draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-05.txt   draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-06.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force D. Farinacci Internet Engineering Task Force D. Farinacci
Internet-Draft lispers.net Internet-Draft lispers.net
Intended status: Experimental B. Weis Intended status: Experimental B. Weis
Expires: December 29, 2016 cisco Systems Expires: December 31, 2016 cisco Systems
June 27, 2016 June 29, 2016
LISP Data-Plane Confidentiality LISP Data-Plane Confidentiality
draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-05 draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-06
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a mechanism for encrypting LISP encapsulated This document describes a mechanism for encrypting LISP encapsulated
traffic. The design describes how key exchange is achieved using traffic. The design describes how key exchange is achieved using
existing LISP control-plane mechanisms as well as how to secure the existing LISP control-plane mechanisms as well as how to secure the
LISP data-plane from third-party surveillance attacks. LISP data-plane from third-party surveillance attacks.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 29, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Encoding and Transmitting Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Encoding and Transmitting Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Shared Keys used for the Data-Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. Shared Keys used for the Data-Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Data-Plane Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. Data-Plane Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Procedures for Encryption and Decryption . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. Procedures for Encryption and Decryption . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. Dynamic Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10. Dynamic Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11. Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 11. Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12.1. SAAG Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.1. SAAG Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12.2. LISP-Crypto Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.2. LISP-Crypto Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Appendix B. Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
B.1. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-05.txt . . . . . . . . 16 B.1. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-06.txt . . . . . . . . 16
B.2. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-04.txt . . . . . . . . 16 B.2. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-05.txt . . . . . . . . 16
B.3. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-03.txt . . . . . . . . 16 B.3. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-04.txt . . . . . . . . 16
B.4. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-02.txt . . . . . . . . 17 B.4. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-03.txt . . . . . . . . 16
B.5. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-01.txt . . . . . . . . 17 B.5. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-02.txt . . . . . . . . 17
B.6. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-00.txt . . . . . . . . 17 B.6. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-01.txt . . . . . . . . 17
B.7. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-01.txt . . . . . . 17 B.7. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-00.txt . . . . . . . . 17
B.8. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-00.txt . . . . . . 18 B.8. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-01.txt . . . . . . 17
B.9. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-00.txt . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Locator/ID Separation Protocol [RFC6830] defines a set of The Locator/ID Separation Protocol [RFC6830] defines a set of
functions for routers to exchange information used to map from non- functions for routers to exchange information used to map from non-
routable Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) to routable Routing Locators routable Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) to routable Routing Locators
(RLOCs). LISP ITRs and PITRs encapsulate packets to ETRs and RTRs. (RLOCs). LISP ITRs and PITRs encapsulate packets to ETRs and RTRs.
Packets that arrive at the ITR or PITR are typically not modified. Packets that arrive at the ITR or PITR are typically not modified.
Which means no protection or privacy of the data is added. If the Which means no protection or privacy of the data is added. If the
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The 'Key Count' field encodes the number of {'Key-Length', 'Key- The 'Key Count' field encodes the number of {'Key-Length', 'Key-
Material'} fields included in the encoded LCAF. The maximum number Material'} fields included in the encoded LCAF. The maximum number
of keys that can be encoded are 3, each identified by key-id 1, of keys that can be encoded are 3, each identified by key-id 1,
followed by key-id 2, an finally key-id 3. followed by key-id 2, an finally key-id 3.
The 'R' bit is not used for this use-case of the Security Type LCAF The 'R' bit is not used for this use-case of the Security Type LCAF
but is reserved for [LISP-DDT] security. Therefore, the R bit is but is reserved for [LISP-DDT] security. Therefore, the R bit is
transmitted as 0 and ignored on receipt. transmitted as 0 and ignored on receipt.
Cipher Suite 0: Cipher Suite 0:
Reserved Reserved
Cipher Suite 1:
Diffie-Hellman Group: 2048-bit MODP [RFC3526]
Encryption: AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode [AES-CBC]
Integrity: Integrated with [AES-CBC] AEAD AEAD_AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
IV length: 16 bytes
Cipher Suite 2: Cipher Suite 1:
Diffie-Hellman Group: 256-bit Elliptic-Curve 25519 [CURVE25519] Diffie-Hellman Group: 2048-bit MODP [RFC3526]
Encryption: AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode [AES-CBC] Encryption: AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode [AES-CBC]
Integrity: Integrated with [AES-CBC] AEAD AEAD_AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 Integrity: Integrated with [AES-CBC] AEAD_AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
IV length: 16 bytes IV length: 16 bytes
Cipher Suite 3: Cipher Suite 2:
Diffie-Hellman Group: 2048-bit MODP [RFC3526] Diffie-Hellman Group: 256-bit Elliptic-Curve 25519 [CURVE25519]
Encryption: AES with 128-bit keys in GCM mode [AES-GCM] Encryption: AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode [AES-CBC]
Integrity: Integrated with [AES-GCM] AEAD [RFC5116] encryption Integrity: Integrated with [AES-CBC] AEAD_AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
IV length: 12 bytes IV length: 16 bytes
Cipher Suite 4: Cipher Suite 3:
Diffie-Hellman Group: 3072-bit MODP [RFC3526] Diffie-Hellman Group: 2048-bit MODP [RFC3526]
Encryption: AES with 128-bit keys in GCM mode [AES-GCM] Encryption: AES with 128-bit keys in GCM mode [RFC5116]
Integrity: Integrated with [AES-GCM] AEAD [RFC5116] encryption Integrity: Integrated with [RFC5116] AEAD_AES_128_GCM
IV length: 12 bytes IV length: 12 bytes
Cipher Suite 5: Cipher Suite 4:
Diffie-Hellman Group: 256-bit Elliptic-Curve 25519 [CURVE25519] Diffie-Hellman Group: 3072-bit MODP [RFC3526]
Encryption: AES with 128-bit keys in GCM mode [AES-GCM] Encryption: AES with 128-bit keys in GCM mode [RFC5116]
Integrity: Integrated with [AES-GCM] AEAD [RFC5116] encryption Integrity: Integrated with [RFC5116] AEAD_AES_128_GCM
IV length: 12 bytes IV length: 12 bytes
Cipher Suite 6: Cipher Suite 5:
Diffie-Hellman Group: 256-bit Elliptic-Curve 25519 [CURVE25519] Diffie-Hellman Group: 256-bit Elliptic-Curve 25519 [CURVE25519]
Encryption: Chacha20-Poly1305 [CHACHA-POLY] [RFC7539] Encryption: AES with 128-bit keys in GCM mode [RFC5116]
Integrity: Integrated with [CHACHA-POLY] AEAD AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 Integrity: Integrated with [RFC5116] AEAD_AES_128_GCM
IV length: 8 bytes IV length: 12 bytes
Cipher Suite 6:
Diffie-Hellman Group: 256-bit Elliptic-Curve 25519 [CURVE25519]
Encryption: Chacha20-Poly1305 [CHACHA-POLY] [RFC7539]
Integrity: Integrated with [CHACHA-POLY] AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305
IV length: 8 bytes
The "Public Key Material" field contains the public key generated by The "Public Key Material" field contains the public key generated by
one of the Cipher Suites defined above. The length of the key in one of the Cipher Suites defined above. The length of the key in
octets is encoded in the "Key Length" field. octets is encoded in the "Key Length" field.
When an ITR, PITR, or RTR sends a Map-Request, they will encode their When an ITR, PITR, or RTR sends a Map-Request, they will encode their
own RLOC in the Security Type LCAF format within the ITR-RLOCs field. own RLOC in the Security Type LCAF format within the ITR-RLOCs field.
When a ETR or RTR sends a Map-Reply, they will encode their RLOCs in When a ETR or RTR sends a Map-Reply, they will encode their RLOCs in
Security Type LCAF format within the RLOC-record field of each EID- Security Type LCAF format within the RLOC-record field of each EID-
record supplied. record supplied.
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The LISP encapsulation header [RFC6830] requires changes to encode The LISP encapsulation header [RFC6830] requires changes to encode
the key-id for the key being used for encryption. the key-id for the key being used for encryption.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Source Port = xxxx | Dest Port = 4341 | / | Source Port = xxxx | Dest Port = 4341 |
UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ | UDP Length | UDP Checksum | \ | UDP Length | UDP Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
L / |N|L|E|V|I|P|K|K| Nonce/Map-Version |\ \ L / |N|L|E|V|I|R|K|K| Nonce/Map-Version |\ \
I +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |A I +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |A
S \ | Instance ID/Locator-Status-Bits | |D S \ | Instance ID/Locator-Status-Bits | |D
P +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |/ P +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |/
| Initialization Vector (IV) | I | Initialization Vector (IV) | I
E +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ C E +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ C
n / | | V n / | | V
c | | | c | | |
r | Packet Payload with EID Header ... | | r | Packet Payload with EID Header ... | |
y | | | y | | |
p \ | |/ p \ | |/
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When an ITR or PITR receives a packet to be encapsulated, they will When an ITR or PITR receives a packet to be encapsulated, they will
first decide what key to use, encode the key-id into the LISP header, first decide what key to use, encode the key-id into the LISP header,
and use that key to encrypt all packet data that follows the LISP and use that key to encrypt all packet data that follows the LISP
header. Therefore, the outer header, UDP header, and LISP header header. Therefore, the outer header, UDP header, and LISP header
travel as plaintext. travel as plaintext.
There is an open working group item to discuss if the data There is an open working group item to discuss if the data
encapsulation header needs change for encryption or any new encapsulation header needs change for encryption or any new
applications. This document proposes changes to the existing header applications. This document proposes changes to the existing header
so experimentation can continue without making large changes to the so experimentation can continue without making large changes to the
data-plane at this time. This document allocates the previously 2 data-plane at this time. This document allocates 2 bits of the
unused flag bits to be used as the KK bits. previously unused 3 flag bits (note the R-bit above is still a
reserved flag bit) for the KK bits.
9. Procedures for Encryption and Decryption 9. Procedures for Encryption and Decryption
When an ITR, PITR, or RTR encapsulate a packet and have already When an ITR, PITR, or RTR encapsulate a packet and have already
computed an AEAD-key (detailed in section Section 7) that is computed an AEAD-key (detailed in section Section 7) that is
associated with a destination RLOC, the following encryption and associated with a destination RLOC, the following encryption and
encapsulation procedures are performed: encapsulation procedures are performed:
1. The encapsulator creates an IV and prepends the IV value to the 1. The encapsulator creates an IV and prepends the IV value to the
packet being encapsulated. For GCM and Chacha cipher suites, the packet being encapsulated. For GCM and Chacha cipher suites, the
skipping to change at page 14, line 15 skipping to change at page 14, line 15
[NIST-SP800-108] [NIST-SP800-108]
"National Institute of Standards and Technology, "National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom "Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom
Functions NIST SP800-108"", NIST SP 800-108, October 2009. Functions NIST SP800-108"", NIST SP 800-108, October 2009.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, DOI 10.17487/RFC2409, November 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2409>.
[RFC2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", [RFC2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
RFC 2631, DOI 10.17487/RFC2631, June 1999, RFC 2631, DOI 10.17487/RFC2631, June 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2631>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2631>.
[RFC3526] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP) [RFC3526] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP)
Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
RFC 3526, DOI 10.17487/RFC3526, May 2003, RFC 3526, DOI 10.17487/RFC3526, May 2003,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3526>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3526>.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B. [RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
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security expertise to make lisp-crypto as secure as the state of the security expertise to make lisp-crypto as secure as the state of the
art in cryptography. art in cryptography.
In addition, the support and suggestions from the SAAG working group In addition, the support and suggestions from the SAAG working group
were helpful and appreciative. were helpful and appreciative.
Appendix B. Document Change Log Appendix B. Document Change Log
[RFC Editor: Please delete this section on publication as RFC.] [RFC Editor: Please delete this section on publication as RFC.]
B.1. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-05.txt B.1. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-06.txt
o Posted June 2016.
o Fixed IDnits errors.
B.2. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-05.txt
o Posted June 2016. o Posted June 2016.
o Update document which reflects comments Luigi provided as document o Update document which reflects comments Luigi provided as document
shepherd. shepherd.
B.2. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-04.txt B.3. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-04.txt
o Posted May 2016. o Posted May 2016.
o Update document timer from expiration. o Update document timer from expiration.
B.3. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-03.txt B.4. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-03.txt
o Posted December 2015. o Posted December 2015.
o Changed cipher suite allocations. We now have 2 AES-CBC cipher o Changed cipher suite allocations. We now have 2 AES-CBC cipher
suites for compatibility, 3 AES-GCM cipher suites that are faster suites for compatibility, 3 AES-GCM cipher suites that are faster
ciphers that include AE and a Chacha20-Poly1305 cipher suite which ciphers that include AE and a Chacha20-Poly1305 cipher suite which
is the fastest but not totally proven/accepted.. is the fastest but not totally proven/accepted..
o Remove 1024-bit DH keys for key exchange. o Remove 1024-bit DH keys for key exchange.
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endian). endian).
o Remove A-bit from Security Type LCAF. No need to do o Remove A-bit from Security Type LCAF. No need to do
authentication only with the introduction of AEAD ciphers. These authentication only with the introduction of AEAD ciphers. These
ciphers can do authentication. So you get ciphertext for free. ciphers can do authentication. So you get ciphertext for free.
o Remove language that refers to "encryption-key" and "integrity- o Remove language that refers to "encryption-key" and "integrity-
key". Used term "AEAD-key" that is used by the AEAD cipher suites key". Used term "AEAD-key" that is used by the AEAD cipher suites
that do encryption and authenticaiton internal to the cipher. that do encryption and authenticaiton internal to the cipher.
B.4. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-02.txt B.5. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-02.txt
o Posted September 2015. o Posted September 2015.
o Add cipher suite for Elliptic Curve 25519 DH exchange. o Add cipher suite for Elliptic Curve 25519 DH exchange.
o Add cipher suite for Chacha20/Poly1305 ciphers. o Add cipher suite for Chacha20/Poly1305 ciphers.
B.5. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-01.txt B.6. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-01.txt
o Posted May 2015. o Posted May 2015.
o Create cipher suites and encode them in the Security LCAF. o Create cipher suites and encode them in the Security LCAF.
o Add IV to beginning of packet header and ICV to end of packet. o Add IV to beginning of packet header and ICV to end of packet.
o AEAD procedures are now part of encrpytion process. o AEAD procedures are now part of encrpytion process.
B.6. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-00.txt B.7. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-00.txt
o Posted January 2015. o Posted January 2015.
o Changing draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-01 to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto- o Changing draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-01 to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-
00. This draft has become a working group document 00. This draft has become a working group document
o Add text to indicate the working group may work on a new data o Add text to indicate the working group may work on a new data
encapsulation header format for data-plane encryption. encapsulation header format for data-plane encryption.
B.7. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-01.txt B.8. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-01.txt
o Posted July 2014. o Posted July 2014.
o Add Group-ID to the encoding format of Key Material in a Security o Add Group-ID to the encoding format of Key Material in a Security
Type LCAF and modify the IANA Considerations so this draft can use Type LCAF and modify the IANA Considerations so this draft can use
key exchange parameters from the IANA registry. key exchange parameters from the IANA registry.
o Indicate that the R-bit in the Security Type LCAF is not used by o Indicate that the R-bit in the Security Type LCAF is not used by
lisp-crypto. lisp-crypto.
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process. process.
o Add text indicating that when RLOC-probing is used for RLOC o Add text indicating that when RLOC-probing is used for RLOC
reachability purposes and rekeying is not desired, that the same reachability purposes and rekeying is not desired, that the same
key exchange parameters should be used so a reallocation of a key exchange parameters should be used so a reallocation of a
pubic key does not happen at the ETR. pubic key does not happen at the ETR.
o Add text to indicate that ECDH can be used to reduce CPU o Add text to indicate that ECDH can be used to reduce CPU
requirements for computing shared secret-keys. requirements for computing shared secret-keys.
B.8. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-00.txt B.9. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-00.txt
o Initial draft posted February 2014. o Initial draft posted February 2014.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Dino Farinacci Dino Farinacci
lispers.net lispers.net
San Jose, California 95120 San Jose, California 95120
USA USA
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