeout
A connection that remains idle for longer than the idle timeout (see A connection that remains idle for longer than the idle timeout (see
Section 7.3.1) becomes closed. Either peer removes connection state Section 7.4.1) becomes closed. Either peer removes connection state
if they have neither sent nor received a packet for this time. if they have neither sent nor received a packet for this time.
The time at which an idle timeout takes effect won't be perfectly The time at which an idle timeout takes effect won't be perfectly
synchronized on peers. A connection enters the draining period when synchronized on peers. A connection enters the draining period when
the idle timeout expires. During this time, an endpoint that the idle timeout expires. During this time, an endpoint that
receives new packets MAY choose to restore the connection. receives new packets MAY choose to restore the connection.
Alternatively, an endpoint that receives packets MAY signal the Alternatively, an endpoint that receives packets MAY signal the
timeout using an immediate close. timeout using an immediate close.
7.7.4. Immediate Close 7.8.3. Immediate Close
An endpoint sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame to terminate the An endpoint sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE or APPLICATION_CLOSE frame to
connection immediately. A CONNECTION_CLOSE causes all open streams terminate the connection immediately. Either frame causes all open
to immediately become closed; open streams can be assumed to be streams to immediately become closed; open streams can be assumed to
implicitly reset. After sending or receiving a CONNECTION_CLOSE be implicitly reset. After sending or receiving a CONNECTION_CLOSE
frame, endpoints immediately enter a draining period. frame, endpoints immediately enter a draining period.
During the draining period, an endpoint that sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE During the draining period, an endpoint that sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE
frame SHOULD respond to any subsequent packet that it receives with or APPLICATION_CLOSE frame SHOULD respond to any subsequent packet
another packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. To reduce the that it receives with another packet containing either close frame.
state that an endpoint maintains in this case, it MAY send the exact To reduce the state that an endpoint maintains in this case, it MAY
same packet. However, endpoints SHOULD limit the number of send the exact same packet. However, endpoints SHOULD limit the
CONNECTION_CLOSE messages they generate. For instance, an endpoint number of packets they generate containing either close frame. For
could progressively increase the number of packets that it receives instance, an endpoint could progressively increase the number of
before sending additional CONNECTION_CLOSE frames. packets that it receives before sending additional packets.
Note: Allowing retransmission of a packet contradicts other advice Note: Allowing retransmission of a packet contradicts other advice
in this document that recommends the creation of new packet in this document that recommends the creation of new packet
numbers for every packet. Sending new packet numbers is primarily numbers for every packet. Sending new packet numbers is primarily
of advantage to loss recovery and congestion control, which are of advantage to loss recovery and congestion control, which are
not expected to be relevant for a closed connection. not expected to be relevant for a closed connection.
Retransmitting the final packet requires less state. Retransmitting the final packet requires less state.
An endpoint can cease sending CONNECTION_CLOSE frames if it receives An immediate close can be used after an application protocol has
either a CONNECTION_CLOSE or an acknowledgement for a packet that arranged to close a connection. This might be after the application
contained a CONNECTION_CLOSE. protocols negotiates a graceful shutdown. The application protocol
exchanges whatever messages that are needed to cause both endpoints
to agree to close the connection, after which the application
requests that the connection be closed. The application protocol can
use an APPLICATION_CLOSE message with an appropriate error code to
signal closure.
7.7.5. Stateless Reset 7.8.4. Stateless Reset
A stateless reset is provided as an option of last resort for a A stateless reset is provided as an option of last resort for a
server that does not have access to the state of a connection. A server that does not have access to the state of a connection. A
server crash or outage might result in clients continuing to send server crash or outage might result in clients continuing to send
data to a server that is unable to properly continue the connection. data to a server that is unable to properly continue the connection.
A server that wishes to communicate a fatal connection error MUST use A server that wishes to communicate a fatal connection error MUST use
a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame if it has sufficient state to do so. a CONNECTION_CLOSE or APPLICATION_CLOSE frame if it has sufficient
state to do so.
To support this process, the server sends a stateless_reset_token To support this process, the server sends a stateless_reset_token
value during the handshake in the transport parameters. This value value during the handshake in the transport parameters. This value
is protected by encryption, so only client and server know this is protected by encryption, so only client and server know this
value. value.
A server that receives packets that it cannot process sends a packet A server that receives packets that it cannot process sends a packet
in the following layout: in the following layout:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0|C|K| 00001 | |0|C|K| 00001 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
+ [Connection ID (64)] + + [Connection ID (64)] +
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Number (8/16/32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Random Octets (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
+ + + +
| | | |
+ Stateless Reset Token (128) + + Stateless Reset Token (128) +
| | | |
+ + + +
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Random Octets (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
This packet SHOULD use the short header form with the shortest
possible packet number encoding. This minimizes the perceived gap
between the last packet that the server sent and this packet. The
leading octet of the Stateless Reset Token will be interpreted as a
packet number. A server MAY use a different short header type,
indicating a different packet number length, but this allows for the
message to be identified as a stateless reset more easily using
heuristics.
A server copies the connection ID field from the packet that triggers A server copies the connection ID field from the packet that triggers
the stateless reset. A server omits the connection ID if explicitly the stateless reset. A server omits the connection ID if explicitly
configured to do so, or if the client packet did not include a configured to do so, or if the client packet did not include a
connection ID. connection ID.
The Packet Number field is set to a randomized value. The server
SHOULD send a packet with a short header and a type of 0x01. This
produces the shortest possible packet number encoding, which
minimizes the perceived gap between the last packet that the server
sent and this packet. A server MAY use a different short header
type, indicating a different packet number length, but a longer
packet number encoding might allow this message to be identified as a
stateless reset more easily using heuristics.
After the first short header octet and optional connection ID, the After the first short header octet and optional connection ID, the
server includes the value of the Stateless Reset Token that it server includes the value of the Stateless Reset Token that it
included in its transport parameters. included in its transport parameters.
After the Stateless Reset Token, the server pads the message with an After the Packet Number, the server pads the message with an
arbitrary number of octets containing random values. arbitrary number of octets containing random values.
Finally, the last 16 octets of the packet are set to the value of the
Stateless Reset Token.
This design ensures that a stateless reset packet is - to the extent This design ensures that a stateless reset packet is - to the extent
possible - indistinguishable from a regular packet. possible - indistinguishable from a regular packet.
A stateless reset is not appropriate for signaling error conditions. A stateless reset is not appropriate for signaling error conditions.
An endpoint that wishes to communicate a fatal connection error MUST An endpoint that wishes to communicate a fatal connection error MUST
use a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame if it has sufficient state to do so. use a CONNECTION_CLOSE or APPLICATION_CLOSE frame if it has
sufficient state to do so.
7.7.5.1. Detecting a Stateless Reset 7.8.4.1. Detecting a Stateless Reset
A client detects a potential stateless reset when a packet with a A client detects a potential stateless reset when a packet with a
short header cannot be decrypted. The client then performs a short header either cannot be decrypted or is marked as a duplicate
constant-time comparison of the 16 octets that follow the Connection packet. The client then compares the last 16 octets of the packet
ID with the Stateless Reset Token provided by the server in its with the Stateless Reset Token provided by the server in its
transport parameters. If this comparison is successful, the transport parameters. If these values are identical, the client MUST
connection MUST be terminated immediately. Otherwise, the packet can enter the draining period and not send any further packets on this
be discarded. connection. If the comparison fails, the packet can be discarded.
7.7.5.2. Calculating a Stateless Reset Token 7.8.4.2. Calculating a Stateless Reset Token
The stateless reset token MUST be difficult to guess. In order to The stateless reset token MUST be difficult to guess. In order to
create a Stateless Reset Token, a server could randomly generate create a Stateless Reset Token, a server could randomly generate
[RFC4086] a secret for every connection that it creates. However, [RFC4086] a secret for every connection that it creates. However,
this presents a coordination problem when there are multiple servers this presents a coordination problem when there are multiple servers
in a cluster or a storage problem for a server that might lose state. in a cluster or a storage problem for a server that might lose state.
Stateless reset specifically exists to handle the case where state is Stateless reset specifically exists to handle the case where state is
lost, so this approach is suboptimal. lost, so this approach is suboptimal.
A single static key can be used across all connections to the same A single static key can be used across all connections to the same
skipping to change at page 38, line 24 skipping to change at page 39, line 13
Stateless Reset Token for that connection. Stateless Reset Token for that connection.
A server that loses state can use the same method to generate a valid A server that loses state can use the same method to generate a valid
Stateless Reset Secret. The connection ID comes from the packet that Stateless Reset Secret. The connection ID comes from the packet that
the server receives. the server receives.
This design relies on the client always sending a connection ID in This design relies on the client always sending a connection ID in
its packets so that the server can use the connection ID from a its packets so that the server can use the connection ID from a
packet to reset the connection. A server that uses this design packet to reset the connection. A server that uses this design
cannot allow clients to omit a connection ID (that is, it cannot use cannot allow clients to omit a connection ID (that is, it cannot use
the truncate_connection_id transport parameter Section 7.3.1). the truncate_connection_id transport parameter Section 7.4.1).
Revealing the Stateless Reset Token allows any entity to terminate Revealing the Stateless Reset Token allows any entity to terminate
the connection, so a value can only be used once. This method for the connection, so a value can only be used once. This method for
choosing the Stateless Reset Token means that the combination of choosing the Stateless Reset Token means that the combination of
server instance, connection ID, and static key cannot occur for server instance, connection ID, and static key cannot occur for
another connection. A connection ID from a connection that is reset another connection. A connection ID from a connection that is reset
by revealing the Stateless Reset Token cannot be reused for new by revealing the Stateless Reset Token cannot be reused for new
connections at the same server without first changing to use a connections at the same server without first changing to use a
different static key or server identifier. different static key or server identifier.
Note that Stateless Reset messages do not have any cryptographic
protection.
8. Frame Types and Formats 8. Frame Types and Formats
As described in Section 6, Regular packets contain one or more As described in Section 6, Regular packets contain one or more
frames. We now describe the various QUIC frame types that can be frames. We now describe the various QUIC frame types that can be
present in a Regular packet. The use of these frames and various present in a Regular packet. The use of these frames and various
frame header bits are described in subsequent sections. frame header bits are described in subsequent sections.
8.1. PADDING Frame 8.1. PADDING Frame
The PADDING frame (type=0x00) has no semantic value. PADDING frames The PADDING frame (type=0x00) has no semantic value. PADDING frames
skipping to change at page 39, line 22 skipping to change at page 40, line 12
of RST_STREAM can discard any data that it already received on that of RST_STREAM can discard any data that it already received on that
stream. stream.
The RST_STREAM frame is as follows: The RST_STREAM frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream ID (32) | | Stream ID (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Code (32) | | Application Error Code (16) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
+ Final Offset (64) + + Final Offset (64) +
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The fields are: The fields are:
Stream ID: The 32-bit Stream ID of the stream being terminated. Stream ID: The 32-bit Stream ID of the stream being terminated.
Error code: A 32-bit error code which indicates why the stream is Application Protocol Error Code: A 16-bit application protocol error
being closed. code (see Section 12.4) which indicates why the stream is being
closed.
Final offset: A 64-bit unsigned integer indicating the absolute byte Final Offset: A 64-bit unsigned integer indicating the absolute byte
offset of the end of data written on this stream by the RST_STREAM offset of the end of data written on this stream by the RST_STREAM
sender. sender.
8.3. CONNECTION_CLOSE frame 8.3. CONNECTION_CLOSE frame
An endpoint sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame (type=0x02) to notify its An endpoint sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame (type=0x02) to notify its
peer that the connection is being closed. If there are open streams peer that the connection is being closed. CONNECTION_CLOSE is used
that haven't been explicitly closed, they are implicitly closed when to signal errors at the QUIC layer, or the absence of errors (with
the connection is closed. The frame is as follows: the NO_ERROR code).
If there are open streams that haven't been explicitly closed, they
are implicitly closed when the connection is closed.
The CONNECTION_CLOSE frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Code (32) | | Error Code (16) | Reason Phrase Length (16) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reason Phrase Length (16) | [Reason Phrase (*)] ... | Reason Phrase (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The fields of a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame are as follows: The fields of a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame are as follows:
Error Code: A 32-bit error code which indicates the reason for Error Code: A 16-bit error code which indicates the reason for
closing this connection. closing this connection. CONNECTION_CLOSE uses codes from the
space defined in Section 12.3 (APPLICATION_CLOSE uses codes from
the application protocol error code space, see Section 12.4).
Reason Phrase Length: A 16-bit unsigned number specifying the length Reason Phrase Length: A 16-bit unsigned number specifying the length
of the reason phrase in bytes. Note that a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame of the reason phrase in bytes. Note that a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame
cannot be split between packets, so in practice any limits on cannot be split between packets, so in practice any limits on
packet size will also limit the space available for a reason packet size will also limit the space available for a reason
phrase. phrase.
Reason Phrase: A human-readable explanation for why the connection Reason Phrase: A human-readable explanation for why the connection
was closed. This can be zero length if the sender chooses to not was closed. This can be zero length if the sender chooses to not
give details beyond the Error Code. This SHOULD be a UTF-8 give details beyond the Error Code. This SHOULD be a UTF-8
encoded string [RFC3629]. encoded string [RFC3629].
8.4. MAX_DATA Frame 8.4. APPLICATION_CLOSE frame
An APPLICATION_CLOSE frame (type=0x03) uses the same format as the
CONNECTION_CLOSE frame (Section 8.3), except that it uses error codes
from the application protocol error code space (Section 12.4) instead
of the transport error code space.
Other than the error code space, the format and semantics of the
APPLICATION_CLOSE frame are identical to the CONNECTION_CLOSE frame.
8.5. MAX_DATA Frame
The MAX_DATA frame (type=0x04) is used in flow control to inform the The MAX_DATA frame (type=0x04) is used in flow control to inform the
peer of the maximum amount of data that can be sent on the connection peer of the maximum amount of data that can be sent on the connection
as a whole. as a whole.
The frame is as follows: The frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
skipping to change at page 41, line 12 skipping to change at page 42, line 12
of 1024 octets. That is, the updated connection-level data limit of 1024 octets. That is, the updated connection-level data limit
is determined by multiplying the encoded value by 1024. is determined by multiplying the encoded value by 1024.
All data sent in STREAM frames counts toward this limit, with the All data sent in STREAM frames counts toward this limit, with the
exception of data on stream 0. The sum of the largest received exception of data on stream 0. The sum of the largest received
offsets on all streams - including closed streams, but excluding offsets on all streams - including closed streams, but excluding
stream 0 - MUST NOT exceed the value advertised by a receiver. An stream 0 - MUST NOT exceed the value advertised by a receiver. An
endpoint MUST terminate a connection with a endpoint MUST terminate a connection with a
QUIC_FLOW_CONTROL_RECEIVED_TOO_MUCH_DATA error if it receives more QUIC_FLOW_CONTROL_RECEIVED_TOO_MUCH_DATA error if it receives more
data than the maximum data value that it has sent, unless this is a data than the maximum data value that it has sent, unless this is a
result of a change in the initial limits (see Section 7.3.2). result of a change in the initial limits (see Section 7.4.2).
8.5. MAX_STREAM_DATA Frame 8.6. MAX_STREAM_DATA Frame
The MAX_STREAM_DATA frame (type=0x05) is used in flow control to The MAX_STREAM_DATA frame (type=0x05) is used in flow control to
inform a peer of the maximum amount of data that can be sent on a inform a peer of the maximum amount of data that can be sent on a
stream. stream.
The frame is as follows: The frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
skipping to change at page 41, line 52 skipping to change at page 42, line 52
stream. Loss or reordering can mean that the largest received offset stream. Loss or reordering can mean that the largest received offset
on a stream can be greater than the total size of data received on on a stream can be greater than the total size of data received on
that stream. Receiving STREAM frames might not increase the largest that stream. Receiving STREAM frames might not increase the largest
received offset. received offset.
The data sent on a stream MUST NOT exceed the largest maximum stream The data sent on a stream MUST NOT exceed the largest maximum stream
data value advertised by the receiver. An endpoint MUST terminate a data value advertised by the receiver. An endpoint MUST terminate a
connection with a FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR error if it receives more data connection with a FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR error if it receives more data
than the largest maximum stream data that it has sent for the than the largest maximum stream data that it has sent for the
affected stream, unless this is a result of a change in the initial affected stream, unless this is a result of a change in the initial
limits (see Section 7.3.2). limits (see Section 7.4.2).
8.6. MAX_STREAM_ID Frame 8.7. MAX_STREAM_ID Frame
The MAX_STREAM_ID frame (type=0x06) informs the peer of the maximum The MAX_STREAM_ID frame (type=0x06) informs the peer of the maximum
stream ID that they are permitted to open. stream ID that they are permitted to open.
The frame is as follows: The frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Maximum Stream ID (32) | | Maximum Stream ID (32) |
skipping to change at page 42, line 33 skipping to change at page 43, line 33
Loss or reordering can mean that a MAX_STREAM_ID frame can be Loss or reordering can mean that a MAX_STREAM_ID frame can be
received which states a lower stream limit than the client has received which states a lower stream limit than the client has
previously received. MAX_STREAM_ID frames which do not increase the previously received. MAX_STREAM_ID frames which do not increase the
maximum stream ID MUST be ignored. maximum stream ID MUST be ignored.
A peer MUST NOT initiate a stream with a higher stream ID than the A peer MUST NOT initiate a stream with a higher stream ID than the
greatest maximum stream ID it has received. An endpoint MUST greatest maximum stream ID it has received. An endpoint MUST
terminate a connection with a STREAM_ID_ERROR error if a peer terminate a connection with a STREAM_ID_ERROR error if a peer
initiates a stream with a higher stream ID than it has sent, unless initiates a stream with a higher stream ID than it has sent, unless
this is a result of a change in the initial limits (see this is a result of a change in the initial limits (see
Section 7.3.2). Section 7.4.2).
8.7. PING frame 8.8. PING frame
Endpoints can use PING frames (type=0x07) to verify that their peers Endpoints can use PING frames (type=0x07) to verify that their peers
are still alive or to check reachability to the peer. The PING frame are still alive or to check reachability to the peer. The PING frame
contains no additional fields. The receiver of a PING frame simply contains no additional fields. The receiver of a PING frame simply
needs to acknowledge the packet containing this frame. needs to acknowledge the packet containing this frame.
A PING frame has no additional fields. A PING frame has no additional fields.
The PING frame can be used to keep a connection alive when an The PING frame can be used to keep a connection alive when an
application or application protocol wishes to prevent the connection application or application protocol wishes to prevent the connection
from timing out. An application protocol SHOULD provide guidance from timing out. An application protocol SHOULD provide guidance
about the conditions under which generating a PING is recommended. about the conditions under which generating a PING is recommended.
This guidance SHOULD indicate whether it is the client or the server This guidance SHOULD indicate whether it is the client or the server
that is expected to send the PING. Having both endpoints send PING that is expected to send the PING. Having both endpoints send PING
frames without coordination can produce an excessive number of frames without coordination can produce an excessive number of
packets and poor performance. packets and poor performance.
A connection will time out if no packets are sent or received for a A connection will time out if no packets are sent or received for a
period longer than the time specified in the idle_timeout transport period longer than the time specified in the idle_timeout transport
parameter (see Section 7.7). However, state in middleboxes might parameter (see Section 7.8). However, state in middleboxes might
time out earlier than that. Though REQ-5 in [RFC4787] recommends a 2 time out earlier than that. Though REQ-5 in [RFC4787] recommends a 2
minute timeout interval, experience shows that sending packets every minute timeout interval, experience shows that sending packets every
15 to 30 seconds is necessary to prevent the majority of middleboxes 15 to 30 seconds is necessary to prevent the majority of middleboxes
from losing state for UDP flows. from losing state for UDP flows.
8.8. BLOCKED Frame 8.9. BLOCKED Frame
A sender sends a BLOCKED frame (type=0x08) when it wishes to send A sender sends a BLOCKED frame (type=0x08) when it wishes to send
data, but is unable to due to connection-level flow control (see data, but is unable to due to connection-level flow control (see
Section 11.2.1). BLOCKED frames can be used as input to tuning of Section 11.2.1). BLOCKED frames can be used as input to tuning of
flow control algorithms (see Section 11.1.2). flow control algorithms (see Section 11.1.2).
The BLOCKED frame does not contain a payload. The BLOCKED frame does not contain a payload.
8.9. STREAM_BLOCKED Frame 8.10. STREAM_BLOCKED Frame
A sender sends a STREAM_BLOCKED frame (type=0x09) when it wishes to A sender sends a STREAM_BLOCKED frame (type=0x09) when it wishes to
send data, but is unable to due to stream-level flow control. This send data, but is unable to due to stream-level flow control. This
frame is analogous to BLOCKED (Section 8.8). frame is analogous to BLOCKED (Section 8.9).
The STREAM_BLOCKED frame is as follows: The STREAM_BLOCKED frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream ID (32) | | Stream ID (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The STREAM_BLOCKED frame contains a single field: The STREAM_BLOCKED frame contains a single field:
Stream ID: A 32-bit unsigned number indicating the stream which is Stream ID: A 32-bit unsigned number indicating the stream which is
flow control blocked. flow control blocked.
8.10. STREAM_ID_BLOCKED Frame 8.11. STREAM_ID_BLOCKED Frame
A sender MAY send a STREAM_ID_BLOCKED frame (type=0x0a) when it A sender MAY send a STREAM_ID_BLOCKED frame (type=0x0a) when it
wishes to open a stream, but is unable to due to the maximum stream wishes to open a stream, but is unable to due to the maximum stream
ID limit set by its peer (see Section 8.6). This does not open the ID limit set by its peer (see Section 8.7). This does not open the
stream, but informs the peer that a new stream was needed, but the stream, but informs the peer that a new stream was needed, but the
stream limit prevented the creation of the stream. stream limit prevented the creation of the stream.
The STREAM_ID_BLOCKED frame does not contain a payload. The STREAM_ID_BLOCKED frame does not contain a payload.
8.11. NEW_CONNECTION_ID Frame 8.12. NEW_CONNECTION_ID Frame
A server sends a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame (type=0x0b) to provide the A server sends a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame (type=0x0b) to provide the
client with alternative connection IDs that can be used to break client with alternative connection IDs that can be used to break
linkability when migrating connections (see Section 7.6.1). linkability when migrating connections (see Section 7.7.1).
The NEW_CONNECTION_ID is as follows: The NEW_CONNECTION_ID is as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence (16) | | Sequence (16) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
+ Connection ID (64) + + Connection ID (64) +
skipping to change at page 44, line 45 skipping to change at page 45, line 45
server. The sequence value can wrap; the value 65535 is followed server. The sequence value can wrap; the value 65535 is followed
by 0. When wrapping the sequence field, the server MUST ensure by 0. When wrapping the sequence field, the server MUST ensure
that a value with the same sequence has been received and that a value with the same sequence has been received and
acknowledged by the client. The connection ID that is assigned acknowledged by the client. The connection ID that is assigned
during the handshake is assumed to have a sequence of 65535. during the handshake is assumed to have a sequence of 65535.
Connection ID: A 64-bit connection ID. Connection ID: A 64-bit connection ID.
Stateless Reset Token: A 128-bit value that will be used to for a Stateless Reset Token: A 128-bit value that will be used to for a
stateless reset when the associated connection ID is used (see stateless reset when the associated connection ID is used (see
Section 7.7.5). Section 7.8.4).
8.12. STOP_SENDING Frame 8.13. STOP_SENDING Frame
An endpoint may use a STOP_SENDING frame (type=0x0c) to communicate An endpoint may use a STOP_SENDING frame (type=0x0c) to communicate
that incoming data is being discarded on receipt at application that incoming data is being discarded on receipt at application
request. This signals a peer to abruptly terminate transmission on a request. This signals a peer to abruptly terminate transmission on a
stream. The frame is as follows: stream.
The STOP_SENDING frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream ID (32) | | Stream ID (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Code (32) | | Application Error Code (16) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The fields are: The fields are:
Stream ID: The 32-bit Stream ID of the stream being ignored. Stream ID: The 32-bit Stream ID of the stream being ignored.
Error Code: The application-specified reason the sender is ignoring Application Error Code: A 16-bit, application-specified reason the
the stream. sender is ignoring the stream (see Section 12.4).
8.13. ACK Frame 8.14. ACK Frame
Receivers send ACK frames to inform senders which packets they have Receivers send ACK frames to inform senders which packets they have
received and processed, as well as which packets are considered received and processed, as well as which packets are considered
missing. The ACK frame contains between 1 and 256 ACK blocks. ACK missing. The ACK frame contains between 1 and 256 ACK blocks. ACK
blocks are ranges of acknowledged packets. Implementations SHOULD blocks are ranges of acknowledged packets. Implementations MUST NOT
NOT generate ACK packets in response to packets which only contain generate packets that only contain ACK frames in response to packets
ACKs. However, they SHOULD ACK those packets when sending ACKs for which only contain ACK frames. However, they SHOULD acknowledge
other packets. packets containing only ACK frames when sending ACK frames in
response to other packets.
To limit ACK blocks to those that have not yet been received by the To limit ACK blocks to those that have not yet been received by the
sender, the receiver SHOULD track which ACK frames have been sender, the receiver SHOULD track which ACK frames have been
acknowledged by its peer. Once an ACK frame has been acknowledged, acknowledged by its peer. Once an ACK frame has been acknowledged,
the packets it acknowledges SHOULD not be acknowledged again. the packets it acknowledges SHOULD NOT be acknowledged again.
A receiver that is only sending ACK frames will not receive A receiver that is only sending ACK frames will not receive
acknowledgments for its packets. Sending an occasional MAX_DATA or acknowledgments for its packets. Sending an occasional MAX_DATA or
MAX_STREAM_DATA frame as data is received will ensure that MAX_STREAM_DATA frame as data is received will ensure that
acknowledgements are generated by a peer. Otherwise, an endpoint MAY acknowledgements are generated by a peer. Otherwise, an endpoint MAY
send a PING frame once per RTT to solicit an acknowledgment. send a PING frame once per RTT to solicit an acknowledgment.
To limit receiver state or the size of ACK frames, a receiver MAY To limit receiver state or the size of ACK frames, a receiver MAY
limit the number of ACK blocks it sends. A receiver can do this even limit the number of ACK blocks it sends. A receiver can do this even
without receiving acknowledgment of its ACK frames, with the without receiving acknowledgment of its ACK frames, with the
skipping to change at page 46, line 9 skipping to change at page 47, line 13
past. past.
Unlike TCP SACKs, QUIC ACK blocks are irrevocable. Once a packet has Unlike TCP SACKs, QUIC ACK blocks are irrevocable. Once a packet has
been acknowledged, even if it does not appear in a future ACK frame, been acknowledged, even if it does not appear in a future ACK frame,
it remains acknowledged. it remains acknowledged.
A client MUST NOT acknowledge Version Negotiation or Server Stateless A client MUST NOT acknowledge Version Negotiation or Server Stateless
Retry packets. These packet types contain packet numbers selected by Retry packets. These packet types contain packet numbers selected by
the client, not the server. the client, not the server.
QUIC ACK frames contain a timestamp section with up to 255
timestamps. Timestamps enable better congestion control, but are not
required for correct loss recovery, and old timestamps are less
valuable, so it is not guaranteed every timestamp will be received by
the sender. A receiver SHOULD send a timestamp exactly once for each
received packet containing retransmittable frames. A receiver MAY
send timestamps for non-retransmittable packets. A receiver MUST not
send timestamps in unprotected packets.
A sender MAY intentionally skip packet numbers to introduce entropy A sender MAY intentionally skip packet numbers to introduce entropy
into the connection, to avoid opportunistic acknowledgement attacks. into the connection, to avoid opportunistic acknowledgement attacks.
The sender SHOULD close the connection if an unsent packet number is The sender SHOULD close the connection if an unsent packet number is
acknowledged. The format of the ACK frame is efficient at expressing acknowledged. The format of the ACK frame is efficient at expressing
blocks of missing packets; skipping packet numbers between 1 and 255 blocks of missing packets; skipping packet numbers between 1 and 255
effectively provides up to 8 bits of efficient entropy on demand, effectively provides up to 8 bits of efficient entropy on demand,
which should be adequate protection against most opportunistic which should be adequate protection against most opportunistic
acknowledgement attacks. acknowledgement attacks.
The type byte for a ACK frame contains embedded flags, and is The type byte for a ACK frame contains embedded flags, and is
skipping to change at page 47, line 8 skipping to change at page 48, line 8
o The two "MM" bits encode the length of the ACK Block Length o The two "MM" bits encode the length of the ACK Block Length
fields. The values 00, 01, 02, and 03 indicate lengths of 8, 16, fields. The values 00, 01, 02, and 03 indicate lengths of 8, 16,
32, and 64 bits respectively. 32, and 64 bits respectively.
An ACK frame is shown below. An ACK frame is shown below.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|[Num Blocks(8)]| NumTS (8) | |[Num Blocks(8)]|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Largest Acknowledged (8/16/32/64) ... | Largest Acknowledged (8/16/32/64) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ACK Delay (16) | | ACK Delay (16) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ACK Block Section (*) ... | ACK Block Section (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamp Section (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: ACK Frame Format Figure 7: ACK Frame Format
The fields in the ACK frame are as follows: The fields in the ACK frame are as follows:
Num Blocks (opt): An optional 8-bit unsigned value specifying the Num Blocks (opt): An optional 8-bit unsigned value specifying the
number of additional ACK blocks (besides the required First ACK number of additional ACK blocks (besides the required First ACK
Block) in this ACK frame. Only present if the 'N' flag bit is 1. Block) in this ACK frame. Only present if the 'N' flag bit is 1.
Num Timestamps: An unsigned 8-bit number specifying the total number
of <packet number, timestamp> pairs in the Timestamp Section.
Largest Acknowledged: A variable-sized unsigned value representing Largest Acknowledged: A variable-sized unsigned value representing
the largest packet number the peer is acknowledging in this packet the largest packet number the peer is acknowledging in this packet
(typically the largest that the peer has seen thus far.) (typically the largest that the peer has seen thus far.)
ACK Delay: The time from when the largest acknowledged packet, as ACK Delay: The time from when the largest acknowledged packet, as
indicated in the Largest Acknowledged field, was received by this indicated in the Largest Acknowledged field, was received by this
peer to when this ACK was sent. peer to when this ACK was sent.
ACK Block Section: Contains one or more blocks of packet numbers ACK Block Section: Contains one or more blocks of packet numbers
which have been successfully received, see Section 8.13.1. which have been successfully received, see Section 8.14.1.
Timestamp Section: Contains zero or more timestamps reporting
transit delay of received packets. See Section 8.13.2.
8.13.1. ACK Block Section 8.14.1. ACK Block Section
The ACK Block Section contains between one and 256 blocks of packet The ACK Block Section contains between one and 256 blocks of packet
numbers which have been successfully received. If the Num Blocks numbers which have been successfully received. If the Num Blocks
field is absent, only the First ACK Block length is present in this field is absent, only the First ACK Block length is present in this
section. Otherwise, the Num Blocks field indicates how many section. Otherwise, the Num Blocks field indicates how many
additional blocks follow the First ACK Block Length field. additional blocks follow the First ACK Block Length field.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
skipping to change at page 48, line 36 skipping to change at page 49, line 36
Gap To Next Block (opt, repeated): An unsigned number specifying the Gap To Next Block (opt, repeated): An unsigned number specifying the
number of contiguous missing packets from the end of the previous number of contiguous missing packets from the end of the previous
ACK block to the start of the next. Repeated "Num Blocks" times. ACK block to the start of the next. Repeated "Num Blocks" times.
ACK Block Length (opt, repeated): An unsigned packet number delta ACK Block Length (opt, repeated): An unsigned packet number delta
that indicates the number of contiguous packets being acknowledged that indicates the number of contiguous packets being acknowledged
starting after the end of the previous gap. Repeated "Num Blocks" starting after the end of the previous gap. Repeated "Num Blocks"
times. times.
8.13.2. Timestamp Section 8.14.1.1. Time Format
The Timestamp Section contains between zero and 255 measurements of
packet receive times relative to the beginning of the connection.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Delta LA (8)]|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [First Timestamp (32)] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|[Delta LA 1(8)]| [Time Since Previous 1 (16)] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|[Delta LA 2(8)]| [Time Since Previous 2 (16)] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|[Delta LA N(8)]| [Time Since Previous N (16)] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 9: Timestamp Section
The fields in the Timestamp Section are:
Delta Largest Acknowledged (opt): An optional 8-bit unsigned packet
number delta specifying the delta between the largest acknowledged
and the first packet whose timestamp is being reported. In other
words, this first packet number may be computed as (Largest
Acknowledged - Delta Largest Acknowledged.)
First Timestamp (opt): An optional 32-bit unsigned value specifying
the time delta in microseconds, from the beginning of the
connection to the arrival of the packet indicated by Delta Largest
Acknowledged.
Delta Largest Acked 1..N (opt, repeated): This field has the same
semantics and format as "Delta Largest Acknowledged". Repeated
"Num Timestamps - 1" times.
Time Since Previous Timestamp 1..N(opt, repeated): An optional
16-bit unsigned value specifying time delta from the previous
reported timestamp. It is encoded in the same format as the ACK
Delay. Repeated "Num Timestamps - 1" times.
The timestamp section lists packet receipt timestamps ordered by
timestamp.
8.13.2.1. Time Format
DISCUSS_AND_REPLACE: Perhaps make this format simpler. DISCUSS_AND_REPLACE: Perhaps make this format simpler.
The time format used in the ACK frame above is a 16-bit unsigned The time format used in the ACK frame above is a 16-bit unsigned
float with 11 explicit bits of mantissa and 5 bits of explicit float with 11 explicit bits of mantissa and 5 bits of explicit
exponent, specifying time in microseconds. The bit format is loosely exponent, specifying time in microseconds. The bit format is loosely
modeled after IEEE 754. For example, 1 microsecond is represented as modeled after IEEE 754. For example, 1 microsecond is represented as
0x1, which has an exponent of zero, presented in the 5 high order 0x1, which has an exponent of zero, presented in the 5 high order
bits, and mantissa of 1, presented in the 11 low order bits. When bits, and mantissa of 1, presented in the 11 low order bits. When
the explicit exponent is greater than zero, an implicit high-order the explicit exponent is greater than zero, an implicit high-order
12th bit of 1 is assumed in the mantissa. For example, a floating 12th bit of 1 is assumed in the mantissa. For example, a floating
value of 0x800 has an explicit exponent of 1, as well as an explicit value of 0x800 has an explicit exponent of 1, as well as an explicit
mantissa of 0, but then has an effective mantissa of 4096 (12th bit mantissa of 0, but then has an effective mantissa of 4096 (12th bit
is assumed to be 1). Additionally, the actual exponent is one-less is assumed to be 1). Additionally, the actual exponent is one-less
than the explicit exponent, and the value represents 4096 than the explicit exponent, and the value represents 4096
microseconds. Any values larger than the representable range are microseconds. Any values larger than the representable range are
clamped to 0xFFFF. clamped to 0xFFFF.
8.13.3. ACK Frames and Packet Protection 8.14.2. ACK Frames and Packet Protection
ACK frames that acknowledge protected packets MUST be carried in a ACK frames that acknowledge protected packets MUST be carried in a
packet that has an equivalent or greater level of packet protection. packet that has an equivalent or greater level of packet protection.
Packets that are protected with 1-RTT keys MUST be acknowledged in Packets that are protected with 1-RTT keys MUST be acknowledged in
packets that are also protected with 1-RTT keys. packets that are also protected with 1-RTT keys.
A packet that is not protected and claims to acknowledge a packet A packet that is not protected and claims to acknowledge a packet
number that was sent with packet protection is not valid. An number that was sent with packet protection is not valid. An
unprotected packet that carries acknowledgments for protected packets unprotected packet that carries acknowledgments for protected packets
skipping to change at page 51, line 16 skipping to change at page 51, line 5
protection keys. protection keys.
For instance, a server acknowledges a TLS ClientHello in the packet For instance, a server acknowledges a TLS ClientHello in the packet
that carries the TLS ServerHello; similarly, a client can acknowledge that carries the TLS ServerHello; similarly, a client can acknowledge
a TLS HelloRetryRequest in the packet containing a second TLS a TLS HelloRetryRequest in the packet containing a second TLS
ClientHello. The complete set of server handshake messages (TLS ClientHello. The complete set of server handshake messages (TLS
ServerHello through to Finished) might be acknowledged by a client in ServerHello through to Finished) might be acknowledged by a client in
protected packets, because it is certain that the server is able to protected packets, because it is certain that the server is able to
decipher the packet. decipher the packet.
8.14. STREAM Frame 8.15. STREAM Frame
STREAM frames implicitly create a stream and carry stream data. The STREAM frames implicitly create a stream and carry stream data. The
type byte for a STREAM frame contains embedded flags, and is type byte for a STREAM frame contains embedded flags, and is
formatted as "11FSSOOD". These bits are parsed as follows: formatted as "11FSSOOD". These bits are parsed as follows:
o The first two bits must be set to 11, indicating that this is a o The first two bits must be set to 11, indicating that this is a
STREAM frame. STREAM frame.
o "F" is the FIN bit, which is used for stream termination. o "F" is the FIN bit, which is used for stream termination.
skipping to change at page 52, line 15 skipping to change at page 51, line 44
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream ID (8/16/24/32) ... | Stream ID (8/16/24/32) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Offset (0/16/32/64) ... | Offset (0/16/32/64) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Data Length (16)] | Stream Data (*) ... | [Data Length (16)] | Stream Data (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 10: STREAM Frame Format Figure 9: STREAM Frame Format
The STREAM frame contains the following fields: The STREAM frame contains the following fields:
Stream ID: The stream ID of the stream (see Section 10.1). Stream ID: The stream ID of the stream (see Section 10.1).
Offset: A variable-sized unsigned number specifying the byte offset Offset: A variable-sized unsigned number specifying the byte offset
in the stream for the data in this STREAM frame. When the offset in the stream for the data in this STREAM frame. When the offset
length is 0, the offset is 0. The first byte in the stream has an length is 0, the offset is 0. The first byte in the stream has an
offset of 0. The largest offset delivered on a stream - the sum offset of 0. The largest offset delivered on a stream - the sum
of the re-constructed offset and data length - MUST be less than of the re-constructed offset and data length - MUST be less than
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9. Packetization and Reliability 9. Packetization and Reliability
The Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU) is the maximum size of the The Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU) is the maximum size of the
entire IP header, UDP header, and UDP payload. The UDP payload entire IP header, UDP header, and UDP payload. The UDP payload
includes the QUIC packet header, protected payload, and any includes the QUIC packet header, protected payload, and any
authentication fields. authentication fields.
All QUIC packets SHOULD be sized to fit within the estimated PMTU to All QUIC packets SHOULD be sized to fit within the estimated PMTU to
avoid IP fragmentation or packet drops. To optimize bandwidth avoid IP fragmentation or packet drops. To optimize bandwidth
efficiency, endpoints SHOULD use Packetization Layer PMTU Discovery efficiency, endpoints SHOULD use Packetization Layer PMTU Discovery
([RFC4821]) and MAY use PMTU Discovery ([RFC1191], [RFC1981]) for ([PLPMTUD]) and MAY use PMTU Discovery ([PMTUDv4], [PMTUDv6]) for
detecting the PMTU, setting the PMTU appropriately, and storing the detecting the PMTU, setting the PMTU appropriately, and storing the
result of previous PMTU determinations. result of previous PMTU determinations.
In the absence of these mechanisms, QUIC endpoints SHOULD NOT send IP In the absence of these mechanisms, QUIC endpoints SHOULD NOT send IP
packets larger than 1280 octets. Assuming the minimum IP header packets larger than 1280 octets. Assuming the minimum IP header
size, this results in a QUIC packet size of 1232 octets for IPv6 and size, this results in a QUIC packet size of 1232 octets for IPv6 and
1252 octets for IPv4. 1252 octets for IPv4.
QUIC endpoints that implement any kind of PMTU discovery SHOULD QUIC endpoints that implement any kind of PMTU discovery SHOULD
maintain an estimate for each combination of local and remote IP maintain an estimate for each combination of local and remote IP
skipping to change at page 54, line 38 skipping to change at page 54, line 19
necessary: necessary:
o All application data sent in STREAM frames MUST be retransmitted, o All application data sent in STREAM frames MUST be retransmitted,
unless the endpoint has sent a RST_STREAM for that stream. When unless the endpoint has sent a RST_STREAM for that stream. When
an endpoint sends a RST_STREAM frame, data outstanding on that an endpoint sends a RST_STREAM frame, data outstanding on that
stream SHOULD NOT be retransmitted, since subsequent data on this stream SHOULD NOT be retransmitted, since subsequent data on this
stream is expected to not be delivered by the receiver. stream is expected to not be delivered by the receiver.
o ACK and PADDING frames MUST NOT be retransmitted. ACK frames o ACK and PADDING frames MUST NOT be retransmitted. ACK frames
containing updated information will be sent as described in containing updated information will be sent as described in
Section 8.13. Section 8.14.
o STOP_SENDING frames MUST be retransmitted, unless the stream has o STOP_SENDING frames MUST be retransmitted, unless the stream has
become closed in the appropriate direction. See Section 10.3. become closed in the appropriate direction. See Section 10.3.
o The most recent MAX_STREAM_DATA frame for a stream MUST be
retransmitted. Any previous unacknowledged MAX_STREAM_DATA frame
for the same stream SHOULD NOT be retransmitted since a newer
MAX_STREAM_DATA frame for a stream obviates the need for
delivering older ones. Similarly, the most recent MAX_DATA frame
MUST be retransmitted; previous unacknowledged ones SHOULD NOT be
retransmitted.
o All other frames MUST be retransmitted. o All other frames MUST be retransmitted.
Upon detecting losses, a sender MUST take appropriate congestion Upon detecting losses, a sender MUST take appropriate congestion
control action. The details of loss detection and congestion control control action. The details of loss detection and congestion control
are described in [QUIC-RECOVERY]. are described in [QUIC-RECOVERY].
A packet MUST NOT be acknowledged until packet protection has been A packet MUST NOT be acknowledged until packet protection has been
successfully removed and all frames contained in the packet have been successfully removed and all frames contained in the packet have been
processed. For STREAM frames, this means the data has been queued processed. For STREAM frames, this means the data has been queued
(but not necessarily delivered to the application). This also means (but not necessarily delivered to the application). This also means
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stream ID it is willing to accept at a given time. stream ID it is willing to accept at a given time.
An alternative view of QUIC streams is as an elastic "message" An alternative view of QUIC streams is as an elastic "message"
abstraction, similar to the way ephemeral streams are used in SST abstraction, similar to the way ephemeral streams are used in SST
[SST], which may be a more appealing description for some [SST], which may be a more appealing description for some
applications. applications.
10.1. Stream Identifiers 10.1. Stream Identifiers
Streams are identified by an unsigned 32-bit integer, referred to as Streams are identified by an unsigned 32-bit integer, referred to as
the Stream ID. To avoid Stream ID collision, clients initiate the Stream ID. To avoid Stream ID collision, clients MUST initiate
streams using odd-numbered Stream IDs; streams initiated by the streams using odd-numbered Stream IDs; servers MUST initiate streams
server use even-numbered Stream IDs. using even-numbered Stream IDs. If an endpoint receives a frame
which corresponds to a stream which is allocated to it (i.e., odd-
numbered for the client or even-numbered for the server) but which it
has not yet created, it MUST close the connection with error code
STREAM_STATE_ERROR.
Stream ID 0 (0x0) is reserved for the cryptographic handshake. Stream ID 0 (0x0) is reserved for the cryptographic handshake.
Stream 0 MUST NOT be used for application data, and is the first Stream 0 MUST NOT be used for application data, and is the first
client-initiated stream. client-initiated stream.
A QUIC endpoint cannot reuse a Stream ID. Streams MUST be created in A QUIC endpoint MUST NOT reuse a Stream ID. Streams MUST be created
sequential order. Open streams can be used in any order. Streams in sequential order. Open streams can be used in any order. Streams
that are used out of order result in lower-numbered streams in the that are used out of order result in lower-numbered streams in the
same direction being counted as open. same direction being counted as open.
Stream IDs are usually encoded as a 32-bit integer, though the STREAM Stream IDs are usually encoded as a 32-bit integer, though the STREAM
frame (Section 8.14) permits a shorter encoding when the leading bits frame (Section 8.15) permits a shorter encoding when the leading bits
of the stream ID are zero. of the stream ID are zero.
10.2. Life of a Stream 10.2. Life of a Stream
The semantics of QUIC streams is based on HTTP/2 streams, and the The semantics of QUIC streams is based on HTTP/2 streams, and the
lifecycle of a QUIC stream therefore closely follows that of an lifecycle of a QUIC stream therefore closely follows that of an
HTTP/2 stream [RFC7540], with some differences to accommodate the HTTP/2 stream [RFC7540], with some differences to accommodate the
possibility of out-of-order delivery due to the use of multiple possibility of out-of-order delivery due to the use of multiple
streams in QUIC. The lifecycle of a QUIC stream is shown in the streams in QUIC. The lifecycle of a QUIC stream is shown in the
following figure and described below. following figure and described below.
skipping to change at page 57, line 44 skipping to change at page 57, line 41
send: endpoint sends this frame send: endpoint sends this frame
recv: endpoint receives this frame recv: endpoint receives this frame
STREAM: a STREAM frame STREAM: a STREAM frame
FIN: FIN flag in a STREAM frame FIN: FIN flag in a STREAM frame
RST: RST_STREAM frame RST: RST_STREAM frame
MSD: MAX_STREAM_DATA frame MSD: MAX_STREAM_DATA frame
SB: STREAM_BLOCKED frame SB: STREAM_BLOCKED frame
Figure 11: Lifecycle of a stream Figure 10: Lifecycle of a stream
Note that this diagram shows stream state transitions and the frames Note that this diagram shows stream state transitions and the frames
and flags that affect those transitions only. It is possible for a and flags that affect those transitions only. It is possible for a
single frame to cause two transitions: receiving a RST_STREAM frame, single frame to cause two transitions: receiving a RST_STREAM frame,
or a STREAM frame with the FIN flag cause the stream state to move or a STREAM frame with the FIN flag cause the stream state to move
from "idle" to "open" and then immediately to one of the "half- from "idle" to "open" and then immediately to one of the "half-
closed" states. closed" states.
The recipient of a frame that changes stream state will have a The recipient of a frame that changes stream state will have a
delayed view of the state of a stream while the frame is in transit. delayed view of the state of a stream while the frame is in transit.
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or a STREAM frame with the FIN flag set also causes a stream to or a STREAM frame with the FIN flag set also causes a stream to
become "half-closed". become "half-closed".
An endpoint might receive MAX_STREAM_DATA or STREAM_BLOCKED frames on An endpoint might receive MAX_STREAM_DATA or STREAM_BLOCKED frames on
peer-initiated streams that are "idle" if there is loss or reordering peer-initiated streams that are "idle" if there is loss or reordering
of packets. Receiving these frames also causes the stream to become of packets. Receiving these frames also causes the stream to become
"open". "open".
An endpoint MUST NOT send a STREAM or RST_STREAM frame for a stream An endpoint MUST NOT send a STREAM or RST_STREAM frame for a stream
ID that is higher than the peers advertised maximum stream ID (see ID that is higher than the peers advertised maximum stream ID (see
Section 8.6). Section 8.7).
10.2.2. open 10.2.2. open
A stream in the "open" state may be used by both peers to send frames A stream in the "open" state may be used by both peers to send frames
of any type. In this state, endpoints can send MAX_STREAM_DATA and of any type. In this state, endpoints can send MAX_STREAM_DATA and
MUST observe the value advertised by its receiving peer (see MUST observe the value advertised by its receiving peer (see
Section 11). Section 11).
Opening a stream causes all lower-numbered streams in the same Opening a stream causes all lower-numbered streams in the same
direction to become open. Thus, opening an odd-numbered stream direction to become open. Thus, opening an odd-numbered stream
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Any frame type that mentions a stream ID can be sent in this state. Any frame type that mentions a stream ID can be sent in this state.
10.2.3. half-closed (local) 10.2.3. half-closed (local)
A stream that is in the "half-closed (local)" state MUST NOT be used A stream that is in the "half-closed (local)" state MUST NOT be used
for sending on new STREAM frames. Retransmission of data that has for sending on new STREAM frames. Retransmission of data that has
already been sent on STREAM frames is permitted. An endpoint MAY already been sent on STREAM frames is permitted. An endpoint MAY
also send MAX_STREAM_DATA and STOP_SENDING in this state. also send MAX_STREAM_DATA and STOP_SENDING in this state.
An application can decide to abandon a stream in this state. An
endpoint can send RST_STREAM for a stream that was closed with the
FIN flag. The final offset carried in this RST_STREAM frame MUST be
the same as the previously established final offset.
An endpoint that closes a stream MUST NOT send data beyond the final An endpoint that closes a stream MUST NOT send data beyond the final
offset that it has chosen, see Section 10.2.5 for details. offset that it has chosen, see Section 10.2.5 for details.
A stream transitions from this state to "closed" when a STREAM frame A stream transitions from this state to "closed" when a STREAM frame
that contains a FIN flag is received and all prior data has arrived, that contains a FIN flag is received and all prior data has arrived,
or when a RST_STREAM frame is received. or when a RST_STREAM frame is received.
An endpoint can receive any frame that mentions a stream ID in this An endpoint can receive any frame that mentions a stream ID in this
state. Providing flow-control credit using MAX_STREAM_DATA frames is state. Providing flow-control credit using MAX_STREAM_DATA frames is
necessary to continue receiving flow-controlled frames. In this necessary to continue receiving flow-controlled frames. In this
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Once all data has been either received or discarded, a sender is no Once all data has been either received or discarded, a sender is no
longer obligated to update the maximum received data for the longer obligated to update the maximum received data for the
connection. connection.
Due to reordering, an endpoint could continue receiving frames for Due to reordering, an endpoint could continue receiving frames for
the stream even after the stream is closed for sending. Frames the stream even after the stream is closed for sending. Frames
received after a peer closes a stream SHOULD be discarded. An received after a peer closes a stream SHOULD be discarded. An
endpoint MAY choose to limit the period over which it ignores frames endpoint MAY choose to limit the period over which it ignores frames
and treat frames that arrive after this time as being in error. and treat frames that arrive after this time as being in error.
An endpoint may receive a RST_STREAM in this state, such as when the
peer resets the stream after sending a FIN on it. In this case, the
endpoint MAY discard any data that it already received on that
stream. The endpoint SHOULD close the connection with a
FINAL_OFFSET_ERROR if the received RST_STREAM carries a different
offset from the one already established.
An endpoint will know the final offset of the data it receives on a An endpoint will know the final offset of the data it receives on a
stream when it reaches the "half-closed (remote)" state, see stream when it reaches the "half-closed (remote)" state, see
Section 11.3 for details. Section 11.3 for details.
A stream in this state can be used by the endpoint to send any frame A stream in this state can be used by the endpoint to send any frame
that mentions a stream ID. In this state, the endpoint MUST observe that mentions a stream ID. In this state, the endpoint MUST observe
advertised stream and connection data limits (see Section 11). advertised stream and connection data limits (see Section 11).
A stream transitions from this state to "closed" by completing A stream transitions from this state to "closed" by completing
transmission of all data. This includes sending all data carried in transmission of all data. This includes sending all data carried in
STREAM frames including the terminal STREAM frame that contains a FIN STREAM frames including the terminal STREAM frame that contains a FIN
flag. flag.
A stream also becomes "closed" when the endpoint sends a RST_STREAM A stream also becomes "closed" when the endpoint sends a RST_STREAM
frame. frame.
10.2.5. closed 10.2.5. closed
The "closed" state is the terminal state for a stream. The "closed" state is the terminal state for a stream. Reordering
might cause frames to be received after closing, see Section 10.2.4.
Once a stream reaches this state, no frames can be sent that mention If the application resets a stream that is already in the "closed"
the stream. Reordering might cause frames to be received after state, a RST_STREAM frame MAY still be sent in order to cancel
closing, see Section 10.2.4. retransmissions of previously-sent STREAM frames.
10.3. Solicited State Transitions 10.3. Solicited State Transitions
If an endpoint is no longer interested in the data being received, it If an endpoint is no longer interested in the data it is receiving on
MAY send a STOP_SENDING frame on a stream in the "open" or "half- a stream, it MAY send a STOP_SENDING frame identifying that stream to
closed (local)" state to prompt closure of the stream in the opposite prompt closure of the stream in the opposite direction. This
direction. This typically indicates that the receiving application typically indicates that the receiving application is no longer
is no longer reading from the stream, but is not a guarantee that reading data it receives from the stream, but is not a guarantee that
incoming data will be ignored. incoming data will be ignored.
STREAM frames received after sending STOP_SENDING are still counted STREAM frames received after sending STOP_SENDING are still counted
toward the connection and stream flow-control windows, even though toward the connection and stream flow-control windows, even though
these frames will be discarded upon receipt. This avoids potential these frames will be discarded upon receipt. This avoids potential
ambiguity about which STREAM frames count toward flow control. ambiguity about which STREAM frames count toward flow control.
Upon receipt of a STOP_SENDING frame on a stream in the "open" or STOP_SENDING can only be sent for any stream that is not "idle",
"half-closed (remote)" states, an endpoint MUST send a RST_STREAM however it is mostly useful for streams in the "open" or "half-closed
with an error code of QUIC_RECEIVED_RST. If the STOP_SENDING frame (local)" states. A STOP_SENDING frame requests that the receiving
is received on a stream that is already in the "half-closed (local)" endpoint send a RST_STREAM frame. An endpoint that receives a
or "closed" states, a RST_STREAM frame MAY still be sent in order to STOP_SENDING frame MUST send a RST_STREAM frame for that stream with
cancel retransmission of previously-sent STREAM frames. an error code of STOPPING. If the STOP_SENDING frame is received on
a stream that is already in the "half-closed (local)" or "closed"
states, a RST_STREAM frame MAY still be sent in order to cancel
retransmission of previously-sent STREAM frames.
While STOP_SENDING frames are retransmittable, an implementation MAY While STOP_SENDING frames are retransmittable, an implementation MAY
choose not to retransmit a lost STOP_SENDING frame if the stream has choose not to retransmit a lost STOP_SENDING frame if the stream has
already been closed in the appropriate direction since the frame was already been closed in the appropriate direction since the frame was
first generated. See Section 9. first generated. See Section 9.
10.4. Stream Concurrency 10.4. Stream Concurrency
An endpoint limits the number of concurrently active incoming streams An endpoint limits the number of concurrently active incoming streams
by adjusting the maximum stream ID. An initial value is set in the by adjusting the maximum stream ID. An initial value is set in the
transport parameters (see Section 7.3.1) and is subsequently transport parameters (see Section 7.4.1) and is subsequently
increased by MAX_STREAM_ID frames (see Section 8.6). increased by MAX_STREAM_ID frames (see Section 8.7).
The maximum stream ID is specific to each endpoint and applies only The maximum stream ID is specific to each endpoint and applies only
to the peer that receives the setting. That is, clients specify the to the peer that receives the setting. That is, clients specify the
maximum stream ID the server can initiate, and servers specify the maximum stream ID the server can initiate, and servers specify the
maximum stream ID the client can initiate. Each endpoint may respond maximum stream ID the client can initiate. Each endpoint may respond
on streams initiated by the other peer, regardless of whether it is on streams initiated by the other peer, regardless of whether it is
permitted to initiated new streams. permitted to initiated new streams.
Endpoints MUST NOT exceed the limit set by their peer. An endpoint Endpoints MUST NOT exceed the limit set by their peer. An endpoint
that receives a STREAM frame with an ID greater than the limit it has that receives a STREAM frame with an ID greater than the limit it has
sent MUST treat this as a stream error of type STREAM_ID_ERROR sent MUST treat this as a stream error of type STREAM_ID_ERROR
(Section 12), unless this is a result of a change in the initial (Section 12), unless this is a result of a change in the initial
offsets (see Section 7.3.2). offsets (see Section 7.4.2).
A receiver MUST NOT renege on an advertisement; that is, once a A receiver MUST NOT renege on an advertisement; that is, once a
receiver advertises a stream ID via a MAX_STREAM_ID frame, it MUST receiver advertises a stream ID via a MAX_STREAM_ID frame, it MUST
NOT subsequently advertise a smaller maximum ID. A sender may NOT subsequently advertise a smaller maximum ID. A sender may
receive MAX_STREAM_ID frames out of order; a sender MUST therefore receive MAX_STREAM_ID frames out of order; a sender MUST therefore
ignore any MAX_STREAM_ID that does not increase the maximum. ignore any MAX_STREAM_ID that does not increase the maximum.
10.5. Sending and Receiving Data 10.5. Sending and Receiving Data
Once a stream is created, endpoints may use the stream to send and Once a stream is created, endpoints may use the stream to send and
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a stream has the stream offset 0. The largest offset delivered on a a stream has the stream offset 0. The largest offset delivered on a
stream MUST be less than 2^64. A receiver MUST ensure that received stream MUST be less than 2^64. A receiver MUST ensure that received
stream data is delivered to the application as an ordered byte- stream data is delivered to the application as an ordered byte-
stream. Data received out of order MUST be buffered for later stream. Data received out of order MUST be buffered for later
delivery, as long as it is not in violation of the receiver's flow delivery, as long as it is not in violation of the receiver's flow
control limits. control limits.
An endpoint MUST NOT send data on any stream without ensuring that it An endpoint MUST NOT send data on any stream without ensuring that it
is within the data limits set by its peer. The cryptographic is within the data limits set by its peer. The cryptographic
handshake stream, Stream 0, is exempt from the connection-level data handshake stream, Stream 0, is exempt from the connection-level data
limits established by MAX_DATA. Stream 0 is still subject to stream- limits established by MAX_DATA. Data on stream 0 other than the
level data limits and MAX_STREAM_DATA. initial cryptographic handshake message is still subject to stream-
level data limits and MAX_STREAM_DATA. This message is exempt from
flow control because it needs to be sent in a single packet
regardless of the server's flow control state. This rule applies
even for 0-RTT handshakes where the remembered value of
MAX_STREAM_DATA would not permit sending a full initial cryptographic
handshake message.
Flow control is described in detail in Section 11, and congestion Flow control is described in detail in Section 11, and congestion
control is described in the companion document [QUIC-RECOVERY]. control is described in the companion document [QUIC-RECOVERY].
10.6. Stream Prioritization 10.6. Stream Prioritization
Stream multiplexing has a significant effect on application Stream multiplexing has a significant effect on application
performance if resources allocated to streams are correctly performance if resources allocated to streams are correctly
prioritized. Experience with other multiplexed protocols, such as prioritized. Experience with other multiplexed protocols, such as
HTTP/2 [RFC7540], shows that effective prioritization strategies have HTTP/2 [RFC7540], shows that effective prioritization strategies have
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prioritizing frames other than STREAM frames ensures that loss prioritizing frames other than STREAM frames ensures that loss
recovery, congestion control, and flow control operate effectively. recovery, congestion control, and flow control operate effectively.
Stream 0 MUST be prioritized over other streams prior to the Stream 0 MUST be prioritized over other streams prior to the
completion of the cryptographic handshake. This includes the completion of the cryptographic handshake. This includes the
retransmission of the second flight of client handshake messages, retransmission of the second flight of client handshake messages,
that is, the TLS Finished and any client authentication messages. that is, the TLS Finished and any client authentication messages.
STREAM frames that are determined to be lost SHOULD be retransmitted STREAM frames that are determined to be lost SHOULD be retransmitted
before sending new data, unless application priorities indicate before sending new data, unless application priorities indicate
otherwise. Retransmitting lost STREAM frames can fill in gaps, which otherwise. Retransmitting lost stream data can fill in gaps, which
allows the peer to consume already received data and free up flow allows the peer to consume already received data and free up flow
control window. control window.
11. Flow Control 11. Flow Control
It is necessary to limit the amount of data that a sender may have It is necessary to limit the amount of data that a sender may have
outstanding at any time, so as to prevent a fast sender from outstanding at any time, so as to prevent a fast sender from
overwhelming a slow receiver, or to prevent a malicious sender from overwhelming a slow receiver, or to prevent a malicious sender from
consuming significant resources at a receiver. This section consuming significant resources at a receiver. This section
describes QUIC's flow-control mechanisms. describes QUIC's flow-control mechanisms.
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An endpoint that detects an error SHOULD signal the existence of that An endpoint that detects an error SHOULD signal the existence of that
error to its peer. Errors can affect an entire connection (see error to its peer. Errors can affect an entire connection (see
Section 12.1), or a single stream (see Section 12.2). Section 12.1), or a single stream (see Section 12.2).
The most appropriate error code (Section 12.3) SHOULD be included in The most appropriate error code (Section 12.3) SHOULD be included in
the frame that signals the error. Where this specification the frame that signals the error. Where this specification
identifies error conditions, it also identifies the error code that identifies error conditions, it also identifies the error code that
is used. is used.
A stateless reset (Section 7.7.5) is not suitable for any error that A stateless reset (Section 7.8.4) is not suitable for any error that
can be signaled with a CONNECTION_CLOSE or RST_STREAM frame. A can be signaled with a CONNECTION_CLOSE, APPLICATION_CLOSE, or
stateless reset MUST NOT be used by an endpoint that has the state RST_STREAM frame. A stateless reset MUST NOT be used by an endpoint
necessary to send a frame on the connection. that has the state necessary to send a frame on the connection.
12.1. Connection Errors 12.1. Connection Errors
Errors that result in the connection being unusable, such as an Errors that result in the connection being unusable, such as an
obvious violation of protocol semantics or corruption of state that obvious violation of protocol semantics or corruption of state that
affects an entire connection, MUST be signaled using a affects an entire connection, MUST be signaled using a
CONNECTION_CLOSE frame (Section 8.3). An endpoint MAY close the CONNECTION_CLOSE or APPLICATION_CLOSE frame (Section 8.3,
connection in this manner, even if the error only affects a single Section 8.4). An endpoint MAY close the connection in this manner
stream. even if the error only affects a single stream.
A CONNECTION_CLOSE frame could be sent in a packet that is lost. An Application protocols can signal application-specific protocol errors
endpoint SHOULD be prepared to retransmit a packet containing a using the APPLICATION_CLOSE frame. Errors that are specific to the
CONNECTION_CLOSE frame if it receives more packets on a terminated transport, including all those described in this document, are
connection. Limiting the number of retransmissions and the time over carried in a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. Other than the type of error
which this final packet is sent limits the effort expended on code they carry, these frames are identical in format and semantics.
terminated connections.
A CONNECTION_CLOSE or APPLICATION_CLOSE frame could be sent in a
packet that is lost. An endpoint SHOULD be prepared to retransmit a
packet containing either frame type if it receives more packets on a
terminated connection. Limiting the number of retransmissions and
the time over which this final packet is sent limits the effort
expended on terminated connections.
An endpoint that chooses not to retransmit packets containing An endpoint that chooses not to retransmit packets containing
CONNECTION_CLOSE risks a peer missing the first such packet. The CONNECTION_CLOSE or APPLICATION_CLOSE risks a peer missing the first
only mechanism available to an endpoint that continues to receive such packet. The only mechanism available to an endpoint that
data for a terminated connection is to use the stateless reset continues to receive data for a terminated connection is to use the
process (Section 7.7.5). stateless reset process (Section 7.8.4).
An endpoint that receives an invalid CONNECTION_CLOSE frame MUST NOT An endpoint that receives an invalid CONNECTION_CLOSE or
signal the existence of the error to its peer. APPLICATION_CLOSE frame MUST NOT signal the existence of the error to
its peer.
12.2. Stream Errors 12.2. Stream Errors
If the error affects a single stream, but otherwise leaves the If the error affects a single stream, but otherwise leaves the
connection in a recoverable state, the endpoint can send a RST_STREAM connection in a recoverable state, the endpoint can send a RST_STREAM
frame (Section 8.2) with an appropriate error code to terminate just frame (Section 8.2) with an appropriate error code to terminate just
the affected stream. the affected stream.
Stream 0 is critical to the functioning of the entire connection. If Stream 0 is critical to the functioning of the entire connection. If
stream 0 is closed with either a RST_STREAM or STREAM frame bearing stream 0 is closed with either a RST_STREAM or STREAM frame bearing
the FIN flag, an endpoint MUST generate a connection error of type the FIN flag, an endpoint MUST generate a connection error of type
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
Some application protocols make other streams critical to that RST_STREAM MUST be instigated by the application and MUST carry an
protocol. An application protocol does not need to inform the application error code. Resetting a stream without knowledge of the
transport that a stream is critical; it can instead generate application protocol could cause the protocol to enter an
appropriate errors in response to being notified that the critical unrecoverable state. Application protocols might require certain
stream is closed. streams to be reliably delivered in order to guarantee consistent
state between endpoints.
An endpoint MAY send a RST_STREAM frame in the same packet as a
CONNECTION_CLOSE frame.
12.3. Error Codes
Error codes are 32 bits long, with the first two bits indicating the
source of the error code:
0x00000000-0x3FFFFFFF: Application-specific error codes. Defined by
each application-layer protocol.
0x40000000-0x7FFFFFFF: Reserved for host-local error codes. These
codes MUST NOT be sent to a peer, but MAY be used in API return
codes and logs.
0x80000000-0xBFFFFFFF: QUIC transport error codes, including packet 12.3. Transport Error Codes
protection errors. Applicable to all uses of QUIC.
0xC0000000-0xFFFFFFFF: Cryptographic error codes. Defined by the QUIC error codes are 16-bit unsigned integers.
cryptographic handshake protocol in use.
This section lists the defined QUIC transport error codes that may be This section lists the defined QUIC transport error codes that may be
used in a CONNECTION_CLOSE or RST_STREAM frame. Error codes share a used in a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. These errors apply to the entire
common code space. Some error codes apply only to either streams or connection.
the entire connection and have no defined semantics in the other
context.
NO_ERROR (0x80000000): An endpoint uses this with CONNECTION_CLOSE
to signal that the connection is being closed abruptly in the
absence of any error. An endpoint uses this with RST_STREAM to
signal that the stream is no longer wanted or in response to the
receipt of a RST_STREAM for that stream.
INTERNAL_ERROR (0x80000001): The endpoint encountered an internal NO_ERROR (0x0): An endpoint uses this with CONNECTION_CLOSE to
error and cannot continue with the connection. signal that the connection is being closed abruptly in the absence
of any error.
CANCELLED (0x80000002): An endpoint sends this with RST_STREAM to INTERNAL_ERROR (0x1): The endpoint encountered an internal error and
indicate that the stream is not wanted and that no application cannot continue with the connection.
action was taken for the stream. This error code is not valid for
use with CONNECTION_CLOSE.
FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR (0x80000003): An endpoint received more data than FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR (0x3): An endpoint received more data than it
it permitted in its advertised data limits (see Section 11). permitted in its advertised data limits (see Section 11).
STREAM_ID_ERROR (0x80000004): An endpoint received a frame for a STREAM_ID_ERROR (0x4): An endpoint received a frame for a stream
stream identifier that exceeded its advertised maximum stream ID. identifier that exceeded its advertised maximum stream ID.
STREAM_STATE_ERROR (0x80000005): An endpoint received a frame for a STREAM_STATE_ERROR (0x5): An endpoint received a frame for a stream
stream that was not in a state that permitted that frame (see that was not in a state that permitted that frame (see
Section 10.2). Section 10.2).
FINAL_OFFSET_ERROR (0x80000006): An endpoint received a STREAM frame FINAL_OFFSET_ERROR (0x6): An endpoint received a STREAM frame
containing data that exceeded the previously established final containing data that exceeded the previously established final
offset. Or an endpoint received a RST_STREAM frame containing a offset. Or an endpoint received a RST_STREAM frame containing a
final offset that was lower than the maximum offset of data that final offset that was lower than the maximum offset of data that
was already received. Or an endpoint received a RST_STREAM frame was already received. Or an endpoint received a RST_STREAM frame
containing a different final offset to the one already containing a different final offset to the one already
established. established.
FRAME_FORMAT_ERROR (0x80000007): An endpoint received a frame that FRAME_FORMAT_ERROR (0x7): An endpoint received a frame that was
was badly formatted. For instance, an empty STREAM frame that badly formatted. For instance, an empty STREAM frame that omitted
omitted the FIN flag, or an ACK frame that has more acknowledgment the FIN flag, or an ACK frame that has more acknowledgment ranges
ranges than the remainder of the packet could carry. This is a than the remainder of the packet could carry. This is a generic
generic error code; an endpoint SHOULD use the more specific frame error code; an endpoint SHOULD use the more specific frame format
format error codes (0x800001XX) if possible. error codes (0x1XX) if possible.
TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR (0x80000008): An endpoint received TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR (0x8): An endpoint received transport
transport parameters that were badly formatted, included an parameters that were badly formatted, included an invalid value,
invalid value, was absent even though it is mandatory, was present was absent even though it is mandatory, was present though it is
though it is forbidden, or is otherwise in error. forbidden, or is otherwise in error.
VERSION_NEGOTIATION_ERROR (0x80000009): An endpoint received VERSION_NEGOTIATION_ERROR (0x9): An endpoint received transport
transport parameters that contained version negotiation parameters parameters that contained version negotiation parameters that
that disagreed with the version negotiation that it performed. disagreed with the version negotiation that it performed. This
This error code indicates a potential version downgrade attack. error code indicates a potential version downgrade attack.
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION (0x8000000A): An endpoint detected an error with PROTOCOL_VIOLATION (0xA): An endpoint detected an error with
protocol compliance that was not covered by more specific error protocol compliance that was not covered by more specific error
codes. codes.
QUIC_RECEIVED_RST (0x80000035): Terminating stream because peer sent FRAME_ERROR (0x1XX): An endpoint detected an error in a specific
a RST_STREAM or STOP_SENDING. frame type. The frame type is included as the last octet of the
error code. For example, an error in a MAX_STREAM_ID frame would
be indicated with the code (0x106).
FRAME_ERROR (0x800001XX): An endpoint detected an error in a See Section 14.2 for details of registering new error codes.
specific frame type. The frame type is included as the last octet
of the error code. For example, an error in a MAX_STREAM_ID frame 12.4. Application Protocol Error Codes
would be indicated with the code (0x80000106).
Application protocol error codes are 16-bit unsigned integers, but
the management of application error codes are left to application
protocols. Application protocol error codes are used for the
RST_STREAM (Section 8.2) and APPLICATION_CLOSE (Section 8.4) frames.
There is no restriction on the use of the 16-bit error code space for
application protocols. However, QUIC reserves the error code with a
value of 0 to mean STOPPING. The application error code of STOPPING
(0) is used by the transport to cancel a stream in response to
receipt of a STOP_SENDING frame.
13. Security and Privacy Considerations 13. Security and Privacy Considerations
13.1. Spoofed ACK Attack 13.1. Spoofed ACK Attack
An attacker receives an STK from the server and then releases the IP An attacker receives an STK from the server and then releases the IP
address on which it received the STK. The attacker may, in the address on which it received the STK. The attacker may, in the
future, spoof this same address (which now presumably addresses a future, spoof this same address (which now presumably addresses a
different endpoint), and initiate a 0-RTT connection with a server on different endpoint), and initiate a 0-RTT connection with a server on
the victim's behalf. The attacker then spoofs ACK frames to the the victim's behalf. The attacker then spoofs ACK frames to the
skipping to change at page 72, line 22 skipping to change at page 72, line 22
14.1. QUIC Transport Parameter Registry 14.1. QUIC Transport Parameter Registry
IANA [SHALL add/has added] a registry for "QUIC Transport Parameters" IANA [SHALL add/has added] a registry for "QUIC Transport Parameters"
under a "QUIC Protocol" heading. under a "QUIC Protocol" heading.
The "QUIC Transport Parameters" registry governs a 16-bit space. The "QUIC Transport Parameters" registry governs a 16-bit space.
This space is split into two spaces that are governed by different This space is split into two spaces that are governed by different
policies. Values with the first byte in the range 0x00 to 0xfe (in policies. Values with the first byte in the range 0x00 to 0xfe (in
hexadecimal) are assigned via the Specification Required policy hexadecimal) are assigned via the Specification Required policy
[RFC5226]. Values with the first byte 0xff are reserved for Private [RFC8126]. Values with the first byte 0xff are reserved for Private
Use [RFC5226]. Use [RFC8126].
Registrations MUST include the following fields: Registrations MUST include the following fields:
Value: The numeric value of the assignment (registrations will be Value: The numeric value of the assignment (registrations will be
between 0x0000 and 0xfeff). between 0x0000 and 0xfeff).
Parameter Name: A short mnemonic for the parameter. Parameter Name: A short mnemonic for the parameter.
Specification: A reference to a publicly available specification for Specification: A reference to a publicly available specification for
the value. the value.
skipping to change at page 73, line 8 skipping to change at page 73, line 8
readily accessible. The expert(s) are encouraged to be biased readily accessible. The expert(s) are encouraged to be biased
towards approving registrations unless they are abusive, frivolous, towards approving registrations unless they are abusive, frivolous,
or actively harmful (not merely aesthetically displeasing, or or actively harmful (not merely aesthetically displeasing, or
architecturally dubious). architecturally dubious).
The initial contents of this registry are shown in Table 4. The initial contents of this registry are shown in Table 4.
+--------+-------------------------+---------------+ +--------+-------------------------+---------------+
| Value | Parameter Name | Specification | | Value | Parameter Name | Specification |
+--------+-------------------------+---------------+ +--------+-------------------------+---------------+
| 0x0000 | initial_max_stream_data | Section 7.3.1 | | 0x0000 | initial_max_stream_data | Section 7.4.1 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x0001 | initial_max_data | Section 7.3.1 | | 0x0001 | initial_max_data | Section 7.4.1 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x0002 | initial_max_stream_id | Section 7.3.1 | | 0x0002 | initial_max_stream_id | Section 7.4.1 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x0003 | idle_timeout | Section 7.3.1 | | 0x0003 | idle_timeout | Section 7.4.1 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x0004 | omit_connection_id | Section 7.3.1 | | 0x0004 | omit_connection_id | Section 7.4.1 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x0005 | max_packet_size | Section 7.3.1 | | 0x0005 | max_packet_size | Section 7.4.1 |
| | | | | | | |
| 0x0006 | stateless_reset_token | Section 7.3.1 | | 0x0006 | stateless_reset_token | Section 7.4.1 |
+--------+-------------------------+---------------+ +--------+-------------------------+---------------+
Table 4: Initial QUIC Transport Parameters Entries Table 4: Initial QUIC Transport Parameters Entries
14.2. QUIC Transport Error Codes Registry
IANA [SHALL add/has added] a registry for "QUIC Transport Error
Codes" under a "QUIC Protocol" heading.
The "QUIC Transport Error Codes" registry governs a 16-bit space.
This space is split into two spaces that are governed by different
policies. Values with the first byte in the range 0x00 to 0xfe (in
hexadecimal) are assigned via the Specification Required policy
[RFC8126]. Values with the first byte 0xff are reserved for Private
Use [RFC8126].
Registrations MUST include the following fields:
Value: The numeric value of the assignment (registrations will be
between 0x0000 and 0xfeff).
Code: A short mnemonic for the parameter.
Description: A brief description of the error code semantics, which
MAY be a summary if a specification reference is provided.
Specification: A reference to a publicly available specification for
the value.
The initial contents of this registry are shown in Table 5. Note
that FRAME_ERROR takes the range from 0x100 to 0x1FF and private use
occupies the range from 0xFE00 to 0xFFFF.
+-----------+------------------------+---------------+--------------+
| Value | Error | Description | Specificatio |
| | | | n |
+-----------+------------------------+---------------+--------------+
| 0x0 | NO_ERROR | No error | Section 12.3 |
| | | | |
| 0x1 | INTERNAL_ERROR | Implementatio | Section 12.3 |
| | | n error | |
| | | | |
| 0x3 | FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR | Flow control | Section 12.3 |
| | | error | |
| | | | |
| 0x4 | STREAM_ID_ERROR | Invalid | Section 12.3 |
| | | stream ID | |
| | | | |
| 0x5 | STREAM_STATE_ERROR | Frame | Section 12.3 |
| | | received in | |
| | | invalid | |
| | | stream state | |
| | | | |
| 0x6 | FINAL_OFFSET_ERROR | Change to | Section 12.3 |
| | | final stream | |
| | | offset | |
| | | | |
| 0x7 | FRAME_FORMAT_ERROR | Generic frame | Section 12.3 |
| | | format error | |
| | | | |
| 0x8 | TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ER | Error in | Section 12.3 |
| | ROR | transport | |
| | | parameters | |
| | | | |
| 0x9 | VERSION_NEGOTIATION_ER | Version | Section 12.3 |
| | ROR | negotiation | |
| | | failure | |
| | | | |
| 0xA | PROTOCOL_VIOLATION | Generic | Section 12.3 |
| | | protocol | |
| | | violation | |
| | | | |
| 0x100-0x1 | FRAME_ERROR | Specific | Section 12.3 |
| FF | | frame format | |
| | | error | |
+-----------+------------------------+---------------+--------------+
Table 5: Initial QUIC Transport Error Codes Entries
15. References 15. References
15.1. Normative References 15.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21 (work in progress), Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21 (work in progress),
July 2017. July 2017.
[PLPMTUD] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>.
[PMTUDv4] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[PMTUDv6] McCann, J., Deering, S., Mogul, J., and R. Hinden, Ed.,
"Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", STD 87, RFC 8201,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8201, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8201>.
[QUIC-RECOVERY] [QUIC-RECOVERY]
Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection
and Congestion Control", draft-ietf-quic-recovery (work in and Congestion Control", draft-ietf-quic-recovery-07 (work
progress), September 2017. in progress), October 2017.
[QUIC-TLS] [QUIC-TLS]
Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using Transport Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using Transport
Layer Security (TLS) to Secure QUIC", draft-ietf-quic-tls Layer Security (TLS) to Secure QUIC", draft-ietf-quic-
(work in progress), September 2017. tls-07 (work in progress), October 2017.
[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191, [RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
editor.org/info/rfc1191>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[RFC1981] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery
for IP version 6", RFC 1981, DOI 10.17487/RFC1981, August
1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1981>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>. 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
editor.org/info/rfc4086>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, <https://www.rfc- RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
editor.org/info/rfc5226>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
15.2. Informative References 15.2. Informative References
[EARLY-DESIGN] [EARLY-DESIGN]
Roskind, J., "QUIC: Multiplexed Transport Over UDP", Roskind, J., "QUIC: Multiplexed Transport Over UDP",
December 2013, <https://goo.gl/dMVtFi>. December 2013, <https://goo.gl/dMVtFi>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
editor.org/info/rfc2104>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2360] Scott, G., "Guide for Internet Standards Writers", BCP 22, [RFC2360] Scott, G., "Guide for Internet Standards Writers", BCP 22,
RFC 2360, DOI 10.17487/RFC2360, June 1998, RFC 2360, DOI 10.17487/RFC2360, June 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2360>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2360>.
[RFC4787] Audet, F., Ed. and C. Jennings, "Network Address [RFC4787] Audet, F., Ed. and C. Jennings, "Network Address
Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast
UDP", BCP 127, RFC 4787, DOI 10.17487/RFC4787, January UDP", BCP 127, RFC 4787, DOI 10.17487/RFC4787, January
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4787>. 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4787>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand [RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
editor.org/info/rfc5869>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC6824] Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure, [RFC6824] Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure,
"TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple "TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple
Addresses", RFC 6824, DOI 10.17487/RFC6824, January 2013, Addresses", RFC 6824, DOI 10.17487/RFC6824, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6824>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6824>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan, [RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301, Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>. July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext [RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540, Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
editor.org/info/rfc7540>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
[SLOWLORIS] [SLOWLORIS]
RSnake Hansen, R., "Welcome to Slowloris...", June 2009, RSnake Hansen, R., "Welcome to Slowloris...", June 2009,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20150315054838/ <https://web.archive.org/web/20150315054838/
http://ha.ckers.org/slowloris/>. http://ha.ckers.org/slowloris/>.
[SST] Ford, B., "Structured streams", ACM SIGCOMM Computer [SST] Ford, B., "Structured streams", ACM SIGCOMM Computer
Communication Review Vol. 37, pp. 361, Communication Review Vol. 37, pp. 361,
DOI 10.1145/1282427.1282421, October 2007. DOI 10.1145/1282427.1282421, October 2007.
15.3. URIs 15.3. URIs
[1] https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/wiki/QUIC-Versions [1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=quic
[2] https://github.com/quicwg
[3] https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/labels/transport
[4] https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/wiki/QUIC-Versions
Appendix A. Contributors Appendix A. Contributors
The original authors of this specification were Ryan Hamilton, Jana The original authors of this specification were Ryan Hamilton, Jana
Iyengar, Ian Swett, and Alyssa Wilk. Iyengar, Ian Swett, and Alyssa Wilk.
The original design and rationale behind this protocol draw The original design and rationale behind this protocol draw
significantly from work by Jim Roskind [EARLY-DESIGN]. In significantly from work by Jim Roskind [EARLY-DESIGN]. In
alphabetical order, the contributors to the pre-IETF QUIC project at alphabetical order, the contributors to the pre-IETF QUIC project at
Google are: Britt Cyr, Jeremy Dorfman, Ryan Hamilton, Jana Iyengar, Google are: Britt Cyr, Jeremy Dorfman, Ryan Hamilton, Jana Iyengar,
skipping to change at page 76, line 16 skipping to change at page 78, line 12
discussions and public ones on the quic@ietf.org and proto- discussions and public ones on the quic@ietf.org and proto-
quic@chromium.org mailing lists. Our thanks to all. quic@chromium.org mailing lists. Our thanks to all.
Appendix C. Change Log Appendix C. Change Log
*RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to *RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to
publication of a final version of this document. publication of a final version of this document.
Issue and pull request numbers are listed with a leading octothorp. Issue and pull request numbers are listed with a leading octothorp.
C.1. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-05 C.1. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-06
o Replaced FNV-1a with AES-GCM for all "Cleartext" packets.
C.2. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-05
o Stateless token is server-only (#726) o Stateless token is server-only (#726)
o Refactor section on connection termination (#733, #748, #328, o Refactor section on connection termination (#733, #748, #328,
#177) #177)
o Limit size of Version Negotiation packet (#585) o Limit size of Version Negotiation packet (#585)
o Clarify when and what to ack (#736) o Clarify when and what to ack (#736)
o Renamed STREAM_ID_NEEDED to STREAM_ID_BLOCKED o Renamed STREAM_ID_NEEDED to STREAM_ID_BLOCKED
o Clarify Keep-alive requirements (#729) o Clarify Keep-alive requirements (#729)
C.2. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-04 C.3. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-04
o Introduce STOP_SENDING frame, RST_STREAM only resets in one o Introduce STOP_SENDING frame, RST_STREAM only resets in one
direction (#165) direction (#165)
o Removed GOAWAY; application protocols are responsible for graceful o Removed GOAWAY; application protocols are responsible for graceful
shutdown (#696) shutdown (#696)
o Reduced the number of error codes (#96, #177, #184, #211) o Reduced the number of error codes (#96, #177, #184, #211)
o Version validation fields can't move or change (#121) o Version validation fields can't move or change (#121)
skipping to change at page 77, line 16 skipping to change at page 79, line 16
o Increased the maximum length of the Largest Acknowledged field in o Increased the maximum length of the Largest Acknowledged field in
ACK frames to 64 bits (#629) ACK frames to 64 bits (#629)
o truncate_connection_id is renamed to omit_connection_id (#659) o truncate_connection_id is renamed to omit_connection_id (#659)
o CONNECTION_CLOSE terminates the connection like TCP RST (#330, o CONNECTION_CLOSE terminates the connection like TCP RST (#330,
#328) #328)
o Update labels used in HKDF-Expand-Label to match TLS 1.3 (#642) o Update labels used in HKDF-Expand-Label to match TLS 1.3 (#642)
C.3. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-03 C.4. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-03
o Change STREAM and RST_STREAM layout o Change STREAM and RST_STREAM layout
o Add MAX_STREAM_ID settings o Add MAX_STREAM_ID settings
C.4. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-02 C.5. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-02
o The size of the initial packet payload has a fixed minimum (#267, o The size of the initial packet payload has a fixed minimum (#267,
#472) #472)
o Define when Version Negotiation packets are ignored (#284, #294, o Define when Version Negotiation packets are ignored (#284, #294,
#241, #143, #474) #241, #143, #474)
o The 64-bit FNV-1a algorithm is used for integrity protection of o The 64-bit FNV-1a algorithm is used for integrity protection of
unprotected packets (#167, #480, #481, #517) unprotected packets (#167, #480, #481, #517)
skipping to change at page 78, line 19 skipping to change at page 80, line 19
linkability (#232, #491, #496) linkability (#232, #491, #496)
o Transport parameters for 0-RTT are retained from a previous o Transport parameters for 0-RTT are retained from a previous
connection (#405, #513, #512) connection (#405, #513, #512)
* A client in 0-RTT no longer required to reset excess streams * A client in 0-RTT no longer required to reset excess streams
(#425, #479) (#425, #479)
o Expanded security considerations (#440, #444, #445, #448) o Expanded security considerations (#440, #444, #445, #448)
C.5. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-01 C.6. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-01
o Defined short and long packet headers (#40, #148, #361) o Defined short and long packet headers (#40, #148, #361)
o Defined a versioning scheme and stable fields (#51, #361) o Defined a versioning scheme and stable fields (#51, #361)
o Define reserved version values for "greasing" negotiation (#112, o Define reserved version values for "greasing" negotiation (#112,
#278) #278)
o The initial packet number is randomized (#35, #283) o The initial packet number is randomized (#35, #283)
skipping to change at page 80, line 17 skipping to change at page 82, line 17
o Remove error code and reason phrase from GOAWAY (#352, #355) o Remove error code and reason phrase from GOAWAY (#352, #355)
o GOAWAY includes a final stream number for both directions (#347) o GOAWAY includes a final stream number for both directions (#347)
o Error codes for RST_STREAM and CONNECTION_CLOSE are now at a o Error codes for RST_STREAM and CONNECTION_CLOSE are now at a
consistent offset (#249) consistent offset (#249)
o Defined priority as the responsibility of the application protocol o Defined priority as the responsibility of the application protocol
(#104, #303) (#104, #303)
C.6. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-00 C.7. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-00
o Replaced DIVERSIFICATION_NONCE flag with KEY_PHASE flag o Replaced DIVERSIFICATION_NONCE flag with KEY_PHASE flag
o Defined versioning o Defined versioning
o Reworked description of packet and frame layout o Reworked description of packet and frame layout
o Error code space is divided into regions for each component o Error code space is divided into regions for each component
o Use big endian for all numeric values o Use big endian for all numeric values
C.7. Since draft-hamilton-quic-transport-protocol-01 C.8. Since draft-hamilton-quic-transport-protocol-01
o Adopted as base for draft-ietf-quic-tls o Adopted as base for draft-ietf-quic-tls
o Updated authors/editors list o Updated authors/editors list
o Added IANA Considerations section o Added IANA Considerations section
o Moved Contributors and Acknowledgments to appendices o Moved Contributors and Acknowledgments to appendices
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
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