draft-ietf-lisp-threats-13.txt   draft-ietf-lisp-threats-14.txt 
Network Working Group D. Saucez Network Working Group D. Saucez
Internet-Draft INRIA Internet-Draft INRIA
Intended status: Informational L. Iannone Intended status: Informational L. Iannone
Expires: February 27, 2016 Telecom ParisTech Expires: June 22, 2016 Telecom ParisTech
O. Bonaventure O. Bonaventure
Universite catholique de Louvain Universite catholique de Louvain
August 26, 2015 December 20, 2015
LISP Threats Analysis LISP Threats Analysis
draft-ietf-lisp-threats-13.txt draft-ietf-lisp-threats-14.txt
Abstract Abstract
This document proposes a threat analysis of the Locator/Identifier This document provides a threat analysis of the Locator/Identifier
Separation Protocol (LISP). Separation Protocol (LISP).
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 27, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 22, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 30 skipping to change at page 2, line 30
2.2.5. Rogue attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2.5. Rogue attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.6. Denial of Service (DoS) attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2.6. Denial of Service (DoS) attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.7. Performance attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2.7. Performance attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.8. Intrusion attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2.8. Intrusion attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.9. Amplification attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2.9. Amplification attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.10. Multi-category attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2.10. Multi-category attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Attack vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Attack vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Gleaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1. Gleaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Locator Status Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. Locator Status Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Map-Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.3. Map-Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4. Routing Locator Reachability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.4. Routing Locator Reachability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5. Instance ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.5. Instance ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.6. Interworking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.6. Interworking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.7. Map-Request messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.7. Map-Request messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.8. Map-Reply messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.8. Map-Reply messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.9. Map-Register messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.9. Map-Register messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.10. Map-Notify messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.10. Map-Notify messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Note on Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4. Note on Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Threats Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5. Threats Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Appendix A. Document Change Log (to be removed on publication) . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) is specified in [RFC6830]. The Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) is specified in [RFC6830].
The present document assess the potential security threats identified This document provides an assessment of the potential security
in the LISP specifications if LISP is deployed in the Internet (i.e., threats for the current LISP specifications if LISP is deployed in
a public non-trustable environment). the Internet (i.e., a public non-trustable environment).
The document is composed of three main parts: the first defines the The document is composed of three main parts: the first defines a
general threat model that attackers can follow to mount attacks. The general threat model that attackers use to mount attacks. The second
second describes the techniques based on the LISP protocol and part, using this threat model, describes the techniques based on the
architecture that attackers can use to construct attacks. The third LISP protocol and LISP architecture that attackers may use to
discusses mitigation techniques and general solutions to protect the construct attacks. The third part discusses mitigation techniques
LISP protocol and architecture from attacks. and general solutions to protect the LISP protocol and architecture
from attacks.
This document does not consider all the possible uses of LISP as This document does not consider all the possible uses of LISP as
discussed in [RFC6830] and [RFC7215]. The document focuses on LISP discussed in [RFC6830] and [RFC7215]. The document focuses on LISP
unicast, including as well LISP Interworking [RFC6832], LISP-MS unicast, including as well LISP Interworking [RFC6832], LISP Map-
[RFC6833], and LISP Map-Versioning [RFC6834]. The reading of these Server [RFC6833]), and LISP Map-Versioning [RFC6834]. The reader is
documents is a prerequisite for understanding the present document. assumed to be familiar with these documents for understanding the
present document.
This document assumes a generic IP service and does not discuss the This document assumes a generic IP service and does not discuss the
difference, from a security viewpoint, between using IPv4 or IPv6. difference, from a security viewpoint, between using IPv4 or IPv6.
2. Threat model 2. Threat model
This document assumes that attackers can be located anywhere in the This document assumes that attackers can be located anywhere in the
Internet (either in LISP sites or outside LISP sites) and that Internet (either in LISP sites or outside LISP sites) and that
attacks can be mounted either by a single attacker or by the attacks can be mounted either by a single attacker or by the
collusion of several attackers. collusion of several attackers.
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2.1.4. Control-plane vs. Data-plane attackers 2.1.4. Control-plane vs. Data-plane attackers
A control-plane attacker mounts its attack by using control-plane A control-plane attacker mounts its attack by using control-plane
functionalities, typically the mapping system. functionalities, typically the mapping system.
A data-plane attacker mounts its attack by using data-plane A data-plane attacker mounts its attack by using data-plane
functionalities. functionalities.
As there is no complete isolation between the control-plane and the As there is no complete isolation between the control-plane and the
data-plane, an attacker can operate in the control-plane (resp. data- data-plane, an attacker can operate in the control-plane (or data-
plane) to mount attacks targeting the data-plane (resp. control- plane) to mount attacks targeting the data-plane (or control-plane)
plane) or keep the attacked and targeted planes at the same layer or keep the attacked and targeted planes at the same layer (i.e.,
(i.e., from control-plane to control-plane or from data-plane to from control-plane to control-plane or from data-plane to data-
data-plane). plane).
2.1.5. Cross mode attackers 2.1.5. Cross mode attackers
The attacker modes of operation are not mutually exclusive and hence The attacker modes of operation are not mutually exclusive and hence
attackers can combine them to mount attacks. attackers can combine them to mount attacks.
For example, an attacker can launch an attack using the control-plane For example, an attacker can launch an attack using the control-plane
directly from within a LISP site to which it got temporary access directly from within a LISP site to which it is able to get temporary
(i.e., internal + control-plane attacker) to create a vulnerability access (i.e., internal + control-plane attacker) to create a
on its target and later on (i.e., time-shifted + external attacker) vulnerability on its target and later on (i.e., time-shifted +
mount an attack on the data plane (i.e., data-plane attacker) that external attacker) mount an attack on the data plane (i.e., data-
leverages the vulnerability. plane attacker) that leverages the vulnerability.
2.2. Threat categories 2.2. Threat categories
Attacks can be classified according to the nine following categories. Attacks can be classified according to the nine following categories.
2.2.1. Replay attack 2.2.1. Replay attack
A replay attack happens when an attacker retransmits at a later time, A replay attack happens when an attacker retransmits at a later time,
and without modifying it, a packet (or a sequence of packets) that and without modifying it, a packet (or a sequence of packets) that
has already been transmitted. has already been transmitted.
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2.2.3. Packet interception and suppression 2.2.3. Packet interception and suppression
In a packet interception and suppression attack, the attacker In a packet interception and suppression attack, the attacker
captures the packet and drops it before it can reach its final captures the packet and drops it before it can reach its final
destination. destination.
2.2.4. Spoofing 2.2.4. Spoofing
With a spoofing attack, the attacker injects packets in the network With a spoofing attack, the attacker injects packets in the network
pretending being another node. Spoofing attacks are made by forging pretending to be another node. Spoofing attacks are made by forging
source addresses in packets. source addresses in packets.
It should be noted that with LISP, packet spoofing is similar to any It should be noted that with LISP, packet spoofing is similar to
other existing tunneling technology currently deployed in the spoofing with any other existing tunneling technology currently
Internet. Generally the term "spoofed packet" indicates a packet deployed in the Internet. Generally the term "spoofed packet"
containing a source IP address that is not the one of the actual indicates a packet containing a source IP address that is not the
originator of the packet. Hence, since LISP uses encapsulation, the actual originator of the packet. Hence, since LISP uses
spoofed address could be in the outer header as well as in the inner encapsulation, the spoofed address could be in the outer header as
header, this translates in two types of spoofing. well as in the inner header, this translates to two types of
spoofing.
Inner address spoofing: the attacker uses encapsulation and uses a Inner address spoofing: the attacker uses encapsulation and uses a
spoofed source address in the inner packet. In case of data- spoofed source address in the inner packet. In case of data-
plane LISP encapsulation, that corresponds to spoof the source plane LISP encapsulation, that corresponds to spoofing the
EID address of the encapsulated packet. source EID (End-point IDentifier) address of the encapsulated
packet.
Outer address spoofing: the attacker does not use encapsulation and Outer address spoofing: the attacker does not use encapsulation and
spoofs the source address of the packet. In case of data-plane spoofs the source address of the packet. In case of data-plane
LISP encapsulation, that corresponds to spoof the source RLOC LISP encapsulation, that corresponds to spoofing the source
address of the encapsulated packet. RLOC (Routing LOCator) address of the encapsulated packet.
Note that the two types of spoofing are not mutually exclusive, Note that the two types of spoofing are not mutually exclusive,
rather all combinations are possible and could be used to perform rather all combinations are possible and could be used to perform
different kind of attacks. For example, an attacker outside a LISP different kinds of attacks. For example, an attacker outside a LISP
site can generate a packet with a forged source IP address (i.e., site can generate a packet with a forged source IP address (i.e.,
outer address spoofing) and forward it to a LISP destination. The outer address spoofing) and forward it to a LISP destination. The
packet is then eventually encapsulated by a PITR so that once packet is then eventually encapsulated by a PITR (Proxy Ingress
encapsulated the attack corresponds to a inner address spoofing. One Tunnel Router) so that once encapsulated the attack corresponds to a
can also imagine an attacker forging a packet with encapsulation inner address spoofing. One can also imagine an attacker forging a
where both inner an outer source addresses are spoofed. packet with encapsulation where both inner and outer source addresses
are spoofed.
It is important to notice that the combination of inner and outer It is important to note that the combination of inner and outer
spoofing makes the identification of the attacker complex as the spoofing makes the identification of the attacker complex as the
packet may not contain information that allows to detect the origin packet may not contain information that allows to detect the origin
of the attack. of the attack.
2.2.5. Rogue attack 2.2.5. Rogue attack
In a rogue attack the attacker manages to appear as a legitimate In a rogue attack the attacker manages to appear as a legitimate
source of information, without faking its identity (as opposed to a source of information, without faking its identity (as opposed to a
spoofing attacker). spoofing attacker).
2.2.6. Denial of Service (DoS) attack 2.2.6. Denial of Service (DoS) attack
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack aims at disrupting a specific A Denial of Service (DoS) attack aims at disrupting a specific
targeted service to make it unable to operate properly. targeted service to make it unable to operate properly.
2.2.7. Performance attack 2.2.7. Performance attack
A performance attacks aims at exploiting computational resources A performance attacks aims at exploiting computational resources
(e.g., memory, processor) of a targeted node so to make it unable to (e.g., memory, processor) of a targeted node so as to make it unable
operate properly. to operate properly.
2.2.8. Intrusion attack 2.2.8. Intrusion attack
In an intrusion attack the attacker gains remote access to a resource In an intrusion attack, the attacker gains remote access to a
(e.g., a host, a router, or a network) or information that it resource (e.g., a host, a router, or a network) or information that
normally doesn't have access to. Intrusion attacks can lead to it legitimately should not have access. Intrusion attacks can lead
privacy leakages. to privacy leakages.
2.2.9. Amplification attack 2.2.9. Amplification attack
In an amplification attack, the traffic generated by the target of In an amplification attack, the traffic generated by the target of
the attack in response to the attack is larger than the traffic that the attack in response to the attack is larger than the traffic that
the attacker must generate. the attacker must generate.
In some cases, the data-plane can be several order of magnitude In some cases, the data-plane can be several orders of magnitude
faster than the control-plane at processing packets. This difference faster than the control-plane at processing packets. This difference
can be exploited to overload the control-plane via the data-plane can be exploited to overload the control-plane via the data-plane
without overloading the data-plane. without overloading the data-plane.
2.2.10. Multi-category attacks 2.2.10. Multi-category attacks
Attacks categories are not mutually exclusive and any combination can Attacks categories are not mutually exclusive and any combination can
be used to perform specific attacks. be used to perform specific attacks.
For example, one can mount a rogue attack to perform a performance For example, one can mount a rogue attack to perform a performance
attack starving the memory of an ITR resulting in a DoS on the ITR. attack starving the memory of an ITR (Ingress Tunnel Router)
resulting in a DoS (Denial-of-Service) on the ITR.
3. Attack vectors 3. Attack vectors
This section presents techniques that can be used by attackers in This section presents attack techniques that may be used by attackers
order to succeed attacks leveraging the LISP protocol and/or when leveraging the LISP protocol and/or architecture.
architecture.
3.1. Gleaning 3.1. Gleaning
To reduce the time required to obtain a mapping, the optional To reduce the time required to obtain a mapping, the optional
gleaning mechanism allows an xTR to directly learn a mapping from the gleaning mechanism defined for LISP allows an xTR ( Ingress and/or
LISP data encapsulated packets and the Map-Request packets that it Egress Tunnel Router) to directly learn a mapping from the LISP data
receives. LISP encapsulated data packets contain a source RLOC, encapsulated packets and the Map-Request packets that it receives.
destination RLOC, source EID and destination EID. When an xTR LISP encapsulated data packets contain a source RLOC, destination
receives an encapsulated data packet coming from a source EID for RLOC, source EID and destination EID. When an xTR receives an
which it does not already know a mapping, it may insert the mapping encapsulated data packet coming from a source EID for which it does
between the source RLOC and the source EID in its EID-to-RLOC Cache. not already know a mapping, it may insert the mapping between the
The same technique can be used when an xTR receives a Map-Request as source RLOC and the source EID in its EID-to-RLOC Cache. The same
the Map-Request also contains a source EID address and a source RLOC. technique can be used when an xTR receives a Map-Request as the Map-
Once a gleaned entry has been added to the EID-to-RLOC cache, the xTR Request also contains a source EID address and a source RLOC. Once a
sends a Map-Request to retrieve the actual mapping for the gleaned gleaned entry has been added to the EID-to-RLOC cache, the xTR sends
EID from the mapping system. a Map-Request to retrieve the actual mapping for the gleaned EID from
the mapping system.
If a packet injected by an off-path attacker and with a spoofed inner If a packet injected by an off-path attacker and with a spoofed inner
address is gleaned by an xTR then the attacker may divert the traffic address is gleaned by an xTR then the attacker may divert the traffic
meant to be delivered to the spoofed EID as long as the gleaned entry meant to be delivered to the spoofed EID as long as the gleaned entry
is used by the xTR. This attack can be used as part of replay, is used by the xTR. This attack can be used as part of replay,
packet manipulation, packet interception and suppression, or DoS packet manipulation, packet interception and suppression, or DoS
attacks as the packets are sent to the attacker. attacks as the packets are sent to the attacker.
If the packet sent by the attacker contains a spoofed outer address If the packet sent by the attacker contains a spoofed outer address
instead of a spoofed inner address then it can achieve a DoS or a instead of a spoofed inner address then it can achieve a DoS or a
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have repercussions on the control-plane as a Map-Request is sent have repercussions on the control-plane as a Map-Request is sent
after the creation of a gleaned entry. The attacker can then achieve after the creation of a gleaned entry. The attacker can then achieve
DoS and performance attacks on the control-plane. For example, if an DoS and performance attacks on the control-plane. For example, if an
attacker sends a packet for each address of a prefix not yet cached attacker sends a packet for each address of a prefix not yet cached
in the EID-to-RLOC cache of an xTR, the xTR will potentially send a in the EID-to-RLOC cache of an xTR, the xTR will potentially send a
Map-Request for each such packet until the mapping is installed which Map-Request for each such packet until the mapping is installed which
leads to an over-utilisation of the control-plane as each packet leads to an over-utilisation of the control-plane as each packet
generates a control-plane event. In order for this attack to generates a control-plane event. In order for this attack to
succeed, the attacker may not need to use spoofing. This issue can succeed, the attacker may not need to use spoofing. This issue can
occur even if gleaning is turned off since whether or not gleaning is occur even if gleaning is turned off since whether or not gleaning is
used the ITR may need to send a Map-Request in response to incoming used as the ITR may need to send a Map-Request in response to
packets whose EID is not currently in the cache. incoming packets whose EID is not currently in the cache.
Gleaning attacks are fundamentally involving a time-shifted mode of Gleaning attacks are fundamentally involving a time-shifted mode of
operation as the attack may last as long as the gleaned entry is kept operation as the attack may last as long as the gleaned entry is kept
by the targeted xTR. RFC 6830 [RFC6830] recommends to store the by the targeted xTR. RFC 6830 [RFC6830] recommends to store the
gleaned entries for only a few seconds which limits the duration of gleaned entries for only a few seconds which limits the duration of
the attack. the attack.
Gleaning attacks always involve external data-plane attackers but Gleaning attacks always involve external data-plane attackers but
results in attacks on either the control-plane or data-plane. results in attacks on either the control-plane or data-plane.
It is worth to notice that the outer spoofed address does not need to Note, the outer spoofed address does not need to be the RLOC of a
be the RLOC of a LISP site an may be any address. LISP site, it may be any address.
3.2. Locator Status Bits 3.2. Locator Status Bits
When the L bit in the LISP header is set to 1, it indicates that the When the L bit in the LISP header is set to 1, it indicates that the
second 32-bits longword of the LISP header contains the Locator second 32-bits longword of the LISP header contains the Locator
Status Bits. In this field, each bit position reflects the status of Status Bits. In this field, each bit position reflects the status of
one of the RLOCs mapped to the source EID found in the encapsulated one of the RLOCs mapped to the source EID found in the encapsulated
packet. The reaction of a LISP xTR that receives such a packet is packet. The reaction of a LISP xTR that receives such a packet is
left as operational choice in [RFC6830]. left as operational choice in [RFC6830].
When an attacker sends a LISP encapsulated packet with a crafted LSB When an attacker sends a LISP encapsulated packet with an
to an xTR, it can influence the xTR's choice of the locators for the illegitimately crafted LSB to an xTR, it can influence the xTR's
prefix associated to the source EID. In case of an off-path choice of the locators for the prefix associated to the source EID.
attacker, the attacker must inject a forged packet in the network In case of an off-path attacker, the attacker must inject a forged
with a spoofed inner address. An on-path attacker can manipulate the packet in the network with a spoofed inner address. An on-path
LSB of legitimate packets passing through it and hence does not need attacker can manipulate the LSB of legitimate packets passing through
to use spoofing. Instead of manipulating the LSB field, an on-path it and hence does not need to use spoofing. Instead of manipulating
attacker can also obtain the same result of injecting packets with the LSB field, an on-path attacker can also obtain the same result of
invalid LSB values by replaying packets. injecting packets with invalid LSB values by replaying packets.
The LSB field can be leveraged to mount a DoS attack by either The LSB field can be leveraged to mount a DoS attack by either
declaring all RLOCs as unreachable (all LSB set to 0), or by declaring all RLOCs as unreachable (all LSB set to 0), or by
concentrating all the traffic to one RLOC (e.g., all but one LSB set concentrating all the traffic to one RLOC (e.g., all but one LSB set
to 0) and hence overloading the RLOC concentrating all the traffic to 0) and hence overloading the RLOC concentrating all the traffic
from the xTR, or by forcing packets to be sent to RLOCs that are from the xTR, or by forcing packets to be sent to RLOCs that are
actually not reachable (e.g., invert LSB values). actually not reachable (e.g., invert LSB values).
The LSB field can also be used to mount a replay, a packet The LSB field can also be used to mount a replay, a packet
manipulation, or a packet interception and suppression attack. manipulation, or a packet interception and suppression attack.
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When the Map-Version bit of the LISP header is set to 1, it indicates When the Map-Version bit of the LISP header is set to 1, it indicates
that the low-order 24 bits of the first 32 bits longword of the LISP that the low-order 24 bits of the first 32 bits longword of the LISP
header contain a Source and Destination Map-Version. When a LISP xTR header contain a Source and Destination Map-Version. When a LISP xTR
receives a LISP encapsulated packet with the Map-Version bit set to receives a LISP encapsulated packet with the Map-Version bit set to
1, the following actions are taken: 1, the following actions are taken:
o It compares the Destination Map-Version found in the header with o It compares the Destination Map-Version found in the header with
the current version of its own configured EID-to-RLOC mapping, for the current version of its own configured EID-to-RLOC mapping, for
the destination EID found in the encapsulated packet. If the the destination EID found in the encapsulated packet. If the
received Destination Map-Version is smaller (i.e., older) than the received Destination Map-Version is smaller (i.e., older) than the
current version, the ETR should apply the SMR procedure described current version, the ETR should apply the SMR (Solicit-Map-
in [RFC6830] and send a Map-Request with the SMR bit set. Request) procedure described in [RFC6830] and send a Map-Request
with the SMR bit set.
o If a mapping exists in the EID-to-RLOC Cache for the source EID, o If a mapping exists in the EID-to-RLOC Cache for the source EID,
then it compares the Map-Version of that entry with the Source then it compares the Map-Version of that entry with the Source
Map-Version found in the header of the packet. If the stored Map-Version found in the header of the packet. If the stored
mapping is older (i.e., the Map-Version is smaller) than the mapping is older (i.e., the Map-Version is smaller) than the
source version of the LISP encapsulated packet, the xTR should source version of the LISP encapsulated packet, the xTR should
send a Map-Request for the source EID. send a Map-Request for the source EID.
A cross-mode attacker can use the Map-Version bit to mount a DoS A cross-mode attacker can use the Map-Version bit to mount a DoS
attack, an amplification attack, or a spoofing attack. For instance attack, an amplification attack, or a spoofing attack. For instance
if the mapping cached at the xTR is outdated, the xTR will send a if the mapping cached at the xTR is outdated, the xTR will send a
Map-Request to retrieve the new mapping which can yield to a DoS Map-Request to retrieve the new mapping which can yield to a DoS
attack (by excess of signalling traffic) or an amplification attack attack (by excess of signalling traffic) or an amplification attack
if the data-plane packet sent by the attacker is smaller, or if the data-plane packet sent by the attacker is smaller, or
otherwise uses fewer resources, than the control-plane packets sent otherwise uses fewer resources, than the control-plane packets sent
in response to the attacker's packet. With a spoofing attack and if in response to the attacker's packet. With a spoofing attack, and if
the xTR considers that the spoofed ITR has an outdated mapping, it the xTR considers that the spoofed ITR has an outdated mapping, it
will send an SMR to the spoofed ITR which can result in performance, will send an SMR to the spoofed ITR which can result in performance,
amplification, or DoS attack as well. amplification, or DoS attack as well.
Map-Version attackers are inherently cross mode as the Map-Version is Map-Version attackers are inherently cross mode as the Map-Version is
a method to put control information in the data-plane. Moreover, a method to put control information in the data-plane. Moreover,
this vector involves live attackers. Nevertheless, on-path attackers this vector involves live attackers. Nevertheless, on-path attackers
do not take specific advantage over off-path attackers. do not have specific advantage over off-path attackers.
3.4. Routing Locator Reachability 3.4. Routing Locator Reachability
The Nonce-Present and Echo-Nonce bits in the LISP header are used to The Nonce-Present and Echo-Nonce bits in the LISP header are used to
verify the reachability of an xTR. A testing xTR sets the Echo-Nonce verify the reachability of an xTR. A testing xTR sets the Echo-Nonce
and the Nonce-Present bits in LISP data encapsulated packets and and the Nonce-Present bits in LISP data encapsulated packets and
include a random nonce in the LISP header of packets. Upon reception include a random nonce in the LISP header of packets. Upon reception
of these packets, the tested xTR stores the nonce and echo it of these packets, the tested xTR stores the nonce and echoes it
whenever it returns a LISP encapsulated data packets to the testing whenever it returns a LISP encapsulated data packets to the testing
xTR. The reception of the echoed nonce confirms that the tested xTR xTR. The reception of the echoed nonce confirms that the tested xTR
is reachable. is reachable.
An attacker can interfere with the reachability test by sending two An attacker can interfere with the reachability test by sending two
different types of packets: different types of packets:
1. LISP data encapsulated packets with the Nonce-Present bit set and 1. LISP data encapsulated packets with the Nonce-Present bit set and
a random nonce. Such packets are normally used in response to a a random nonce. Such packets are normally used in response to a
reachability test. reachability test.
2. LISP data encapsulated packets with the Nonce-Present and the 2. LISP data encapsulated packets with the Nonce-Present and the
Echo-Nonce bits both set. These packets will force the receiving Echo-Nonce bits both set. These packets will force the receiving
ETR to store the received nonce and echo it in the LISP ETR to store the received nonce and echo it in the LISP
encapsulated packets that it sends. These packets are normally encapsulated packets that it sends. These packets are normally
used as trigger for a reachability test. used as a trigger for a reachability test.
The first type of packets is used to make xTRs think that an other The first type of packets are used to make xTRs think that an other
xTR is reachable while it is not. It is hence a way to mount a DoS xTR is reachable while it is not. It is hence a way to mount a DoS
attack (i.e., the ITR will send its packet to a non-reachable ETR attack (i.e., the ITR will send its packet to a non-reachable ETR
while it should use another one). when it should use another one).
The second type of packets could be exploited to attack the nonce- The second type of packets could be exploited to attack the nonce-
based reachability test. If the attacker sends a continuous flow of based reachability test. If the attacker sends a continuous flow of
packets that each have a different random nonce, the ETR that packets that each have a different random nonce, the ETR that
receives such packets will continuously change the nonce that it receives such packets will continuously change the nonce that it
returns to the remote ITR, which can yield to a performance attack. returns to the remote ITR, which can yield to a performance attack.
If the remote ITR tries a nonce-reachability test, this test may fail If the remote ITR tries a nonce-reachability test, this test may fail
because the ETR may echo an invalid nonce. This hence yields to a because the ETR may echo an invalid nonce. This hence yields to a
DoS attack. DoS attack.
skipping to change at page 12, line 15 skipping to change at page 12, line 21
LISP site. LISP site.
An attacker (either a control-plane or data-plane attacker) can use An attacker (either a control-plane or data-plane attacker) can use
the instance ID functionality to mount an intrusion attack. the instance ID functionality to mount an intrusion attack.
3.6. Interworking 3.6. Interworking
[RFC6832] defines Proxy-ITR and Proxy-ETR network elements to allow [RFC6832] defines Proxy-ITR and Proxy-ETR network elements to allow
LISP and non-LISP sites to communicate. The Proxy-ITR has LISP and non-LISP sites to communicate. The Proxy-ITR has
functionality similar to the ITR, however, its main purpose is to functionality similar to the ITR, however, its main purpose is to
encapsulate packets arriving from the DFZ in order to reach LISP encapsulate packets arriving from the DFZ (Default-Free Zone) in
sites. A Proxy-ETR has functionality similar to the ETR, however, order to reach LISP sites. A PETR (Proxy Egress Tunnel Router) has
its main purpose is to inject de-encapsulated packets in the DFZ in functionality similar to the ETR, however, its main purpose is to
order to reach non-LISP Sites from LISP sites. As a PITR (resp. inject de-encapsulated packets in the DFZ in order to reach non-LISP
PETR) is a particular case of ITR (resp. ETR), it is subject to same sites from LISP sites. As a PITR (or PETR) is a particular case of
attacks than ITRs (resp. ETR). ITR (or ETR), it is subject to similar attacks as ITRs (or ETRs).
As any other system relying on proxies, LISP interworking can be used As any other system relying on proxies, LISP interworking can be used
by attackers to hide their exact origin in the network. by attackers to hide their exact origin in the network.
3.7. Map-Request messages 3.7. Map-Request messages
A control-plane off-path attacker can exploit Map-Request messages to A control-plane off-path attacker can exploit Map-Request messages to
mount DoS, performance, or amplification attacks. By sending Map- mount DoS, performance, or amplification attacks. By sending Map-
Request messages at high rate, the attacker can overload nodes Request messages at high rate, the attacker can overload nodes
involved in the mapping system. For instance sending Map-Requests at involved in the mapping system. For instance sending Map-Requests at
high rate can considerably increase the state maintained in a Map- high rate can considerably increase the state maintained in a Map-
Resolver or consume CPU cycles on ETRs that have to process the Map- Resolver or consume CPU cycles on ETRs that have to process the Map-
Request packets they receive in their slow path (i.e., performance or Request packets they receive in their slow path (i.e., performance or
DoS attack). When the Map-Reply packet is larger than the Map- DoS attack). When the Map-Reply packet is larger than the Map-
Request sent by the attacker, that yields to an amplification attack. Request sent by the attacker, that yields to an amplification attack.
The attacker can combine the attack with a spoofing attack to The attacker can combine the attack with a spoofing attack to
overload the node to which the spoofed address is actually attached. overload the node to which the spoofed address is actually attached.
It is worth to notice that if the attacker sets the P bit (Probe Bit) Note, if the attacker sets the P bit (Probe Bit) in the Map-Request,
in the Map-Request, it is legitimate the send the Map-Request it will cause legitimately sending the Map-Request directly to the
directly to the ETR instead of passing through the mapping system. ETR instead of passing through the mapping system.
The SMR bit can be used to mount a variant of these attacks. The SMR bit can be used to mount a variant of these attacks.
For efficiency reasons, Map-Records can be appended to Map-Request For efficiency reasons, Map-Records can be appended to Map-Request
messages. When an xTR receives a Map-Request with appended Map- messages. When an xTR receives a Map-Request with appended Map-
Records, it does the same operations as for the other Map-Request Records, it does the same operations as for the other Map-Request
messages and is so subject to the same attacks. However, it also messages and so is subject to the same attacks. However, it also
installs in its EID-to-RLOC cache the Map-Records contained in the installs in its EID-to-RLOC cache the Map-Records contained in the
Map-Request. An attacker can then use this vector to force the Map-Request. An attacker can then use this vector to force the
installation of mappings in its target xTR. Consequently, the EID- installation of mappings in its target xTR. Consequently, the EID-
to-RLOC cache of the xTR is polluted by potentially forged mappings to-RLOC cache of the xTR is polluted by potentially forged mappings
allowing the attacker to mount any of the attacks categorized in allowing the attacker to mount any of the attacks categorized in
Section 2.2 (see Section 3.8 for more details). It is worth to Section 2.2 (see Section 3.8 for more details). Note, the attacker
mention that the attacker does not need to forge the mappings present does not need to forge the mappings present in the Map-Request to
in the Map-Request to achieve a performance or DoS attack. Indeed, achieve a performance or DoS attack. Indeed, if the attacker owns a
if the attacker owns a large enough EID prefix it can de-aggregate it large enough EID prefix it can de-aggregate it in many small
in many small prefixes, each corresponding to another mapping and it prefixes, each corresponding to another mapping and it installs them
installs them in the xTR cache by mean of the Map-Request. in the xTR cache by mean of the Map-Request.
Moreover, attackers can use Map Resolver and/or Map Server network Moreover, attackers can use Map Resolver and/or Map Server network
elements to relay its attacks and hide the origin of the attack. elements to relay its attacks and hide the origin of the attack.
Indeed, on the one hand, a Map Resolver is used to dispatch Map- Indeed, on the one hand, a Map Resolver is used to dispatch Map-
Request to the mapping system and, on the other hand, a Map Server is Request to the mapping system and, on the other hand, a Map Server is
used to dispatch Map-Requests coming from the mapping system to ETRs used to dispatch Map-Requests coming from the mapping system to ETRs
that are authoritative for the EID in the Map-Request. that are authoritative for the EID in the Map-Request.
3.8. Map-Reply messages 3.8. Map-Reply messages
Most of the security of the Map-Reply messages depends on the 64 bits Most of the security risks associated with Map-Reply messages will
nonce that is included in a Map-Request and returned in the Map- depend on the 64 bits nonce that is included in a Map-Request and
Reply. If an ETR does not accept Map-Reply messages with an invalid returned in the Map-Reply. If an ETR does not accept Map-Reply
nonce, the risk of an off-path attack is limited given the size of messages with an invalid nonce, the risk of an off-path attack is
the nonce (64 bits). Nevertheless, the nonce only confirms that the limited given the size of the nonce (64 bits). Nevertheless, the
Map-Reply received was sent in response to a Map-Request sent, it nonce only confirms that the Map-Reply received was sent in response
does not validate the contents of that Map-Reply. to a Map-Request sent, it does not validate the contents of that Map-
Reply.
If an attacker manages to send a valid (i.e., in response to a Map- If an attacker manages to send a valid (i.e., in response to a Map-
Request and with the correct nonce) Map-Reply to an ITR, then it can Request and with the correct nonce) Map-Reply to an ITR, then it can
perform any of the attack categorised in Section 2.2 as it can inject perform any of the attacks categorised in Section 2.2 as it can
forged mappings directly in the ITR EID-to-RLOC cache. For instance, inject forged mappings directly in the ITR EID-to-RLOC cache. For
if the mapping injected to the ITR points to the address of a node instance, if the mapping injected to the ITR points to the address of
controlled by the attacker, it can mount replay, packet manipulation, a node controlled by the attacker, it can mount replay, packet
packet interception and suppression, or DoS attacks as it will manipulation, packet interception and suppression, or DoS attacks, as
receive every packet destined to a destination lying in the EID it will receive every packet destined to a destination lying in the
prefix of the injected mapping. In addition, the attacker can inject EID prefix of the injected mapping. In addition, the attacker can
plethora of mappings in the ITR to mount a performance attack by inject a plethora of mappings in the ITR to mount a performance
filling up the EID-to-RLOC cache of the ITR. If the attacker can attack by filling up the EID-to-RLOC cache of the ITR. The attacker
also mount an amplification attack as soon as the ITR has to send a can also mount an amplification attack if the ITR at that time is
lot of packets to the EIDs matching the injected mapping. In this sending a large number of packets to the EIDs matching the injected
case, the RLOC address associated to the mapping is the address of mapping. In this case, the RLOC address associated to the mapping is
the real target of the attacker and all the traffic of the ITR will the address of the real target of the attacker and so all the traffic
be sent to the target which means that with one single packet the of the ITR will be sent to the target which means that with one
attacker may generate very high traffic towards its final target. single packet the attacker may generate very high traffic towards its
final target.
If the attacker is a valid ETR in the system it can mount a rogue If the attacker is a valid ETR in the system, it can mount a rogue
attack if it uses prefixes over-claiming. In such a scenario, the attack if it uses prefixes over-claiming. In such a scenario, the
attacker ETR replies to a legitimate Map-Request message it received attacker ETR replies to a legitimate Map-Request message which it
with a Map-Reply message that contains an EID-Prefix that is larger received with a Map-Reply message that contains an EID-Prefix that is
than the prefix owned by the attacker. For instance if the owned larger than the prefix owned by the attacker. For example if the
prefix is 192.0.2.0/25 but the Map-Reply contains a mapping for owned prefix is 192.0.2.0/25 but the Map-Reply contains a mapping for
192.0.2.0/24, then the mapping will influence packets destined to 192.0.2.0/24, then the mapping will influence packets destined to
other EIDs than the one attacker has authority on. With such other EIDs than the one attacker has authority on. With such
technique, the attacker can mount the attacks presented above as it technique, the attacker can mount the attacks presented above as it
can (partially) control the mappings installed on its target ITR. To can (partially) control the mappings installed on its target ITR. To
force its target ITR to send a Map-Request, nothing prevents the force its target ITR to send a Map-Request, nothing prevents the
attacker to initiate some communication with the ITR. This method attacker to initiate some communication with the ITR. This method
can be used by internal attackers that want to control the mappings can be used by internal attackers that want to control the mappings
installed in their site. To that aim, they simply have to collude installed in their site. To that aim, they simply have to collude
with an external attacker ready to over-claim prefixes on behalf of with an external attacker ready to over-claim prefixes on behalf of
the internal attacker. the internal attacker.
It is worth to notice that when the Map-Reply is in response to a Note, when the Map-Reply is in response to a Map-Request sent via the
Map-Request sent via the mapping system (i.e., not send directly from mapping system (i.e., not send directly from the ITR to an ETR), the
the ITR to an ETR), the attacker does not need to use a spoofing attacker does not need to use a spoofing attack to achieve its attack
attack to achieve its attack as by design the source IP address of a as by design the source IP address of a Map-Reply is not known in
Map-Reply is not known in advance by the ITR. advance by the ITR.
Map-Request and Map-Reply messages are exposed to any type of Map-Request and Map-Reply messages are exposed to any type of
attackers, on-path or off-path but also external or internal attackers, on-path or off-path but also external or internal
attackers. Also, even though they are control message, they can be attackers. Also, even though they are control message, they can be
leveraged by data-plane attackers. As the decision of removing leveraged by data-plane attackers. As the decision of removing
mappings is based on the TTL indicated in the mapping, time-shifted mappings is based on the TTL indicated in the mapping, time-shifted
attackers can take benefit of injecting forged mappings as well. attackers can take advantage of injecting forged mappings as well.
3.9. Map-Register messages 3.9. Map-Register messages
Map-Register messages are sent by ETRs to Map Servers to indicate to Map-Register messages are sent by ETRs to Map Servers to indicate to
the mapping system the EID prefixes associated to them. The Map- the mapping system the EID prefixes associated to them. The Map-
Register message provides an EID prefix and the list of ETRs that are Register message provides an EID prefix and the list of ETRs that are
able to provide Map-Replies for the EID covered by the EID prefix. able to provide Map-Replies for the EID covered by the EID prefix.
As Map-Register messages are protected by an authentication As Map-Register messages are protected by an authentication
mechanism, only a compromised ETR can register itself to its mechanism, only a compromised ETR can register itself to its
skipping to change at page 14, line 51 skipping to change at page 15, line 10
A compromised ETR can over-claim the prefix it owns in order to A compromised ETR can over-claim the prefix it owns in order to
influence the route followed by Map-Requests for EIDs outside the influence the route followed by Map-Requests for EIDs outside the
scope of its legitimate EID prefix (see Section 3.8 for the list of scope of its legitimate EID prefix (see Section 3.8 for the list of
over-claiming attacks). over-claiming attacks).
A compromised ETR can also de-aggregate its EID prefix in order to A compromised ETR can also de-aggregate its EID prefix in order to
register more EID prefixes than necessary to its Map Servers (see register more EID prefixes than necessary to its Map Servers (see
Section 3.7 for the impact of de-aggregation of prefixes by an Section 3.7 for the impact of de-aggregation of prefixes by an
attacker). attacker).
Similarly, a compromised Map Server can accept invalid registration Similarly, a compromised Map Server can accept an invalid
or advertise invalid EID prefix to the mapping system. registration or advertise an invalid EID prefix to the mapping
system.
3.10. Map-Notify messages 3.10. Map-Notify messages
Map-Notify messages are sent by a Map Server to an ETR to acknowledge Map-Notify messages are sent by a Map Server to an ETR to acknowledge
the good reception and processing of a Map-Register message. the reception and processing of a Map-Register message.
Similarly to the pair Map-Request/Map-Reply, the pair Map-Register/ Similarly to the pair Map-Request/Map-Reply, the pair Map-Register/
Map-Notify is protected by a nonce making it hard for an attacker to Map-Notify is protected by a nonce making it difficult for an
inject a falsified notification to an ETR to make this ETR believe attacker to inject a falsified notification to an ETR to make this
that the registration succeeded while it has not. ETR believe that the registration succeeded when it has not.
4. Note on Privacy 4. Note on Privacy
As presented by [RFC6973], universal privacy considerations are As reviewed in [RFC6973], universal privacy considerations are
impossible to establish as the privacy definition may vary from one difficult to establish as the privacy definitions may vary for
to another. As a consequence, this document does not aim at different scenarios. As a consequence, this document does not aim at
identifying privacy issues related to the LISP protocol but it is identifying privacy issues related to the LISP protocol but the
necessary to highlight that security threats identified in this security threats identified in this document could play a role in
document could play a role in privacy threats as defined in section 5 privacy threats as defined in section 5 of [RFC6973].
of [RFC6973].
Like public deployments of any other control plane protocols, in an Similar to public deployments of any other control plane protocols,
Internet deployment mappings are public and hence provide information in an Internet deployment, LISP mappings are public and hence provide
about the infrastructure and reachability of LISP sites (i.e., the information about the infrastructure and reachability of LISP sites
addresses of the edge routers). Depending upon deployment details, (i.e., the addresses of the edge routers). Depending upon deployment
LISP map replies might or might not provide finer grained and more details, LISP map replies might or might not provide finer grained
detailed information than is available with currently deployed and more detailed information than is available with currently
routing and control protocols. deployed routing and control protocols.
5. Threats Mitigation 5. Threats Mitigation
Most of threats can be mitigated with careful deployment and Most of the above threats can be mitigated with careful deployment
configuration (e.g., filter) and also by applying the general rules and configuration (e.g., filter) and also by applying the general
in security that consist in activating only features that are rules of security, e.g. only activating features that are necessary
necessary in the deployment and verifying the validity of the for the deployment and verifying the validity of the information
information obtained from third parties. obtained from third parties.
The control-plane is the most critical part of LISP from a security The control-plane is the most critical part of LISP from a security
viewpoint and it is worth to notice that the specifications already viewpoint and it is worth to notice that the LISP specifications
offer authentication mechanism for mappings registration ([RFC6833]) already offer an authentication mechanism for mappings registration
and this mechanism combined with LISP-SEC [I-D.ietf-lisp-sec] ([RFC6833]). This mechanism, combined with LISP-SEC
strongly mitigates threats in non-trustable environments such as the [I-D.ietf-lisp-sec], strongly mitigates threats in non-trustable
Internet. Moreover, LISP specifications define an authentication environments such as the Internet. Moreover, an authentication data
data field for Map-Request messages and Encapsulated Control messages field for Map-Request messages and Encapsulated Control messages was
without specifying how to use it [RFC6830]. The presence of this allocated [RFC6830]. This field provides a general authentication
field in the specifications allows to propose a general mechanism technique for the LISP control-plane which future
authentication mechanisms for the LISP control-plane while staying specifications may use while staying backward compatible. The usage
backward compatible. The exact technique still has to be designed will be designed and defined specific for the needs of the
and defined. To maximally mitigate the threats on the mapping specification. The exact technique still has to be designed and
system, authentication must be used, whenever possible, for both Map- defined. To maximally mitigate the threats on the mapping system,
Request and Map-Reply messages and for messages exchanged internally authentication must be used, whenever possible, for both Map-Request
among elements of the mapping system, such as specified in and Map-Reply messages and for messages exchanged internally among
elements of the mapping system, such as specified in
[I-D.ietf-lisp-sec] and [I-D.ietf-lisp-ddt]. [I-D.ietf-lisp-sec] and [I-D.ietf-lisp-ddt].
Systematically applying filters and rate-limitation, as proposed in Systematically applying filters and rate-limitation, as proposed in
[RFC6830], mitigates most of the threats presented in this document. [RFC6830], will mitigate most of the threats presented in this
In order to minimise the risk of overloading the control-plane with document. In order to minimise the risk of overloading the control-
actions triggered from data-plane events, such actions should be rate plane with actions triggered from data-plane events, such actions
limited. should be rate limited.
Finally, all information opportunistically learned (e.g., with LSB or Moreover, all information opportunistically learned (e.g., with LSB
gleaning) should be used with care until they are verified. For or gleaning) should be used with care until they are verified. For
instance, a reachability change learned with LSB should not be used example, a reachability change learned with LSB should not be used
directly to decide the destination RLOC, but instead should trigger a directly to decide the destination RLOC, but instead should trigger a
rate-limited reachability test. Similarly, a gleaned entry should be rate-limited reachability test. Similarly, a gleaned entry should be
used only for the flow that triggered the gleaning procedure until used only for the flow that triggered the gleaning procedure until
the gleaned entry has been verified [Trilogy]. the gleaned entry has been verified [Trilogy].
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
This entire document is dedicated to threat analysis and mitigation This document provides a threat analysis and proposes mitigation
of the Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol, aiming at helping to techniques for the Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol.
understand the security risks at stake, and how to mitigate them,
while deploying LISP in non-trustable environments.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request to IANA. This document makes no request to IANA.
8. Acknowledgments 8. Acknowledgments
This document builds upon the draft of Marcelo Bagnulo This document builds upon the document of Marcelo Bagnulo
([I-D.bagnulo-lisp-threat]), where the flooding attack and the ([I-D.bagnulo-lisp-threat]), where the flooding attack and the
reference environment were first described. reference environment was first described.
The authors would like to thank Ronald Bonica, Albert Cabellos, Ross The authors would like to thank Deborah Brungard, Ronald Bonica,
Callon, Noel Chiappa, Florin Coras, Vina Ermagan, Dino Farinacci, Albert Cabellos, Ross Callon, Noel Chiappa, Florin Coras, Vina
Stephen Farrell, Joel Halpern, Emily Hiltzik, Darrel Lewis, Edward Ermagan, Dino Farinacci, Stephen Farrell, Joel Halpern, Emily
Lopez, Fabio Maino, Terry Manderson, and Jeff Wheeler for their Hiltzik, Darrel Lewis, Edward Lopez, Fabio Maino, Terry Manderson,
comments. and Jeff Wheeler for their comments.
This work has been partially supported by the INFSO-ICT-216372 This work has been partially supported by the INFSO-ICT-216372
TRILOGY Project (www.trilogy-project.org). TRILOGY Project (www.trilogy-project.org).
The work of Luigi Iannone has been partially supported by the ANR-13- The work of Luigi Iannone has been partially supported by the ANR-13-
INFR-0009 LISP-Lab Project (www.lisp-lab.org) and the EIT KIC ICT- INFR-0009 LISP-Lab Project (www.lisp-lab.org) and the EIT KIC ICT-
Labs SOFNETS Project. Labs SOFNETS Project.
9. References 9. References
skipping to change at page 18, line 9 skipping to change at page 18, line 19
draft-bagnulo-lisp-threat-01 (work in progress), draft-bagnulo-lisp-threat-01 (work in progress),
July 2007. July 2007.
[I-D.ietf-lisp-ddt] [I-D.ietf-lisp-ddt]
Fuller, V., Lewis, D., Ermagan, V., and A. Jain, "LISP Fuller, V., Lewis, D., Ermagan, V., and A. Jain, "LISP
Delegated Database Tree", draft-ietf-lisp-ddt-03 (work in Delegated Database Tree", draft-ietf-lisp-ddt-03 (work in
progress), April 2015. progress), April 2015.
[I-D.ietf-lisp-sec] [I-D.ietf-lisp-sec]
Maino, F., Ermagan, V., Cabellos-Aparicio, A., and D. Maino, F., Ermagan, V., Cabellos-Aparicio, A., and D.
Saucez, "LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)", draft-ietf-lisp-sec-08 Saucez, "LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)", draft-ietf-lisp-sec-09
(work in progress), April 2015. (work in progress), October 2015.
[RFC7215] Jakab, L., Cabellos-Aparicio, A., Coras, F., Domingo- [RFC7215] Jakab, L., Cabellos-Aparicio, A., Coras, F., Domingo-
Pascual, J., and D. Lewis, "Locator/Identifier Separation Pascual, J., and D. Lewis, "Locator/Identifier Separation
Protocol (LISP) Network Element Deployment Protocol (LISP) Network Element Deployment
Considerations", RFC 7215, DOI 10.17487/RFC7215, Considerations", RFC 7215, DOI 10.17487/RFC7215,
April 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7215>. April 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7215>.
[Trilogy] Saucez, D. and L. Iannone, "How to mitigate the effect of [Trilogy] Saucez, D. and L. Iannone, "How to mitigate the effect of
scans on mapping systems", Trilogy Future Internet Summer scans on mapping systems", Trilogy Future Internet Summer
School., 2009. School., 2009.
Appendix A. Document Change Log Appendix A. Document Change Log (to be removed on publication)
o Version 14 Posted December 2015.
* Editorial changes according to Deborah Brungard's (Routing AD)
review.
o Version 13 Posted August 2015. o Version 13 Posted August 2015.
* Keepalive version. * Keepalive version.
o Version 12 Posted March 2015. o Version 12 Posted March 2015.
* Addressed comments by Ross Callon on the mailing list (http:// * Addressed comments by Ross Callon on the mailing list (http://
www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/lisp/current/msg05829.html). www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/lisp/current/msg05829.html).
* Addition of a section discussing mitigation techniques for * Addition of a section discussing mitigation techniques for
deployments in non-trustable environments. deployments in non-trustable environments.
o Version 11 Posted December 2014. o Version 11 Posted December 2014.
* Editorial polishing. Clarifications added in few points. * Editorial polishing. Clarifications added in few points.
o Version 10 Posted July 2014. o Version 10 Posted July 2014.
* Document completely remodeled according to the discussions on * Document completely remodelled according to the discussions on
the mailing list in the thread the mailing list in the thread
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/lisp/current/msg05206.html http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/lisp/current/msg05206.html
and to address comments from Ronald Bonica and Ross Callon. and to address comments from Ronald Bonica and Ross Callon.
o Version 09 Posted March 2014. o Version 09 Posted March 2014.
* Updated document according to the review of A. Cabellos. * Updated document according to the review of A. Cabellos.
o Version 08 Posted October 2013. o Version 08 Posted October 2013.
 End of changes. 61 change blocks. 
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