draft-ietf-lisp-sec-00.txt   draft-ietf-lisp-sec-01.txt 
Network Working Group F. Maino Network Working Group F. Maino
Internet-Draft V. Ermagan Internet-Draft V. Ermagan
Intended status: Experimental Cisco Systems Intended status: Experimental Cisco Systems
Expires: January 2, 2012 A. Cabellos Expires: July 4, 2012 A. Cabellos
Technical University of Technical University of
Catalonia Catalonia
D. Saucez D. Saucez
O. Bonaventure O. Bonaventure
Universite catholique de Louvain Universite catholique de Louvain
July 1, 2011 January 1, 2012
LISP-Security (LISP-SEC) LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)
draft-ietf-lisp-sec-00.txt draft-ietf-lisp-sec-01.txt
Abstract Abstract
This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that
provide origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection provide origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection
to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup
process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID- process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID-
prefix claims in Map-Reply messages. prefix claims in Map-Reply messages.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 4, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. LISP-SEC Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. LISP-SEC Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Protocol Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Protocol Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. LISP-SEC Control Messages Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. LISP-SEC Control Messages Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Encapsulated Control Message LISP-SEC Extensions . . . . . 7 5.1. Encapsulated Control Message LISP-SEC Extensions . . . . . 7
5.2. Map-Reply LISP-SEC Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.2. Map-Reply LISP-SEC Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3. ITR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.3. ITR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3.1. Map-Reply Record Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.3.1. Map-Reply Record Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3.2. PITR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.3.2. PITR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.4. Encrypting and Decrypting an OTK . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.4. Encrypting and Decrypting an OTK . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.5. Map-Resolver Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.5. Map-Resolver Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.6. Map-Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.6. Map-Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.6.1. Map-Server Processing in Proxy mode . . . . . . . . . 15 5.6.1. Map-Server Processing in Proxy mode . . . . . . . . . 15
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functions for routers to exchange information used to map from non- functions for routers to exchange information used to map from non-
routable Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) to routable Routing Locators routable Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) to routable Routing Locators
(RLOCs). If these EID-to-RLOC mappings, carried through Map-Reply (RLOCs). If these EID-to-RLOC mappings, carried through Map-Reply
messages, are transmitted without integrity protection, an adversary messages, are transmitted without integrity protection, an adversary
can manipulate them and hijack the communication, impersonate the can manipulate them and hijack the communication, impersonate the
requested EID or mount Denial of Service or Distributed Denial of requested EID or mount Denial of Service or Distributed Denial of
Service attacks. Also, if the Map-Reply message is transported Service attacks. Also, if the Map-Reply message is transported
unauthenticated, an adversarial LISP entity can overclaim an EID- unauthenticated, an adversarial LISP entity can overclaim an EID-
prefix and maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number of prefix and maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number of
hosts. A detailed description of "overclaiming" attack is provided hosts. A detailed description of "overclaiming" attack is provided
in [I-D.saucez-lisp-security]. in [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats].
This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that
provide origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection provide origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection
to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup
process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID- process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID-
prefix claims in Map-Reply messages, ensuring that the sender of a prefix claims in Map-Reply messages, ensuring that the sender of a
Map-Reply that provides the location for a given EID-prefix is Map-Reply that provides the location for a given EID-prefix is
entitled to do so according to the EID prefix registered in the entitled to do so according to the EID prefix registered in the
associated Map Server. Map-Register security, including the right associated Map Server. Map-Register security, including the right
for a LISP entity to register an EID-prefix or to claim presence at for a LISP entity to register an EID-prefix or to claim presence at
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protect the integrity of the Map-Reply message. protect the integrity of the Map-Reply message.
For definitions of other terms, notably Map-Request, Map-Reply, For definitions of other terms, notably Map-Request, Map-Reply,
Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR), Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), Map-Server Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR), Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), Map-Server
(MS) and Map-Resolver (MR) please consult the LISP specification (MS) and Map-Resolver (MR) please consult the LISP specification
[I-D.ietf-lisp]. [I-D.ietf-lisp].
3. LISP-SEC Threat Model 3. LISP-SEC Threat Model
LISP-SEC addresses the control plane threats, described in LISP-SEC addresses the control plane threats, described in
[I-D.saucez-lisp-security], that target EID-to-RLOC mappings, [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats], that target EID-to-RLOC mappings, including
including manipulations of Map-Request and Map-Reply messages, and manipulations of Map-Request and Map-Reply messages, and malicious
malicious xTR EID overclaiming. However LISP-SEC makes two main xTR EID overclaiming. However LISP-SEC makes two main assumptions
assumptions that are not part of [I-D.saucez-lisp-security]. First, that are not part of [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats]. First, the LISP
the LISP Mapping System is expected to deliver Map-Request messages Mapping System is expected to deliver Map-Request messages to their
to their intended destinations as identified by the EID. Second, no intended destinations as identified by the EID. Second, no man-in-
man-in-the-middle attack can be mounted within the LISP Mapping the-middle attack can be mounted within the LISP Mapping System.
System. Furthermore, while LISP-SEC enables detection of EID prefix Furthermore, while LISP-SEC enables detection of EID prefix over
over claiming attacks, it assumes that Map Servers can verify the EID claiming attacks, it assumes that Map Servers can verify the EID
prefix authorization at time of registration. prefix authorization at time of registration.
Accordingly to the threat model described in Accordingly to the threat model described in [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats]
[I-D.saucez-lisp-security] LISP-SEC assumes that any kind of attack, LISP-SEC assumes that any kind of attack, including MITM attacks, can
including MITM attacks, can be mounted in the access network, outside be mounted in the access network, outside of the boundaries of the
of the boundaries of the LISP mapping system. An on-path attacker, LISP mapping system. An on-path attacker, outside of the LISP
outside of the LISP mapping service system can, for instance, hijack mapping service system can, for instance, hijack mapping requests and
mapping requests and replies, spoofing the identity of a LISP node. replies, spoofing the identity of a LISP node. Another example of
Another example of on-path attack, called over claiming attack, can on-path attack, called over claiming attack, can be mounted by a
be mounted by a malicious Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), by over malicious Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), by over claiming the EID-
claiming the EID-prefixes for which it is authoritative. In this way prefixes for which it is authoritative. In this way the ETR can
the ETR can maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number of hosts.
of hosts.
4. Protocol Operations 4. Protocol Operations
The goal of the security mechanisms defined in [I-D.ietf-lisp] is to The goal of the security mechanisms defined in [I-D.ietf-lisp] is to
prevent unauthorized insertion of mapping data, by providing origin prevent unauthorized insertion of mapping data, by providing origin
authentication and integrity protection for the Map-Registration, and authentication and integrity protection for the Map-Registration, and
by using the nonce to detect unsolicited Map-Reply sent by off-path by using the nonce to detect unsolicited Map-Reply sent by off-path
attackers. attackers.
LISP-SEC builds on top of the security mechanisms defined in LISP-SEC builds on top of the security mechanisms defined in
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7.1. HMAC functions 7.1. HMAC functions
The following HMAC ID values are defined by this memo for use as The following HMAC ID values are defined by this memo for use as
Requested HMAC ID, EID HMAC ID, and PKT HMAC ID in the LISP-SEC Requested HMAC ID, EID HMAC ID, and PKT HMAC ID in the LISP-SEC
Authentication Data: Authentication Data:
Name Number Defined In Name Number Defined In
------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------
NONE 0 NONE 0
AUTH-HMAC-SHA-1-160 1 [RFC2104] AUTH-HMAC-SHA-1-96 1 [RFC2104]
AUTH-HMAC-SHA-256-128 2 [RFC4634] AUTH-HMAC-SHA-256-128 2 [RFC4634]
values 2-65535 are reserved to IANA. values 2-65535 are reserved to IANA.
HMAC Functions HMAC Functions
AUTH-HMAC-SHA-1-160 MUST be supported, AUTH-HMAC-SHA-256-128 should AUTH-HMAC-SHA-1-96 MUST be supported, AUTH-HMAC-SHA-256-128 should be
be supported. supported.
7.2. Key Wrap Functions 7.2. Key Wrap Functions
The following OTK Encryption ID values are defined by this memo for The following OTK Encryption ID values are defined by this memo for
use as OTK key wrap algorithms ID in the LISP-SEC Authentication use as OTK key wrap algorithms ID in the LISP-SEC Authentication
Data: Data:
Name Number Defined In Name Number Defined In
------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------
NULL-KEY-WRAP-128 1 NULL-KEY-WRAP-128 1
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The authors would like to acknowledge Pere Monclus, Dave Meyer, Dino The authors would like to acknowledge Pere Monclus, Dave Meyer, Dino
Farinacci, Brian Weis, David McGrew, Darrel Lewis and Landon Curt Farinacci, Brian Weis, David McGrew, Darrel Lewis and Landon Curt
Noll for their valuable suggestions provided during the preparation Noll for their valuable suggestions provided during the preparation
of this document. of this document.
9. Normative References 9. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-lisp] [I-D.ietf-lisp]
Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis,
"Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)",
draft-ietf-lisp-14 (work in progress), June 2011. draft-ietf-lisp-18 (work in progress), December 2011.
[I-D.ietf-lisp-interworking] [I-D.ietf-lisp-interworking]
Lewis, D., Meyer, D., Farinacci, D., and V. Fuller, Lewis, D., Meyer, D., Farinacci, D., and V. Fuller,
"Interworking LISP with IPv4 and IPv6", "Interworking LISP with IPv4 and IPv6",
draft-ietf-lisp-interworking-01 (work in progress), draft-ietf-lisp-interworking-02 (work in progress),
August 2010. June 2011.
[I-D.ietf-lisp-ms] [I-D.ietf-lisp-ms]
Fuller, V. and D. Farinacci, "LISP Map Server", Fuller, V. and D. Farinacci, "LISP Map Server Interface",
draft-ietf-lisp-ms-09 (work in progress), June 2011. draft-ietf-lisp-ms-14 (work in progress), December 2011.
[I-D.saucez-lisp-security] [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats]
Saucez, D., Iannone, L., and O. Bonaventure, "LISP Saucez, D., Iannone, L., and O. Bonaventure, "LISP Threats
Security Threats", draft-saucez-lisp-security-03 (work in Analysis", draft-ietf-lisp-threats-00 (work in progress),
progress), March 2011. July 2011.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997. February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard [RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002. (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
 End of changes. 15 change blocks. 
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