draft-ietf-manet-rfc6622-bis-00.txt   draft-ietf-manet-rfc6622-bis-01.txt 
Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg
Internet-Draft Fujitsu Laboratories of America Internet-Draft Fujitsu Laboratories of America
Obsoletes: 6622 (if approved) T. Clausen Obsoletes: 6622 (if approved) T. Clausen
Intended status: Standards Track LIX, Ecole Polytechnique Intended status: Standards Track LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
Expires: September 23, 2013 C. Dearlove Expires: September 24, 2013 C. Dearlove
BAE Systems ATC BAE Systems ATC
March 22, 2013 March 23, 2013
Integrity Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions Integrity Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions
for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)
draft-ietf-manet-rfc6622-bis-00 draft-ietf-manet-rfc6622-bis-01
Abstract Abstract
This document extends and replaces RFC 6622. It describes general This document extends and replaces RFC 6622. It describes general
and flexible TLVs for representing cryptographic Integrity Check and flexible TLVs for representing cryptographic Integrity Check
Values (ICVs) (i.e., digital signatures or Message Authentication Values (ICVs) (i.e., digital signatures or Message Authentication
Codes (MACs)) as well as timestamps, using the generalized Mobile Ad Codes (MACs)) as well as timestamps, using the generalized Mobile Ad
Hoc Network (MANET) packet/message format defined in RFC 5444. It Hoc Network (MANET) packet/message format defined in RFC 5444. It
defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs, and two Address Block TLVs defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs, and two Address Block TLVs
for affixing ICVs and timestamps to a packet, a message, and an for affixing ICVs and timestamps to a packet, a message, and an
skipping to change at page 1, line 41 skipping to change at page 1, line 41
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 23, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 24, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Differences from RFC6622 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. General ICV TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. General ICV TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Packet ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.1. Packet ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Message ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.1. Message ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1. Address Block ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10.1. Address Block ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. ICV: Basic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11. ICV: Basic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12. ICV: Hash Function and Cryptographic Function . . . . . . . . 9 12. ICV: Hash Function and Cryptographic Function . . . . . . . . 10
12.1. General ICV TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 12.1. General ICV TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12.1.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12.1.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12.2.2. Message ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.2.2. Message ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12.3. Example of a Message Including an ICV . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.3. Example of a Message Including an ICV . . . . . . . . . . 12
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 14
13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 15 13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13.5. Hash Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 13.5. Hash Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13.6. Cryptographic Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 13.6. Cryptographic Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document, which extends and replaces [RFC6622], specifies: This document, which extends and replaces [RFC6622], specifies:
o Two TLVs for carrying Integrity Check Values (ICVs) and timestamps o Two TLVs for carrying Integrity Check Values (ICVs) and timestamps
in packets, messages, and address blocks as defined by [RFC5444]. in packets, messages, and address blocks as defined by [RFC5444].
o A generic framework for ICVs, accounting (for Message TLVs) for o A generic framework for ICVs, accounting (for Message TLVs) for
mutable message header fields (<msg-hop-limit> and mutable message header fields (<msg-hop-limit> and
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This document retains the IANA registries, defined in [RFC6622], for This document retains the IANA registries, defined in [RFC6622], for
recording code points for hash-functions, cryptographic functions, recording code points for hash-functions, cryptographic functions,
and ICV calculations. This document requests additional allocations and ICV calculations. This document requests additional allocations
from these registries. from these registries.
Moreover, in Section 12, this document defines the following: Moreover, in Section 12, this document defines the following:
o A method for generating ICVs using a combination of a o A method for generating ICVs using a combination of a
cryptographic function and a hash function. cryptographic function and a hash function.
1.1. Differences from RFC6622
This document obsoletes [RFC6622]. The changes introduced by this
document are, however, small. In addition to editorial updates, this
document adds a new type extension for the ICV TLV that is specified
in Section 12 of this document. The TLV value of a TLV with this
type extension has the same internal structure as a TLV with type
extension 1, but is calculated also over the source address of the IP
datagram carrying the packet, message, or address block.
The rationale for adding this type extension is that some MANET
protocols, such as [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2], use the IP source address
of the IP datagram carrying the packet, message or address block,
e.g., to identify links with neighbor routers. If this address is
not otherwise contained in the packet, message, or address block
payload (which is permitted, e.g., in [RFC6130]), the address is not
protected against tampering.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444]. This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444].
In particular, the following TLV fields from [RFC5444] are used in In particular, the following TLV fields and notation from [RFC5444]
this specification: are used in this specification:
<msg-hop-limit> is the hop limit of a message, as specified in <msg-hop-limit> is the hop limit of a message, as specified in
Section 5.2 of [RFC5444]. Section 5.2 of [RFC5444].
<msg-hop-count> is the hop count of a message, as specified in <msg-hop-count> is the hop count of a message, as specified in
Section 5.2 of [RFC5444]. Section 5.2 of [RFC5444].
<length> is the length of a TLV in octets, as specified in Section <length> is the length of the value field in a TLV in octets, as
5.4.1 of [RFC5444]. specified in Section 5.4.1 of [RFC5444].
single-length is the length of a single value in the value field in
a TLV in octets, as specified in Section 5.4.1 of [RFC5444]. (It
is equal to <length> except in a multivalue Address Block TLV.)
3. Applicability Statement 3. Applicability Statement
MANET routing protocols using the format defined in [RFC5444] are MANET routing protocols using the format defined in [RFC5444] are
accorded the ability to carry additional information in control accorded the ability to carry additional information in control
messages and packets, through the inclusion of TLVs. Information so messages and packets, through the inclusion of TLVs. Information so
included MAY be used by a MANET routing protocol, or by an extension included MAY be used by a MANET routing protocol, or by an extension
of a MANET routing protocol, according to its specification. of a MANET routing protocol, according to its specification.
This document specifies how to include an ICV for a packet, a This document specifies how to include an ICV for a packet, a
message, and addresses in address blocks within a message, using such message, and addresses in address blocks within a message, using such
TLVs. This document also specifies how to treat "mutable" fields, TLVs. This document also specifies how to treat "mutable" fields,
specifically the <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit> fields, if specifically the <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit> fields, if
present in the message header when calculating ICVs, such that the present in the message header when calculating ICVs, such that the
resulting ICV can be correctly verified by any recipient. resulting ICV can be correctly verified by any recipient.
This document describes a generic framework for creating ICVs, and This document describes a generic framework for creating ICVs, and
how to include these ICVs in TLVs. In Section 12, an example method how to include these ICVs in TLVs. In Section 12, an example method
for calculating such ICVs is given, using a cryptographic function for calculating such ICVs is given, using a cryptographic function
over the hash value of the content. and a hash function.
4. Security Architecture 4. Security Architecture
Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to
security"; however, they have a clause allowing a control message to security"; however, they may have a clause allowing a control message
be rejected as "badly formed" or "insecure" prior to the message to be rejected as "badly formed" or "insecure" prior to the message
being processed or forwarded. MANET routing protocols such as the being processed or forwarded. In particular, MANET routing protocols
Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP) [RFC6130] and the Optimized such as the Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP) [RFC6130] and the
Link State Routing Protocol version 2 [OLSRv2] recognize external Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 [OLSRv2] recognize
reasons (such as failure to verify an ICV) for rejecting a message external reasons (such as failure to verify an ICV) for rejecting a
that would be considered "invalid for processing". This architecture message that would be considered "invalid for processing".
is a result of the observation that with respect to security in
MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and that MANET routing protocol This architecture is a result of the observation that with respect to
deployment domains have varying security requirements ranging from security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and that MANET routing
"unbreakable" to "virtually none". The virtue of this approach is protocol deployment domains have varying security requirements
that MANET routing protocol specifications (and implementations) can ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The virtue of this
remain "generic", with extensions providing proper security approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications (and
mechanisms specific to a deployment domain. implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing
proper security mechanisms specific to a deployment domain.
The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this
specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as
follows: follows:
o Security-oblivious MANET routing protocol specifications, with a o MANET routing protocol specifications, with a clause allowing an
clause allowing an extension to reject a message (prior to extension to reject a message (prior to processing/forwarding) as
processing/forwarding) as "badly formed" or "insecure". "badly formed" or "insecure".
o MANET routing protocol security extensions, rejecting messages as o MANET routing protocol security extensions, rejecting messages as
"badly formed" or "insecure", as appropriate for a given security "badly formed" or "insecure", as appropriate for a given security
requirement specific to a deployment domain. requirement specific to a deployment domain.
o Code points and an exchange format for information, necessary for o Code points and an exchange format for information, necessary for
specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions. specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions.
This document addresses the last of the issues listed above by This document addresses the last of the issues listed above by
specifying a common exchange format for cryptographic ICVs, making specifying a common exchange format for cryptographic ICVs, making
reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV, and Address reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV, and Address
Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared) among Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared) among
MANET routing protocol security extensions. MANET routing protocol security extensions.
For the specific decomposition of an ICV into a cryptographic For the specific decomposition of an ICV using a cryptographic
function over a hash value (specified in Section 12), this document function and a hash function (specified in Section 12), this document
reports the two IANA registries from [RFC6622] for code points for reports the two IANA registries from [RFC6622] for code points for
hash functions and cryptographic functions adhering to [RFC5444]. hash functions and cryptographic functions adhering to [RFC5444].
With respect to [RFC5444], this document is: With respect to [RFC5444], this document is:
o Intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of o Intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of
use described in Appendix B of [RFC5444]. use described in Appendix B of [RFC5444].
o A specific example of the Security Considerations section of o A specific example of the Security Considerations section of
[RFC5444] (the authentication part). [RFC5444] (the authentication part).
5. Overview and Functioning 5. Overview and Functioning
This document specifies a syntactical representation of security- This document specifies a syntactical representation of security-
related information for use with [RFC5444] addresses, messages, and related information for use with [RFC5444] addresses, messages, and
packets, and also reports and updates IANA registrations (from packets, and also reports and updates IANA registrations (from
[RFC6622]) of TLV types and type extension registries for these TLV [RFC6622]) of TLV types and type extension registries for these TLV
types. types.
Moreover, this document provides guidelines for how MANET routing Moreover, this document provides guidelines for how MANET routing
protocols and MANET routing protocol extensions using this protocols, and MANET routing protocol extensions using this
specification should treat ICV and Timestamp TLVs, and mutable fields specification, should treat ICV and Timestamp TLVs, and mutable
in messages. This specification does not represent a stand-alone fields in messages. This specification does not represent a stand-
protocol; MANET routing protocols and MANET routing protocol alone protocol; MANET routing protocols, and MANET routing protocol
extensions, using this specification, MUST provide instructions as to extensions using this specification, MUST provide instructions as to
how to handle packets, messages, and addresses with security how to handle packets, messages, and addresses with security
information, associated as specified in this document. information, associated as specified in this document.
This document reports previously assigned TLV types (from [RFC6622]) This document reports previously assigned TLV types (from [RFC6622])
from the registries defined for Packet, Message, and Address Block from the registries defined for Packet, Message, and Address Block
TLVs in [RFC5444]. When a TLV type is assigned from one of these TLVs in [RFC5444]. When a TLV type is assigned from one of these
registries, a registry for type extensions for that TLV type is registries, a registry for type extensions for that TLV type is
created by IANA. This document reports and updates these type created by IANA. This document reports and updates these type
extension registries, in order to specify internal structure (and extension registries, in order to specify internal structure (and
accompanying processing) of the <value> field of a TLV. accompanying processing) of the <value> field of a TLV.
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they do so, they MUST specify their internal structure (if any) and they do so, they MUST specify their internal structure (if any) and
interpretation. interpretation.
6. General ICV TLV Structure 6. General ICV TLV Structure
The value of the ICV TLV is: The value of the ICV TLV is:
<value> := <ICV-value> <value> := <ICV-value>
where where
<ICV-value> is a field, of <length> octets, which contains the <ICV-value> is a field, of <length> octets, which contains the
information to be interpreted by the ICV verification process, as information to be interpreted by the ICV verification process, as
specified by the type extension. specified by the type extension.
Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the <ICV-value> Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the <ICV-value>
nor the internal structure thereof, if any; such information MUST be nor the internal structure thereof, if any; such information MUST be
specified by way of the type extension for the ICV TLV type. See specified by the type extension for the ICV TLV type; see Section 13.
Section 13. This document specifies three such type extensions -- This document specifies three such type extensions -- one for ICVs
one for ICVs without pre-defined structures, and two for ICVs without pre-defined structures, and two for ICVs constructed
constructed combining a cryptographic function and a hash function. combining a cryptographic function and a hash function.
7. General Timestamp TLV Structure 7. General Timestamp TLV Structure
The value of the Timestamp TLV is: The value of the Timestamp TLV is:
<value> := <time-value> <value> := <time-value>
where: where:
<time-value> is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, which <time-value> is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, which
contains the timestamp. contains the timestamp.
Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the
<time-value> nor the internal structure thereof, if any; such <time-value> nor the internal structure thereof, if any; such
information MUST be specified by way of the type extension for the information MUST be specified by the type extension for the
TIMESTAMP TLV type. See Section 13. TIMESTAMP TLV type; see Section 13.
A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its
setting and interpretation are to be determined by the MANET routing setting and interpretation are to be determined by the MANET routing
protocol, or MANET routing protocol extension, that uses the protocol, or MANET routing protocol extension, that uses the
timestamp and can, for example, correspond to a UNIX timestamp, GPS timestamp and can, for example, correspond to a POSIX timestamp, GPS
timestamp, or a simple sequence number. timestamp, or a simple sequence number.
8. Packet TLVs 8. Packet TLVs
Two Packet TLVs are defined: one for including the cryptographic ICV Two Packet TLVs are defined: one for including the cryptographic ICV
of a packet and one for including the timestamp indicating the time of a packet and one for including the timestamp indicating the time
at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated. at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.
8.1. Packet ICV TLV 8.1. Packet ICV TLV
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The rationale for removing any Packet ICV TLV already present prior The rationale for removing any Packet ICV TLV already present prior
to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same
packet, e.g., using different ICV functions. packet, e.g., using different ICV functions.
8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV 8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV
A Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described A Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described
in Section 7. If a packet contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV, in Section 7. If a packet contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV,
the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before any ICV TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before any ICV TLV,
in order that it be included in the calculation of the ICV. in order to include it in the calculation of the ICV.
9. Message TLVs 9. Message TLVs
Two Message TLVs are defined: one for including the cryptographic ICV Two Message TLVs are defined: one for including the cryptographic ICV
of a message and one for including the timestamp indicating the time of a message and one for including the timestamp indicating the time
at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated. at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.
9.1. Message ICV TLV 9.1. Message ICV TLV
A Message ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in A Message ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in
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The rationale for removing any Message ICV TLV already present prior The rationale for removing any Message ICV TLV already present prior
to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same
message, e.g., using different ICV functions. message, e.g., using different ICV functions.
9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV 9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV
A Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described A Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described
in Section 7. If a message contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV, in Section 7. If a message contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV,
the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the ICV TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the ICV TLV,
in order that it be included in the calculation of the ICV. in order to include it in the calculation of the ICV.
10. Address Block TLVs 10. Address Block TLVs
Two Address Block TLVs are defined: one for associating a Two Address Block TLVs are defined: one for associating a
cryptographic ICV to an address and one for including the timestamp cryptographic ICV to an address and one for including the timestamp
indicating the time at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated. indicating the time at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.
10.1. Address Block ICV TLV 10.1. Address Block ICV TLV
An Address Block ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in An Address Block ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in
Section 6. The ICV is calculated over the address, concatenated with Section 6. The ICV is calculated over the address, concatenated with
any other values -- for example, any other Address Block TLV <value> any other values -- for example, any other Address Block TLV <value>
fields -- associated with that address. A MANET routing protocol or fields -- associated with that address. A MANET routing protocol or
MANET routing protocol extension using Address Block ICV TLVs MUST MANET routing protocol extension using Address Block ICV TLVs MUST
specify how to include any such concatenated attribute of the address specify how to include any such concatenated attribute of the address
in the verification process of the ICV. When determining the in the calculation and verification processes for the ICV. When
<ICV-value> for an address, the following consideration MUST be determining the <ICV-value> for an address, the following
applied: consideration MUST be applied:
o If other TLV values are concatenated with the address for o If other TLV values are concatenated with the address for
calculating the ICV, these TLVs MUST NOT be Address Block ICV TLVs calculating the ICV, these TLVs MUST NOT be Address Block ICV TLVs
already associated with the address. already associated with the address.
The rationale for not concatenating the address with any ICV TLV The rationale for not concatenating the address with any ICV TLV
values already associated with the address when calculating the ICV values already associated with the address when calculating the ICV
is that several ICVs may be added to the same address, e.g., using is that several ICVs may be added to the same address, e.g., using
different ICV functions. different ICV functions.
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where: where:
<hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the <hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the
hash function. hash function.
<cryptographic-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field <cryptographic-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field
specifying the cryptographic function. specifying the cryptographic function.
<key-id-length> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the <key-id-length> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the
length of the <key-id> field in number of octets. The value 0x00 length of the <key-id> field in number of octets. The value 0x00
is reserved for using a pre-installed, shared key. is reserved for using a single pre-installed, shared key.
<key-id> is a field specifying the key identifier of the key that <key-id> is a field specifying the key identifier of the key that
was used to calculate the ICV of the message, which allows unique was used to calculate the ICV of the message, which allows unique
identification of different keys with the same originator. It is identification of different keys with the same originator. It is
the responsibility of each key originator to make sure that the responsibility of each key originator to make sure that
actively used keys that it issues have distinct key identifiers. actively used keys that it issues have distinct key identifiers.
If <key-id-length> equals 0x00, the <key-id> field is not If <key-id-length> equals 0x00, the <key-id> field is not
contained in the TLV, and a pre-installed, shared key is used. contained in the TLV, and a single pre-installed, shared key is
used.
<ICV-data> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is <ICV-data> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is <length> -
<length> - 3 - <key-id-length>, and which contains the 3 - <key-id-length>, except in a multivslue Address Block TLV, in
cryptographic ICV. which it is single-length - 3 - <key-id-length>, and which
contains the cryptographic ICV.
The version of this TLV, specified in this section, assumes that, The version of this TLV, specified in this section, assumes that,
unless otherwise specified, calculating the ICV can be decomposed unless otherwise specified, calculating the ICV can be decomposed
into: into:
ICV-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content)) ICV-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content))
In some cases a different combination of cryptographic function and In some cases a different combination of cryptographic function and
hash function may be specified. This is the case for the HMAC hash function may be specified. This is the case for the HMAC
function, which is specified as defined in Section 13.6, which function, which is specified as defined in Section 13.6, using the
applies the hash function twice. hash function twice.
The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the
entries in two IANA registries, which are reported by this entries in two IANA registries, which are reported by this
specification and are described in Section 13. specification and are described in Section 13.
12.1.1. Rationale 12.1.1. Rationale
The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic
function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a
single octet -- possibly as a TLV type extension -- is that adding single octet -- possibly as a TLV type extension -- is that adding
further hash functions or cryptographic functions in the future may further hash functions or cryptographic functions in the future may
lead to a non-contiguous number space. lead to a non-contiguous number space.
The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the
cryptographic ICV in the TLV is that, before being able to validate a cryptographic ICV in the TLV is that, before being able to validate a
cryptographic ICV, routers have to exchange or acquire keys (e.g., cryptographic ICV, routers have to exchange or acquire keys (e.g.,
public keys). Any additional parameters can be provided together public keys). Any additional parameters can be provided together
with the keys in that bootstrap process. It is therefore not with the keys in that bootstrap process. It is therefore not
necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to transmit the necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to transmit the
parameters within every message. One implicitly available parameter parameters within every message. One implicitly available parameter
is the length of the ICV, which is <length> - 3 - <key-id-length>, is the length of an ICV, which is <length> - 3 - <key-id-length> (or
and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic function. single-length - 3 - <key-id-length> in a multivalue Address Block
TLV) and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic function.
12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV 12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV
The considerations listed in the following subsections MUST be The considerations listed in the following subsections MUST be
applied when calculating the ICV for Packet, Message, and Address applied when calculating the ICV for Packet, Message, and Address
Block ICV TLVs, respectively. Block ICV TLVs, respectively.
12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV 12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV
When determining the <ICV-value> for a packet, with type extension = When determining the <ICV-value> for a packet, with type extension =
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| | | | may represent any random value | | | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review | | | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 1: Packet TLV Types Table 1: Packet TLV Types
More than one ICV Packet TLV with the same type extension MAY be More than one ICV Packet TLV with the same type extension MAY be
included in a packet if these represent different ICV calculations included in a packet if these represent different ICV calculations
(e.g., with type extension 1 or 2 and different cryptographic (e.g., with type extension 1 or 2 and different cryptographic
function and/or hash function). ICV Packet TLVs that carry what is function and/or hash function, or with a different key identifier).
declared to be the same information MUST NOT be included in the same ICV Packet TLVs that carry what is declared to be the same
packet. information MUST NOT be included in the same packet.
13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations 13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations
IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], made allocations from the IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], made allocations from the
"Message TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Message TLVs "Message TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Message TLVs
specified in Table 2. IANA are requested to modify this allocation specified in Table 2. IANA are requested to modify this allocation
(defining type extension = 2) as indicated. (defining type extension = 2) as indicated.
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
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| | | | may represent any random value | | | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review | | | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 2: Message TLV Types Table 2: Message TLV Types
More than one ICV Message TLV with the same type extension MAY be More than one ICV Message TLV with the same type extension MAY be
included in a message if these represent different ICV calculations included in a message if these represent different ICV calculations
(e.g., with type extension 1 or 2 and different cryptographic (e.g., with type extension 1 or 2 and different cryptographic
function and/or hash function). ICV Message TLVs that carry what is function and/or hash function, or with a different key identifier).
declared to be the same information MUST NOT be included in the same ICV Message TLVs that carry what is declared to be the same
message. information MUST NOT be included in the same message.
13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations 13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations
IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], made allocations from the IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], made allocations from the
"Address Block TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs "Address Block TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs
specified in Table 3. IANA are requested to modify this allocation specified in Table 3. IANA are requested to modify this allocation
(defining type extension = 2) as indicated. (defining type extension = 2) as indicated.
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
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| | | | length with no constraints such as | | | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it | | | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value | | | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review | | | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 3: Address Block TLV Types Table 3: Address Block TLV Types
More than one ICV Address Block TLV with the same type extension MAY More than one ICV Address Block TLV with the same type extension MAY
be associated with an Address Block if these represent different ICV be associated with an address if these represent different ICV
calculations (e.g., with type extension 1 or 2 and different calculations (e.g., with type extension 1 or 2 and different
cryptographic function and/or hash function). ICV Address Block TLVs cryptographic function and/or hash function, or with a different key
that carry what is declared to be the same information MUST NOT be identifier). ICV Address Block TLVs that carry what is declared to
associated with the same Address Block. be the same information MUST NOT be associated with the same address.
13.5. Hash Functions 13.5. Hash Functions
IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], created a new registry for IANA has, in accordance with [RFC6622], created a new registry for
hash functions that can be used when creating an ICV, as specified in hash functions that can be used when creating an ICV, as specified in
Section 12 of this document. The initial assignments and allocation Section 12 of this document. The initial assignments and allocation
policies are specified in Table 4. This registry is unchanged by policies are specified in Table 4. This registry is unchanged by
this specification. this specification.
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
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Thomas Heide Clausen Thomas Heide Clausen
LIX, Ecole Polytechnique LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
91128 Palaiseau Cedex 91128 Palaiseau Cedex
France France
Phone: +33 6 6058 9349 Phone: +33 6 6058 9349
EMail: T.Clausen@computer.org EMail: T.Clausen@computer.org
URI: http://www.thomasclausen.org/ URI: http://www.thomasclausen.org/
Christopher Dearlove Christopher Dearlove
BAE Systems ATC BAE Systems Advanced Technology Centre
West Hanningfield Road
Great Baddow, Chelmsford
United Kingdom
Phone: +44 1245 242194 Phone: +44 1245 242194
EMail: chris.dearlove@baesystems.com EMail: chris.dearlove@baesystems.com
URI: http://www.baesystems.com/ URI: http://www.baesystems.com/
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