draft-ietf-mboned-driad-amt-discovery-01.txt   draft-ietf-mboned-driad-amt-discovery-02.txt 
Mboned J. Holland Mboned J. Holland
Internet-Draft Akamai Technologies, Inc. Internet-Draft Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Updates: 7450 (if approved) February 14, 2019 Updates: 7450 (if approved) March 08, 2019
Intended status: Standards Track Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: August 18, 2019 Expires: September 9, 2019
DNS Reverse IP AMT Discovery DNS Reverse IP AMT Discovery
draft-ietf-mboned-driad-amt-discovery-01 draft-ietf-mboned-driad-amt-discovery-02
Abstract Abstract
This document updates RFC 7450 (Automatic Multicast Tunneling, or This document updates RFC 7450 (Automatic Multicast Tunneling, or
AMT) by extending the relay discovery process to use a new DNS AMT) by extending the relay discovery process to use a new DNS
resource record named AMTRELAY when discovering AMT relays for resource record named AMTRELAY when discovering AMT relays for
source-specific multicast channels. The reverse IP DNS zone for a source-specific multicast channels. The reverse IP DNS zone for a
multicast sender's IP address is configured to use AMTRELAY resource multicast sender's IP address is configured to use AMTRELAY resource
records to advertise a set of AMT relays that can receive and forward records to advertise a set of AMT relays that can receive and forward
multicast traffic from that sender over an AMT tunnel. multicast traffic from that sender over an AMT tunnel.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 18, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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4.2.1. RData Format - Precedence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.2.1. RData Format - Precedence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2.2. RData Format - Discovery Optional (D-bit) . . . . . . 24 4.2.2. RData Format - Discovery Optional (D-bit) . . . . . . 24
4.2.3. RData Format - Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.2.3. RData Format - Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2.4. RData Format - Relay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.2.4. RData Format - Relay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3. AMTRELAY Record Presentation Format . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.3. AMTRELAY Record Presentation Format . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3.1. Representation of AMTRELAY RRs . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.3.1. Representation of AMTRELAY RRs . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3.2. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.3.2. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.1. Record-spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.1. Use of AMT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.2. Local Override . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.2. Record-spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.3. Congestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.3. Congestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix A. Unknown RRType construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Appendix A. Unknown RRType construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines DNS Reverse IP AMT Discovery (DRIAD), a This document defines DNS Reverse IP AMT Discovery (DRIAD), a
mechanism for AMT gateways to discover AMT relays that are capable of mechanism for AMT gateways to discover AMT relays that are capable of
forwarding multicast traffic from a known source IP address. forwarding multicast traffic from a known source IP address.
AMT (Automatic Multicast Tunneling) is defined in [RFC7450], and AMT (Automatic Multicast Tunneling) is defined in [RFC7450], and
provides a method to transport multicast traffic over a unicast provides a method to transport multicast traffic over a unicast
tunnel, in order to traverse non-multicast-capable network segments. tunnel, in order to traverse non-multicast-capable network segments.
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| 3 | A wire-encoded domain name is present | | 3 | A wire-encoded domain name is present |
| 4-255 | Unassigned | | 4-255 | Unassigned |
+-------+---------------------------------------+ +-------+---------------------------------------+
Values 0, 1, 2, and 3 are further explained in Section 4.2.3 and Values 0, 1, 2, and 3 are further explained in Section 4.2.3 and
Section 4.2.4. Relay type numbers 4 through 255 can be assigned with Section 4.2.4. Relay type numbers 4 through 255 can be assigned with
a policy of Specification Required (as described in [RFC8126]). a policy of Specification Required (as described in [RFC8126]).
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
[ TBD: these 3 are just the first few most obvious issues, with just 6.1. Use of AMT
sketches of the problem. Explain better, and look for trickier
issues. ]
6.1. Record-spoofing This document defines a mechanism that enables a more widespread and
automated use of AMT, even without access to a multicast backbone.
Operators of networks and applications that include a DRIAD-capable
AMT gateway are advised to carefully consider the security
considerations in Section 6 of [RFC7450].
If AMT is used to ingest multicast traffic, providing a false AMT gateway operators also are encouraged to implement the
AMTRELAY record to a gateway using it for discovery can result in opportunistic use of IPSec [RFC4301] when IPSECKEY records [RFC4025]
Denial of Service, or artificial multicast traffic from a source are available to secure traffic from AMT relays, or when a trust
under an attacker's control. relationship with the AMT relays can be otherwise secured.
Therefore, it is important to ensure that the AMTRELAY record is 6.2. Record-spoofing
authentic, with DNSSEC [RFC4033] or other operational safeguards that
can provide assurance of the authenticity of the record contents.
6.2. Local Override The AMTRELAY resource record contains information that SHOULD be
communicated to the DNS client without being modified. The method
used to ensure the result was unmodified is up to the client.
The local relays, while important for overall network performance, There must be a trust relationship between the end consumer of this
can't be secured by DNSSEC. resource record and the DNS server. This relationship may be end-to-
end DNSSEC validation, a TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG(0) [RFC2931] channel
to another secure source, a secure local channel on the host, DNS
over TLS [RFC7858] or HTTPS [RFC8484], or some other secure
mechanism.
If an AMT gateway accepts a maliciously crafted AMTRELAY record, the
result could be a Denial of Service, or receivers processing
multicast traffic from a source under the attacker's control.
6.3. Congestion 6.3. Congestion
Multicast traffic, particularly interdomain multicast traffic, Multicast traffic, particularly interdomain multicast traffic,
carries some congestion risks, as described in Section 4 of carries some congestion risks, as described in Section 4 of
[RFC8085]. Network operators are advised to take precautions [RFC8085].
including monitoring of application traffic behavior, traffic
authentication, and rate-limiting of multicast traffic, in order to Application implementors and network operators that use DRIAD-capable
ensure network health. AMT gateways are advised to take precautions including monitoring of
application traffic behavior, traffic authentication at ingest, rate-
limiting of multicast traffic, and the use of circuit-breaker
techniques such as those described in Section 3.1.10 of [RFC8085] and
similar protections at the network level, in order to ensure network
health in the event of misconfiguration, poorly written applications
that don't follow UDP congestion control principles, or deliberate
attack.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
This specification was inspired by the previous work of Doug Nortz, This specification was inspired by the previous work of Doug Nortz,
Robert Sayko, David Segelstein, and Percy Tarapore, presented in the Robert Sayko, David Segelstein, and Percy Tarapore, presented in the
MBONED working group at IETF 93. MBONED working group at IETF 93.
Thanks to Jeff Goldsmith, Toerless Eckert, Mikael Abrahamsson, Lenny Thanks to Jeff Goldsmith, Toerless Eckert, Mikael Abrahamsson, Lenny
Giuliano, and Mark Andrews for their very helpful comments. Giuliano, Mark Andrews, Sandy Zheng, Kyle Rose, and Ben Kaduk for
their very helpful comments.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987, STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
skipping to change at page 29, line 48 skipping to change at page 30, line 21
DOI 10.17487/RFC8305, December 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8305, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8305>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8305>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[RFC2317] Eidnes, H., de Groot, G., and P. Vixie, "Classless IN- [RFC2317] Eidnes, H., de Groot, G., and P. Vixie, "Classless IN-
ADDR.ARPA delegation", BCP 20, RFC 2317, ADDR.ARPA delegation", BCP 20, RFC 2317,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2317, March 1998, DOI 10.17487/RFC2317, March 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2317>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2317>.
[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B.
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
(TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>.
[RFC2931] Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures
( SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, DOI 10.17487/RFC2931, September
2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2931>.
[RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V. [RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550, Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550,
July 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3550>. July 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3550>.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4025] Richardson, M., "A Method for Storing IPsec Keying
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", Material in DNS", RFC 4025, DOI 10.17487/RFC4025, March
RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005, 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4025>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
[RFC5110] Savola, P., "Overview of the Internet Multicast Routing [RFC5110] Savola, P., "Overview of the Internet Multicast Routing
Architecture", RFC 5110, DOI 10.17487/RFC5110, January Architecture", RFC 5110, DOI 10.17487/RFC5110, January
2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5110>. 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5110>.
[RFC6726] Paila, T., Walsh, R., Luby, M., Roca, V., and R. Lehtonen, [RFC6726] Paila, T., Walsh, R., Luby, M., Roca, V., and R. Lehtonen,
"FLUTE - File Delivery over Unidirectional Transport", "FLUTE - File Delivery over Unidirectional Transport",
RFC 6726, DOI 10.17487/RFC6726, November 2012, RFC 6726, DOI 10.17487/RFC6726, November 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6726>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6726>.
skipping to change at page 30, line 30 skipping to change at page 31, line 16
Traffic Leakages in Dual-Stack Hosts/Networks", RFC 7359, Traffic Leakages in Dual-Stack Hosts/Networks", RFC 7359,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7359, August 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7359, August 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7359>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7359>.
[RFC7761] Fenner, B., Handley, M., Holbrook, H., Kouvelas, I., [RFC7761] Fenner, B., Handley, M., Holbrook, H., Kouvelas, I.,
Parekh, R., Zhang, Z., and L. Zheng, "Protocol Independent Parekh, R., Zhang, Z., and L. Zheng, "Protocol Independent
Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM): Protocol Specification Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM): Protocol Specification
(Revised)", STD 83, RFC 7761, DOI 10.17487/RFC7761, March (Revised)", STD 83, RFC 7761, DOI 10.17487/RFC7761, March
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7761>. 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7761>.
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8313] Tarapore, P., Ed., Sayko, R., Shepherd, G., Eckert, T., [RFC8313] Tarapore, P., Ed., Sayko, R., Shepherd, G., Eckert, T.,
Ed., and R. Krishnan, "Use of Multicast across Inter- Ed., and R. Krishnan, "Use of Multicast across Inter-
domain Peering Points", BCP 213, RFC 8313, domain Peering Points", BCP 213, RFC 8313,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8313, January 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8313, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8313>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8313>.
[RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
(DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.
[RFC8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS [RFC8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499, Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>. January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.
Appendix A. Unknown RRType construction Appendix A. Unknown RRType construction
In a DNS resolver that understands the AMTRELAY type, the zone file In a DNS resolver that understands the AMTRELAY type, the zone file
might contain this line: might contain this line:
IN AMTRELAY 128 0 3 amtrelays.example.com. IN AMTRELAY 128 0 3 amtrelays.example.com.
 End of changes. 18 change blocks. 
33 lines changed or deleted 72 lines changed or added

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