draft-ietf-mboned-anycast-rp-03.txt | draft-ietf-mboned-anycast-rp-04.txt | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
MBONED Working Group Dorian Kim | MBONED Working Group Dorian Kim | |||
Internet Draft Verio | Internet Draft Verio | |||
David Meyer | David Meyer | |||
Cisco Systems | Cisco Systems | |||
Henry Kilmer | Henry Kilmer | |||
Dino Farinacci | Dino Farinacci | |||
Procket Networks | Procket Networks | |||
Category Informational | Category Informational | |||
November, 1999 | December, 1999 | |||
Anycast RP mechanism using PIM and MSDP | Anycast RP mechanism using PIM and MSDP | |||
<draft-ietf-mboned-anycast-rp-03.txt> | <draft-ietf-mboned-anycast-rp-04.txt> | |||
1. Status of this Memo | 1. Status of this Memo | |||
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with | This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with | |||
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC Internet-Drafts. | all provisions of Section 10 of RFC Internet-Drafts. | |||
2026 are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force | 2026 are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force | |||
(IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups | (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups | |||
may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. | may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. | |||
skipping to change at page 5, line 11 | skipping to change at page 5, line 11 | |||
anycast RP address. If a dynamic mechanism such as auto-RP or the | anycast RP address. If a dynamic mechanism such as auto-RP or the | |||
PIMv2 bootstrap mechanism is being used to advertise group to RP | PIMv2 bootstrap mechanism is being used to advertise group to RP | |||
mappings, the anycast IP address should be used for the RP address. | mappings, the anycast IP address should be used for the RP address. | |||
6.1.3. Configure MSDP peerings between each of the anycast RPs in the | 6.1.3. Configure MSDP peerings between each of the anycast RPs in the | |||
set | set | |||
Unlike the group to RP mapping advertisements, MSDP peerings must use | Unlike the group to RP mapping advertisements, MSDP peerings must use | |||
an IP address that is unique to the endpoints. A general guideline is | an IP address that is unique to the endpoints. A general guideline is | |||
to follow the addressing of the BGP peerings, e.g., loopbacks for | to follow the addressing of the BGP peerings, e.g., loopbacks for | |||
iBGP peering, physical interface addresses for eBGP peering. | iBGP peering, physical interface addresses for eBGP peering. Note | |||
that the anycast address MUST NOT be used as the RP address in SA | ||||
messages (as this would case the peer-RPF check to fail). | ||||
6.1.4. Configure the non-RP's with the group-to-anycast-RP-address | 6.1.4. Configure the non-RP's with the group-to-anycast-RP-address | |||
mappings | mappings | |||
Finally, each non-RP router must learn the set of group to RP | Finally, each non-RP router must learn the set of group to RP | |||
mappings. This could be done via static configuration, auto-RP, or by | mappings. This could be done via static configuration, auto-RP, or by | |||
PIMv2 bootstrap mechanism. | PIMv2 bootstrap mechanism. | |||
6.1.5. Ensure that the anycast IP address is reachable by all routers in | 6.1.5. Ensure that the anycast IP address is reachable by all routers in | |||
the domain | the domain | |||
This is typically accomplished by injecting the /32 into the domain's | This is typically accomplished by causing each RP to inject the /32 | |||
IGP. | into the domain's IGP. | |||
6.2. Interaction with MSDP Peer-RPF check | 6.2. Interaction with MSDP Peer-RPF check | |||
Each MSDP peer receives and forwards the message away from the RP | Each MSDP peer receives and forwards the message away from the RP | |||
address in a "peer-RPF flooding" fashion. The notion of peer-RPF | address in a "peer-RPF flooding" fashion. The notion of peer-RPF | |||
flooding is with respect to forwarding SA messages [MSDP]. The BGP | flooding is with respect to forwarding SA messages [MSDP]. The BGP | |||
routing tables are examined to determine which peer is the next hop | routing tables are examined to determine which peer is the next hop | |||
towards the originating RP of the SA message. Such a peer is called | towards the originating RP of the SA message. Such a peer is called | |||
an "RPF peer". See [MSDP] for details of the Peer-RPF check. | an "RPF peer". See [MSDP] for details of the Peer-RPF check. Not | |||
finally that the anycast address MUST NOT be used as the RP address | ||||
in the RP's SA messages. | ||||
6.3. State Implications | 6.3. State Implications | |||
It should be noted that using MSDP in this way forces the creation of | It should be noted that using MSDP in this way forces the creation of | |||
(S,G) state along the path from the receiver to the source. This | (S,G) state along the path from the receiver to the source. This | |||
state may not be present if a single RP was used and receivers were | state may not be present if a single RP was used and receivers were | |||
forced to stay on the shared tree. | forced to stay on the shared tree. | |||
6.4. Further Applications of Anycast RP mechanism | ||||
The solution described above can also be applied to external MSDP | ||||
peers that are used to join two PIM-SM domains together. This can | ||||
provide redundancy to the MSDP peering session, ease operational | ||||
complexity as well as simplify configuration management. A side | ||||
effect to be aware of with this design is that which of the | ||||
configured MSDP sessions comes up will be determined via the unicast | ||||
topology between two providers, and can be somewhat unpredictable. If | ||||
any of the backup peering sessions resets, the active session will | ||||
also reset. | ||||
7. Security considerations | 7. Security considerations | |||
Since the solution described here makes heavy use of anycast | Since the solution described here makes heavy use of anycast | |||
addressing, care must be taken to avoid spoofing. In particular | addressing, care must be taken to avoid spoofing. In particular | |||
unicast routing and PIM RPs must be protected. | unicast routing and PIM RPs must be protected. | |||
7.1. Unicast Routing | 7.1. Unicast Routing | |||
Both internal and external unicast routing can be weakly protected | Both internal and external unicast routing can be weakly protected | |||
End of changes. | ||||
This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.23, available from http://www.levkowetz.com/ietf/tools/rfcdiff/ |