--- 1/draft-ietf-nfsv4-acl-mapping-01.txt 2006-02-05 00:48:10.000000000 +0100 +++ 2/draft-ietf-nfsv4-acl-mapping-02.txt 2006-02-05 00:48:10.000000000 +0100 @@ -1,18 +1,23 @@ Network Working Group Marius Aamodt Eriksen - -Document: draft-ietf-nfsv4-acl-mapping-01.txt +Internet Draft J. Bruce Fields +Document: draft-ietf-nfsv4-acl-mapping-02.txt October 2004 Mapping Between NFSv4 and Posix Draft ACLs -SSttaattuuss ooff tthhiiss MMeemmoo +Status of this Memo + + By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable + patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, + or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be dis- + closed, in accordance with RFC 3668. This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months @@ -22,302 +27,343 @@ The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. "Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002-2004). All Rights Reserved." -AAbbssttrraacctt +Abstract - The NFS (Network File System) version 4[rfc3010bis] (NFSv4) specifies - a flavor of Access Control Lists (ACLs) that resembles that of Win- - dows NT's. ACLs are used to specify fine grained control of access - to file system objects. An ACL consists of a number of Access Con- - trol Entries (ACEs), each specify some level of access for an entity; - an entity can be a a user, group or a special entity. The access - level is described using an access mask, which is a bitmask where - each bit describes a level of access, for example read, write and - execute permissions on the file system object. + NFS version 4 [rfc3530] (NFSv4) specifies a flavor of Access Control + Lists (ACLs) resembling Windows NT ACLs. A number of operating sys- + tems use a different flavor of ACL based on a withdrawn POSIX draft. + NFSv4 clients and servers on such operating systems may wish to map -Mapping NFSv4 ACLs February 2004 +Mapping NFSv4 ACLs October 2004 -TTaabbllee ooff CCoonntteennttss + between NFSv4 ACLs and their native ACLs. To this end, we describe a + mapping from POSIX draft ACLs to a subset of NFSv4 ACLs. - 11.. IInnttrroodduuccttiioonn . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 22.. NNFFSSvv44 AACCLLss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 33.. PPOOSSIIXX AACCLLss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 44.. MMaappppiinngg PPoossiixx AACCLLss - ttoo NNFFSSvv44 AACCLLss . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 55.. SSeeccuurriittyy - CCoonnssiiddeerraattiioonnss . . . . . . . 7 - 66.. BBiibblliiooggrraapphhyy . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 77.. AAcckknnoowwlleeddggmmeennttss . . . . . 9 - 88.. AAuutthhoorr''ss AAddddrreessss . . . . 10 - 99.. CCooppyyrriigghhtt . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 +Mapping NFSv4 ACLs October 2004 -Mapping NFSv4 ACLs February 2004 +Table of Contents -11.. IInnttrroodduuccttiioonn + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 2. NFSv4 ACLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3. POSIX ACLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 4. Mapping Posix ACLs to NFSv4 ACLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 5. Using the Mapping in NFSv4 Implementations . . . . . . . . . 8 + 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 7. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 8. Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 9. Copyright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - The NFS (Network File System) version 4 [rfc3010bis] (NFSv4) speci- - fies a flavor of Access Control Lists (ACLs) that resembles that of - Windows NT's. ACLs are used to specify fine grained control of - access to file system objects. An ACL consists of a number of Access +Mapping NFSv4 ACLs October 2004 + +1. Introduction + + Access Control Lists (ACLs) are used to specify fine-grained access + rights to file system objects. An ACL consists of a number of Access Control Entries (ACEs), each specifying some level of access for an - entity; an entity can be a a user, group or a special entity. The - access level is described using an access mask, which is a bitmask - where each bit describes a level of access, for example read, write - and execute permissions on the file system object. + entity. The entity may be a user, a group, or a special entity (such + as "everyone"). The level of access is described using an access + mask, which is a bitmask with each bit corresponding to a type of + access (such as "read" or "append"). -22.. NNFFSSvv44 AACCLLss + In the following sections we describe two ACL models: NFSv4 ACLs, and + ACLs based on a withdrawn POSIX draft, which we will refer to as + "POSIX ACLs". Since NFSv4 ACLs are much finer-grained than POSIX + ACLs, it is not possible in general to map an arbitrary NFSv4 ACL to + a POSIX ACL with the same semantics. It does, however, turn out to + be possible to map any POSIX ACL to a NFSv4 ACL that has nearly iden- + tical semantics. We will describe such a mapping, and discuss how it + might be used in NFSv4 client and server implementations. - NFSv4 ACLs are rich in nature and expand upon the traditional idea of - ACLs. An NFSv4 ACE can be of type ALLOW, DENY, LOG or ALARM; each - specifies a different action to take should the ACE match a current - request. NFSv4 ACLs also have a rich set of access types that com- - plements the traditional types. These include appending data to the - file object, deleting children of the file object, deleting the file - object, etc [rfc3010bis]. +2. NFSv4 ACLs - NFSv4 ACLs are interpreted in a straightforward manner. + An NFSv4 ACL is an ordered sequence of ACEs, each having an entity, a + type, and an access mask. The entity may be the name of a user or + group, or may also be one of a small set of special entities. Among + the special entities are "OWNER" (the current owner of the file), + "GROUP" (the group associated with the file), and "EVERYONE". - 1) Walk through the list of ACEs from the ACL in order + The access mask includes bits for access types that are more fine- + grained than the traditional "read", "write", and "execute" permis- + sions used in UNIX mode bits. - 2) If the "who" (entity) field in the ACE does not match that of the - requester, the particular ACE is not processed. + The type may be ALLOW or DENY. (AUDIT or ALARM are also allowed, but + they are not relevant to our discussion). - 3) Process all ACEs until all the bits in the requested access mask - have been ALLOWed; once a particular bit has been ALLOWed by an - ACE, it is no longer considered in further processing. + The NFSv4 ACL permission-checking algorithm is straightforward. + Given an ACL and a requestor asking for a set of permissions speci- + fied by an access mask: - 4) If a particular access is DENYed (while that bit is still under - consideration), the request is denied. + 1) Walk through the list of ACEs from the ACL in order. - 5) If all bits have been ALLOWed, the access is granted, or else - behavior is undefined. + 2) Ignore any ACE for with an entity not matching requestor. - NFSv4 ACLs also specify a number of special entities such as OWNER, - GROUP, and EVERYONE. These refer to the traditional UNIX mode bits. - Others include DIALUP, BATCH, and AUTHENTICATED, which have special- - ized uses. +Mapping NFSv4 ACLs October 2004 -Mapping NFSv4 ACLs February 2004 + 3) Process all ACEs until all the bits in the requested access mask + have been ALLOWed by an ALLOW ace with that bit set. Once a par- + ticular bit has been ALLOWed by an ACE, it is no longer considered + in further processing. - Additionally the NFSv4 ACLs specify a number of flags that can be - applied to an ACL. These include a specification on how an ACL on a - directory may be propagated to newly created files or directories - inside of said directory. + 4) If a bit in the requested access mask is DENYed (while that bit is + still under consideration), the request is denied. - It is clear that the granularity of access control that NFSv4 ACLs - specify is well beyond the standard UNIX capability of expressing - file system object permissions. + 5) If all bits have been ALLOWed, the access is granted. Otherwise + behavior is undefined. -33.. PPOOSSIIXX AACCLLss + There are also a number of flags that can be applied to an NFSv4 ACE. + Three flags that we will need to use in the following discussion + apply to ACEs in a directory ACL. They are: ACE4_DIREC- + TORY_INHERIT_ACE, which indicates that the ACE should be added to new + subdirectories of the directory; ACE4_FILE_INHERIT_ACE, which does + the same for new files; and ACE4_INHERIT_ONLY, which indicates that + the ACE should be ignored when determining access to the directory + itself. - POSIX ACLs refer to POSIX 1003.1e/1003.2c Draft Standard 17 [posix- - acl], which was meant to specify a POSIX standard for ACLs, but - unfortunately never materialized. However, many systems still use - it, both in the form of it's latest draft as well as earlier drafts. + We refer the reader to [rfc3530] for further details. - POSIX ACLs are simpler than their NFSv4 equivalents. Each ACE an has - an entity and the traditional UNIX mode bits that are assigned to the - particular entity. The entity may be an arbitrary UID or GID or one - of a few special entities, the most notable of which is the ACL_MASK - entity. POSIX ACLs are also interepreted differently than their - NFSv4 equivalents. +3. POSIX ACLs - POSIX ACLs are interpreted as follows: + A number of operating systems, including Linux and FreeBSD, implement + ACLs based on the withdrawn POSIX 1003.1e/1003.2c Draft Standard 17 + [posixacl]. We will refer to such ACLs as "POSIX ACLs". - 1) Process the ACL_USER_OBJ (equivalent to UNIX file owner) ACE - first; if the UID of the requester does not match that of the - ACL_USER_OBJ, then the ACE is ignored. Otherwise, if the - requester's access mask is allowed by the access mask of the ACE, - the request is granted, else the request is denied. + POSIX ACLs use access masks with only the traditional "read", + "write", and "execute" bits. Each ACE in a POSIX ACL is one of five + types: ACL_USER_OBJ, ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, ACL_GROUP, ACL_MASK, + and ACL_OTHER. Each ACL_USER ACE has a uid associated with it, and + each ACL_GROUP ACE has a gid associated with it. Every POSIX ACL + must have exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ, ACL_GROUP, and ACL_OTHER ACE, and + at most one ACL_MASK ace. The ACL_MASK ace is required if the ACL + has any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP aces. There may not be two ACL_USER + aces with the same uid, and there may not be two ACL_GROUP aces with + the same gid. - 2) Process all of the ACL_USER ACEs; the entity of these ACEs specify - a user on the system. If the UID of the requester does not match - that of the ACE, then the ACE is ignored. Otherwise, if the - requester's access mask is allowed by the access mask of the ACE, - the request is granted, else the request is denied. + Given a POSIX ACL and a requestor asking for access, permission is + determined as follows: - 3) Process the ACL_GROUP_OBJ ACE and all of the ACL_GROUP ACEs; the - entity of these ACEs specify a group on the system. If none of - the GIDs of the requester match the current ACE, the particular - ACE is ignored. For any matching ACE, if the the requester's - access mask is allowed by the ACEs access mask, then access is - permitted. If there are matching ACEs, but none allow access, - then access is denied. + 1) If the requestor is the file owner, then allow or deny access + depending on whether the ACL_USER_OBJ ACE allows or denies it. -Mapping NFSv4 ACLs February 2004 +Mapping NFSv4 ACLs October 2004 - 4) If the requester's access mask is allowed by the ACL_OTHER ACE, - then grant access. + Otherwise, - 5) Deny access. + 2) if the requestor's uid matches the uid of one of the ACL_USER + ACE's, then allow or deny access depending on whether the + ACL_USER_OBJ ACE allows or denies it. Otherwise, + + 3) Consider the set of all ACL_GROUP ACE's whose gid the requestor is + a member of. Add to that set the ACL_GROUP_OBJ ACE, if the + requestor is also a member of that group. Allow access if one of + the ACE's in the resulting set allows access. If the set of + matching ACEs is nonempty, and none allow access, then deny + access. Otherwise, if none of these ACEs match, + + 4) if the requester's access mask is allowed by the ACL_OTHER ACE, + then grant access. Otherwise, deny access. Steps (2) and (3) have an additional criteria; in addition to check- ing whether the requested access mask is allowed by the access mask in the ACE, the requested bits also have to be in the access mask of the special ACE with the ACL_MASK entity. This allows file owners to specify a maximum level of access allowed by any other user or group that has any access to the file system object. In addition to a regular POSIX ACL, a directory in the file system may also have associated with it a default ACL. This default ACL + does not affect permissions to the directory itself. Instead, it governs the ACL a file system object will be assigned initially when it is created as a child of the particular directory. -44.. MMaappppiinngg PPoossiixx AACCLLss ttoo NNFFSSvv44 AACCLLss +4. Mapping Posix ACLs to NFSv4 ACLs - Given the difference in both extensiveness and interpretation of - POSIX and NFSv4 ACLs, any conversion between the two is difficult. - However, POSIX ACLs are a subset of NFSv4 ACLs. Any POSIX ACL can be - emulated with an NFSv4 ACL using the following mapping. + Given the differences between POSIX and NFSv4 ACLs, any conversion + between the two is difficult. However, POSIX ACLs are a subset of + NFSv4 ACLs, and any POSIX ACL can be emulated with an NFSv4 ACL using + the following mapping. - The ACE entities are translated as follows. The non-special entities - in form of UIDs and GIDs is translated to equivalent strings (a sys- - tem dependent process, typically done by lookups to /etc/passwd in - UNIX). The POSIX ACL_USER_OBJ entity is translated to the "OWNER" - NFSv4 entity. Similary, the POSIX ACL_GROUP_OBJ is translated to the - "GROUP" NFSv4 entity. The ACL_OTHER entity is translated to the - "EVERYONE" NFSv4 entity. + First, the uid's and gid's on the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP ACEs must be + translated into NFSv4 names--a system-dependent process, which, on + UNIX for example, may be done by lookups to /etc/passwd. Also, the + special ACL_USER_OBJ, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_OTHER ACEs must be + translated to NFSv4 ACEs with the special entities "OWNER", "GROUP", + and "EVERYONE", respectively. The ACE access mask is translated as follows. The read bit of the POSIX access mask is translated to the logical OR of the + +Mapping NFSv4 ACLs October 2004 + ACE4_READ_DATA and ACE4_READ_NAMED_ATTRS NFSv4 access mask fields. The write bit of the POSIX access mask is translated to the logical - OR of the ACE4_WRITE_DATA, ACE4_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRIBUTES and + OR of the ACE4_WRITE_DATA, ACE4_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS and ACE4_APPEND_DATA NFSv4 access mask fields. The execute bit of the POSIX access mask is translated into the ACE4_EXECUTE and ACE4_READ_DATA NFSv4 acess mask fields. Note that NFSv4 defines ACE4_READ_DATA, ACE4_WRITE_DATA, and ACE4_APPEND_DATA to be equal to ACE4_LIST_DIRECTORY, ACE4_ADD_FILE, and ACE4_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY, respectively, so this translation makes sense for directories as well. However, on directories the ACE4_DELETE_CHILD field must be included in the translation of the POSIX write bit. -Mapping NFSv4 ACLs February 2004 - In addition to the above, the OWNER entity must always be given ACE4_WRITE_ACL and ACE4_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES, and all entities must be - given ACE4_READ_ACL and ACE4_READ_ATTRIBUTES. + given ACE4_READ_ACL, ACE4_READ_ATTRIBUTES, and ACE4_SYNCHRONIZE. The + ACE4_DELETE bit should be neither allowed nor denied by any ACE. The ACE flag field also has a simple translation. If the file system object is a directory, and the POSIX ACE belongs to a default ACL, - the "ACE4_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE" flag is set in the NFSv4 ACE. If the - entity in the POSIX ACE refers to a group, the "ACE4_IDENTI- - FIER_GROUP" flag is set in the NFSv4 ACE. + the ACE4_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE, ACE4_DIRECTORY_INHERIT, and + ACE4_FILE_INHERIT flags are set in the NFSv4 ACE. If the entity in + the POSIX ACE refers to a group, the "ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP" flag is + set in the NFSv4 ACE. The POSIX ACL_USER_OBJ ACE is also always given the permission bits "ACE4_READ_ACL" and "ACE4_WRITE_ACL." Completing the mapping reduces to being able to emulate an ACL_MASK - and compensate for the difference in interpretation between two ACL - implementations. + and compensate for some differences in the permission-checking algo- + rithms of the two ACL implementations. - The difference in interpretation of the two ACL types call for a - translation scheme. The scheme follows: + The difference in permission-checking algorithms is handled as fol- + lows: Every user ACE in the POSIX ACL maps into 2 NFSv4 ACEs; one ALLOW ACE which is translated as specified by the above scheme, then a comple- menting DENY ACE which is also translated as specified by the above scheme, with the exception that the access mask is inverted. Note that the ACL_USER_OBJ ACE is placed first in this list. Every group ACE in the POSIX ACL produces a similar pair, but instead of being in sequence, all of the ALLOW ACEs are all in sequence, fol- lowed by all the DENY ACEs. The ACL_GROUP_OBJ ACE is placed first in both lists. Lastly, the POSIX ACL_OTHER ACE is translated into a pair of ACEs as in the user ACE case. - This translation strategy allows us to emulate POSIX ACL interpreta- - tion in an NFSv4 ACL. +Mapping NFSv4 ACLs October 2004 + + With this done, the NFSv4 permission-checking algorithm applied to + the resulting NFSv4 ACL will produce the same result as the POSIX + permission-checking algorithm did on the original POSIX ACL. To handle the special POSIX entity ACL_MASK, we slightly modify the above translation: With the exception of the "OWNER" and "EVERYONE" ACEs, another ACE is prepended to the ACE. The prepended ACE is a DENY ACE with the same entity as the following ALLOW ACE, but with a permission mask set to the complement of the POSIX ACL_MASK. This method allows us to preserve the real permission bits of each ACE should the ACL_MASK be changed. -Mapping NFSv4 ACLs February 2004 +5. Using the Mapping in NFSv4 Implementations -55.. SSeeccuurriittyy CCoonnssiiddeerraattiioonnss + Note that the algorithm described in the previous section not only + provides a way to map any POSIX ACL to be mapped to an NFSv4 ACL with + similar semantics, but also provides the reverse mapping in the case + where the NFSv4 ACL is precisely in the format of an ACL produced by + the algorithm above. - Since this draft deals with the mapping of Access Control Lists, it - is deeply involved with security. The body of this document needs to - address the issue of mapping ACLs in a way as to not disobey the - intent of or mislead the user. + The algorithm can therefore be used to implement a subset of the + NFSv4 ACL model. This may be useful to NFSv4 clients and servers + with preexisting system interfaces that support POSIX ACLs and that + cannot be modified to support NFSv4 ACLs. -Mapping NFSv4 ACLs February 2004 + A server, for example, that wishes to export via NFSv4 a filesystem + that supports only POSIX ACLs, may use this mapping to answer client + requests for existing ACLs by translating POSIX ACLs on its filesys- + tem to NFSv4 ACLs to send to the client. However, when a client + attempts to set an ACL, the server faces a problem. If the given ACL + happens to be in precisely the format of an ACL produced by this map- + ping (as would happen if, for example, the client was performing the + same translation), then the server can map it to a POSIX ACL to store + on the filesystem. But for any other NFSv4 ACL, the server should + return an error to avoid any chance of inaccurately representing the + client's intention. -66.. BBiibblliiooggrraapphhyy + The language of [rfc3530] allows a server some flexibility in han- + dling ACLs that it cannot enforce completely accurately, as long as + it adheres to "the guiding principle... that the server must not + accept ACLs that appear to make [a file] more secure than it really + is." - [rfc3010bis] - Shepler, S. et. al., "NFS version 4 Protocol", draft-ietf- - nfsv4-rfc3010bis-05.txt, April 2003. +Mapping NFSv4 ACLs October 2004 - http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf- - nfsv4-rfc3010bis-05.txt + It may therefore be possible for a server to accept a wider range of + NFSv4 ACLs, as long as it can ensure that in every case the resulting + POSIX ACL denies at least all access that the original NFSv4 ACL + denied. The results of such a mapping may, however, be somewhat + unexpected, and it is preferable simply to refuse all NFSv4 ACLs that + do not map accurately, and provide clients with software to help gen- + erate POSIX-mappable NFSv4 ACLs if necessary. - [posixacl] - IEEE, "IEEE Draft P1003.1e", October 1997 (last draft). + Similarly, a client that uses NFSv4 ACLS to implement user interfaces + that only deal in POSIX ACLs may handle user requests to set ACLs + easily enough, but should return errors when the user requests ACLs + that, on consulting the server, turn out to not be mappable to POSIX + ACLs. - http://wt.xpilot.org/publications/posix.1e/download.html +Mapping NFSv4 ACLs October 2004 -Mapping NFSv4 ACLs February 2004 +6. Security Considerations -77.. AAcckknnoowwlleeddggmmeennttss + Any automatic mapping from one ACL model to another must provide + guarantees that the mapping preserves semantics, or risk misleading + users about the permissions set on filesystem objects. For this rea- + son, we recommend performing such mapping only when it can be done + accurately, and returning errors in all other cases. - The author would like to thank and acknowledge Bruce Fields for his - careful scrutiny and excellent comments and suggestions. +Mapping NFSv4 ACLs October 2004 -Mapping NFSv4 ACLs February 2004 +7. Bibliography -88.. AAuutthhoorr''ss AAddddrreessss + [rfc3530] + Shepler, S. et. al., "NFS version 4 Protocol", April 2003. + + http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3530.txt + + [posixacl] + IEEE, "IEEE Draft P1003.1e", October 1997 (last draft). + + http://wt.xpilot.org/publications/posix.1e/download.html + +Mapping NFSv4 ACLs October 2004 + +8. Author's Address Address comments related to this memorandum to: - marius@umich.edu + marius@umich.edu bfields@umich.edu Marius Aamodt Eriksen + J. Bruce Fields University of Michigan / CITI 535 West William Ann Arbor, Michigan E-mail: marius@umich.edu + E-mail: bfields@umich.edu -99.. CCooppyyrriigghhtt - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002-2004). All Rights Reserved. - - This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to - others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it - or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published and - distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, - provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are - included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this doc- - ument itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the - copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other - Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of develop- - ing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights - defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as - required to translate it into languages other than English. +9. Copyright - The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be - revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject + to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and + except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. - This document and the information contained herein is provided on an - "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING - TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING - BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION - HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MER- - CHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + This document and the information contained herein are provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS + OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET + ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, + INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFOR- + MATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES + OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.