draft-ietf-lisp-sec-10.txt   draft-ietf-lisp-sec-11.txt 
Network Working Group F. Maino Network Working Group F. Maino
Internet-Draft V. Ermagan Internet-Draft V. Ermagan
Intended status: Experimental Cisco Systems Intended status: Experimental Cisco Systems
Expires: October 15, 2016 A. Cabellos Expires: April 6, 2017 A. Cabellos
Technical University of Catalonia Technical University of Catalonia
D. Saucez D. Saucez
INRIA INRIA
April 13, 2016 October 3, 2016
LISP-Security (LISP-SEC) LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)
draft-ietf-lisp-sec-10 draft-ietf-lisp-sec-11
Abstract Abstract
This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that
provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection
to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup
process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID- process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID-
prefix claims in Map-Reply messages. prefix claims in Map-Reply messages.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 15, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 6, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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functions for routers to exchange information used to map from non- functions for routers to exchange information used to map from non-
routable Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) to routable Routing Locators routable Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) to routable Routing Locators
(RLOCs). If these EID-to-RLOC mappings, carried through Map-Reply (RLOCs). If these EID-to-RLOC mappings, carried through Map-Reply
messages, are transmitted without integrity protection, an adversary messages, are transmitted without integrity protection, an adversary
can manipulate them and hijack the communication, impersonate the can manipulate them and hijack the communication, impersonate the
requested EID, or mount Denial of Service or Distributed Denial of requested EID, or mount Denial of Service or Distributed Denial of
Service attacks. Also, if the Map-Reply message is transported Service attacks. Also, if the Map-Reply message is transported
unauthenticated, an adversarial LISP entity can overclaim an EID- unauthenticated, an adversarial LISP entity can overclaim an EID-
prefix and maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number of prefix and maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number of
hosts. A detailed description of "overclaiming" attack is provided hosts. A detailed description of "overclaiming" attack is provided
in [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats]. in [RFC7835].
This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that
provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection
to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup
process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID- process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID-
prefix claims in Map-Reply messages, ensuring that the sender of a prefix claims in Map-Reply messages, ensuring that the sender of a
Map-Reply that provides the location for a given EID-prefix is Map-Reply that provides the location for a given EID-prefix is
entitled to do so according to the EID prefix registered in the entitled to do so according to the EID prefix registered in the
associated Map-Server. Map-Register security, including the right associated Map-Server. Map-Register security, including the right
for a LISP entity to register an EID-prefix or to claim presence at for a LISP entity to register an EID-prefix or to claim presence at
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PKT-AD: The portion of Map-Reply Authentication Data used to PKT-AD: The portion of Map-Reply Authentication Data used to
protect the integrity of the Map-Reply message. protect the integrity of the Map-Reply message.
For definitions of other terms, notably Map-Request, Map-Reply, For definitions of other terms, notably Map-Request, Map-Reply,
Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR), Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), Map-Server Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR), Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), Map-Server
(MS), and Map-Resolver (MR) please consult the LISP specification (MS), and Map-Resolver (MR) please consult the LISP specification
[RFC6830]. [RFC6830].
3. LISP-SEC Threat Model 3. LISP-SEC Threat Model
LISP-SEC addresses the control plane threats, described in LISP-SEC addresses the control plane threats, described in [RFC7835],
[I-D.ietf-lisp-threats], that target EID-to-RLOC mappings, including that target EID-to-RLOC mappings, including manipulations of Map-
manipulations of Map-Request and Map-Reply messages, and malicious Request and Map-Reply messages, and malicious ETR EID prefix
ETR EID prefix overclaiming. LISP-SEC makes two main assumptions: overclaiming. LISP-SEC makes two main assumptions: (1) the LISP
(1) the LISP mapping system is expected to deliver a Map-Request mapping system is expected to deliver a Map-Request message to their
message to their intended destination ETR as identified by the EID, intended destination ETR as identified by the EID, and (2) no man-in-
and (2) no man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack can be mounted within the the-middle (MITM) attack can be mounted within the LISP Mapping
LISP Mapping System. Furthermore, while LISP-SEC enables detection System. Furthermore, while LISP-SEC enables detection of EID prefix
of EID prefix overclaiming attacks, it assumes that Map-Servers can overclaiming attacks, it assumes that Map-Servers can verify the EID
verify the EID prefix authorization at time of registration. prefix authorization at time of registration.
According to the threat model described in [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats] According to the threat model described in [RFC7835] LISP-SEC assumes
LISP-SEC assumes that any kind of attack, including MITM attacks, can that any kind of attack, including MITM attacks, can be mounted in
be mounted in the access network, outside of the boundaries of the the access network, outside of the boundaries of the LISP mapping
LISP mapping system. An on-path attacker, outside of the LISP system. An on-path attacker, outside of the LISP mapping system can,
mapping system can, for example, hijack Map-Request and Map-Reply for example, hijack Map-Request and Map-Reply messages, spoofing the
messages, spoofing the identity of a LISP node. Another example of identity of a LISP node. Another example of on-path attack, called
on-path attack, called overclaiming attack, can be mounted by a overclaiming attack, can be mounted by a malicious Egress Tunnel
malicious Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), by overclaiming the EID- Router (ETR), by overclaiming the EID-prefixes for which it is
prefixes for which it is authoritative. In this way the ETR can authoritative. In this way the ETR can maliciously redirect traffic
maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number of hosts. directed to a large number of hosts.
4. Protocol Operations 4. Protocol Operations
The goal of the security mechanisms defined in [RFC6830] is to The goal of the security mechanisms defined in [RFC6830] is to
prevent unauthorized insertion of mapping data by providing origin prevent unauthorized insertion of mapping data by providing origin
authentication and integrity protection for the Map-Registration, and authentication and integrity protection for the Map-Registration, and
by using the nonce to detect unsolicited Map-Reply sent by off-path by using the nonce to detect unsolicited Map-Reply sent by off-path
attackers. attackers.
LISP-SEC builds on top of the security mechanisms defined in LISP-SEC builds on top of the security mechanisms defined in
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8. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge Pere Monclus, Dave Meyer, Dino The authors would like to acknowledge Pere Monclus, Dave Meyer, Dino
Farinacci, Brian Weis, David McGrew, Darrel Lewis and Landon Curt Farinacci, Brian Weis, David McGrew, Darrel Lewis and Landon Curt
Noll for their valuable suggestions provided during the preparation Noll for their valuable suggestions provided during the preparation
of this document. of this document.
9. Normative References 9. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-lisp-threats]
Saucez, D., Iannone, L., and O. Bonaventure, "LISP Threats
Analysis", draft-ietf-lisp-threats-15 (work in progress),
January 2016.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC6830] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The [RFC6830] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The
Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830, Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6830, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6830, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6830>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6830>.
[RFC6833] Fuller, V. and D. Farinacci, "Locator/ID Separation [RFC6833] Fuller, V. and D. Farinacci, "Locator/ID Separation
Protocol (LISP) Map-Server Interface", RFC 6833, Protocol (LISP) Map-Server Interface", RFC 6833,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6833, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6833, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6833>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6833>.
[RFC7835] Saucez, D., Iannone, L., and O. Bonaventure, "Locator/ID
Separation Protocol (LISP) Threat Analysis", RFC 7835,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7835, April 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7835>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Fabio Maino Fabio Maino
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
170 Tasman Drive 170 Tasman Drive
San Jose, California 95134 San Jose, California 95134
USA USA
Email: fmaino@cisco.com Email: fmaino@cisco.com
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