NFSv4                                                          J. Fields
Internet-Draft                                            A. Gruenbacher
Intended status: Standards Track                                 Red Hat
Expires: April 6, September 4, 2017                                  October                                March 03, 2016 2017

         Allowing inheritable Inheritable NFSv4 ACLs to override Override the umask
                       draft-ietf-nfsv4-umask-02 Umask
                       draft-ietf-nfsv4-umask-03

Abstract

   In some many important environments, inheritable NFSv4 ACLs can be
   rendered ineffective by the application of the per-process umask.
   This is
   easily worked around can be addressed by transmitting the umask and create mode
   separately, to allow servers as
   separate pieces of data, allowing the server to make more intelligent
   decisions about the permissions to set on new mode of files.  This document
   proposes a file. protocol extension which accomplishes that.

Status of This Memo

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Protocol Extension Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  mode_umask Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . .   4 . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5   6

1.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Problem Statement

   On Unix-like systems, each process is associated with a file mode
   creation mask (umask).  In the absence of inheritable permissions,
   the umask (umask), which specifies which permissions must be
   turned off when creating new file system objects.  With "POSIX" Access Control Lists
   [POSIX-1003.1e], in the presence of inheritable permissions, the
   umask must be ignored.  Other Access Control List implementations on
   Unix-like systems may ignore the umask in a similar way.

   The NFSv4 protocol currently does not include the umask concept;
   applying the umask is left to clients.  Unfortunately, clients have
   no way of atomically checking for inheritable permissions and
   applying the umask only when necessary.  Instead, they err on the
   safe side and always apply the umask.  Thus the mode the server
   receives in an OPEN already has the umask applied.

   When applying the mode, section 6.4.1.1 of [RFC7530] recommends that
   servers SHOULD restrict permissions granted to any user or group
   named in the ACL to be no more than the permissions granted by the
   MODE4_RGRP, MODE4_WGRP, and MODE4_XGRP bits.  Servers aiming to
   provide clients with Unix-like chmod behavior may also be motivated
   by the same requirements in [SUSv4].  (See the discussion of
   additional and alternate access control mechanisms in section "4.4
   File Permissions".) Permissions" of that document.)

   On many existing installations, all ordinary users by default use the
   same effective group ID.  To prevent granting all users full access
   to each other's files, such installations usually default to a umask
   with very restrictive permissions.  Thus  As a result, inherited ACEs
   describing the permissions to be granted to named users and groups
   in an inherited ACL end up being mostly
   are often ignored.  This leads to file permissions which are more restrictive than they
   should be makes inheritable ACLs useless in some
   common cases; permission inheritance over NFSv4 is
   broken.

   To address cases.

   Linux solves this problem, a new attribute is proposed which allows the
   server to apply problem on local filesystems by ignoring the umask only when there are no inheritable
   permissions.
   in the case the parent of the newly-created file has inheritable
   ACEs; see [LinuxACL].

   The same solution should work for NFS.  However, the NFSv4 protocol
   does not currently give the client a way to transmit the umask of the
   process opening a file.  And clients have no way of atomically
   checking for inheritable permissions and applying the umask only when
   necessary.  As a result, the server receives an OPEN with a mode
   attribute that already has the umask applied.

   This document solves the problem by defining a new attribute which
   allows the client to transmit umask and the mode specified at file
   creation separately, allowing the client to ignore the umask in the
   presence of inheritable ACLs.  At least in the Linux case, this
   allows NFSv4 to provide the same semantics available using local
   access.

3.  Protocol Extension Considerations

   This document presents an extension to minor version 2 of the NFSv4
   protocol as described in [nfsv4-versioning].  It describes a new
   OPTIONAL feature.  NFSv4.2 servers and clients implemented without
   knowledge of this extension will continue to interoperate with
   clients and servers that are aware of the extension (whether they
   support it or not).

   Note that [RFC7862] does not define NFSv4.2 as non-extensible, so
   that it is considered by [nfsv4-versioning] to be an extensible minor
   version.  As a result, upon publication of this document as a
   Proposed Standard, the extension described herein will effectively be
   part of NFSv4.2, even though this document does not update [RFC7862]
   or [RFC7863].

4.  mode_umask Attribute

         struct mode_umask4 {
           mode4  mu_mode;
           mode4  mu_umask;
         };

           +------------+----+-------------+-----+------------+
           | Name       | Id | Data Type   | Acc | Defined in |
           +------------+----+-------------+-----+------------+
           | mode_umask | 81 | mode_umask4 | W   | Section 3 4  |
           +------------+----+-------------+-----+------------+

                                  Table 1

   The NFSv4.2 mode_umask attribute is based on the open mode and umask
   that and on the
   mode bits specified at open time, which together determine the mode
   of a newly created UNIX file.  Only the nine low-order mode4 bits of
   mu_umask are defined.  A server MUST return NFS4ERR_INVAL if bits
   other than those nine are set.

   The mode_umask attribute is only meaningful for operations that
   create objects (CREATE and OPEN); the server SHOULD reject it for in other operations that take
   fattr4 arguments. arguments, the server MUST reject it with NFS4ERR_INVAL.

   The server MUST ignore any mode attribute return NFS4ERR_INVAL if the client attempts to set
   both mode and mode_umask in the same operation
   as mode_umask. operation.

   When the server supports the mode_umask attribute, a client creating
   a file should use mode_umask in place of mode, with mu_mode set to
   the unmodified mode provided by the user, and mu_umask set to the
   umask of the requesting process.

   The server then uses mode_umask as follows:

   o  On a server that supports ACL attributes, if an object inherits
      any ACEs from its parent directory, mu_mode SHOULD be used, and
      mu_umask ignored.

   o  Otherwise, mu_umask MUST be used to limit the mode: all bits in
      the mode MUST be turned off which are set in the umask; the mode
      assigned to use for creating the new object becomes (mu_mode & ~mu_umask) instead.

4.

5.  Security Considerations

   The mode_umask attribute shifts to the server the decision about when
   to apply the umask.  Because the server MUST apply the umask if there
   are no inheritable permissions, the traditional semantics are
   preserved in the absence of a permission inheritance mechanism.  The
   only relaxation of permissions comes in the case servers follow the
   recommendation
   RECOMMENDATION that they SHOULD ignore the umask in the presence of
   inheritable permissions.

   The practice of ignoring the umask when there are inheritable
   permissions in the form of a "POSIX" default ACL is common practice;
   there are no known of long standing
   and has not given rise to security concerns. issues.  The "POSIX" default ACL
   mechanism and the mechanism of inheriting permissions for permission inheritance in NFSv4 is are
   equivalent for this purpose.

5. from a security perspective.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not require any actions by IANA.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [LEGAL]    IETF Trust, "Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents",
              November 2008, <http://trustee.ietf.org/docs/
              IETF-Trust-License-Policy.pdf>.

   [POSIX-1003.1e]
              Portable Applications Standards Committee of the IEEE
              Compute Society, "POSIX 1003.1e Withdrawn Draft 17",
              October 1997.

   [nfsv4-versioning]
              Noveck, D., "Rules for NFSv4 Extensions and Minor
              Versions", draft-ietf-nfsv4-versioning-08 (work in
              progress), December 2016.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", March 1997.

   [RFC4506]  Eisler, M., "XDR: External Data Representation Standard",
              STD 67, RFC 4506, May 2006.

   [RFC5661]  Shepler, S., Ed., Eisler, M., Ed., and D. Noveck, Ed.,
              "Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor Version 1
              Protocol", RFC 5661, January 2010.

   [RFC5662]  Shepler, S., Ed., Eisler, M., Ed., and D. Noveck, Ed.,
              "Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor Version 1
              External Data Representation Standard (XDR) Description",
              RFC 5662, January 2010.

   [RFC7530]  Haynes, T. and D. Noveck, "Network File System (NFS)
              version 4 Protocol", RFC 7530, March 2015.

   [RFC7862]  Haynes, T., "Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor
              Version 2 Protocol", RFC 7862, November 2016.

   [RFC7863]  Haynes, T., "Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor
              Version 2 External Data Representation Standard (XDR)
              Description", RFC 7863, November 2016.

   [SUSv4]    The Open Group, "Single UNIX Specification Version 4",
              2013.

7.2.  Informative References

   [LinuxACL]
              Gruenbacher, A., "ACL(5) - Access Control Lists", Linux
              man pages ACL(5), March 2002, <http://kernel.org/doc/man-
              pages/online/pages/man5/acl.5.html>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Dave Noveck and Trond Myklebust for review.

Authors' Addresses

   J. Bruce Fields
   Red Hat, Inc.

   Email: bfields@redhat.com

   Andreas Gruenbacher
   Red Hat, Inc.

   Email: agruenba@redhat.com