draft-ietf-lisp-sec-04.txt   draft-ietf-lisp-sec-05.txt 
Network Working Group F. Maino Network Working Group F. Maino
Internet-Draft V. Ermagan Internet-Draft V. Ermagan
Intended status: Experimental Cisco Systems Intended status: Experimental Cisco Systems
Expires: April 15, 2013 A. Cabellos Expires: April 24, 2014 A. Cabellos
Technical University of Technical University of Catalonia
Catalonia
D. Saucez D. Saucez
INRIA INRIA
O. Bonaventure O. Bonaventure
Universite Catholique de Louvain Universite Catholique de Louvain
October 12, 2012 October 21, 2013
LISP-Security (LISP-SEC) LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)
draft-ietf-lisp-sec-04 draft-ietf-lisp-sec-05
Abstract Abstract
This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that
provide origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection provide origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection
to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup
process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID- process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID-
prefix claims in Map-Reply messages. prefix claims in Map-Reply messages.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 15, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 24, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. LISP-SEC Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. LISP-SEC Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Protocol Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Protocol Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. LISP-SEC Control Messages Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. LISP-SEC Control Messages Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Encapsulated Control Message LISP-SEC Extensions . . . . . 7 5.1. Encapsulated Control Message LISP-SEC Extensions . . . . 7
5.2. Map-Reply LISP-SEC Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.2. Map-Reply LISP-SEC Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3. Map-Register LISP-SEC Extentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.3. Map-Register LISP-SEC Extentions . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4. ITR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.4. ITR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.4.1. Map-Reply Record Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.4.1. Map-Reply Record Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4.2. PITR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.4.2. PITR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.5. Encrypting and Decrypting an OTK . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.5. Encrypting and Decrypting an OTK . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.6. Map-Resolver Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.6. Map-Resolver Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.7. Map-Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.7. Map-Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.7.1. Map-Server Processing in Proxy mode . . . . . . . . . 15 5.7.1. Map-Server Processing in Proxy mode . . . . . . . . . 15
5.8. ETR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.8. ETR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Mapping System Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.1. Mapping System Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. Random Number Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.2. Random Number Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3. Map-Server and ETR Colocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.3. Map-Server and ETR Colocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. HMAC functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.1. HMAC functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2. Key Wrap Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.2. Key Wrap Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.3. Key Derivation Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.3. Key Derivation Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Locator/ID Separation Protocol [I-D.ietf-lisp] defines a set of The Locator/ID Separation Protocol [RFC6830] defines a set of
functions for routers to exchange information used to map from non- functions for routers to exchange information used to map from non-
routable Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) to routable Routing Locators routable Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) to routable Routing Locators
(RLOCs). If these EID-to-RLOC mappings, carried through Map-Reply (RLOCs). If these EID-to-RLOC mappings, carried through Map-Reply
messages, are transmitted without integrity protection, an adversary messages, are transmitted without integrity protection, an adversary
can manipulate them and hijack the communication, impersonate the can manipulate them and hijack the communication, impersonate the
requested EID or mount Denial of Service or Distributed Denial of requested EID or mount Denial of Service or Distributed Denial of
Service attacks. Also, if the Map-Reply message is transported Service attacks. Also, if the Map-Reply message is transported
unauthenticated, an adversarial LISP entity can overclaim an EID- unauthenticated, an adversarial LISP entity can overclaim an EID-
prefix and maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number of prefix and maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number of
hosts. A detailed description of "overclaiming" attack is provided hosts. A detailed description of "overclaiming" attack is provided
skipping to change at page 4, line 18 skipping to change at page 4, line 17
EID-AD: The portion of ECM and Map-Reply Authentication Data EID-AD: The portion of ECM and Map-Reply Authentication Data
used for verification of EID-prefix authorization. used for verification of EID-prefix authorization.
PKT-AD: The portion of Map-Reply Authentication Data used to PKT-AD: The portion of Map-Reply Authentication Data used to
protect the integrity of the Map-Reply message. protect the integrity of the Map-Reply message.
For definitions of other terms, notably Map-Request, Map-Reply, For definitions of other terms, notably Map-Request, Map-Reply,
Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR), Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), Map-Server Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR), Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), Map-Server
(MS) and Map-Resolver (MR) please consult the LISP specification (MS) and Map-Resolver (MR) please consult the LISP specification
[I-D.ietf-lisp]. [RFC6830].
3. LISP-SEC Threat Model 3. LISP-SEC Threat Model
LISP-SEC addresses the control plane threats, described in LISP-SEC addresses the control plane threats, described in
[I-D.ietf-lisp-threats], that target EID-to-RLOC mappings, including [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats], that target EID-to-RLOC mappings, including
manipulations of Map-Request and Map-Reply messages, and malicious manipulations of Map-Request and Map-Reply messages, and malicious
ETR EID prefix overclaiming. However LISP-SEC makes two main ETR EID prefix overclaiming. However LISP-SEC makes two main
assumptions that are not part of [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats]. First, the assumptions that are not part of [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats]. First, the
LISP mapping system is expected to deliver a Map-Request message to LISP mapping system is expected to deliver a Map-Request message to
its intended destination ETR as identified by the EID. Second, no their intended destination ETR as identified by the EID. Second, no
man-in-the-middle attack can be mounted within the LISP Mapping man-in-the-middle attack can be mounted within the LISP Mapping
System. Furthermore, while LISP-SEC enables detection of EID prefix System. Furthermore, while LISP-SEC enables detection of EID prefix
overclaiming attacks, it assumes that Map Servers can verify the EID overclaiming attacks, it assumes that Map Servers can verify the EID
prefix authorization at time of registration. prefix authorization at time of registration.
According to the threat model described in [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats] According to the threat model described in [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats]
LISP-SEC assumes that any kind of attack, including MITM attacks, can LISP-SEC assumes that any kind of attack, including MITM attacks, can
be mounted in the access network, outside of the boundaries of the be mounted in the access network, outside of the boundaries of the
LISP mapping system. An on-path attacker, outside of the LISP LISP mapping system. An on-path attacker, outside of the LISP
mapping system can, for example, hijack Map-Request and Map-Reply mapping system can, for example, hijack Map-Request and Map-Reply
messages, spoofing the identity of a LISP node. Another example of messages, spoofing the identity of a LISP node. Another example of
on-path attack, called over claiming attack, can be mounted by a on-path attack, called over claiming attack, can be mounted by a
malicious Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), by overclaiming the EID- malicious Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), by overclaiming the EID-
prefixes for which it is authoritative. In this way the ETR can prefixes for which it is authoritative. In this way the ETR can
maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number of hosts. maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number of hosts.
4. Protocol Operations 4. Protocol Operations
The goal of the security mechanisms defined in [I-D.ietf-lisp] is to The goal of the security mechanisms defined in [RFC6830] is to
prevent unauthorized insertion of mapping data by providing origin prevent unauthorized insertion of mapping data by providing origin
authentication and integrity protection for the Map-Registration, and authentication and integrity protection for the Map-Registration, and
by using the nonce to detect unsolicited Map-Reply sent by off-path by using the nonce to detect unsolicited Map-Reply sent by off-path
attackers. attackers.
LISP-SEC builds on top of the security mechanisms defined in LISP-SEC builds on top of the security mechanisms defined in
[I-D.ietf-lisp] to address the threats described in Section 3 by [RFC6830] to address the threats described in Section 3 by leveraging
leveraging the trust relationships existing among the LISP entities the trust relationships existing among the LISP entities
participating to the exchange of the Map-Request/Map-Reply messages. participating to the exchange of the Map-Request/Map-Reply messages.
Those trust relationships are used to securely distribute a One-Time Those trust relationships are used to securely distribute a One-Time
Key (OTK) that provides origin authentication, integrity and anti- Key (OTK) that provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-
replay protection to mapping data conveyed via the mapping lookup replay protection to mapping data conveyed via the mapping lookup
process, and that effectively prevent over claiming attacks. The process, and that effectively prevent over claiming attacks. The
processing of security parameters during the Map-Request/Map-Reply processing of security parameters during the Map-Request/Map-Reply
exchange is as follows: exchange is as follows:
o The ITR-OTK is generated and stored at the ITR, and securely o The ITR-OTK is generated and stored at the ITR, and securely
transported to the Map-Server. transported to the Map-Server.
skipping to change at page 5, line 50 skipping to change at page 5, line 46
the Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange: the Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange:
o The ITR, upon needing to transmit a Map-Request message, generates o The ITR, upon needing to transmit a Map-Request message, generates
and stores an OTK (ITR-OTK). This ITR-OTK is included into the and stores an OTK (ITR-OTK). This ITR-OTK is included into the
Encapsulated Control Message (ECM) that contains the Map-Request Encapsulated Control Message (ECM) that contains the Map-Request
sent to the Map-Resolver. To provide confidentiality to the ITR- sent to the Map-Resolver. To provide confidentiality to the ITR-
OTK over the path between the ITR and its Map-Resolver, the ITR- OTK over the path between the ITR and its Map-Resolver, the ITR-
OTK SHOULD be encrypted using a preconfigured key shared between OTK SHOULD be encrypted using a preconfigured key shared between
the ITR and the Map-Resolver, similar to the key shared between the ITR and the Map-Resolver, similar to the key shared between
the ETR and the Map-Server in order to secure ETR registration the ETR and the Map-Server in order to secure ETR registration
[I-D.ietf-lisp-ms]. [RFC6833].
o The Map-Resolver decapsulates the ECM message, decrypts the ITR- o The Map-Resolver decapsulates the ECM message, decrypts the ITR-
OTK, if needed, and forwards through the Mapping System the OTK, if needed, and forwards through the Mapping System the
received Map-Request and the ITR-OTK, as part of a new ECM received Map-Request and the ITR-OTK, as part of a new ECM
message. As described in Section 5.6, the LISP Mapping System message. As described in Section 5.6, the LISP Mapping System
delivers the ECM to the appropriate Map-Server, as identified by delivers the ECM to the appropriate Map-Server, as identified by
the EID destination address of the Map-Request. the EID destination address of the Map-Request.
o The Map-Server is configured with the location mappings and policy o The Map-Server is configured with the location mappings and policy
information for the ETR responsible for the EID destination information for the ETR responsible for the EID destination
skipping to change at page 6, line 28 skipping to change at page 6, line 28
an HMAC computed using the ITR-OTK, to a new Encapsulated Control an HMAC computed using the ITR-OTK, to a new Encapsulated Control
Message that contains the received Map-Request. Message that contains the received Map-Request.
o The Map-Server derives a new OTK, the MS-OTK, by applying a Key o The Map-Server derives a new OTK, the MS-OTK, by applying a Key
Derivation Function (KDF) to the ITR-OTK. This MS-OTK is included Derivation Function (KDF) to the ITR-OTK. This MS-OTK is included
in the Encapsulated Control Message that the Map Server uses to in the Encapsulated Control Message that the Map Server uses to
forward the Map-Request to the ETR. To provide MS-OTK forward the Map-Request to the ETR. To provide MS-OTK
confidentiality over the path between the Map-Server and the ETR, confidentiality over the path between the Map-Server and the ETR,
the MS-OTK should be encrypted using the key shared between the the MS-OTK should be encrypted using the key shared between the
ETR and the Map-Server in order to secure ETR registration ETR and the Map-Server in order to secure ETR registration
[I-D.ietf-lisp-ms]. [RFC6833].
o If the Map-Server is acting in proxy mode, as specified in o If the Map-Server is acting in proxy mode, as specified in
[I-D.ietf-lisp], the ETR is not involved in the generation of the [RFC6830], the ETR is not involved in the generation of the Map-
Map-Reply. In this case the Map-Server generates the Map-Reply on Reply. In this case the Map-Server generates the Map-Reply on
behalf of the ETR as described below. behalf of the ETR as described below.
o The ETR, upon receiving the ECM encapsulated Map-Request from the o The ETR, upon receiving the ECM encapsulated Map-Request from the
Map-Server, decrypts the MS-OTK, if needed, and originates a Map-Server, decrypts the MS-OTK, if needed, and originates a
standard Map-Reply that contains the EID-to-RLOC mapping standard Map-Reply that contains the EID-to-RLOC mapping
information as specified in [I-D.ietf-lisp]. information as specified in [RFC6830].
o The ETR computes an HMAC over this standard Map-Reply, keyed with o The ETR computes an HMAC over this standard Map-Reply, keyed with
MS-OTK to protect the integrity of the whole Map-Reply. The ETR MS-OTK to protect the integrity of the whole Map-Reply. The ETR
also copies the EID-prefix authorization data that the Map-Server also copies the EID-prefix authorization data that the Map-Server
included in the ECM encapsulated Map-Request into the Map-Reply included in the ECM encapsulated Map-Request into the Map-Reply
message. The ETR then sends this complete Map-Reply message to message. The ETR then sends this complete Map-Reply message to
the requesting ITR. the requesting ITR.
o The ITR, upon receiving the Map-Reply, uses the locally stored o The ITR, upon receiving the Map-Reply, uses the locally stored
ITR-OTK to verify the integrity of the EID-prefix authorization ITR-OTK to verify the integrity of the EID-prefix authorization
data included in the Map-Reply by the Map-Server. The ITR data included in the Map-Reply by the Map-Server. The ITR
computes the MS-OTK by applying the same KDF used by the Map- computes the MS-OTK by applying the same KDF used by the Map-
Server, and verifies the integrity of the Map-Reply. If the Server, and verifies the integrity of the Map-Reply. If the
integrity checks fail, the Map-Reply MUST be discarded. Also, if integrity checks fail, the Map-Reply MUST be discarded. Also, if
the EID-prefixes claimed by the ETR in the Map-Reply are not equal the EID-prefixes claimed by the ETR in the Map-Reply are not equal
to or more specific than the EID-prefix authorization data or more specific than the EID-prefix authorization data inserted
inserted by the Map-Server, the ITR MUST discard the Map-Reply. by the Map-Server, the ITR MUST discard the Map-Reply.
5. LISP-SEC Control Messages Details 5. LISP-SEC Control Messages Details
LISP-SEC metadata associated with a Map-Request is transported within LISP-SEC metadata associated with a Map-Request is transported within
the Encapsulated Control Message that contains the Map-Request. the Encapsulated Control Message that contains the Map-Request.
LISP-SEC metadata associated with the Map-Reply is transported within LISP-SEC metadata associated with the Map-Reply is transported within
the Map-Reply itself. the Map-Reply itself.
5.1. Encapsulated Control Message LISP-SEC Extensions 5.1. Encapsulated Control Message LISP-SEC Extensions
LISP-SEC uses the ECM (Encapsulated Control Message) defined in LISP-SEC uses the ECM (Encapsulated Control Message) defined in
[I-D.ietf-lisp] with Type set to 8, and S bit set to 1 to indicate [RFC6830] with Type set to 8, and S bit set to 1 to indicate that the
that the LISP header includes Authentication Data (AD). The format LISP header includes Authentication Data (AD). The format of the
of the LISP-SEC ECM Authentication Data is defined in the following LISP-SEC ECM Authentication Data is defined in the following figure.
figure. OTK-AD stands for One-Time Key Authentication Data and OTK-AD stands for One-Time Key Authentication Data and EID-AD stands
EID-AD stands for EID Authentication Data. for EID Authentication Data.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AD Type |V| Reserved | Requested HMAC ID | | AD Type |V| Reserved | Requested HMAC ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\
| OTK Length | OTK Encryption ID | | | OTK Length | OTK Encryption ID | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| One-Time-Key Preamble ... | | | One-Time-Key Preamble ... | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ OTK-AD +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ OTK-AD
skipping to change at page 8, line 19 skipping to change at page 8, line 16
Reserved: Set to 0 on transmission and ignored on receipt. Reserved: Set to 0 on transmission and ignored on receipt.
Requested HMAC ID: The HMAC algorithm requested by the ITR. See Requested HMAC ID: The HMAC algorithm requested by the ITR. See
Section 5.4 for details. Section 5.4 for details.
OTK Length: The length (in bytes) of the OTK Authentication Data OTK Length: The length (in bytes) of the OTK Authentication Data
(OTK-AD), that contains the OTK Preamble and the OTK. (OTK-AD), that contains the OTK Preamble and the OTK.
OTK Encryption ID: The identifier of the key wrapping algorithm OTK Encryption ID: The identifier of the key wrapping algorithm
used to encrypt the One-Time-Key. When a 128-bit OTK is sent used to encrypt the One-Time-Key. When a 128-bit OTK is sent
unencrypted by the Map-Resolver, the OTK Encryption ID is set to unencrypted by the Map-Resolver, the OTK Encryption ID is set to
NULL_KEY_WRAP_128. See Section 5.5 for more details. NULL_KEY_WRAP_128. See Section 5.5 for more details.
One-Time-Key Preamble: set to 0 if the OTK is not encrypted. When One-Time-Key Preamble: set to 0 if the OTK is not encrypted. When
the OTK is encrypted, this field may carry additional metadata the OTK is encrypted, this field may carry additional metadata
resulting from the key wrapping operation. When a 128-bit OTK is resulting from the key wrapping operation. When a 128-bit OTK is
sent unencrypted by Map-Resolver, the OTK Preamble is set to sent unencrypted by Map-Resolver, the OTK Preamble is set to
0x0000000000000000 (64 bits). See Section 5.5 for details. 0x0000000000000000 (64 bits). See Section 5.5 for details.
One-Time-Key: the OTK encrypted (or not) as specified by OTK One-Time-Key: the OTK encrypted (or not) as specified by OTK
skipping to change at page 9, line 20 skipping to change at page 9, line 19
EID-prefix: The Map-Server uses this field to specify the EID- EID-prefix: The Map-Server uses this field to specify the EID-
prefix that the destination ETR is authoritative for, and is the prefix that the destination ETR is authoritative for, and is the
longest match for the requested EID. longest match for the requested EID.
EID HMAC: HMAC of the EID-AD computed and inserted by Map-Server. EID HMAC: HMAC of the EID-AD computed and inserted by Map-Server.
Before computing the HMAC operation the EID HMAC field MUST be set Before computing the HMAC operation the EID HMAC field MUST be set
to 0. The HMAC covers the entire EID-AD. to 0. The HMAC covers the entire EID-AD.
5.2. Map-Reply LISP-SEC Extensions 5.2. Map-Reply LISP-SEC Extensions
LISP-SEC uses the Map-Reply defined in [I-D.ietf-lisp], with Type set LISP-SEC uses the Map-Reply defined in [RFC6830], with Type set to 2,
to 2, and S bit set to 1 to indicate that the Map-Reply message and S bit set to 1 to indicate that the Map-Reply message includes
includes Authentication Data (AD). The format of the LISP-SEC Map- Authentication Data (AD). The format of the LISP-SEC Map-Reply
Reply Authentication Data is defined in the following figure. PKT-AD Authentication Data is defined in the following figure. PKT-AD is
is the Packet Authentication Data that covers the Map-Reply payload. the Packet Authentication Data that covers the Map-Reply payload.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AD Type | Reserved | | AD Type | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <---+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <---+
| EID-AD Length | KDF ID | | | EID-AD Length | KDF ID | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Record Count | Reserved | EID HMAC ID | EID-AD | Record Count | Reserved | EID HMAC ID | EID-AD
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\ | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\ |
| Reserved | EID mask-len | EID-AFI | | | | Reserved | EID mask-len | EID-AFI | | |
skipping to change at page 10, line 52 skipping to change at page 11, line 9
The second bit after the Type field in a Map-Register message is The second bit after the Type field in a Map-Register message is
allocated as the S bit. The S bit indicates to the Map-Server that allocated as the S bit. The S bit indicates to the Map-Server that
the registering ETR is LISP-SEC enabled. An ETR that supports LISP- the registering ETR is LISP-SEC enabled. An ETR that supports LISP-
SEC MUST set the S bit in its Map-Register messages. SEC MUST set the S bit in its Map-Register messages.
5.4. ITR Processing 5.4. ITR Processing
Upon creating a Map-Request, the ITR generates a random ITR-OTK that Upon creating a Map-Request, the ITR generates a random ITR-OTK that
is stored locally, together with the nonce generated as specified in is stored locally, together with the nonce generated as specified in
[I-D.ietf-lisp]. [RFC6830].
The Map-Request MUST be encapsulated in an ECM, with the S-bit set to The Map-Request MUST be encapsulated in an ECM, with the S-bit set to
1, to indicate the presence of Authentication Data. If the ITR and 1, to indicate the presence of Authentication Data. If the ITR and
the Map-Resolver are configured with a shared key, the ITR-OTK the Map-Resolver are configured with a shared key, the ITR-OTK
confidentiality SHOULD be protected by wrapping the ITR-OTK with the confidentiality SHOULD be protected by wrapping the ITR-OTK with the
algorithm specified by the OTK Encryption ID field. See Section 5.5 algorithm specified by the OTK Encryption ID field. See Section 5.5
for further details on OTK encryption. for further details on OTK encryption.
The Requested HMAC ID field contains the suggested HMAC algorithm to The Requested HMAC ID field contains the suggested HMAC algorithm to
be used by the Map-Server and the ETR to protect the integrity of the be used by the Map-Server and the ETR to protect the integrity of the
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a new Map-Request with a different Requested HMAC ID according to a new Map-Request with a different Requested HMAC ID according to
ITR's local policy. ITR's local policy.
Each individual Map-Reply EID-record is considered valid only if: (1) Each individual Map-Reply EID-record is considered valid only if: (1)
both EID-AD and PKT-AD are valid, and (2) the intersection of the both EID-AD and PKT-AD are valid, and (2) the intersection of the
EID-prefix in the Map-Reply EID-record with one of the EID-prefixes EID-prefix in the Map-Reply EID-record with one of the EID-prefixes
contained in the EID-AD is not empty. After identifying the Map- contained in the EID-AD is not empty. After identifying the Map-
Reply record as valid, the ITR sets the EID-prefix in the Map-Reply Reply record as valid, the ITR sets the EID-prefix in the Map-Reply
record to the value of the intersection set computed before, and adds record to the value of the intersection set computed before, and adds
the Map-Reply EID-record to its EID-to-RLOC cache, as described in the Map-Reply EID-record to its EID-to-RLOC cache, as described in
[I-D.ietf-lisp]. An example of Map-Reply record validation is [RFC6830]. An example of Map-Reply record validation is provided in
provided in Section 5.4.1. Section 5.4.1.
The ITR SHOULD send SMR triggered Map Requests over the mapping The ITR SHOULD send SMR triggered Map Requests over the mapping
system in order to receive a secure Map-Reply. If an ITR accepts system in order to receive a secure Map-Reply. If an ITR accepts
piggybacked Map-Replies, it SHOULD also send a Map-Request over the piggybacked Map-Replies, it SHOULD also send a Map-Request over the
mapping system in order to securely verify the piggybacked Map-Reply. mapping system in order to securely verify the piggybacked Map-Reply.
5.4.1. Map-Reply Record Validation 5.4.1. Map-Reply Record Validation
The payload of a Map-Reply may contain multiple EID-records. The The payload of a Map-Reply may contain multiple EID-records. The
whole Map-Reply is signed by the ETR, with the PKT HMAC, to provide whole Map-Reply is signed by the ETR, with the PKT HMAC, to provide
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an ITR. However, if the PITR is directly connected to the ALT, the an ITR. However, if the PITR is directly connected to the ALT, the
PITR performs the functions of both the ITR and the Map-Resolver PITR performs the functions of both the ITR and the Map-Resolver
forwarding the Map-Request encapsulated in an ECM header that forwarding the Map-Request encapsulated in an ECM header that
includes the Authentication Data fields as described in Section 5.6. includes the Authentication Data fields as described in Section 5.6.
5.5. Encrypting and Decrypting an OTK 5.5. Encrypting and Decrypting an OTK
MS-OTK confidentiality is required in the path between the Map-Server MS-OTK confidentiality is required in the path between the Map-Server
and the ETR, the MS-OTK SHOULD be encrypted using the preconfigured and the ETR, the MS-OTK SHOULD be encrypted using the preconfigured
key shared between the Map-Server and the ETR for the purpose of key shared between the Map-Server and the ETR for the purpose of
securing ETR registration [I-D.ietf-lisp-ms]. Similarly, if ITR-OTK securing ETR registration [RFC6833]. Similarly, if ITR-OTK
confidentiality is required in the path between the ITR and the Map- confidentiality is required in the path between the ITR and the Map-
Resolver, the ITR-OTK SHOULD be encrypted with a key shared between Resolver, the ITR-OTK SHOULD be encrypted with a key shared between
the ITR and the Map-Resolver. the ITR and the Map-Resolver.
The OTK is encrypted using the algorithm specified in the OTK The OTK is encrypted using the algorithm specified in the OTK
Encryption ID field. When the AES Key Wrap algorithm is used to Encryption ID field. When the AES Key Wrap algorithm is used to
encrypt a 128-bit OTK, according to [RFC3339], the AES Key Wrap encrypt a 128-bit OTK, according to [RFC3339], the AES Key Wrap
Initialization Value MUST be set to 0xA6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6 (64 bits). Initialization Value MUST be set to 0xA6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6 (64 bits).
The output of the AES Key Wrap operation is 192-bit long. The most The output of the AES Key Wrap operation is 192-bit long. The most
significant 64-bit are copied in the One-Time Key Preamble field, significant 64-bit are copied in the One-Time Key Preamble field,
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When a 128-bit OTK is sent unencrypted the OTK Encryption ID is set When a 128-bit OTK is sent unencrypted the OTK Encryption ID is set
to NULL_KEY_WRAP_128, and the OTK Preamble is set to to NULL_KEY_WRAP_128, and the OTK Preamble is set to
0x0000000000000000 (64 bits). 0x0000000000000000 (64 bits).
5.6. Map-Resolver Processing 5.6. Map-Resolver Processing
Upon receiving an encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set, the Upon receiving an encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set, the
Map-Resolver decapsulates the ECM message. The ITR-OTK, if Map-Resolver decapsulates the ECM message. The ITR-OTK, if
encrypted, is decrypted as specified in Section 5.5. encrypted, is decrypted as specified in Section 5.5.
The Map-Resolver, as specified in [I-D.ietf-lisp-ms], originates a The Map-Resolver, as specified in [RFC6833], originates a new ECM
new ECM header with the S-bit set, that contains the unencrypted ITR- header with the S-bit set, that contains the unencrypted ITR-OTK, as
OTK, as specified in Section 5.5, and the other data derived from the specified in Section 5.5, and the other data derived from the ECM
ECM Authentication Data of the received encapsulated Map-Request. Authentication Data of the received encapsulated Map-Request.
The Map-Resolver then forwards the received Map-Request, encapsulated The Map-Resolver then forwards the received Map-Request, encapsulated
in the new ECM header that includes the newly computed Authentication in the new ECM header that includes the newly computed Authentication
Data fields. Data fields.
5.7. Map-Server Processing 5.7. Map-Server Processing
Upon receiving an ECM encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set, Upon receiving an ECM encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set,
the Map-Server process the Map-Request according to the value of the the Map-Server process the Map-Request according to the value of the
S-bit contained in the Map-Register sent by the ETR during S-bit contained in the Map-Register sent by the ETR during
registration. registration.
If the S-bit contained in the Map-Register was clear the Map-Server If the S-bit contained in the Map-Register was clear the Map-Server
decapsulates the ECM and generates a new ECM encapsulated Map-Request decapsulates the ECM and generates a new ECM encapsulated Map-Request
that does not contain an ECM Authentication Data, as specified in that does not contain an ECM Authentication Data, as specified in
[I-D.ietf-lisp]. The Map-Server does not perform any further LISP- [RFC6830]. The Map-Server does not perform any further LISP-SEC
SEC processing. processing.
If the S-bit contained in the Map-Register was set the Map-Server If the S-bit contained in the Map-Register was set the Map-Server
decapsulates the ECM and generates a new ECM Authentication Data. decapsulates the ECM and generates a new ECM Authentication Data.
The Authentication Data includes the OTK-AD and the EID-AD, that The Authentication Data includes the OTK-AD and the EID-AD, that
contains EID-prefix authorization information, that are ultimately contains EID-prefix authorization information, that are ultimately
sent to the requesting ITR. sent to the requesting ITR.
The Map-Server updates the OTK-AD by deriving a new OTK (MS-OTK) from The Map-Server updates the OTK-AD by deriving a new OTK (MS-OTK) from
the ITR-OTK received with the Map-Request. MS-OTK is derived the ITR-OTK received with the Map-Request. MS-OTK is derived
applying the key derivation function specified in the KDF ID field. applying the key derivation function specified in the KDF ID field.
If the algorithm specified in the KDF ID field is not supported, the If the algorithm specified in the KDF ID field is not supported, the
Map-Server uses a different algorithm to derive the key and updates Map-Server uses a different algorithm to derive the key and updates
the KDF ID field accordingly. the KDF ID field accordingly.
The Map-Server and the ETR MUST be configured with a shared key for The Map-Server and the ETR MUST be configured with a shared key for
mapping registration according to [I-D.ietf-lisp-ms]. If MS-OTK mapping registration according to [RFC6833]. If MS-OTK
confidentiality is required, then the MS-OTK SHOULD be encrypted, by confidentiality is required, then the MS-OTK SHOULD be encrypted, by
wrapping the MS-OTK with the algorithm specified by the OTK wrapping the MS-OTK with the algorithm specified by the OTK
Encryption ID field as specified in Section 5.5. Encryption ID field as specified in Section 5.5.
The Map-Server includes in the EID-AD the longest match registered The Map-Server includes in the EID-AD the longest match registered
EID-prefix for the destination EID, and an HMAC of this EID-prefix. EID-prefix for the destination EID, and an HMAC of this EID-prefix.
The HMAC is keyed with the ITR-OTK contained in the received ECM The HMAC is keyed with the ITR-OTK contained in the received ECM
Authentication Data, and the HMAC algorithm is chosen according to Authentication Data, and the HMAC algorithm is chosen according to
the Requested HMAC ID field. If The Map-Server does not support this the Requested HMAC ID field. If The Map-Server does not support this
algorithm, the Map-Server uses a different algorithm and specifies it algorithm, the Map-Server uses a different algorithm and specifies it
in the EID HMAC ID field. The scope of the HMAC operation covers the in the EID HMAC ID field. The scope of the HMAC operation covers the
entire EID-AD, from the EID-AD Length field to the EID HMAC field, entire EID-AD, from the EID-AD Length field to the EID HMAC field,
which must be set to 0 before the computation. which must be set to 0 before the computation.
The Map-Server then forwards the updated ECM encapsulated Map- The Map-Server then forwards the updated ECM encapsulated Map-
Request, that contains the OTK-AD, the EID-AD, and the received Map- Request, that contains the OTK-AD, the EID-AD, and the received Map-
Request to an authoritative ETR as specified in [I-D.ietf-lisp]. Request to an authoritative ETR as specified in [RFC6830].
5.7.1. Map-Server Processing in Proxy mode 5.7.1. Map-Server Processing in Proxy mode
If the Map-Server is in proxy mode, it generates a Map-Reply, as If the Map-Server is in proxy mode, it generates a Map-Reply, as
specified in [I-D.ietf-lisp], with the S-bit set to 1. The Map-Reply specified in [RFC6830], with the S-bit set to 1. The Map-Reply
includes the Authentication Data that contains the EID-AD, computed includes the Authentication Data that contains the EID-AD, computed
as specified in Section 5.7, as well as the PKT-AD computed as as specified in Section 5.7, as well as the PKT-AD computed as
specified in Section 5.8. specified in Section 5.8.
5.8. ETR Processing 5.8. ETR Processing
Upon receiving an ECM encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set, Upon receiving an ECM encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set,
the ETR decapsulates the ECM message. The OTK field, if encrypted, the ETR decapsulates the ECM message. The OTK field, if encrypted,
is decrypted as specified in Section 5.5 to obtain the unencrypted is decrypted as specified in Section 5.5 to obtain the unencrypted
MS-OTK. MS-OTK.
The ETR then generates a Map-Reply as specified in [I-D.ietf-lisp] The ETR then generates a Map-Reply as specified in [RFC6830] and
and includes the Authentication Data that contains the EID-AD, as includes the Authentication Data that contains the EID-AD, as
received in the encapsulated Map-Request, as well as the PKT-AD. received in the encapsulated Map-Request, as well as the PKT-AD.
The EID-AD is copied from the Authentication Data of the received The EID-AD is copied from the Authentication Data of the received
encapsulated Map-Request. encapsulated Map-Request.
The PKT-AD contains the HMAC of the whole Map-Reply packet, keyed The PKT-AD contains the HMAC of the whole Map-Reply packet, keyed
with the MS-OTK and computed using the HMAC algorithm specified in with the MS-OTK and computed using the HMAC algorithm specified in
the Requested HMAC ID field of the received encapsulated Map-Request. the Requested HMAC ID field of the received encapsulated Map-Request.
If the ETR does not support the Requested HMAC ID, it uses a If the ETR does not support the Requested HMAC ID, it uses a
different algorithm and updates the PKT HMAC ID field accordingly. different algorithm and updates the PKT HMAC ID field accordingly.
The scope of the HMAC operation covers the entire PKT-AD, from the The scope of the HMAC operation covers the entire PKT-AD, from the
Map-Reply Type field to the PKT HMAC field, which must be set to 0 Map-Reply Type field to the PKT HMAC field, which must be set to 0
before the computation. before the computation.
Finally the ETR sends the Map-Reply to the requesting ITR as Finally the ETR sends the Map-Reply to the requesting ITR as
specified in [I-D.ietf-lisp]. specified in [RFC6830].
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
6.1. Mapping System Security 6.1. Mapping System Security
The LISP-SEC threat model described in Section 3, assumes that the The LISP-SEC threat model described in Section 3, assumes that the
LISP Mapping System is working properly and eventually delivers Map- LISP Mapping System is working properly and eventually delivers Map-
Request messages to a Map-Server that is authoritative for the Request messages to a Map-Server that is authoritative for the
requested EID. requested EID.
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8. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge Pere Monclus, Dave Meyer, Dino The authors would like to acknowledge Pere Monclus, Dave Meyer, Dino
Farinacci, Brian Weis, David McGrew, Darrel Lewis and Landon Curt Farinacci, Brian Weis, David McGrew, Darrel Lewis and Landon Curt
Noll for their valuable suggestions provided during the preparation Noll for their valuable suggestions provided during the preparation
of this document. of this document.
9. Normative References 9. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-lisp]
Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis,
"Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)",
draft-ietf-lisp-23 (work in progress), May 2012.
[I-D.ietf-lisp-interworking]
Lewis, D., Meyer, D., Farinacci, D., and V. Fuller,
"Interworking LISP with IPv4 and IPv6",
draft-ietf-lisp-interworking-06 (work in progress),
March 2012.
[I-D.ietf-lisp-ms]
Fuller, V. and D. Farinacci, "LISP Map Server Interface",
draft-ietf-lisp-ms-16 (work in progress), March 2012.
[I-D.ietf-lisp-threats] [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats]
Saucez, D., Iannone, L., and O. Bonaventure, "LISP Threats Saucez, D., Iannone, L., and O. Bonaventure, "LISP Threats
Analysis", draft-ietf-lisp-threats-02 (work in progress), Analysis", draft-ietf-lisp-threats-08 (work in progress),
September 2012. October 2013.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
February 1997. 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard [RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002. (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness [RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005. Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. May 2008.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand [RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010. Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010.
[RFC6830] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The
Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830, January
2013.
[RFC6833] Fuller, V. and D. Farinacci, "Locator/ID Separation
Protocol (LISP) Map-Server Interface", RFC 6833, January
2013.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Fabio Maino Fabio Maino
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
170 Tasman Drive 170 Tasman Drive
San Jose, California 95134 San Jose, California 95134
USA USA
Email: fmaino@cisco.com Email: fmaino@cisco.com
skipping to change at page 20, line 4 skipping to change at page 19, line 37
Email: fmaino@cisco.com Email: fmaino@cisco.com
Vina Ermagan Vina Ermagan
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
170 Tasman Drive 170 Tasman Drive
San Jose, California 95134 San Jose, California 95134
USA USA
Email: vermagan@cisco.com Email: vermagan@cisco.com
Albert Cabellos Albert Cabellos
Technical University of Catalonia Technical University of Catalonia
c/ Jordi Girona s/n c/ Jordi Girona s/n
Barcelona, 08034 Barcelona 08034
Spain Spain
Email: acabello@ac.upc.edu Email: acabello@ac.upc.edu
Damien Saucez Damien Saucez
INRIA INRIA
2004 route des Lucioles - BP 93 2004 route des Lucioles - BP 93
Sophia Antipolis, Sophia Antipolis
France France
Email: damien.saucez@inria.fr Email: damien.saucez@inria.fr
Olivier Bonaventure Olivier Bonaventure
Universite Catholique de Louvain Universite Catholique de Louvain
Place St. Barbe 2 Place St. Barbe 2
Louvain-la-Neuve, Louvain-la-Neuve
Belgium Belgium
Email: olivier.bonaventure@uclouvain.be Email: olivier.bonaventure@uclouvain.be
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