draft-ietf-manet-rfc6622-bis-01.txt   draft-ietf-manet-rfc6622-bis-02.txt 
Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg
Internet-Draft Fujitsu Laboratories of America Internet-Draft Fujitsu Laboratories of America
Obsoletes: 6622 (if approved) T. Clausen Obsoletes: 6622 (if approved) T. Clausen
Intended status: Standards Track LIX, Ecole Polytechnique Intended status: Standards Track LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
Expires: September 24, 2013 C. Dearlove Expires: October 17, 2013 C. Dearlove
BAE Systems ATC BAE Systems ATC
March 23, 2013 April 15, 2013
Integrity Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions Integrity Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions
for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)
draft-ietf-manet-rfc6622-bis-01 draft-ietf-manet-rfc6622-bis-02
Abstract Abstract
This document extends and replaces RFC 6622. It describes general This document revises, extends and replaces RFC 6622. It describes
and flexible TLVs for representing cryptographic Integrity Check general and flexible TLVs for representing cryptographic Integrity
Values (ICVs) (i.e., digital signatures or Message Authentication Check Values (ICVs) and timestamps, using the generalized Mobile Ad
Codes (MACs)) as well as timestamps, using the generalized Mobile Ad
Hoc Network (MANET) packet/message format defined in RFC 5444. It Hoc Network (MANET) packet/message format defined in RFC 5444. It
defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs, and two Address Block TLVs defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs, and two Address Block TLVs
for affixing ICVs and timestamps to a packet, a message, and an for affixing ICVs and timestamps to a packet, a message, and one or
address, respectively. more addresses, respectively.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 24, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 17, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Differences from RFC6622 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Differences from RFC6622 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. General ICV TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. General ICV TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1. Packet ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.1. ICV Packet TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8.2. TIMESTAMP Packet TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Message ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.1. ICV Message TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9.2. TIMESTAMP Message TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.1. Address Block ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.1. ICV Address Block TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.2. TIMESTAMP Address Block TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. ICV: Basic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11. ICV: Basic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12. ICV: Hash Function and Cryptographic Function . . . . . . . . 10 12. ICV: Hash Function and Cryptographic Function . . . . . . . . 11
12.1. General ICV TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12.1. General ICV TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.1.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.1.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV . . . . . . . . . . 13
12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12.2.2. Message ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.2.2. Message ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.3. Example of a Message Including an ICV . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.3. Example of a Message Including an ICV . . . . . . . . . . 14
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 14 13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 16 13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 19
13.5. Hash Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 13.5. Hash Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
13.6. Cryptographic Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 13.6. Cryptographic Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document, which extends and replaces [RFC6622], specifies: This document specifies a syntactical representation of security-
related information for use with [RFC5444] addresses, messages, and
packets, and also reports and updates IANA registrations (from
[RFC6622]) of TLV types and type extension registries for these TLV
types. This specification does not represent a stand-alone protocol,
but is intended for use by MANET routing protocols, or security
extensions thereof.
o Two TLVs for carrying Integrity Check Values (ICVs) and timestamps Specifically, this document, which revises, extends and replaces
in packets, messages, and address blocks as defined by [RFC5444]. [RFC6622], specifies:
o A generic framework for ICVs, accounting (for Message TLVs) for o Two kinds of TLV: one for carrying Integrity Check Values (ICVs)
mutable message header fields (<msg-hop-limit> and and one for timestamps in packets, messages, and address blocks as
<msg-hop-count>), where these fields are present in messages. defined by [RFC5444].
o A generic framework for use of these TLVs, accounting for specific
features of Packet, Message and Address Block TLVs.
This document retains the IANA registries, defined in [RFC6622], for This document retains the IANA registries, defined in [RFC6622], for
recording code points for hash-functions, cryptographic functions, recording code points for ICV calculations, and requests an
and ICV calculations. This document requests additional allocations additional allocation from each these registries. This document
from these registries. retains the IANA registries, defined in [RFC6622], for recording code
points for timestamps, hash-functions, and cryptographic functions,
but does not request any additional allocations from these
registries.
Moreover, in Section 12, this document defines the following: Moreover, in Section 12, this document defines the following:
o A method for generating ICVs using a combination of a o A method for generating ICVs using a combination of a
cryptographic function and a hash function. cryptographic function and a hash function, and for including such
ICVs in the value field of a TLV.
1.1. Differences from RFC6622 1.1. Differences from RFC6622
This document obsoletes [RFC6622]. The changes introduced by this This document obsoletes [RFC6622]. In addition to editorial updates,
document are, however, small. In addition to editorial updates, this this document adds a new type extension 2 for the ICV TLV that is
document adds a new type extension for the ICV TLV that is specified specified in Section 12 of this document. It also makes it clear
in Section 12 of this document. The TLV value of a TLV with this that an ICV TLV may be used to carry a truncated ICV, and that a
type extension has the same internal structure as a TLV with type single- or multi- value ICV or TIMESTAMP Address Block TLV may cover
extension 1, but is calculated also over the source address of the IP more than one address.
datagram carrying the packet, message, or address block.
The rationale for adding this type extension is that some MANET The TLV value of an ICV TLV with type extension 2 has the same
protocols, such as [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2], use the IP source address internal structure as an ICV TLV with type extension 1, but is
of the IP datagram carrying the packet, message or address block, calculated also over the source address of the IP datagram carrying
e.g., to identify links with neighbor routers. If this address is the packet, message, or Address Block. The rationale for adding this
not otherwise contained in the packet, message, or address block type extension is that some MANET protocols, such as [RFC6130], use
payload (which is permitted, e.g., in [RFC6130]), the address is not the IP source address of the IP datagram carrying the packet, message
protected against tampering. or Address Block, e.g., to identify links with neighbor routers. If
this address is not otherwise contained in the packet, message, or
Address Block payload (which is permitted, e.g., in [RFC6130]), then
the address is not protected against tampering.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444]. This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444].
In particular, the following TLV fields and notation from [RFC5444] In particular, the following TLV fields and notation from [RFC5444]
skipping to change at page 4, line 28 skipping to change at page 4, line 43
3. Applicability Statement 3. Applicability Statement
MANET routing protocols using the format defined in [RFC5444] are MANET routing protocols using the format defined in [RFC5444] are
accorded the ability to carry additional information in control accorded the ability to carry additional information in control
messages and packets, through the inclusion of TLVs. Information so messages and packets, through the inclusion of TLVs. Information so
included MAY be used by a MANET routing protocol, or by an extension included MAY be used by a MANET routing protocol, or by an extension
of a MANET routing protocol, according to its specification. of a MANET routing protocol, according to its specification.
This document specifies how to include an ICV for a packet, a This document specifies how to include an ICV for a packet, a
message, and addresses in address blocks within a message, using such message, and addresses in Address Blocks within a message, using such
TLVs. This document also specifies how to treat "mutable" fields, TLVs. This document also specifies how to treat an empty Packet TLV
specifically the <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit> fields, if Block, and "mutable" fields, specifically the <msg-hop-count> and
present in the message header when calculating ICVs, such that the <msg-hop-limit> fields, if present in the Message Header when
resulting ICV can be correctly verified by any recipient. calculating ICVs, such that the resulting ICV can be correctly
verified by any recipient.
This document describes a generic framework for creating ICVs, and This document describes a generic framework for creating ICVs, and
how to include these ICVs in TLVs. In Section 12, an example method how to include these ICVs in TLVs. In Section 12, an example method
for calculating such ICVs is given, using a cryptographic function for calculating such ICVs is given, using a cryptographic function
and a hash function. and a hash function, for which two TLV type extensions are allocated.
4. Security Architecture 4. Security Architecture
Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to MANET routing protocol specifications may have a clause allowing a
security"; however, they may have a clause allowing a control message control message to be rejected as "badly formed" or "insecure" prior
to be rejected as "badly formed" or "insecure" prior to the message to the message being processed or forwarded. In particular, MANET
being processed or forwarded. In particular, MANET routing protocols routing protocols such as the Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)
such as the Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP) [RFC6130] and the [RFC6130] and the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2
Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 [OLSRv2] recognize [OLSRv2] recognize external reasons (such as failure to verify an
external reasons (such as failure to verify an ICV) for rejecting a ICV) for rejecting a message that would be considered "invalid for
message that would be considered "invalid for processing". processing".
This architecture is a result of the observation that with respect to This architecture is a result of the observation that with respect to
security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and that MANET routing security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and that MANET routing
protocol deployment domains have varying security requirements protocol deployment domains have varying security requirements
ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The virtue of this ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The virtue of this
approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications (and approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications (and
implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing
proper security mechanisms specific to a deployment domain. proper security mechanisms specific to a deployment domain.
The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this
specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as
follows: follows:
o MANET routing protocol specifications, with a clause allowing an o MANET routing protocol specifications, each with a clause allowing
extension to reject a message (prior to processing/forwarding) as an extension to reject a message (prior to processing/forwarding)
"badly formed" or "insecure". as "badly formed" or "insecure".
o MANET routing protocol security extensions, rejecting messages as o MANET routing protocol security extensions, each rejecting
"badly formed" or "insecure", as appropriate for a given security messages as "badly formed" or "insecure", as appropriate for a
requirement specific to a deployment domain. given security requirement specific to a deployment domain.
o Code points and an exchange format for information, necessary for o Code points and an exchange format for information, necessary for
specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions. specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions.
This document addresses the last of the issues listed above by This document addresses the last of the points above, by specifying a
specifying a common exchange format for cryptographic ICVs, making common exchange format for cryptographic ICVs and timestamps, making
reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV, and Address reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV, and Address
Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared) among Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used by (and shared among)
MANET routing protocol security extensions. MANET routing protocol security extensions.
For the specific decomposition of an ICV using a cryptographic For the specific decomposition of an ICV using a cryptographic
function and a hash function (specified in Section 12), this document function and a hash function (specified in Section 12), this document
reports the two IANA registries from [RFC6622] for code points for reports the two IANA registries from [RFC6622] for code points for
hash functions and cryptographic functions adhering to [RFC5444]. hash functions and cryptographic functions.
With respect to [RFC5444], this document is: With respect to [RFC5444], this document is:
o Intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of o Intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of
use described in Appendix B of [RFC5444]. use described in Appendix B of [RFC5444].
o A specific example of the Security Considerations section of o A specific example of the Security Considerations section of
[RFC5444] (the authentication part). [RFC5444] (the authentication part).
5. Overview and Functioning 5. Overview and Functioning
skipping to change at page 6, line 9 skipping to change at page 6, line 25
This document specifies a syntactical representation of security- This document specifies a syntactical representation of security-
related information for use with [RFC5444] addresses, messages, and related information for use with [RFC5444] addresses, messages, and
packets, and also reports and updates IANA registrations (from packets, and also reports and updates IANA registrations (from
[RFC6622]) of TLV types and type extension registries for these TLV [RFC6622]) of TLV types and type extension registries for these TLV
types. types.
Moreover, this document provides guidelines for how MANET routing Moreover, this document provides guidelines for how MANET routing
protocols, and MANET routing protocol extensions using this protocols, and MANET routing protocol extensions using this
specification, should treat ICV and Timestamp TLVs, and mutable specification, should treat ICV and Timestamp TLVs, and mutable
fields in messages. This specification does not represent a stand- fields in messages. This specification does not represent a stand-
alone protocol; MANET routing protocols, and MANET routing protocol alone protocol. MANET routing protocols, and MANET routing protocol
extensions using this specification, MUST provide instructions as to extensions using this specification, MUST provide instructions as to
how to handle packets, messages, and addresses with security how to handle packets, messages, and addresses with security
information, associated as specified in this document. information, associated as specified in this document.
This document reports previously assigned TLV types (from [RFC6622]) This document reports previously assigned TLV types (from [RFC6622])
from the registries defined for Packet, Message, and Address Block from the registries defined for Packet, Message, and Address Block
TLVs in [RFC5444]. When a TLV type is assigned from one of these TLVs in [RFC5444]. When a TLV type is assigned from one of these
registries, a registry for type extensions for that TLV type is registries, a registry for type extensions for that TLV type is
created by IANA. This document reports and updates these type created by IANA. This document reports and updates these type
extension registries, in order to specify internal structure (and extension registries, in order to specify internal structure (and
accompanying processing) of the <value> field of a TLV. accompanying processing) of the <value> field of a TLV.
For example, and as defined in this document, an ICV TLV with type For example, and as reported in this document, an ICV TLV with type
extension = 0 specifies that the <value> field has no pre-defined extension = 0 specifies that the <value> field has no pre-defined
internal structure but is simply a sequence of octets. An ICV TLV internal structure but is simply a sequence of octets. An ICV TLV
with type extension = 1 specifies that the <value> field has a pre- with type extension = 1 specifies that the <value> field has a pre-
defined internal structure and defines its interpretation. An ICV defined internal structure and defines its interpretation. An ICV
TLV with type extension = 2 specifies a modified version of this TLV with type extension = 2 specifies a modified version of this
definition. (Specifically, with type extension = 1 or type extension definition.
= 2, the <value> field contains the result of combining a
Specifically, with type extension = 1 or type extension = 2 (added in
this document), the <value> field contains the result of combining a
cryptographic function and a hash function, calculated over the cryptographic function and a hash function, calculated over the
contents of the packet, message or address block, with sub-fields contents of the packet, message or Address Block. The <value> field
indicating which hash function and cryptographic function have been contains multiple sub-fields indicating which hash function and
used; this is specified in Section 12. The difference between the cryptographic function have been used as specified in Section 12.
two type extensions is that the ICV TLV with type extension = 2 is The difference between the two type extensions is that the ICV TLV
calculated also over the source address of the IP datagram carrying with type extension = 2 is calculated also over the source address of
the packet, message, or address block.) the IP datagram carrying the packet, message, or address block.
Other documents can request assignments for other type extensions; if Other documents can request assignments for other type extensions; if
they do so, they MUST specify their internal structure (if any) and they do so, they MUST specify their internal structure (if any) and
interpretation. interpretation.
6. General ICV TLV Structure 6. General ICV TLV Structure
The value of the ICV TLV is: The value of the ICV TLV is:
<value> := <ICV-value> <value> := <ICV-value>+
where where:
<ICV-value> is a field, of <length> octets, which contains the
information to be interpreted by the ICV verification process, as
specified by the type extension.
Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the <ICV-value> <ICV-value> is a field, of length <length> octets (except in a
nor the internal structure thereof, if any; such information MUST be multivalue Address Block TLV, where each <ICV-value> is of length
single-length octets) that contains the information to be
interpreted by the ICV verification process, as specified by the
type extension.
Note that this does not specify how to calculate the <ICV-value> nor
the internal structure thereof, if any; such information MUST be
specified by the type extension for the ICV TLV type; see Section 13. specified by the type extension for the ICV TLV type; see Section 13.
This document specifies three such type extensions -- one for ICVs This document specifies three such type extensions -- one for ICVs
without pre-defined structures, and two for ICVs constructed without pre-defined structures, and two for ICVs constructed
combining a cryptographic function and a hash function. combining a cryptographic function and a hash function.
7. General Timestamp TLV Structure 7. General Timestamp TLV Structure
The value of the Timestamp TLV is: The value of the Timestamp TLV is:
<value> := <time-value> <value> := <time-value>+
where: where:
<time-value> is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, which <time-value> is a field, of length <length> octets (except in a
contains the timestamp. multivalue Address Block TLV, where each <time-value> is of length
single-length octets) that contains the timestamp.
Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the Note that this does not specify how to calculate the <time-value> nor
<time-value> nor the internal structure thereof, if any; such the internal structure thereof, if any; such information MUST be
information MUST be specified by the type extension for the specified by the type extension for the TIMESTAMP TLV type; see
TIMESTAMP TLV type; see Section 13. Section 13.
A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its
setting and interpretation are to be determined by the MANET routing setting and interpretation are to be determined by the MANET routing
protocol, or MANET routing protocol extension, that uses the protocol, or MANET routing protocol extension, that uses the
timestamp and can, for example, correspond to a POSIX timestamp, GPS timestamp and can, for example, correspond to a POSIX timestamp, GPS
timestamp, or a simple sequence number. timestamp, or a simple sequence number. Note that insuring time
synchronization in a MANET may be difficult because of the
decentralized architecture as well as highly dynamic topology due to
mobility or other factors. It is out of scope for this document to
specify a time synchronization mechanism.
8. Packet TLVs 8. Packet TLVs
Two Packet TLVs are defined: one for including the cryptographic ICV Two Packet TLVs are defined: one for including the cryptographic ICV
of a packet and one for including the timestamp indicating the time of a packet and one for including the timestamp indicating the time
at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated. at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.
8.1. Packet ICV TLV 8.1. ICV Packet TLV
A Packet ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in
Section 6.
The following considerations apply: An ICV Packet TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in
Section 6. When determining the <ICV-value> for a packet, and adding
an ICV Packet TLV to a packet, the following considerations MUST be
applied:
o Because packets as defined in [RFC5444] are never forwarded by o Because packets as defined in [RFC5444] are never forwarded by
routers, no special considerations are required regarding mutable routers, no special considerations are required regarding mutable
fields (e.g., <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit>), if present fields (i.e., <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit>), if present
within any messages in the packet, when calculating the ICV. within any messages in the packet, when calculating the ICV.
o Any Packet ICV TLVs already present in the Packet TLV block MUST o Any Packet ICV TLVs already present in the Packet TLV Block MUST
be removed before calculating the ICV, and the Packet TLV block be removed before calculating the ICV, and the Packet TLV Block
size MUST be recalculated accordingly. Removed ICV TLVs MUST be size MUST be recalculated accordingly.
restored after having calculated the ICV value.
The rationale for removing any Packet ICV TLV already present prior o If the Packet TLV Block now contains no Packet TLVs, the Packet
to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same TLV Block MUST be removed, and the phastlv bit in the <pkt-flags>
packet, e.g., using different ICV functions. field in the Packet Header MUST be cleared ('0').
8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV o Any removed ICV Packet TLVs MUST be restored after having
calculated the ICV, and the Packet TLV Block size MUST be
recalculated accordingly.
A Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described o When any removed ICV Packet TLVs, and the newly calculated ICV
in Section 7. If a packet contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV, Packet TLV, are added to the packet, if there is no Packet TLV
the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before any ICV TLV, Block then one MUST be added, including setting ('1') the phastlv
in order to include it in the calculation of the ICV. bit in the <pkt-flags> field in the Packet Header.
The rationale for removing any Packet ICV TLVs already present prior
to calculating the ICV is that several ICV TLVs may be added to the
same packet, e.g., using different ICV cryptographic and/or hash
functions. The rationale for removing an empty Packet TLV Block is
because the receiver of the packet cannot tell the difference between
what was an absent Packet TLV Block, and what was an empty Packet TLV
Block when removing and verifying the ICV Packet TLV if no other
Packet TLVs are present.
8.2. TIMESTAMP Packet TLV
A TIMESTAMP Packet TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described
in Section 7. If a packet contains one or more TIMESTAMP TLVs and
one or more ICV TLVs, then the TIMESTAMP TLVs (as well as any other
Packet TLVs) MUST be added to the packet before the ICV TLVs, in
order to include the timestamps and other TLVs in the calculation of
the ICVs.
9. Message TLVs 9. Message TLVs
Two Message TLVs are defined: one for including the cryptographic ICV Two Message TLVs are defined: one for including the cryptographic ICV
of a message and one for including the timestamp indicating the time of a message and one for including the timestamp indicating the time
at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated. at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.
9.1. Message ICV TLV 9.1. ICV Message TLV
A Message ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in An ICV Message TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in
Section 6. When determining the <ICV-value> for a message, the Section 6. When determining the <ICV-value> for a message, the
following considerations MUST be applied: following considerations MUST be applied:
o The fields <msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>, if present, MUST o The fields <msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>, if present in the
both be assumed to have the value 0 (zero) when calculating the Message Header, MUST both be assumed to have the value 0 (zero)
ICV. when calculating the ICV.
o Any Message ICV TLVs already present in the Message TLV block MUST o Any Message ICV TLVs already present in the Message TLV Block MUST
be removed before calculating the ICV, and the message size as be removed before calculating the ICV, and the message size as
well as the Message TLV block size MUST be recalculated well as the Message TLV Block size MUST be recalculated
accordingly. Removed ICV TLVs MUST be restored after having accordingly. Also, all relevant TLVs other than ICV TLVs MUST be
calculated the ICV value. added prior to TCV value calculation.
The rationale for removing any Message ICV TLV already present prior o Any removed ICV Message TLVs MUST be restored after having
to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same calculated the ICV, and the message size as well as the Message
message, e.g., using different ICV functions. TLV Block size MUST be recalculated accordingly.
9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV The rationale for removing any ICV Message TLVs already present prior
to calculating the ICV is that several ICV TLVs may be added to the
same message, e.g., using different ICV cryptographic and/or hash
functions.
A Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described 9.2. TIMESTAMP Message TLV
in Section 7. If a message contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV,
the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the ICV TLV, A TIMESTAMP Message TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described
in order to include it in the calculation of the ICV. in Section 7. If a message contains one or more TIMESTAMP TLVs and
one or more ICV TLVs, then the TIMESTAMP TLVs (as well as any other
Message TLVs) MUST be added to the message before the ICV TLVs, in
order to include the timestamps and other Message TLVs in the
calculation of the ICV.
10. Address Block TLVs 10. Address Block TLVs
Two Address Block TLVs are defined: one for associating a Two Address Block TLVs are defined: one for associating a
cryptographic ICV to an address and one for including the timestamp cryptographic ICV to one or more addresses and their associated
indicating the time at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated. information, and one for including the timestamp indicating the time
at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.
10.1. Address Block ICV TLV 10.1. ICV Address Block TLV
An Address Block ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in An ICV Address Block TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in
Section 6. The ICV is calculated over the address, concatenated with Section 6. The ICV is calculated over one or more addresses,
any other values -- for example, any other Address Block TLV <value> concatenated with any other values -- for example, other Address
fields -- associated with that address. A MANET routing protocol or Block TLV <value> fields -- associated with those addresses. A MANET
MANET routing protocol extension using Address Block ICV TLVs MUST routing protocol, or MANET routing protocol extension, using Address
specify how to include any such concatenated attribute of the address Block ICV TLVs MUST specify how to include any such concatenated
in the calculation and verification processes for the ICV. When attributes of the addresses in the calculation and verification
determining the <ICV-value> for an address, the following processes for the ICV. When determining an <ICV-value> for one or
consideration MUST be applied: more addresses, the following consideration MUST be applied:
o If other TLV values are concatenated with the address for o If other TLV values are concatenated with the addresses for
calculating the ICV, these TLVs MUST NOT be Address Block ICV TLVs calculating the ICV, the corresponding TLVs MUST NOT be ICV
already associated with the address. Address Block TLVs already associated with any of the addresses.
The rationale for not concatenating the address with any ICV TLV The rationale for not concatenating the addresses with any ICV TLV
values already associated with the address when calculating the ICV values already associated with the addresses when calculating the ICV
is that several ICVs may be added to the same address, e.g., using is that several ICVs may be added to the same address or addresses,
different ICV functions. e.g., using different ICV cryptographic and/or hash functions, and
the order of addition is not known to the recipient.
10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV 10.2. TIMESTAMP Address Block TLV
An Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as A TIMESTAMP Address Block TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as
described in Section 7. If both a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV are described in Section 7. If one or more TIMESTAMP TLVs and one or
associated with an address, the TIMESTAMP TLV <value> MUST be covered more ICV TLVs are associated with an address, the relevant TIMESTAMP
when calculating the value of the ICV to be contained in the ICV TLV TLV <time-value>(s) MUST be included before calculating the value of
value (i.e., concatenated with the associated address and any other the ICV to be contained in the ICV TLV value (i.e., concatenated with
values as described in Section 10.1). the associated addresses and any other values as described in
Section 10.1).
11. ICV: Basic 11. ICV: Basic
The basic ICV, represented by way of an ICV TLV with type extension = The basic ICV, represented by way of an ICV TLV with type extension =
0, is a simple bit-field containing the cryptographic ICV. This 0, is a simple bit-field containing the cryptographic ICV. This
assumes that the mechanism stipulating how ICVs are calculated and assumes that the mechanism stipulating how ICVs are calculated and
verified is established outside of this specification, e.g., by way verified is established outside of this specification, e.g., by
of administrative configuration or external out-of-band signaling. administrative configuration or external out-of-band signaling.
Thus, the <ICV-value>, when using type extension = 0, is Thus, the <ICV-value>, when using type extension = 0, is:
<ICV-value> := <ICV-data> <ICV-value> := <ICV-data>
where: where:
<ICV-data> is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, which <ICV-data> is a field, of length <length> octets (or single-length
contains the cryptographic ICV. octets in a multivalue Address Block TLV) that contains the
cryptographic ICV.
12. ICV: Hash Function and Cryptographic Function 12. ICV: Hash Function and Cryptographic Function
One common way of calculating an ICV is combining a cryptographic One common way of calculating an ICV is combining a cryptographic
function and a hash function applied to the content. This function and a hash function applied to the content. This
decomposition is specified in this section, using either type decomposition is specified in this section, using either type
extension = 1 or type extension = 2, in the ICV TLVs. extension = 1 or type extension = 2, in the ICV TLVs.
12.1. General ICV TLV Structure 12.1. General ICV TLV Structure
The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic
ICV, including specification of the appropriate hash function and ICV, including specification of the appropriate hash function and
cryptographic function used for calculating the ICV: cryptographic function used for calculating the ICV:
<ICV-value> := <hash-function> <ICV-value> := <hash-function>
<cryptographic-function> <cryptographic-function>
<key-id-length> <key-id-length>
<key-id> <key-id>?
<ICV-data> <ICV-data>
where: where:
<hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the <hash-function> is a one octet unsigned integer field specifying the
hash function. hash function.
<cryptographic-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field <cryptographic-function> is a one octet unsigned integer field
specifying the cryptographic function. specifying the cryptographic function.
<key-id-length> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the <key-id-length> is a one octet unsigned integer field specifying the
length of the <key-id> field in number of octets. The value 0x00 length of the <key-id> field as a number of octets. The value
is reserved for using a single pre-installed, shared key. zero (0x00) is reserved for using a single pre-installed, shared
key.
<key-id> is a field specifying the key identifier of the key that <key-id> is a field specifying the key identifier of the key that
was used to calculate the ICV of the message, which allows unique was used to calculate the ICV of the message, which allows unique
identification of different keys with the same originator. It is identification of different keys with the same originator. It is
the responsibility of each key originator to make sure that the responsibility of each key originator to make sure that
actively used keys that it issues have distinct key identifiers. actively used keys that it issues have distinct key identifiers.
If <key-id-length> equals 0x00, the <key-id> field is not If <key-id-length> equals zero (0x00), the <key-id> field is not
contained in the TLV, and a single pre-installed, shared key is contained in the TLV, and a single pre-installed, shared key is
used. used.
<ICV-data> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is <length> - <ICV-data> is a field with length <length> - 3 - <key-id-length>
3 - <key-id-length>, except in a multivslue Address Block TLV, in octets (except in a multivalue Address Block TLV, in which it is
which it is single-length - 3 - <key-id-length>, and which single-length - 3 - <key-id-length> octets) and which contains the
contains the cryptographic ICV. cryptographic ICV.
The version of this TLV, specified in this section, assumes that, The version of this TLV, specified in this section, assumes that,
unless otherwise specified, calculating the ICV can be decomposed unless otherwise specified, calculating the ICV can be decomposed
into: into:
ICV-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content)) ICV-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content))
In some cases a different combination of cryptographic function and In some cases a different combination of cryptographic function and
hash function may be specified. This is the case for the HMAC hash function may be specified. This is the case for the HMAC
function, which is specified as defined in Section 13.6, using the function, which is specified as defined in Section 13.6, using the
hash function twice. hash function twice.
The difference between the two type extensions is that in addition to
the information covered by the ICV using type extension 1 (which is
detailed in the following sections), the ICV using type extension 2
also MUST cover the source address of the IP datagram carrying the
corresponding packet, message, or Address Block.
The <ICV-data> field MAY be truncated after being calculated, this is
indicated by its length, calculated as described above. The
truncation SHOULD be as specified for the relevant cryptographic
function (and, if appropriate, hash function).
The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the
entries in two IANA registries, which are reported by this entries in two IANA registries, which are reported by this
specification and are described in Section 13. specification and are described in Section 13.
12.1.1. Rationale 12.1.1. Rationale
The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic
function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a
single octet -- possibly as a TLV type extension -- is that adding single octet -- possibly as a TLV type extension -- is that adding
further hash functions or cryptographic functions in the future may further hash functions or cryptographic functions in the future may
lead to a non-contiguous number space. lead to a non-contiguous number space, as well as providing a smaller
overall space.
The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the
cryptographic ICV in the TLV is that, before being able to validate a cryptographic ICV in the TLV is that, before being able to validate a
cryptographic ICV, routers have to exchange or acquire keys (e.g., cryptographic ICV, routers have to exchange or acquire keys. Any
public keys). Any additional parameters can be provided together additional parameters can be provided together with the keys in that
with the keys in that bootstrap process. It is therefore not bootstrap process. It is therefore not necessary, and would even
necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to transmit the entail an extra overhead, to transmit the parameters within every
parameters within every message. One implicitly available parameter message.
is the length of an ICV, which is <length> - 3 - <key-id-length> (or
single-length - 3 - <key-id-length> in a multivalue Address Block The rationale for the addition of type extension 2 is that the source
TLV) and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic function. code address is used in some cases, such as when processing HELLO
messages in [RFC6130]. This is applicable only to packets (which
only ever travel one hop) and messages (and their Address Blocks)
that only travel one hop. It is not applicable to messages that may
be forwarded more than one hop, such as TC messages in [OLSRv2].
12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV 12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV
The considerations listed in the following subsections MUST be The considerations listed in the following subsections MUST be
applied when calculating the ICV for Packet, Message, and Address applied when calculating the ICV for Packet, Message, and Address
Block ICV TLVs, respectively. Block TLVs, respectively.
12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV 12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV
When determining the <ICV-value> for a packet, with type extension = When determining the <ICV-data> for a packet, with type extension =
1, the ICV is calculated over the fields <hash-function>, 1:
<cryptographic-function>, <key-id-length>, and -- if present --
<key-id> (in that order), concatenated with the entire packet, o The ICV is calculated over the fields <hash-function>,
including the packet header, all Packet TLVs (other than Packet ICV <cryptographic-function>, <key-id-length>, and -- if present --
TLVs), and all included Messages and their message headers, in <key-id> (in that order), followed by the entire packet, including
accordance with Section 8.1. When determining the <ICV-value> for a the Packet Header, including all Packet TLVs (other than ICV
packet, with type extension = 2, the same procedure is used, except Packet TLVs), and all included messages. The considerations of
that the source address of the IP datagram carrying the packet is Section 8.1 MUST be applied.
also concatenated, in the first position, with the data used.
When determining the <ICV-data> for a packet, with type extension =
2:
o The same procedure as for type extension = 1 is used, except that
the source address of the IP datagram carrying the packet is also
concatenated, in the first position, with the data used.
12.2.2. Message ICV TLV 12.2.2. Message ICV TLV
When determining the <ICV-value> for a message, with type extension = When determining the <ICV-data> for a message, with type extension =
1, the ICV is calculated over the fields <hash-function>, 1:
<cryptographic-function>, <key-id-length>, and -- if present --
<key-id> (in that order), concatenated with the entire message. The o The ICV is calculated over the fields <hash-function>,
considerations in Section 9.1 MUST be applied. When determining the <cryptographic-function>, <key-id-length>, and -- if present --
<ICV-value> for a message, with type extension = 2, the same <key-id> (in that order), followed by the entire message. The
procedure is used, except that the source address of the IP datagram considerations in Section 9.1 MUST be applied.
carrying the message is also concatenated, in the first position,
with the data used. When determining the <ICV-data> for a message, with type extension =
2:
o The same procedure as for type extension = 1 is used, except that
the source address of the IP datagram carrying the message is also
concatenated, in the first position, with the data used.
12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV 12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV
When determining the <ICV-value> for an address, block, with type When determining the <ICV-data> for one or more addresses, with type
extension = 2, the ICV is calculated over the fields <hash-function>, extension = 1:
<cryptographic-function>, <key-id-length>, and -- if present --
<key-id> (in that order), concatenated with the address, and o The ICV is calculated over the fields <hash-function>,
concatenated with any other values -- for example, any other address <cryptographic-function>, <key-id-length>, and -- if present --
block TLV <value> that is associated with that address. A MANET <key-id> (in that order), followed by the addresses, and followed
routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extension using Address by any other values -- for example, other address block TLV
Block ICV TLVs MUST specify how to include any such concatenated <value>s that are associated with those addresses. A MANET
attribute of the address in the verification process of the ICV. The routing protocol, or MANET routing protocol extension, using ICV
considerations in Section 10.1 MUST be applied. When determining the Address Block TLVs MUST specify how to include any such
<ICV-value> for an address block, with type extension = 2, the same concatenated attribute of the addresses in the verification
procedure is used, except that the source address of the IP datagram process of the ICV. The considerations in Section 10.1 MUST be
carrying the address block is also concatenated, in the first applied.
position, with the data used.
When determining the <ICV-data> for one or more addresses, with type
extension = 2:
o The same procedure as for type extension = 1 is used, except that
the source address of the IP datagram carrying the Address Block
is also concatenated, in the first position, with the data used.
12.3. Example of a Message Including an ICV 12.3. Example of a Message Including an ICV
The sample message depicted in Figure 1 is derived from Appendix D of The sample message depicted in Figure 1 is derived from Appendix D of
[RFC5444]. The message contains an ICV Message TLV, with the value [RFC5444]. The message contains an ICV Message TLV, with the value
representing an ICV that is 16 octets long of the whole message, and representing an ICV that is 16 octets long of the whole message, and
a key identifier that is 4 octets long. The type extension of the a key identifier that is 4 octets long. The type extension of the
Message TLV is 1, for the specific decomposition of an ICV using a Message TLV is 1, for the specific decomposition of an ICV using a
cryptographic function and a hash function, as specified in cryptographic function and a hash function, as specified in
Section 12. Section 12.
skipping to change at page 13, line 41 skipping to change at page 15, line 38
| ICV Value (cont) | | ICV Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Example Message with ICV Figure 1: Example Message with ICV
13. IANA Considerations 13. IANA Considerations
This specification reports the following, originally specified in This specification reports the following, originally specified in
[RFC6622]: [RFC6622]:
o Two Packet TLV types, which have been allocated from the 0-223 o Two Packet TLV Types, which have been allocated from the 0-223
range of the "Packet TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444], as range of the "Packet TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444], as
specified in Table 1. specified in Table 1.
o Two Message TLV types, which have been allocated from the 0-127 o Two Message TLV Types, which have been allocated from the 0-127
range of the "Message TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444], as range of the "Message TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444], as
specified in Table 2. specified in Table 2.
o Two Address Block TLV types, which have been allocated from the o Two Address Block TLV Types, which have been allocated from the
0-127 range of the "Address Block TLV Types" repository of 0-127 range of the "Address Block TLV Types" repository of
[RFC5444], as specified in Table 3. [RFC5444], as specified in Table 3.
This specification updates the following, created in [RFC6622]: This specification updates the following, created in [RFC6622]:
o A type extension registry for each of these TLV types with values o A type extension registry for each of these TLV types with values
as listed in Tables 1, 2, and 3. as listed in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
The following terms are used as defined in [BCP26]: "Namespace", The following terms are used as defined in [BCP26]: "Namespace",
"Registration", and "Designated Expert". "Registration", and "Designated Expert".
The following policy is used as defined in [BCP26]: "Expert Review". The following policy is used as defined in [BCP26]: "Expert Review".
13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines 13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines
For TLV type extensions registries where an Expert Review is For TLV type extensions registries where an Expert Review is
required, the Designated Expert SHOULD take the same general required, the Designated Expert SHOULD take the same general
recommendations into consideration as those specified by [RFC5444]. recommendations into consideration as those specified by [RFC5444].
For the Timestamp TLV, the same type extensions for all Packet, For both Timestamp and ICV TLVs, functionally similar extensions for
Message, and Address Block TLVs SHOULD be numbered identically. Packet, Message, and Address Block TLVs SHOULD be numbered
identically.
13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations 13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations
IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], made allocations from the IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], made allocations from the
"Packet TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs "Packet TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs
specified in Table 1. IANA are requested to modify this allocation specified in Table 1. IANA are requested to modify this allocation
(defining type extension = 2) as indicated. (defining type extension = 2) as indicated.
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| ICV | 5 | 0 | ICV of a packet | | ICV | 5 | 0 | ICV of a packet |
| | | 1-2 | ICV, using a cryptographic | | | | 1 | ICV, using a cryptographic |
| | | | function and a hash function, as | | | | | function and a hash function, as |
| | | | specified in Section 12 of this | | | | | specified in Section 12 of this |
| | | | document | | | | | document |
| | | 2 | ICV, using a cryptographic |
| | | | function and a hash function, and |
| | | | including the IP datagram source |
| | | | address, as specified in |
| | | | Section 12 of this document |
| | | 3-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review | | | | 3-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | 6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | TIMESTAMP | 6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the TLV Length | | | | | length, given by the TLV Length |
| | | | field. The MANET routing protocol | | | | | field. The MANET routing protocol |
| | | | has to define how to interpret | | | | | has to define how to interpret |
| | | | this timestamp | | | | | this timestamp |
| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as | | | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as |
| | | | specified in [IEEE 1003.1-2008 | | | | | specified in [IEEE 1003.1-2008 |
| | | | (POSIX)] | | | | | (POSIX)] |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format, as defined | | | | 2 | NTP timestamp format, as specified |
| | | | in [RFC5905] | | | | | in [RFC5905] |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary | | | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as | | | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it | | | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value | | | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review | | | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 1: Packet TLV Types Table 1: Packet TLV Types
More than one ICV Packet TLV with the same type extension MAY be More than one ICV Packet TLV with the same type extension MAY be
included in a packet if these represent different ICV calculations included in a packet if these represent different ICV calculations
(e.g., with type extension 1 or 2 and different cryptographic (e.g., with type extension 1 or 2 and different cryptographic
function and/or hash function, or with a different key identifier). function and/or hash function, or with a different key identifier).
ICV Packet TLVs that carry what is declared to be the same ICV Packet TLVs that carry what is declared to be the same
information MUST NOT be included in the same packet. information MUST NOT be included in the same packet. More than one
TIMESTAMP Packet TLV with the same type extension MUST NOT be
included in a packet.
13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations 13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations
IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], made allocations from the IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], made allocations from the
"Message TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Message TLVs "Message TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Message TLVs
specified in Table 2. IANA are requested to modify this allocation specified in Table 2. IANA are requested to modify this allocation
(defining type extension = 2) as indicated. (defining type extension = 2) as indicated.
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| ICV | 5 | 0 | ICV of a message | | ICV | 5 | 0 | ICV of a message |
| | | 1-2 | ICV, using a cryptographic | | | | 1 | ICV, using a cryptographic |
| | | | function and a hash function, as | | | | | function and a hash function, as |
| | | | specified in Section 12 of this | | | | | specified in Section 12 of this |
| | | | document | | | | | document |
| | | 2 | ICV, using a cryptographic |
| | | | function and a hash function, and |
| | | | including the IP datagram source |
| | | | address, as specified in |
| | | | Section 12 of this document |
| | | 3-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review | | | | 3-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | 6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | TIMESTAMP | 6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the TLV Length | | | | | length, given by the TLV Length |
| | | | field. | | | | | field. |
| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as | | | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as |
| | | | specified in [IEEE 1003.1-2008 | | | | | specified in [IEEE 1003.1-2008 |
| | | | (POSIX)] | | | | | (POSIX)] |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format, as defined | | | | 2 | NTP timestamp format, as specified |
| | | | in [RFC5905] | | | | | in [RFC5905] |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary | | | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as | | | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it | | | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value | | | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review | | | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 2: Message TLV Types Table 2: Message TLV Types
More than one ICV Message TLV with the same type extension MAY be More than one ICV Message TLV with the same type extension MAY be
included in a message if these represent different ICV calculations included in a message if these represent different ICV calculations
(e.g., with type extension 1 or 2 and different cryptographic (e.g., with type extension 1 or 2 and different cryptographic
function and/or hash function, or with a different key identifier). function and/or hash function, or with a different key identifier).
ICV Message TLVs that carry what is declared to be the same ICV Message TLVs that carry what is declared to be the same
information MUST NOT be included in the same message. information MUST NOT be included in the same message. More than one
TIMESTAMP Message TLV with the same type extension MUST NOT be
included in a message.
13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations 13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations
IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], made allocations from the IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], made allocations from the
"Address Block TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs "Address Block TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs
specified in Table 3. IANA are requested to modify this allocation specified in Table 3. IANA are requested to modify this allocation
(defining type extension = 2) as indicated. (defining type extension = 2) as indicated.
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| ICV | 5 | 0 | ICV of an object (e.g., an | | ICV | 5 | 0 | ICV of an object (e.g., an |
| | | | address) | | | | | address) |
| | | 1-2 | ICV, using a cryptographic | | | | 1 | ICV, using a cryptographic |
| | | | function and a hash function, as | | | | | function and a hash function, as |
| | | | specified in Section 12 of this | | | | | specified in Section 12 of this |
| | | | document | | | | | document |
| | | 2 | ICV, using a cryptographic |
| | | | function and a hash function, and |
| | | | including the IP datagram source |
| | | | address, as specified in |
| | | | Section 12 of this document |
| | | 3-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review | | | | 3-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | 6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | TIMESTAMP | 6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the TLV Length | | | | | length, given by the TLV Length |
| | | | field | | | | | field |
| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as | | | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as |
| | | | specified in [IEEE 1003.1-2008 | | | | | specified in [IEEE 1003.1-2008 |
| | | | (POSIX)] | | | | | (POSIX)] |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format, as defined | | | | 2 | NTP timestamp format, as specified |
| | | | in [RFC5905] | | | | | in [RFC5905] |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary | | | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as | | | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it | | | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value | | | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review | | | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 3: Address Block TLV Types Table 3: Address Block TLV Types
More than one ICV Address Block TLV with the same type extension MAY More than one ICV Address Block TLV with the same type extension MAY
be associated with an address if these represent different ICV be associate with an address if these represent different ICV
calculations (e.g., with type extension 1 or 2 and different calculations (e.g., with type extension 1 or 2 and different
cryptographic function and/or hash function, or with a different key cryptographic function and/or hash function, or with a different key
identifier). ICV Address Block TLVs that carry what is declared to identifier). ICV Address Block TLVs that carry what is declared to
be the same information MUST NOT be associated with the same address. be the same information MUST NOT be associated with the same address.
More than one TIMESTAMP Address Block TLV with the same type
extension MUST NOT be associated with any address.
13.5. Hash Functions 13.5. Hash Functions
IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], created a new registry for IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], created a registry for hash
hash functions that can be used when creating an ICV, as specified in functions that can be used when creating an ICV, as specified in
Section 12 of this document. The initial assignments and allocation Section 12 of this document. The initial assignments and allocation
policies are specified in Table 4. This registry is unchanged by policies are specified in Table 4. This registry is unchanged by
this specification. this specification.
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
| Hash | Algorithm | Description | | Hash | Algorithm | Description |
| Function | | | | Function | | |
| Value | | | | Value | | |
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
| 0 | none | The "identity function": The hash value | | 0 | none | The "identity function": The hash value |
| | | of an object is the object itself | | | | of an object is the object itself |
| 1 | SHA1 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2] | | 1 | SHA1 | [NIST-FIPS-180-4] |
| 2 | SHA224 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2-change] | | 2 | SHA224 | [NIST-FIPS-180-4] |
| 3 | SHA256 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2] | | 3 | SHA256 | [NIST-FIPS-180-4] |
| 4 | SHA384 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2] | | 4 | SHA384 | [NIST-FIPS-180-4] |
| 5 | SHA512 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2] | | 5 | SHA512 | [NIST-FIPS-180-4] |
| 6-251 | | Unassigned; Expert Review | | 6-251 | | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| 252-255 | | Experimental Use | | 252-255 | | Experimental Use |
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
Table 4: Hash Function Registry Table 4: Hash Function Registry
13.6. Cryptographic Functions 13.6. Cryptographic Functions
IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], created a new registry for IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], created a registry for the
the cryptographic functions, as specified in Section 12 of this cryptographic functions, as specified in Section 12 of this document.
document. Initial assignments and allocation policies are specified Initial assignments and allocation policies are specified in Table 5.
in Table 5. This registry is unchanged by this specification. This registry is unchanged by this specification.
+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+ +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
| Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description | | Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description |
| Function Value | | | | Function Value | | |
+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+ +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
| 0 | none | The "identity function": The value | | 0 | none | The "identity function": The value |
| | | of an encrypted hash is the hash | | | | of an encrypted hash is the hash |
| | | itself | | | | itself |
| 1 | RSA | [RFC3447] | | 1 | RSA | [RFC3447] |
| 2 | DSA | [NIST-FIPS-186-3] | | 2 | DSA | [NIST-FIPS-186-3] |
skipping to change at page 19, line 39 skipping to change at page 22, line 10
The authors would like to thank Bo Berry (Cisco), Alan Cullen (BAE The authors would like to thank Bo Berry (Cisco), Alan Cullen (BAE
Systems), Justin Dean (NRL), Paul Lambert (Marvell), Jerome Milan Systems), Justin Dean (NRL), Paul Lambert (Marvell), Jerome Milan
(Ecole Polytechnique), and Henning Rogge (FGAN) for their (Ecole Polytechnique), and Henning Rogge (FGAN) for their
constructive comments on [RFC6622]. constructive comments on [RFC6622].
The authors also appreciate the detailed reviews of [RFC6622] from The authors also appreciate the detailed reviews of [RFC6622] from
the Area Directors, in particular Stewart Bryant (Cisco), Stephen the Area Directors, in particular Stewart Bryant (Cisco), Stephen
Farrell (Trinity College Dublin), and Robert Sparks (Tekelec), as Farrell (Trinity College Dublin), and Robert Sparks (Tekelec), as
well as Donald Eastlake (Huawei) from the Security Directorate. well as Donald Eastlake (Huawei) from the Security Directorate.
The authors would like to thank Justin Dean (NRL) and Henning Rogge
(FGAN) for their constructive comments on this specification.
16. References 16. References
16.1. Normative References 16.1. Normative References
[BCP26] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines [BCP26] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines
for Writing an IANA Considerations for Writing an IANA Considerations
Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. May 2008.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs
skipping to change at page 20, line 39 skipping to change at page 23, line 13
(DSS)", FIPS 186-3, June 2009. (DSS)", FIPS 186-3, June 2009.
[ANSI-X9-62-2005] American National Standards Institute, [ANSI-X9-62-2005] American National Standards Institute,
"Public Key Cryptography for the "Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62-2005, November 2005. (ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62-2005, November 2005.
[NIST-SP-800-67] National Institute of Standards and [NIST-SP-800-67] National Institute of Standards and
Technology, "Recommendation for the Technology, "Recommendation for the
Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA)
(TDEA) Block Cipher", Special Block Cipher", Special
Publication 800-67, May 2004. Publication 800-67, Revision 1,
January 2012.
[NIST-FIPS-180-2] National Institute of Standards and
Technology, "Specifications for the
Secure Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2,
August 2002.
[NIST-FIPS-180-2-change] National Institute of Standards and [NIST-FIPS-180-4] National Institute of Standards and
Technology, "Federal Information Technology, "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)",
Processing Standards Publication 180-2 (+ FIPS 180-4, March 2012.
Change Notice to include SHA-224)",
FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
[IEEE 1003.1-2008 (POSIX)] IEEE Computer Society, "1003.1-2008 [IEEE 1003.1-2008 (POSIX)] IEEE Computer Society, "1003.1-2008
Standard for Information Technology - Standard for Information Technology -
Portable Operating System Interface Portable Operating System Interface
(POSIX) Base Specifications, Issue 7", (POSIX) Base Specifications, Issue 7",
December 2008. December 2008.
16.2. Informative References 16.2. Informative References
[RFC6130] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and J. Dean, [RFC6130] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and J. Dean,
skipping to change at page 21, line 26 skipping to change at page 23, line 42
Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)",
RFC 6130, April 2011. RFC 6130, April 2011.
[RFC6622] Herberg, U. and T. Clausen, "Integrity [RFC6622] Herberg, U. and T. Clausen, "Integrity
Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions
for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)", for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)",
RFC 6622, May 2012. RFC 6622, May 2012.
[OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Jacquet, P., [OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Jacquet, P.,
and U. Herberg, "The Optimized Link State and U. Herberg, "The Optimized Link State
Routing Protocol version 2", Work Routing Protocol version 2", Work in
in Progress, March 2012. Progress draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-19,
March 2013.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Ulrich Herberg Ulrich Herberg
Fujitsu Laboratories of America Fujitsu Laboratories of America
1240 E. Arques Ave. 1240 E. Arques Ave.
Sunnyvale, CA 94085 Sunnyvale, CA 94085
USA USA
EMail: ulrich@herberg.name EMail: ulrich@herberg.name
 End of changes. 96 change blocks. 
281 lines changed or deleted 390 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.41. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/