draft-ietf-lisp-sec-14.txt   draft-ietf-lisp-sec-15.txt 
Network Working Group F. Maino Network Working Group F. Maino
Internet-Draft V. Ermagan Internet-Draft V. Ermagan
Intended status: Standards Track Cisco Systems Intended status: Standards Track Cisco Systems
Expires: April 28, 2018 A. Cabellos Expires: October 19, 2018 A. Cabellos
Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
D. Saucez D. Saucez
INRIA INRIA
October 25, 2017 April 17, 2018
LISP-Security (LISP-SEC) LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)
draft-ietf-lisp-sec-14 draft-ietf-lisp-sec-15
Abstract Abstract
This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that
provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection
to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup
process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID- process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID-
prefix claims in Map-Reply messages. prefix claims in Map-Reply messages.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 28, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 19, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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5.4.2. PITR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.4.2. PITR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.5. Encrypting and Decrypting an OTK . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.5. Encrypting and Decrypting an OTK . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.6. Map-Resolver Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.6. Map-Resolver Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.7. Map-Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.7. Map-Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.7.1. Map-Server Processing in Proxy mode . . . . . . . . . 16 5.7.1. Map-Server Processing in Proxy mode . . . . . . . . . 16
5.8. ETR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.8. ETR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1. Mapping System Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.1. Mapping System Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2. Random Number Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.2. Random Number Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.3. Map-Server and ETR Colocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.3. Map-Server and ETR Colocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.4. Deploying LISP-SEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.4. Deploying LISP-SEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.5. Shared Keys Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.5. Shared Keys Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.6. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.6. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.7. Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of Service 6.7. Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of Service
Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1. ECM AD Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.1. ECM AD Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.2. Map-Reply AD Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.2. Map-Reply AD Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3. HMAC Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.3. HMAC Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.4. Key Wrap Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.4. Key Wrap Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.5. Key Derivation Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7.5. Key Derivation Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Locator/ID Separation Protocol [RFC6830] is a network-layer-based The Locator/ID Separation Protocol
protocol that enables separation of IP addresses into two new [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis],[I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis] is a network-
numbering spaces: Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) and Routing Locators layer-based protocol that enables separation of IP addresses into two
(RLOCs). EID-to-RLOC mappings are stored in a database, the LISP new numbering spaces: Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) and Routing
Mapping System, and made available via the Map-Request/Map-Reply Locators (RLOCs). EID-to-RLOC mappings are stored in a database, the
LISP Mapping System, and made available via the Map-Request/Map-Reply
lookup process. If these EID-to-RLOC mappings, carried through Map- lookup process. If these EID-to-RLOC mappings, carried through Map-
Reply messages, are transmitted without integrity protection, an Reply messages, are transmitted without integrity protection, an
adversary can manipulate them and hijack the communication, adversary can manipulate them and hijack the communication,
impersonate the requested EID, or mount Denial of Service or impersonate the requested EID, or mount Denial of Service or
Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Also, if the Map-Reply Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Also, if the Map-Reply
message is transported unauthenticated, an adversarial LISP entity message is transported unauthenticated, an adversarial LISP entity
can overclaim an EID-prefix and maliciously redirect traffic directed can overclaim an EID-prefix and maliciously redirect traffic directed
to a large number of hosts. The LISP-SEC threat model, described in to a large number of hosts. The LISP-SEC threat model, described in
Section 3, is built on top of the LISP threat model defined in Section 3, is built on top of the LISP threat model defined in
[RFC7835], that includes a detailed description of "overclaiming" [RFC7835], that includes a detailed description of "overclaiming"
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One-Time Key (OTK): An ephemeral randomly generated key that must One-Time Key (OTK): An ephemeral randomly generated key that must
be used for a single Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange. be used for a single Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange.
ITR One-Time Key (ITR-OTK): The One-Time Key generated at the ITR. ITR One-Time Key (ITR-OTK): The One-Time Key generated at the ITR.
MS One-Time Key (MS-OTK): The One-Time Key generated at the Map- MS One-Time Key (MS-OTK): The One-Time Key generated at the Map-
Server. Server.
Authentication Data (AD): Metadata that is included either in a Authentication Data (AD): Metadata that is included either in a
LISP Encapsulated Control Message (ECM) header, as defined in LISP Encapsulated Control Message (ECM) header, as defined in
Section 6.1.8 of [RFC6830], or in a Map-Reply message to support Section 6.1.8 of [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis], or in a Map-Reply
confidentiality, integrity protection, and verification of EID- message to support confidentiality, integrity protection, and
prefix authorization. verification of EID-prefix authorization.
OTK Authentication Data (OTK-AD): The portion of ECM OTK Authentication Data (OTK-AD): The portion of ECM
Authentication Data that contains a One-Time Key. Authentication Data that contains a One-Time Key.
EID Authentication Data (EID-AD): The portion of ECM and Map-Reply EID Authentication Data (EID-AD): The portion of ECM and Map-Reply
Authentication Data used for verification of EID-prefix Authentication Data used for verification of EID-prefix
authorization. authorization.
Packet Authentication Data (PKT-AD): The portion of Map-Reply Packet Authentication Data (PKT-AD): The portion of Map-Reply
Authentication Data used to protect the integrity of the Map-Reply Authentication Data used to protect the integrity of the Map-Reply
message. message.
For definitions of other terms, notably Map-Request, Map-Reply, For definitions of other terms, notably Map-Request, Map-Reply,
Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR), Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), Map-Server Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR), Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), Map-Server
(MS), and Map-Resolver (MR) please consult the LISP specification (MS), and Map-Resolver (MR) please consult the LISP specification
[RFC6830]. [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis].
3. LISP-SEC Threat Model 3. LISP-SEC Threat Model
LISP-SEC addresses the control plane threats, described in section LISP-SEC addresses the control plane threats, described in section
3.7 and 3.8 of [RFC7835], that target EID-to-RLOC mappings, including 3.7 and 3.8 of [RFC7835], that target EID-to-RLOC mappings, including
manipulations of Map-Request and Map-Reply messages, and malicious manipulations of Map-Request and Map-Reply messages, and malicious
ETR EID prefix overclaiming. LISP-SEC makes two main assumptions: ETR EID prefix overclaiming. LISP-SEC makes two main assumptions:
(1) the LISP mapping system is expected to deliver a Map-Request (1) the LISP mapping system is expected to deliver a Map-Request
message to their intended destination ETR as identified by the EID, message to their intended destination ETR as identified by the EID,
and (2) no man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack can be mounted within the and (2) no man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack can be mounted within the
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system. An on-path attacker, outside of the LISP mapping system can, system. An on-path attacker, outside of the LISP mapping system can,
for example, hijack Map-Request and Map-Reply messages, spoofing the for example, hijack Map-Request and Map-Reply messages, spoofing the
identity of a LISP node. Another example of on-path attack, called identity of a LISP node. Another example of on-path attack, called
overclaiming attack, can be mounted by a malicious Egress Tunnel overclaiming attack, can be mounted by a malicious Egress Tunnel
Router (ETR), by overclaiming the EID-prefixes for which it is Router (ETR), by overclaiming the EID-prefixes for which it is
authoritative. In this way the ETR can maliciously redirect traffic authoritative. In this way the ETR can maliciously redirect traffic
directed to a large number of hosts. directed to a large number of hosts.
4. Protocol Operations 4. Protocol Operations
The goal of the security mechanisms defined in [RFC6830] is to The goal of the security mechanisms defined in
prevent unauthorized insertion of mapping data by providing origin [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis] is to prevent unauthorized insertion of
authentication and integrity protection for the Map-Registration, and mapping data by providing origin authentication and integrity
by using the nonce to detect unsolicited Map-Reply sent by off-path protection for the Map-Registration, and by using the nonce to detect
attackers. unsolicited Map-Reply sent by off-path attackers.
LISP-SEC builds on top of the security mechanisms defined in LISP-SEC builds on top of the security mechanisms defined in
[RFC6830] to address the threats described in Section 3 by leveraging [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis] to address the threats described in
the trust relationships existing among the LISP entities Section 3 by leveraging the trust relationships existing among the
participating to the exchange of the Map-Request/Map-Reply messages. LISP entities participating to the exchange of the Map-Request/Map-
Those trust relationships are used to securely distribute a One-Time Reply messages. Those trust relationships are used to securely
Key (OTK) that provides origin authentication, integrity and anti- distribute a One-Time Key (OTK) that provides origin authentication,
replay protection to mapping data conveyed via the mapping lookup integrity and anti-replay protection to mapping data conveyed via the
process, and that effectively prevent overclaiming attacks. The mapping lookup process, and that effectively prevent overclaiming
processing of security parameters during the Map-Request/Map-Reply attacks. The processing of security parameters during the Map-
exchange is as follows: Request/Map-Reply exchange is as follows:
o The ITR-OTK is generated and stored at the ITR, and securely o The ITR-OTK is generated and stored at the ITR, and securely
transported to the Map-Server. transported to the Map-Server.
o The Map-Server uses the ITR-OTK to compute a Keyed-Hashing for o The Map-Server uses the ITR-OTK to compute a Keyed-Hashing for
Message Authentication (HMAC) [RFC2104] that protects the Message Authentication (HMAC) [RFC2104] that protects the
integrity of the mapping data known to the Map-Server to prevent integrity of the mapping data known to the Map-Server to prevent
overclaiming attacks. The Map-Server also derives a new OTK, the overclaiming attacks. The Map-Server also derives a new OTK, the
MS-OTK, that is passed to the ETR, by applying a Key Derivation MS-OTK, that is passed to the ETR, by applying a Key Derivation
Function (KDF) to the ITR-OTK. Function (KDF) to the ITR-OTK.
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the Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange: the Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange:
o The ITR, upon needing to transmit a Map-Request message, generates o The ITR, upon needing to transmit a Map-Request message, generates
and stores an OTK (ITR-OTK). This ITR-OTK is included into the and stores an OTK (ITR-OTK). This ITR-OTK is included into the
Encapsulated Control Message (ECM) that contains the Map-Request Encapsulated Control Message (ECM) that contains the Map-Request
sent to the Map-Resolver. To provide confidentiality to the ITR- sent to the Map-Resolver. To provide confidentiality to the ITR-
OTK over the path between the ITR and its Map-Resolver, the ITR- OTK over the path between the ITR and its Map-Resolver, the ITR-
OTK SHOULD be encrypted using a preconfigured key shared between OTK SHOULD be encrypted using a preconfigured key shared between
the ITR and the Map-Resolver, similar to the key shared between the ITR and the Map-Resolver, similar to the key shared between
the ETR and the Map-Server in order to secure ETR registration the ETR and the Map-Server in order to secure ETR registration
[RFC6833]. [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis].
o The Map-Resolver decapsulates the ECM message, decrypts the ITR- o The Map-Resolver decapsulates the ECM message, decrypts the ITR-
OTK, if needed, and forwards through the Mapping System the OTK, if needed, and forwards through the Mapping System the
received Map-Request and the ITR-OTK, as part of a new ECM received Map-Request and the ITR-OTK, as part of a new ECM
message. As described in Section 5.6, the LISP Mapping System message. As described in Section 5.6, the LISP Mapping System
delivers the ECM to the appropriate Map-Server, as identified by delivers the ECM to the appropriate Map-Server, as identified by
the EID destination address of the Map-Request. the EID destination address of the Map-Request.
o The Map-Server is configured with the location mappings and policy o The Map-Server is configured with the location mappings and policy
information for the ETR responsible for the EID destination information for the ETR responsible for the EID destination
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an HMAC computed using the ITR-OTK, to a new Encapsulated Control an HMAC computed using the ITR-OTK, to a new Encapsulated Control
Message that contains the received Map-Request. Message that contains the received Map-Request.
o The Map-Server derives a new OTK, the MS-OTK, by applying a Key o The Map-Server derives a new OTK, the MS-OTK, by applying a Key
Derivation Function (KDF) to the ITR-OTK. This MS-OTK is included Derivation Function (KDF) to the ITR-OTK. This MS-OTK is included
in the Encapsulated Control Message that the Map-Server uses to in the Encapsulated Control Message that the Map-Server uses to
forward the Map-Request to the ETR. To provide MS-OTK forward the Map-Request to the ETR. To provide MS-OTK
confidentiality over the path between the Map-Server and the ETR, confidentiality over the path between the Map-Server and the ETR,
the MS-OTK SHOULD be encrypted using the key shared between the the MS-OTK SHOULD be encrypted using the key shared between the
ETR and the Map-Server in order to secure ETR registration ETR and the Map-Server in order to secure ETR registration
[RFC6833]. [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis].
o If the Map-Server is acting in proxy mode, as specified in o If the Map-Server is acting in proxy mode, as specified in
[RFC6830], the ETR is not involved in the generation of the Map- [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis], the ETR is not involved in the
Reply. In this case the Map-Server generates the Map-Reply on generation of the Map-Reply. In this case the Map-Server
behalf of the ETR as described below. generates the Map-Reply on behalf of the ETR as described below.
o The ETR, upon receiving the ECM encapsulated Map-Request from the o The ETR, upon receiving the ECM encapsulated Map-Request from the
Map-Server, decrypts the MS-OTK, if needed, and originates a Map-Server, decrypts the MS-OTK, if needed, and originates a
standard Map-Reply that contains the EID-to-RLOC mapping standard Map-Reply that contains the EID-to-RLOC mapping
information as specified in [RFC6830]. information as specified in [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis].
o The ETR computes an HMAC over this standard Map-Reply, keyed with o The ETR computes an HMAC over this standard Map-Reply, keyed with
MS-OTK to protect the integrity of the whole Map-Reply. The ETR MS-OTK to protect the integrity of the whole Map-Reply. The ETR
also copies the EID-prefix authorization data that the Map-Server also copies the EID-prefix authorization data that the Map-Server
included in the ECM encapsulated Map-Request into the Map-Reply included in the ECM encapsulated Map-Request into the Map-Reply
message. The ETR then sends this complete Map-Reply message to message. The ETR then sends this complete Map-Reply message to
the requesting ITR. the requesting ITR.
o The ITR, upon receiving the Map-Reply, uses the locally stored o The ITR, upon receiving the Map-Reply, uses the locally stored
ITR-OTK to verify the integrity of the EID-prefix authorization ITR-OTK to verify the integrity of the EID-prefix authorization
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LISP-SEC metadata associated with a Map-Request is transported within LISP-SEC metadata associated with a Map-Request is transported within
the Encapsulated Control Message that contains the Map-Request. the Encapsulated Control Message that contains the Map-Request.
LISP-SEC metadata associated with the Map-Reply is transported within LISP-SEC metadata associated with the Map-Reply is transported within
the Map-Reply itself. the Map-Reply itself.
5.1. Encapsulated Control Message LISP-SEC Extensions 5.1. Encapsulated Control Message LISP-SEC Extensions
LISP-SEC uses the ECM (Encapsulated Control Message) defined in LISP-SEC uses the ECM (Encapsulated Control Message) defined in
[RFC6830] with Type set to 8, and S bit set to 1 to indicate that the [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis] with Type set to 8, and S bit set to 1 to
LISP header includes Authentication Data (AD). The format of the indicate that the LISP header includes Authentication Data (AD). The
LISP-SEC ECM Authentication Data is defined in the following figure. format of the LISP-SEC ECM Authentication Data is defined in the
OTK-AD stands for One-Time Key Authentication Data and EID-AD stands following figure. OTK-AD stands for One-Time Key Authentication Data
for EID Authentication Data. and EID-AD stands for EID Authentication Data.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ECM AD Type |V| Reserved | Requested HMAC ID | | ECM AD Type |V| Reserved | Requested HMAC ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\
| OTK Length | OTK Encryption ID | | | OTK Length | OTK Encryption ID | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| One-Time-Key Preamble ... | | | One-Time-Key Preamble ... | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+OTK-AD +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+OTK-AD
skipping to change at page 9, line 47 skipping to change at page 9, line 47
EID-prefix: The Map-Server uses this field to specify the EID- EID-prefix: The Map-Server uses this field to specify the EID-
prefix that the destination ETR is authoritative for, and is the prefix that the destination ETR is authoritative for, and is the
longest match for the requested EID. longest match for the requested EID.
EID HMAC: HMAC of the EID-AD computed and inserted by Map-Server. EID HMAC: HMAC of the EID-AD computed and inserted by Map-Server.
Before computing the HMAC operation the EID HMAC field MUST be set Before computing the HMAC operation the EID HMAC field MUST be set
to 0. The HMAC covers the entire EID-AD. to 0. The HMAC covers the entire EID-AD.
5.2. Map-Reply LISP-SEC Extensions 5.2. Map-Reply LISP-SEC Extensions
LISP-SEC uses the Map-Reply defined in [RFC6830], with Type set to 2, LISP-SEC uses the Map-Reply defined in [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis],
and S bit set to 1 to indicate that the Map-Reply message includes with Type set to 2, and S bit set to 1 to indicate that the Map-Reply
Authentication Data (AD). The format of the LISP-SEC Map-Reply message includes Authentication Data (AD). The format of the LISP-
Authentication Data is defined in the following figure. PKT-AD is SEC Map-Reply Authentication Data is defined in the following figure.
the Packet Authentication Data that covers the Map-Reply payload.
PKT-AD is the Packet Authentication Data that covers the Map-Reply
payload.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MR AD Type | Reserved | | MR AD Type | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <---+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <---+
| EID-AD Length | KDF ID | | | EID-AD Length | KDF ID | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Record Count | Reserved | EID HMAC ID |EID-AD | Record Count | Reserved | EID HMAC ID |EID-AD
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\ | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\ |
skipping to change at page 11, line 24 skipping to change at page 11, line 28
PKT HMAC: HMAC of the whole Map-Reply packet, including the LISP- PKT HMAC: HMAC of the whole Map-Reply packet, including the LISP-
SEC Authentication Data. The scope of the authentication goes SEC Authentication Data. The scope of the authentication goes
from the Map-Reply Type field to the PKT HMAC field included. from the Map-Reply Type field to the PKT HMAC field included.
Before computing the HMAC operation the PKT HMAC field MUST be set Before computing the HMAC operation the PKT HMAC field MUST be set
to 0. See Section 5.8 for more details. to 0. See Section 5.8 for more details.
5.3. Map-Register LISP-SEC Extentions 5.3. Map-Register LISP-SEC Extentions
This memo is allocating one of the bits marked as Reserved in the This memo is allocating one of the bits marked as Reserved in the
Map-Register message defined in Section 6.1.6 of [RFC6830]. More Map-Register message defined in Section 6.1.6 of
precisely, the second bit after the Type field in a Map-Register [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis]. More precisely, the second bit after the
message is allocated as the S bit. The S bit indicates to the Map- Type field in a Map-Register message is allocated as the S bit. The
Server that the registering ETR is LISP-SEC enabled. An ETR that S bit indicates to the Map-Server that the registering ETR is LISP-
supports LISP-SEC MUST set the S bit in its Map-Register messages. SEC enabled. An ETR that supports LISP-SEC MUST set the S bit in its
Map-Register messages.
5.4. ITR Processing 5.4. ITR Processing
Upon creating a Map-Request, the ITR generates a random ITR-OTK that Upon creating a Map-Request, the ITR generates a random ITR-OTK that
is stored locally, together with the nonce generated as specified in is stored locally, together with the nonce generated as specified in
[RFC6830]. [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis].
The Map-Request MUST be encapsulated in an ECM, with the S-bit set to The Map-Request MUST be encapsulated in an ECM, with the S-bit set to
1, to indicate the presence of Authentication Data. If the ITR and 1, to indicate the presence of Authentication Data. If the ITR and
the Map-Resolver are configured with a shared key, the ITR-OTK the Map-Resolver are configured with a shared key, the ITR-OTK
confidentiality SHOULD be protected by wrapping the ITR-OTK with the confidentiality SHOULD be protected by wrapping the ITR-OTK with the
algorithm specified by the OTK Encryption ID field. See Section 5.5 algorithm specified by the OTK Encryption ID field. See Section 5.5
for further details on OTK encryption. for further details on OTK encryption.
The Requested HMAC ID field contains the suggested HMAC algorithm to The Requested HMAC ID field contains the suggested HMAC algorithm to
be used by the Map-Server and the ETR to protect the integrity of the be used by the Map-Server and the ETR to protect the integrity of the
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ITR's local policy or until all HMAC IDs supported by the ITR have ITR's local policy or until all HMAC IDs supported by the ITR have
been attempted. been attempted.
Each individual Map-Reply EID-record is considered valid only if: (1) Each individual Map-Reply EID-record is considered valid only if: (1)
both EID-AD and PKT-AD are valid, and (2) the intersection of the both EID-AD and PKT-AD are valid, and (2) the intersection of the
EID-prefix in the Map-Reply EID-record with one of the EID-prefixes EID-prefix in the Map-Reply EID-record with one of the EID-prefixes
contained in the EID-AD is not empty. After identifying the Map- contained in the EID-AD is not empty. After identifying the Map-
Reply record as valid, the ITR sets the EID-prefix in the Map-Reply Reply record as valid, the ITR sets the EID-prefix in the Map-Reply
record to the value of the intersection set computed before, and adds record to the value of the intersection set computed before, and adds
the Map-Reply EID-record to its EID-to-RLOC cache, as described in the Map-Reply EID-record to its EID-to-RLOC cache, as described in
[RFC6830]. An example of Map-Reply record validation is provided in [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis]. An example of Map-Reply record
Section 5.4.1. validation is provided in Section 5.4.1.
The ITR SHOULD send SMR triggered Map-Requests over the mapping The ITR SHOULD send SMR triggered Map-Requests over the mapping
system in order to receive a secure Map-Reply. If an ITR accepts system in order to receive a secure Map-Reply. If an ITR accepts
piggybacked Map-Replies, it SHOULD also send a Map-Request over the piggybacked Map-Replies, it SHOULD also send a Map-Request over the
mapping system in order to verify the piggybacked Map-Reply with a mapping system in order to verify the piggybacked Map-Reply with a
secure Map-Reply. secure Map-Reply.
5.4.1. Map-Reply Record Validation 5.4.1. Map-Reply Record Validation
The payload of a Map-Reply may contain multiple EID-records. The The payload of a Map-Reply may contain multiple EID-records. The
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System such as LISP+ALT [RFC6836], the PITR performs the functions of System such as LISP+ALT [RFC6836], the PITR performs the functions of
both the ITR and the Map-Resolver forwarding the Map-Request both the ITR and the Map-Resolver forwarding the Map-Request
encapsulated in an ECM header that includes the Authentication Data encapsulated in an ECM header that includes the Authentication Data
fields as described in Section 5.6. fields as described in Section 5.6.
5.5. Encrypting and Decrypting an OTK 5.5. Encrypting and Decrypting an OTK
MS-OTK confidentiality is required in the path between the Map-Server MS-OTK confidentiality is required in the path between the Map-Server
and the ETR, the MS-OTK SHOULD be encrypted using the preconfigured and the ETR, the MS-OTK SHOULD be encrypted using the preconfigured
key shared between the Map-Server and the ETR for the purpose of key shared between the Map-Server and the ETR for the purpose of
securing ETR registration [RFC6833]. Similarly, if ITR-OTK securing ETR registration [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis]. Similarly, if
confidentiality is required in the path between the ITR and the Map- ITR-OTK confidentiality is required in the path between the ITR and
Resolver, the ITR-OTK SHOULD be encrypted with a key shared between the Map-Resolver, the ITR-OTK SHOULD be encrypted with a key shared
the ITR and the Map-Resolver. between the ITR and the Map-Resolver.
The OTK is encrypted using the algorithm specified in the OTK The OTK is encrypted using the algorithm specified in the OTK
Encryption ID field. When the AES Key Wrap algorithm is used to Encryption ID field. When the AES Key Wrap algorithm is used to
encrypt a 128-bit OTK, according to [RFC3394], the AES Key Wrap encrypt a 128-bit OTK, according to [RFC3394], the AES Key Wrap
Initialization Value MUST be set to 0xA6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6 (64 bits). Initialization Value MUST be set to 0xA6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6 (64 bits).
The output of the AES Key Wrap operation is 192-bit long. The most The output of the AES Key Wrap operation is 192-bit long. The most
significant 64-bit are copied in the One-Time Key Preamble field, significant 64-bit are copied in the One-Time Key Preamble field,
while the 128 less significant bits are copied in the One-Time Key while the 128 less significant bits are copied in the One-Time Key
field of the LISP-SEC Authentication Data. field of the LISP-SEC Authentication Data.
skipping to change at page 15, line 20 skipping to change at page 15, line 25
Upon receiving an encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set, the Upon receiving an encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set, the
Map-Resolver decapsulates the ECM message. The ITR-OTK, if Map-Resolver decapsulates the ECM message. The ITR-OTK, if
encrypted, is decrypted as specified in Section 5.5. encrypted, is decrypted as specified in Section 5.5.
Protecting the confidentiality of the ITR-OTK and, in general, the Protecting the confidentiality of the ITR-OTK and, in general, the
security of how the Map-Request is handed by the Map-Resolver to the security of how the Map-Request is handed by the Map-Resolver to the
Map-Server, is specific to the particular Mapping System used, and Map-Server, is specific to the particular Mapping System used, and
outside of the scope of this memo. outside of the scope of this memo.
In Mapping Systems where the Map-Server is compliant with [RFC6833], In Mapping Systems where the Map-Server is compliant with
the Map-Resolver originates a new ECM header with the S-bit set, that [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis], the Map-Resolver originates a new ECM
contains the unencrypted ITR-OTK, as specified in Section 5.5, and header with the S-bit set, that contains the unencrypted ITR-OTK, as
the other data derived from the ECM Authentication Data of the specified in Section 5.5, and the other data derived from the ECM
received encapsulated Map-Request. Authentication Data of the received encapsulated Map-Request.
The Map-Resolver then forwards to the Map-Server the received Map- The Map-Resolver then forwards to the Map-Server the received Map-
Request, encapsulated in the new ECM header that includes the newly Request, encapsulated in the new ECM header that includes the newly
computed Authentication Data fields. computed Authentication Data fields.
5.7. Map-Server Processing 5.7. Map-Server Processing
Upon receiving an ECM encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set, Upon receiving an ECM encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set,
the Map-Server process the Map-Request according to the value of the the Map-Server process the Map-Request according to the value of the
S-bit contained in the Map-Register sent by the ETR during S-bit contained in the Map-Register sent by the ETR during
registration. registration.
If the S-bit contained in the Map-Register was clear the Map-Server If the S-bit contained in the Map-Register was clear the Map-Server
decapsulates the ECM and generates a new ECM encapsulated Map-Request decapsulates the ECM and generates a new ECM encapsulated Map-Request
that does not contain an ECM Authentication Data, as specified in that does not contain an ECM Authentication Data, as specified in
[RFC6830]. The Map-Server does not perform any further LISP-SEC [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis]. The Map-Server does not perform any
processing, and the Map-Reply will not be protected. further LISP-SEC processing, and the Map-Reply will not be protected.
If the S-bit contained in the Map-Register was set the Map-Server If the S-bit contained in the Map-Register was set the Map-Server
decapsulates the ECM and generates a new ECM Authentication Data. decapsulates the ECM and generates a new ECM Authentication Data.
The Authentication Data includes the OTK-AD and the EID-AD, that The Authentication Data includes the OTK-AD and the EID-AD, that
contains EID-prefix authorization information, that are ultimately contains EID-prefix authorization information, that are ultimately
sent to the requesting ITR. sent to the requesting ITR.
The Map-Server updates the OTK-AD by deriving a new OTK (MS-OTK) from The Map-Server updates the OTK-AD by deriving a new OTK (MS-OTK) from
the ITR-OTK received with the Map-Request. MS-OTK is derived the ITR-OTK received with the Map-Request. MS-OTK is derived
applying the key derivation function specified in the KDF ID field. applying the key derivation function specified in the KDF ID field.
If the algorithm specified in the KDF ID field is not supported, the If the algorithm specified in the KDF ID field is not supported, the
Map-Server uses a different algorithm to derive the key and updates Map-Server uses a different algorithm to derive the key and updates
the KDF ID field accordingly. the KDF ID field accordingly.
The Map-Server and the ETR MUST be configured with a shared key for The Map-Server and the ETR MUST be configured with a shared key for
mapping registration according to [RFC6833]. If MS-OTK mapping registration according to [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis]. If MS-
confidentiality is required, then the MS-OTK SHOULD be encrypted, by OTK confidentiality is required, then the MS-OTK SHOULD be encrypted,
wrapping the MS-OTK with the algorithm specified by the OTK by wrapping the MS-OTK with the algorithm specified by the OTK
Encryption ID field as specified in Section 5.5. Encryption ID field as specified in Section 5.5.
The Map-Server includes in the EID-AD the longest match registered The Map-Server includes in the EID-AD the longest match registered
EID-prefix for the destination EID, and an HMAC of this EID-prefix. EID-prefix for the destination EID, and an HMAC of this EID-prefix.
The HMAC is keyed with the ITR-OTK contained in the received ECM The HMAC is keyed with the ITR-OTK contained in the received ECM
Authentication Data, and the HMAC algorithm is chosen according to Authentication Data, and the HMAC algorithm is chosen according to
the Requested HMAC ID field. If The Map-Server does not support this the Requested HMAC ID field. If The Map-Server does not support this
algorithm, the Map-Server uses a different algorithm and specifies it algorithm, the Map-Server uses a different algorithm and specifies it
in the EID HMAC ID field. The scope of the HMAC operation covers the in the EID HMAC ID field. The scope of the HMAC operation covers the
entire EID-AD, from the EID-AD Length field to the EID HMAC field, entire EID-AD, from the EID-AD Length field to the EID HMAC field,
which must be set to 0 before the computation. which must be set to 0 before the computation.
The Map-Server then forwards the updated ECM encapsulated Map- The Map-Server then forwards the updated ECM encapsulated Map-
Request, that contains the OTK-AD, the EID-AD, and the received Map- Request, that contains the OTK-AD, the EID-AD, and the received Map-
Request to an authoritative ETR as specified in [RFC6830]. Request to an authoritative ETR as specified in
[I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis].
5.7.1. Map-Server Processing in Proxy mode 5.7.1. Map-Server Processing in Proxy mode
If the Map-Server is in proxy mode, it generates a Map-Reply, as If the Map-Server is in proxy mode, it generates a Map-Reply, as
specified in [RFC6830], with the S-bit set to 1. The Map-Reply specified in [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis], with the S-bit set to 1.
includes the Authentication Data that contains the EID-AD, computed The Map-Reply includes the Authentication Data that contains the EID-
as specified in Section 5.7, as well as the PKT-AD computed as AD, computed as specified in Section 5.7, as well as the PKT-AD
specified in Section 5.8. computed as specified in Section 5.8.
5.8. ETR Processing 5.8. ETR Processing
Upon receiving an ECM encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set, Upon receiving an ECM encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set,
the ETR decapsulates the ECM message. The OTK field, if encrypted, the ETR decapsulates the ECM message. The OTK field, if encrypted,
is decrypted as specified in Section 5.5 to obtain the unencrypted is decrypted as specified in Section 5.5 to obtain the unencrypted
MS-OTK. MS-OTK.
The ETR then generates a Map-Reply as specified in [RFC6830] and The ETR then generates a Map-Reply as specified in
includes the Authentication Data that contains the EID-AD, as [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis] and includes the Authentication Data that
received in the encapsulated Map-Request, as well as the PKT-AD. contains the EID-AD, as received in the encapsulated Map-Request, as
well as the PKT-AD.
The EID-AD is copied from the Authentication Data of the received The EID-AD is copied from the Authentication Data of the received
encapsulated Map-Request. encapsulated Map-Request.
The PKT-AD contains the HMAC of the whole Map-Reply packet, keyed The PKT-AD contains the HMAC of the whole Map-Reply packet, keyed
with the MS-OTK and computed using the HMAC algorithm specified in with the MS-OTK and computed using the HMAC algorithm specified in
the Requested HMAC ID field of the received encapsulated Map-Request. the Requested HMAC ID field of the received encapsulated Map-Request.
If the ETR does not support the Requested HMAC ID, it uses a If the ETR does not support the Requested HMAC ID, it uses a
different algorithm and updates the PKT HMAC ID field accordingly. different algorithm and updates the PKT HMAC ID field accordingly.
The scope of the HMAC operation covers the entire PKT-AD, from the The scope of the HMAC operation covers the entire PKT-AD, from the
Map-Reply Type field to the PKT HMAC field, which must be set to 0 Map-Reply Type field to the PKT HMAC field, which must be set to 0
before the computation. before the computation.
Finally the ETR sends the Map-Reply to the requesting ITR as Finally the ETR sends the Map-Reply to the requesting ITR as
specified in [RFC6830]. specified in [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis].
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
6.1. Mapping System Security 6.1. Mapping System Security
The LISP-SEC threat model described in Section 3, assumes that the The LISP-SEC threat model described in Section 3, assumes that the
LISP Mapping System is working properly and eventually delivers Map- LISP Mapping System is working properly and eventually delivers Map-
Request messages to a Map-Server that is authoritative for the Request messages to a Map-Server that is authoritative for the
requested EID. requested EID.
skipping to change at page 21, line 32 skipping to change at page 21, line 32
8. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge Pere Monclus, Dave Meyer, Dino The authors would like to acknowledge Pere Monclus, Dave Meyer, Dino
Farinacci, Brian Weis, David McGrew, Darrel Lewis and Landon Curt Farinacci, Brian Weis, David McGrew, Darrel Lewis and Landon Curt
Noll for their valuable suggestions provided during the preparation Noll for their valuable suggestions provided during the preparation
of this document. of this document.
9. Normative References 9. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis]
Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., Lewis, D., and A.
Cabellos-Aparicio, "The Locator/ID Separation Protocol
(LISP)", draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis-12 (work in progress),
March 2018.
[I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis]
Fuller, V., Farinacci, D., and A. Cabellos-Aparicio,
"Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) Control-Plane",
draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis-10 (work in progress), March
2018.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
editor.org/info/rfc2104>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard [RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394, (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394,
September 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3394>. September 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3394>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
editor.org/info/rfc4086>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
editor.org/info/rfc5226>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand [RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
editor.org/info/rfc5869>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms [RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
editor.org/info/rfc6234>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC6830] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The
Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6830, January 2013, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6830>.
[RFC6833] Fuller, V. and D. Farinacci, "Locator/ID Separation
Protocol (LISP) Map-Server Interface", RFC 6833,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6833, January 2013, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6833>.
[RFC6836] Fuller, V., Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, [RFC6836] Fuller, V., Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis,
"Locator/ID Separation Protocol Alternative Logical "Locator/ID Separation Protocol Alternative Logical
Topology (LISP+ALT)", RFC 6836, DOI 10.17487/RFC6836, Topology (LISP+ALT)", RFC 6836, DOI 10.17487/RFC6836,
January 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6836>. January 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6836>.
[RFC7835] Saucez, D., Iannone, L., and O. Bonaventure, "Locator/ID [RFC7835] Saucez, D., Iannone, L., and O. Bonaventure, "Locator/ID
Separation Protocol (LISP) Threat Analysis", RFC 7835, Separation Protocol (LISP) Threat Analysis", RFC 7835,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7835, April 2016, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC7835, April 2016,
editor.org/info/rfc7835>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7835>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Fabio Maino Fabio Maino
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
170 Tasman Drive 170 Tasman Drive
San Jose, California 95134 San Jose, California 95134
USA USA
Email: fmaino@cisco.com Email: fmaino@cisco.com
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