draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-00.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-01.txt 
OAuth Working Group B. Campbell OAuth Working Group B. Campbell
Internet-Draft J. Bradley Internet-Draft J. Bradley
Intended status: Standards Track Ping Identity Intended status: Standards Track Ping Identity
Expires: November 10, 2017 N. Sakimura Expires: November 27, 2017 N. Sakimura
Nomura Research Institute Nomura Research Institute
T. Lodderstedt T. Lodderstedt
YES Europe AG YES Europe AG
May 9, 2017 May 26, 2017
Mutual TLS Profiles for OAuth Clients Mutual TLS Profiles for OAuth Clients
draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-00 draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-01
Abstract Abstract
This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) mutual This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) mutual
authentication using X.509 certificates as a mechanism for both OAuth authentication using X.509 certificates as a mechanism for both OAuth
client authentication to the token endpoint as well as for sender client authentication to the token endpoint as well as for sender
constrained access to OAuth protected resources. constrained access to OAuth protected resources.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 10, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 27, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Mutual TLS for Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Mutual TLS for Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Mutual TLS Client Authentication to the Token Endpoint . 3 2.1. Mutual TLS Client Authentication to the Token Endpoint . 3
2.2. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Dynamic Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Dynamic Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Mutual TLS Sender Constrained Resources Access . . . . . . . 5 3. Mutual TLS Sender Constrained Resources Access . . . . . . . 5
3.1. X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint Confirmation Method 3.1. X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint Confirmation Method
for JWT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 for JWT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Confirmation Method for Token Introspection . . . . . . . 6
4.1. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration . . . . 6 4.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration . . . . 7
4.3. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration . 6 4.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration . . . . . 8
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. TLS Versions and Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.4. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration . 8
5.2. Client Identity Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.4.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1. TLS Versions and Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. Client Identity Binding by the Authorization Server . . . 9
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix B. Document(s) History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix B. Document(s) History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) mutual This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) mutual
authentication using X.509 certificates as a mechanism for both OAuth authentication using X.509 certificates as a mechanism for both OAuth
client authentication to the token endpoint as well as for sender client authentication to the token endpoint as well as for sender
constrained access to OAuth protected resources. constrained access to OAuth protected resources.
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] defines a shared The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] defines a shared
secret method of client authentication but also allows for the secret method of client authentication but also allows for the
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authentication utilizing mutual TLS [RFC5246] certificate-based authentication utilizing mutual TLS [RFC5246] certificate-based
authentication, which provides better security characteristics than authentication, which provides better security characteristics than
shared secrets. shared secrets.
Mutual TLS sender constrained access to protected resources ensures Mutual TLS sender constrained access to protected resources ensures
that only the party in possession of the private key corresponding to that only the party in possession of the private key corresponding to
the certificate can utilize the access token to get access to the the certificate can utilize the access token to get access to the
associated resources. Such a constraint is unlike the case of the associated resources. Such a constraint is unlike the case of the
basic bearer token described in [RFC6750], where any party in basic bearer token described in [RFC6750], where any party in
possession of the access token can use it to access the associated possession of the access token can use it to access the associated
resources. Mutual TLS sender constrained access prevents the use of resources. Mutual TLS sender constrained access binds the access
stolen access tokens by binding the access token to the client's token to the client's certificate thus preventing the use of stolen
certificate. access tokens or replay of access tokens by unauthorized parties.
Mutual TLS sender constrained access tokens and mutual TLS client Mutual TLS sender constrained access tokens and mutual TLS client
authentication are distinct mechanisms that don't necessarily need to authentication are distinct mechanisms that don't necessarily need to
be deployed together. be deployed together.
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions 1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119]. 2119 [RFC2119].
1.2. Terminology 1.2. Terminology
This specification uses the following phrases interchangeably: This specification uses the following phrases interchangeably:
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Mutual Authentication Transport Layer Security (TLS) Mutual Authentication
Mutual TLS Mutual TLS
Mutual TLS X.509 client certificate authentication
These phrases all refer to the process whereby a client uses it's These phrases all refer to the process whereby a client uses it's
X.509 certificate to authenticate itself with a server when X.509 certificate to authenticate itself with a server when
negotiating a TLS session. In TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] this requires the negotiating a TLS session. In TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] this requires the
client to send Client Certificate and Certificate Verify messages client to send Client Certificate and Certificate Verify messages
during the TLS handshake and for the server to verify these messages. during the TLS handshake and for the server to verify these messages.
2. Mutual TLS for Client Authentication 2. Mutual TLS for Client Authentication
2.1. Mutual TLS Client Authentication to the Token Endpoint 2.1. Mutual TLS Client Authentication to the Token Endpoint
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2.2. Authorization Server Metadata 2.2. Authorization Server Metadata
"tls_client_auth" is used as a new value of the "tls_client_auth" is used as a new value of the
"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" metadata parameter to "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" metadata parameter to
indicate server support for mutual TLS as a client authentication indicate server support for mutual TLS as a client authentication
method in authorization server metadata such as [OpenID.Discovery] method in authorization server metadata such as [OpenID.Discovery]
and [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]. and [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery].
2.3. Dynamic Client Registration 2.3. Dynamic Client Registration
This draft adds the following values and metadata parameters to the This draft adds the following values and metadata parameters to OAuth
OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration [RFC7591]. 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration [RFC7591].
The value "tls_client_auth" is used to indicate the client's The value "tls_client_auth" is used to indicate the client's
intention to use mutual TLS as an authentication method to the token intention to use mutual TLS as an authentication method to the token
endpoint for the "token_endpoint_auth_method" client metadata field. endpoint for the "token_endpoint_auth_method" client metadata field.
For authorization servers that associate certificates with clients For authorization servers that associate certificates with clients
using subject information in the certificate, the following two new using subject information in the certificate, the following two new
string metadata parameters can be used: metadata parameters can be used:
tls_client_auth_subject_dn The expected subject distinguished name tls_client_auth_subject_dn
of the client certificate can be represented using An [RFC4514] string representation of the expected subject
"tls_client_auth_subject_dn". distinguished name of the certificate the OAuth client will use in
mutual TLS authentication.
tls_client_auth_issuer_dn The metadata parameter tls_client_auth_root_dn
"tls_client_auth_issuer_dn" can optionally be used to constrain An [RFC4514] string representation of a distinguished name that
the expected distinguished name of the root issuer of the client can optionally be used to constrain, for the given client, the
expected distinguished name of the root issuer of the client
certificate. certificate.
For authorization servers that use the key or full certificate to For authorization servers that use the key or full certificate to
associate clients with certificate, the existing "jwks_uri" or "jwks" associate clients with certificates, the existing "jwks_uri" or
metadata parameters from [RFC7591] shall be used. "jwks" metadata parameters from [RFC7591] should be used.
3. Mutual TLS Sender Constrained Resources Access 3. Mutual TLS Sender Constrained Resources Access
When mutual TLS X.509 client certificate authentication is used at When mutual TLS is used at the token endpoint, the authorization
the token endpoint, the authorization server is able to bind the server is able to bind the issued access token to the client
issued access token to the client certificate. Such a binding is certificate. Such a binding is accomplished by associating the
accomplished by associating a hash of the certificate with the token certificate with the token in a way that can be accessed by the
in a way that can be accessed by the protected resource, such as protected resource, such as embedding the certificate hash in the
embedding the certificate hash in the issued access token directly, issued access token directly, using the syntax described in
using the syntax described in Section 3.1, or through token Section 3.1, or through token introspection as described in
introspection [RFC7662]. The specific method for associating the Section 3.2. Other methods of associating a certificate with an
certificate with the access token is determined by the authorization access token are possible, per agreement by the authorization server
server and the protected resource, and is beyond the scope for this and the protected resource, but are beyond the scope of this
specification. specification.
The client makes protected resource requests as described in The client makes protected resource requests as described in
[RFC6750], however, those requests MUST be made over a mutually [RFC6750], however, those requests MUST be made over a mutually
authenticated TLS connection using the same certificate that was used authenticated TLS connection using the same certificate that was used
to authenticate to the token endpoint. for mutual TLS at the token endpoint.
The protected resource MUST obtain the client certificate used for The protected resource MUST obtain the client certificate used for
TLS authentication and MUST verify that the hash of that certificate mutual TLS authentication and MUST verify that the that certificate
exactly matches the hash of the certificate associated with the matches the certificate associated with the access token. If they do
access token. If the hash values do not match, the resource access not match, the resource access attempt MUST be rejected with an
attempt MUST be rejected with an error. error.
3.1. X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint Confirmation Method for JWT 3.1. X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint Confirmation Method for JWT
When access tokens are represented as a JSON Web Tokens When access tokens are represented as a JSON Web Tokens
(JWT)[RFC7519], the certificate hash information SHOULD be (JWT)[RFC7519], the certificate hash information SHOULD be
represented using the "x5t#S256" confirmation method member defined represented using the "x5t#S256" confirmation method member defined
herein. herein.
To represent the hash of a certificate in a JWT, this specification To represent the hash of a certificate in a JWT, this specification
defines the new JWT Confirmation Method RFC 7800 [RFC7800] member defines the new JWT Confirmation Method RFC 7800 [RFC7800] member
"x5t#S256" for the X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint. The value "x5t#S256" for the X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint. The value
of the "x5t#S256" member is a base64url-encoded SHA-256[SHS] hash of the "x5t#S256" member is a base64url-encoded SHA-256[SHS] hash
(a.k.a. thumbprint or digest) of the DER encoding of the X.509 (a.k.a. thumbprint or digest) of the DER encoding of the X.509
certificate[RFC5280] (note that certificate thumbprints are also certificate[RFC5280] (note that certificate thumbprints are also
sometimes also known as certificate fingerprints). sometimes also known as certificate fingerprints).
The following is an example of a JWT payload containing an "x5t#S256" The following is an example of a JWT payload containing an "x5t#S256"
certificate thumbprint confirmation method. certificate thumbprint confirmation method.
{ {
"iss": "https://server.example.com", "iss": "https://server.example.com",
"aud": "https://resource.example.org", "sub": "ty.webb@example.com",
"sub": "ty.webb@example.com", "exp": 1493726400,
"exp": 1493726400, "nbf": 1493722800,
"nbf": 1493722800, "cnf":{
"cnf":{ "x5t#S256": "bwcK0esc3ACC3DB2Y5_lESsXE8o9ltc05O89jdN-dg2"
"x5t#S256": "bwcK0esc3ACC3DB2Y5_lESsXE8o9ltc05O89jdN-dg2" }
} }
}
Figure 1: Example claims of a Certificate Thumbprint Constrained JWT. Figure 1: Example claims of a Certificate Thumbprint Constrained JWT
3.2. Confirmation Method for Token Introspection
OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] defines a method for a
protected resource to query an authorization server about the active
state of an access token as well as to determine meta-information
about the token.
For a mutual TLS sender constrained access token, the hash of the
certificate to which the token is bound is conveyed to the protected
resource as meta-information in a token introspection response. The
hash is conveyed using same structure as the certificate SHA-256
thumbprint confirmation method, described in Section 3.1, as a top-
level member of the introspection response JSON. The protected
resource compares that certificate hash to a hash of the client
certificate used for mutual TLS authentication and rejects the
request, if they do not match.
Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens [RFC7800]
defined the "cnf" (confirmation) claim, which enables confirmation
key information to be carried in a JWT. However, the same proof-of-
possession semantics are also useful for introspected access tokens
whereby the protected resource obtains the confirmation key data as
meta-information of a token introspection response and uses that
information in verifying proof-of-possession. Therefore this
specification defines and registers proof-of-possession semantics for
OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] using the "cnf" structure.
When included as a top-level member of an OAuth token introspection
response, "cnf" has the same semantics and format as the the claim of
the same name defined in [RFC7800]. While this specification only
explicitly uses the "x5t#S256" confirmation method member, it needed
to define and register the higher level "cnf" structure as an
introspection response member in order to define and use its more
specific "x5t#S256" confirmation method.
The following is an example of an introspection response for an
active token with an "x5t#S256" certificate thumbprint confirmation
method.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{
"active": true,
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "ty.webb@example.com",
"exp": 1493726400,
"nbf": 1493722800,
"cnf":{
"x5t#S256": "bwcK0esc3ACC3DB2Y5_lESsXE8o9ltc05O89jdN-dg2"
}
}
Figure 2: Example Introspection Response for a Certificate
Constrained Access Token
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
4.1. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration 4.1. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration
This specification requests registration of the following value in This specification requests registration of the following value in
the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] for the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] for
JWT "cnf" member values established by [RFC7800]. JWT "cnf" member values established by [RFC7800].
4.1.1. Registry Contents 4.1.1. Registry Contents
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This specification requests registration of the following value in This specification requests registration of the following value in
the IANA "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry the IANA "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591]. [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591].
4.2.1. Registry Contents 4.2.1. Registry Contents
o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "tls_client_auth" o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "tls_client_auth"
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]]
4.3. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration 4.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration
This specification requests registration of the following value in
the IANA "OAuth Token Introspection Response" registry
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7662].
4.3.1. Registry Contents
o Claim Name: "cnf"
o Claim Description: Confirmation
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of [[ this specification ]]
4.4. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration
This specification requests registration of the following client This specification requests registration of the following client
metadata definitions in the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration metadata definitions in the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration
Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591]: Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591]:
4.3.1. Registry Contents 4.4.1. Registry Contents
o Client Metadata Name: "tls_client_auth_subject_dn" o Client Metadata Name: "tls_client_auth_subject_dn"
o Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the expected o Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the expected
subject distinguished name of the client certificate. subject distinguished name of the client certificate.
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.3 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Client Metadata Name: "tls_client_auth_issuer_dn" o Client Metadata Name: "tls_client_auth_root_dn"
o Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the expected o Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the expected
distinguished name of the root issuer of the client certificate distinguished name of the root issuer of the client certificate
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.3 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.3 of [[ this specification ]]
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
5.1. TLS Versions and Best Practices 5.1. TLS Versions and Best Practices
TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] is cited in this document because, at the time of TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] is cited in this document because, at the time of
writing, it is latest version that is widely deployed. However, this writing, it is latest version that is widely deployed. However, this
document is applicable with other TLS versions supporting document is applicable with other TLS versions supporting
certificate-based client authentication. Implementation security certificate-based client authentication. Implementation security
considerations for TLS, including version recommendations, can be considerations for TLS, including version recommendations, can be
found in Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security found in Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security
(TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [BCP195]. (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [BCP195].
5.2. Client Identity Binding 5.2. Client Identity Binding by the Authorization Server
No specific method of binding a certificate to a client identifier at No specific method of binding a certificate to a client identifier at
the token endoint is prescribed by this document. However, some the token endpoint is prescribed by this document. However, some
method MUST be employed so that, in addition to proving possession of method MUST be employed so that, in addition to proving possession of
the private key corresponding to the certificate, the client identity the private key corresponding to the certificate, the client identity
is also bound to the certificate. One such binding would be to is also bound to the certificate. One such binding would be to
configure for the client a value that the certificate must contain in configure for the client a value that the certificate must contain in
the subject field or the subjectAltName extension and possibly a the subject field and possibly the expected trust anchor. An
restricted set of trust anchors. An alternative method would be to alternative method would be to configure a public key for the client
configure a public key for the client directly that would have to directly that would have to match the subject public key info of the
match the subject public key info of the certificate. certificate.
6. References 6. References
6.1. Normative References 6.1. Normative References
[BCP195] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, [BCP195] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
RFC 4514, DOI 10.17487/RFC4514, June 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4514>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
skipping to change at page 9, line 28 skipping to change at page 11, line 11
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol", P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015, RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", [RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015, RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements Appendix A. Acknowledgements
Scott "not Tomlinson" Tomilson and Matt Peterson were involved in the Scott "not Tomlinson" Tomilson and Matt Peterson were involved in
original design and development work on a mutual TLS client design and development work on a mutual TLS OAuth client
authentication implementation that informed some of the content of authentication implementation that informed some of the content of
this document. this document.
Additionally, the authors would like to thank the following people Additionally, the authors would like to thank the following people
for their input and contributions to the specification: Sergey for their input and contributions to the specification: Sergey
Beryozkin, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Samuel Erdtman, Phil Hunt, Sean Beryozkin, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Samuel Erdtman, Phil Hunt, Sean
Leonard, Kepeng Li, James Manger, Jim Manico, Nov Matake, Sascha Leonard, Kepeng Li, James Manger, Jim Manico, Nov Matake, Sascha
Preibisch, Justin Richer, Dave Tonge, and Hannes Tschofenig. Preibisch, Justin Richer, Dave Tonge, and Hannes Tschofenig.
Appendix B. Document(s) History Appendix B. Document(s) History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-01
o Added more explicit details of using RFC 7662 token introspection
with mutual TLS sender constrained access tokens.
o Added an IANA OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration
request for "cnf".
o Specify that tls_client_auth_subject_dn and
tls_client_auth_root_dn are RFC 4514 String Representation of
Distinguished Names.
o Changed tls_client_auth_issuer_dn to tls_client_auth_root_dn.
o Changed the text in the Section 3 to not be specific about using a
hash of the cert.
o Changed the abbreviated title to 'OAuth Mutual TLS' (previously
was the acronym MTLSPOC).
draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-00 draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-00
o Created the initial working group version from draft-campbell- o Created the initial working group version from draft-campbell-
oauth-mtls oauth-mtls
draft-campbell-oauth-mtls-01 draft-campbell-oauth-mtls-01
o Fix some typos. o Fix some typos.
o Add to the acknowledgements list. o Add to the acknowledgements list.
draft-campbell-oauth-mtls-00
o Add a Mutual TLS sender constrained protected resource access o Add a Mutual TLS sender constrained protected resource access
method and a x5t#S256 cnf method for JWT access tokens (concepts method and a x5t#S256 cnf method for JWT access tokens (concepts
taken in part from draft-sakimura-oauth-jpop-04). taken in part from draft-sakimura-oauth-jpop-04).
o Fixed "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" to o Fixed "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" to
"token_endpoint_auth_method" for client metadata. "token_endpoint_auth_method" for client metadata.
o Add "tls_client_auth_subject_dn" and "tls_client_auth_issuer_dn" o Add "tls_client_auth_subject_dn" and "tls_client_auth_issuer_dn"
client metadata parameters and mention using "jwks_uri" or "jwks". client metadata parameters and mention using "jwks_uri" or "jwks".
o Say that the authentication method is determined by client policy o Say that the authentication method is determined by client policy
regardless of whether the client was dynamically registered or regardless of whether the client was dynamically registered or
statically configured. statically configured.
 End of changes. 28 change blocks. 
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