Network Working Group                                    P. Hallam-Baker
Obsoletes: 6844 (if approved)                               R. Stradling
Intended status: Standards Track                                 Sectigo
Expires: August 8, November 10, 2019                            J. Hoffman-Andrews
                                                           Let's Encrypt
                                                       February 04,
                                                            May 09, 2019

    DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record


   The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Resource Record
   allows a DNS domain name holder to specify one or more Certification
   Authorities (CAs) authorized to issue certificates for that domain
   name.  CAA Resource Records allow a public Certification Authority to
   implement additional controls to reduce the risk of unintended
   certificate mis-issue.  This document defines the syntax of the CAA
   record and rules for processing CAA records by certificate issuers.

   This document obsoletes RFC 6844.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 8, November 10, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Relevant Resource Record Set  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.1.1.  Canonical Presentation Format . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  CAA issue Property  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  CAA issuewild Property  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.4.  CAA iodef Property  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.5.  Critical Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  Use of DNS Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  Non-Compliance by Certification Authority . . . . . . . .  12
     5.3.  Mis-Issue by Authorized Certification Authority . . . . .  12
     5.4.  Suppression or Spoofing of CAA Records  . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.5.  Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.6.  Abuse of the Critical Flag  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  Blocked Queries or Responses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.2.  Rejected Queries and Malformed Responses  . . . . . . . .  14
     6.3.  Delegation to Private Nameservers . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.4.  Bogus DNSSEC Responses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Differences versus RFC6844  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Resource Record
   allows a DNS domain name holder to specify the Certification
   Authorities (CAs) authorized to issue certificates for that domain
   name.  Publication of CAA Resource Records allows a public
   Certification Authority to implement additional controls to reduce
   the risk of unintended certificate mis-issue.

   Like the TLSA record defined in DNS-Based Authentication of Named
   Entities (DANE) [RFC6698], CAA records are used as a part of a
   mechanism for checking PKIX [RFC6698] certificate data.  The
   distinction between the two specifications is that CAA records
   specify an authorization control to be performed by a certificate
   issuer before issue of a certificate and TLSA records specify a
   verification control to be performed by a relying party after the
   certificate is issued.

   Conformance with a published CAA record is a necessary but not
   sufficient condition for issuance of a certificate.

   Criteria for inclusion of embedded trust anchor certificates in
   applications are outside the scope of this document.  Typically, such
   criteria require the CA to publish a Certification Practices
   Statement (CPS) that specifies how the requirements of the
   Certificate Policy (CP) are achieved.  It is also common for a CA to
   engage an independent third-party auditor to prepare an annual audit
   statement of its performance against its CPS.

   A set of CAA records describes only current grants of authority to
   issue certificates for the corresponding DNS domain name.  Since
   certificates are valid for a period of time, it is possible that a
   certificate that is not conformant with the CAA records currently
   published was conformant with the CAA records published at the time
   that the certificate was issued.  Relying parties MUST NOT use CAA
   records as part of certificate validation.

   CAA records MAY be used by Certificate Evaluators as a possible
   indicator of a security policy violation.  Such use SHOULD take
   account of the possibility that published CAA records changed between
   the time a certificate was issued and the time at which the
   certificate was observed by the Certificate Evaluator.

2.  Definitions

2.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC8174]. BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.2.  Defined Terms

   The following terms are used in this document:

   Certificate: An X.509 Certificate, as specified in [RFC5280].

   Certificate Evaluator: A party other than a Relying Party that
   evaluates the trustworthiness of certificates issued by Certification

   Certification Authority (CA): An Issuer that issues certificates in
   accordance with a specified Certificate Policy.

   Certificate Policy (CP): Specifies the criteria that a Certification
   Authority undertakes to meet in its issue of certificates.  See

   Certification Practices Statement (CPS): Specifies the means by which
   the criteria of the Certificate Policy are met.  In most cases, this
   will be the document against which the operations of the
   Certification Authority are audited.  See [RFC3647].

   Domain Name: The label assigned to a node in the Domain Name System.

   Domain Name System (DNS): The Internet naming system specified in
   [RFC1034] and [RFC1035].

   DNS Security (DNSSEC): Extensions to the DNS that provide
   authentication services as specified in [RFC4033], [RFC4034],
   [RFC4035], [RFC5155], and revisions.

   Fully-Qualified Domain Name: A Domain Name that includes the labels
   of all superior nodes in the Domain Name System.

   Issuer: An entity that issues certificates.  See [RFC5280].

   Property: The tag-value portion of a CAA Resource Record.

   Property Tag: The tag portion of a CAA Resource Record.

   Property Value: The value portion of a CAA Resource Record.

   Resource Record (RR): A particular entry in the DNS including the
   owner name, class, type, time to live, and data, as defined in
   [RFC1034] and [RFC2181].

   Resource Record Set (RRSet): A set of Resource Records of a
   particular owner name, class, and type.  The time to live on all RRs
   with an RRSet is always the same, but the data may be different among
   RRs in the RRSet.

   Relevant Resource Record Set (Relevant RRSet): A set of CAA Resource
   Records resulting from applying the algorithm in Section 4 to a
   specific Domain Name or Wildcard Domain Name.

   Relying Party: A party that makes use of an application whose
   operation depends on use of a certificate for making a security
   decision.  See [RFC5280].

   Wildcard Domain Name: A Domain Name consisting of a single asterisk
   character followed by a single full stop character ("*.") followed by
   a Fully-Qualified Domain Name.

3.  Relevant Resource Record Set

   Before issuing a certificate, a compliant CA MUST check for
   publication of a Relevant RRSet.  If such an RRSet exists, a CA MUST
   NOT issue a certificate unless the CA determines that either (1) the
   certificate request is consistent with the applicable CAA Resource
   Record set or (2) an exception specified in the relevant Certificate
   Policy or Certification Practices Statement applies.  If the Relevant
   RRSet for a Domain Name or Wildcard Domain Name contains no Property
   Tags that restrict issuance (for instance, if it contains only iodef
   Property Tags, or only Property Tags unrecognized by the CA), CAA
   does not restrict issuance.

   A certificate request MAY specify more than one Domain Name and MAY
   specify Wildcard Domain Names.  Issuers MUST verify authorization for
   all the Domain Names and Wildcard Domain Names specified in the

   The search for a CAA RRSet climbs the DNS name tree from the
   specified label up to but not including the DNS root '.' until a CAA
   RRSet is found.

   Given a request for a specific Domain Name X, or a request for a
   Wildcard Domain Name *.X, the Relevant Resource Record Set
   RelevantCAASet(X) is determined as follows:

   Let CAA(X) be the RRSet returned by performing a CAA record query for
   the Domain Name X, according to the lookup algorithm specified in RFC
   1034 section 4.3.2 (in particular chasing aliases).  Let Parent(X) be
   the Domain Name produced by removing the leftmost label of X.

     for domain is not ".":
       if CAA(domain) is not Empty:
         return CAA(domain)
       domain = Parent(domain)
     return Empty

   For example, processing CAA for the Domain Name "X.Y.Z" where there
   are no CAA records at any level in the tree RelevantCAASet would have
   the following steps:

   CAA("X.Y.Z.") = Empty; domain = Parent("X.Y.Z.") = "Y.Z."
   CAA("Y.Z.")   = Empty; domain = Parent("Y.Z.")   = "Z."
   CAA("Z.")     = Empty; domain = Parent("Z.")     = "."
   return Empty

   Processing CAA for the Domain Name "A.B.C" where there is a CAA
   record "issue" at "B.C" would terminate early upon
   finding the CAA record:

   CAA("A.B.C.") = Empty; domain = Parent("A.B.C.") = "B.C."
   CAA("B.C.")   = "issue"
   return "issue"

4.  Mechanism

4.1.  Syntax

   A CAA Resource Record contains a single Property consisting of a tag-
   value pair.  A Domain Name MAY have multiple CAA RRs associated with
   it and a given Property Tag MAY be specified more than once across
   those RRs.

   The RDATA section for a CAA Resource Record contains one Property.  A
   Property consists of the following:

   | Flags          | Tag Length = n |
   | Tag char 0     | Tag char 1     |...| Tag char n-1  |
   | Value byte 0   | Value byte 1   |.....| Value byte m-1 |

   Where n is the length specified in the Tag length field and m is the
   remaining octets in the Value field.  They are related by (m = d - n
   - 2) where d is the length of the RDATA section.

   The fields are defined as follows:

   Flags: One octet containing the following field:

   Bit 0, Issuer Critical Flag: If the value is set to '1', the Property
   is critical.  A Certification Authority MUST NOT issue certificates
   for any Domain Name where the Relevant RRSet for that Domain Name
   contains a CAA critical Property for an unknown or unsupported
   Property Tag.

   Note that according to the conventions set out in [RFC1035], bit 0 is
   the Most Significant Bit and bit 7 is the Least Significant Bit.
   Thus, the Flags value 1 means that bit 7 is set while a value of 128
   means that bit 0 is set according to this convention.

   All other bit positions are reserved for future use.

   To ensure compatibility with future extensions to CAA, DNS records
   compliant with this version of the CAA specification MUST clear (set
   to "0") all reserved flags bits.  Applications that interpret CAA
   records MUST ignore the value of all reserved flag bits.

   Tag Length: A single octet containing an unsigned integer specifying
   the tag length in octets.  The tag length MUST be at least 1 and
   SHOULD be no more than 15.

   Tag: The Property identifier, a sequence of US-ASCII characters.

   Tags MAY contain US-ASCII characters 'a' through 'z', 'A' through
   'Z', and the numbers 0 through 9.  Tags SHOULD NOT contain any other
   characters.  Matching of tags is case insensitive.

   Tags submitted for registration by IANA MUST NOT contain any
   characters other than the (lowercase) US-ASCII characters 'a' through
   'z' and the numbers 0 through 9.

   Value: A sequence of octets representing the Property Value.
   Property Values are encoded as binary values and MAY employ sub-

   The length of the value field is specified implicitly as the
   remaining length of the enclosing RDATA section.

4.1.1.  Canonical Presentation Format

   The canonical presentation format of the CAA record is:

   CAA <flags> <tag> <value>

   Flags: Is an unsigned integer between 0 and 255.

   Tag: Is a non-zero sequence of US-ASCII letters and numbers in lower

   Value: The value field, expressed as a contiguous set of characters
   without interior spaces, or as a quoted string.  See the the
   <character-string> format specified in [RFC1035], Section 5.1, but
   note that the value field contains no length byte and is not limited
   to 255 characters.

4.2.  CAA issue Property

   If the issue Property Tag is present in the Relevant RRSet for a
   Domain Name, it is a request that Issuers

   1.  Perform CAA issue restriction processing for the Domain Name, and

   2.  Grant authorization to issue certificates containing that Domain
       Name to the holder of the issuer-domain-name or a party acting
       under the explicit authority of the holder of the issuer-domain-

   The CAA issue Property Value has the following sub-syntax (specified
   in ABNF as per [RFC5234]).

issue-value = *WSP [issuer-domain-name *WSP] [";" *WSP [parameters *WSP]]

issuer-domain-name = label *("." label)
label = (ALPHA / DIGIT) *( *("-") (ALPHA / DIGIT))

parameters = (parameter *WSP ";" *WSP parameters) / parameter
parameter = tag *WSP "=" *WSP value
tag = (ALPHA / DIGIT) *( *("-") (ALPHA / DIGIT))
value = *(%x21-3A / %x3C-7E)

   For consistency with other aspects of DNS administration, Domain Name
   values are specified in letter-digit-hyphen Label (LDH-Label) form.

   The following CAA record set requests that no certificates be issued
   for the Domain Name '' by any Issuer other than or         CAA 0 issue ""         CAA 0 issue ""
   Because the presence of an issue Property Tag in the Relevant RRSet
   for a Domain Name restricts issuance, Domain Name owners can use an
   issue Property Tag with no issuer-domain-name to request no issuance.

   For example, the following RRSet requests that no certificates be
   issued for the Domain Name '' by any Issuer.       CAA 0 issue ";"

   An issue Property Tag where the issue-value does not match the ABNF
   grammar MUST be treated the same as one specifying an empty issuer-
   domain-name.  For example, the following malformed CAA RRSet forbids
   issuance:     CAA 0 issue "%%%%%"

   CAA authorizations are additive; thus, the result of specifying both
   an empty issuer-domain-name and a non-empty issuer-domain-name is the
   same as specifying just the non-empty issuer-domain-name.

   An Issuer MAY choose to specify parameters that further constrain the
   issue of certificates by that Issuer, for example, specifying that
   certificates are to be subject to specific validation polices, billed
   to certain accounts, or issued under specific trust anchors.

   For example, if has requested its customer to specify their account number "230123" in
   each of the customer's CAA records using the (CA-defined) "account"
   parameter, it would look like this:   CAA 0 issue "; account=230123"

   The semantics of parameters to the issue Property Tag are determined
   by the Issuer alone.

4.3.  CAA issuewild Property

   The issuewild Property Tag has the same syntax and semantics as the
   issue Property Tag except that it only grants authorization to issue
   certificates that specify a Wildcard Domain Name and issuewild
   properties take precedence over issue properties when specified.

   issuewild properties MUST be ignored when processing a request for a
   Domain Name (that is, not a Wildcard Domain Name).

   If at least one issuewild Property is specified in the Relevant RRSet
   for a Wildcard Domain Name, all issue properties MUST be ignored when
   processing a request for that Wildcard Domain Name.

   For example, the following RRSet requests that _only_
   issue certificates for "" or "",
   and that _only_ issue certificates for
   "*" or "*          CAA 0 issue ""          CAA 0 issuewild ""

   The following RRSet requests that _only_ issue
   certificates for "", "*" or
   "*".         CAA 0 issue ""

   The following RRSet requests that _only_ issue
   certificates for "*" or "*".
   It does not permit any Issuer to issue for "" or
   "".         CAA 0 issuewild ""         CAA 0 issue ";"

   The following RRSet requests that _only_ issue
   certificates for "*" or "*".
   It permits any Issuer to issue for "" or
   "".         CAA 0 issuewild ""

4.4.  CAA iodef Property

   The iodef Property specifies a means of reporting certificate issue
   requests or cases of certificate issue for domains for which the
   Property appears in the Relevant RRSet, when those requests or
   issuances violate the security policy of the Issuer or the Domain
   Name holder.

   The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) [RFC7970] is
   used to present the incident report in machine-readable form.

   The iodef Property Tag takes a URL as its Property Value.  The URL
   scheme type determines the method used for reporting:

   mailto: The IODEF incident report is reported as a MIME email
   attachment to an SMTP email that is submitted to the mail address
   specified.  The mail message sent SHOULD contain a brief text message
   to alert the recipient to the nature of the attachment.

   http or https: The IODEF report is submitted as a Web service request
   to the HTTP address specified using the protocol specified in

   The following RRSet specifies that reports may be made by means of
   email with the IODEF data as an attachment, a Web service [RFC6546],
   or both:         CAA 0 issue ""         CAA 0 iodef ""         CAA 0 iodef ""

4.5.  Critical Flag

   The critical flag is intended to permit future versions of CAA to
   introduce new semantics that MUST be understood for correct
   processing of the record, preventing conforming CAs that do not
   recognize the new semantics from issuing certificates for the
   indicated Domain Names.

   In the following example, the Property with a Property Tag of 'tbs'
   is flagged as critical.  Neither the CA nor any other
   Issuer is authorized to issue for "" (or any other
   domains for which this is the Relevant RRSet) unless the Issuer has
   implemented the processing rules for the 'tbs' Property Tag.       CAA 0 issue ""       CAA 128 tbs "Unknown"

5.  Security Considerations

   CAA records assert a security policy that the holder of a Domain Name
   wishes to be observed by Issuers.  The effectiveness of CAA records
   as an access control mechanism is thus dependent on observance of CAA
   constraints by Issuers.

   The objective of the CAA record properties described in this document
   is to reduce the risk of certificate mis-issue rather than avoid
   reliance on a certificate that has been mis-issued.  DANE [RFC6698]
   describes a mechanism for avoiding reliance on mis-issued

5.1.  Use of DNS Security

   Use of DNSSEC to authenticate CAA RRs is strongly RECOMMENDED but not
   required.  An Issuer MUST NOT issue certificates if doing so would
   conflict with the Relevant RRSet, irrespective of whether the
   corresponding DNS records are signed.

   DNSSEC provides a proof of non-existence for both DNS Domain Names
   and RRSets within Domain Names.  DNSSEC verification thus enables an
   Issuer to determine if the answer to a CAA record query is empty
   because the RRSet is empty or if it is non-empty but the response has
   been suppressed.

   Use of DNSSEC allows an Issuer to acquire and archive a proof that
   they were authorized to issue certificates for the Domain Name.
   Verification of such archives MAY be an audit requirement to verify
   CAA record processing compliance.  Publication of such archives MAY
   be a transparency requirement to verify CAA record processing

5.2.  Non-Compliance by Certification Authority

   CAA records offer CAs a cost-effective means of mitigating the risk
   of certificate mis-issue: the cost of implementing CAA checks is very
   small and the potential costs of a mis-issue event include the
   removal of an embedded trust anchor.

5.3.  Mis-Issue by Authorized Certification Authority

   Use of CAA records does not prevent mis-issue by an authorized
   Certification Authority, i.e., a CA that is authorized to issue
   certificates for the Domain Name in question by CAA records.

   Domain Name holders SHOULD verify that the CAs they authorize to
   issue certificates for their Domain Names employ appropriate controls
   to ensure that certificates are issued only to authorized parties
   within their organization.

   Such controls are most appropriately determined by the Domain Name
   holder and the authorized CA(s) directly and are thus out of scope of
   this document.

5.4.  Suppression or Spoofing of CAA Records

   Suppression of the CAA record or insertion of a bogus CAA record
   could enable an attacker to obtain a certificate from an Issuer that
   was not authorized to issue for that Domain Name.

   Where possible, Issuers SHOULD perform DNSSEC validation to detect
   missing or modified CAA record sets.

   In cases where DNSSEC is not deployed for a corresponding Domain
   Name, an Issuer SHOULD attempt to mitigate this risk by employing
   appropriate DNS security controls.  For example, all portions of the
   DNS lookup process SHOULD be performed against the authoritative name
   server.  Data cached by third parties MUST NOT be relied on but MAY
   be used to support additional anti-spoofing or anti-suppression

5.5.  Denial of Service

   Introduction of a malformed or malicious CAA RR could in theory
   enable a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.

   This specific threat is not considered to add significantly to the
   risk of running an insecure DNS service.

   An attacker could, in principle, perform a DoS attack against an
   Issuer by requesting a certificate with a maliciously long DNS name.
   In practice, the DNS protocol imposes a maximum name length and CAA
   processing does not exacerbate the existing need to mitigate DoS
   attacks to any meaningful degree.

5.6.  Abuse of the Critical Flag

   A Certification Authority could make use of the critical flag to
   trick customers into publishing records that prevent competing
   Certification Authorities from issuing certificates even though the
   customer intends to authorize multiple providers.

   In practice, such an attack would be of minimal effect since any
   competent competitor that found itself unable to issue certificates
   due to lack of support for a Property marked critical SHOULD
   investigate the cause and report the reason to the customer.  The
   customer will thus discover that they had been deceived.

6.  Deployment Considerations

   A CA implementing CAA may find that they receive errors looking up
   CAA records.  The following are some common causes of such errors, so
   that CAs may provide guidance to their subscribers on fixing the
   underlying problems.

6.1.  Blocked Queries or Responses

   Some middleboxes, in particular anti-DDoS appliances, may be
   configured to drop DNS packets of unknown types, or may start
   dropping such packets when they consider themselves under attack.
   This generally manifests as a timed-out DNS query, or a SERVFAIL at a
   local recursive resolver.

6.2.  Rejected Queries and Malformed Responses

   Some authoritative nameservers respond with REJECTED or NOTIMP when
   queried for a Resource Record type they do not recognize.  At least
   one authoritative resolver produces a malformed response (with the QR
   bit set to 0) when queried for unknown Resource Record types.  Per
   RFC 1034, the correct response for unknown Resource Record types is

6.3.  Delegation to Private Nameservers

   Some Domain Name administrators make the contents of a subdomain
   unresolvable on the public Internet by delegating that subdomain to a
   nameserver whose IP address is private.  A CA processing CAA records
   for such subdomains will receive SERVFAIL from its recursive
   resolver.  The CA MAY interpret that as preventing issuance.  Domain
   Name administrators wishing to issue certificates for private Domain
   Names SHOULD use split-horizon DNS with a publicly available
   nameserver, so that CAs can receive a valid, empty CAA response for
   those Domain Names.

6.4.  Bogus DNSSEC Responses

   Queries for CAA Resource Records are different from most DNS RR
   types, because a signed, empty response to a query for CAA RRs is
   meaningfully different from a bogus response.  A signed, empty
   response indicates that there is definitely no CAA policy set at a
   given label.  A bogus response may mean either a misconfigured zone,
   or an attacker tampering with records.  DNSSEC implementations may
   have bugs with signatures on empty responses that go unnoticed,
   because for more common Resource Record types like A and AAAA, the
   difference to an end user between empty and bogus is irrelevant; they
   both mean a site is unavailable.

   In particular, at least two authoritative resolvers that implement
   live signing had bugs when returning empty Resource Record sets for
   DNSSEC-signed zones, in combination with mixed-case queries.  Mixed-
   case queries, also known as DNS 0x20, are used by some recursive
   resolvers to increase resilience against DNS poisoning attacks.
   DNSSEC-signing authoritative resolvers are expected to copy the same
   capitalization from the query into their ANSWER section, but sign the
   response as if they had use all lowercase.  In particular, PowerDNS
   versions prior to 4.0.4 had this bug.

7.  Differences versus RFC6844

   This document obsoletes RFC6844.  The most important change is to the
   Certification Authority Processing section.  RFC6844 specified an
   algorithm that performed DNS tree-climbing not only on the Domain
   Name being processed, but also on all CNAMEs and DNAMEs encountered
   along the way.  This made the processing algorithm very inefficient
   when used on Domain Names that utilize many CNAMEs, and would have
   made it difficult for hosting providers to set CAA policies on their
   own Domain Names without setting potentially unwanted CAA policies on
   their customers' Domain Names.  This document specifies a simplified
   processing algorithm that only performs tree climbing on the Domain
   Name being processed, and leaves processing of CNAMEs and DNAMEs up
   to the CA's recursive resolver.

   This document also includes a "Deployment Considerations" section
   detailing experience gained with practical deployment of CAA
   enforcement among CAs in the WebPKI.

   This document clarifies the ABNF grammar for issue and issuewild tags
   and resolves some inconsistencies with the document text.  In
   particular, it specifies that parameters are separated with
   semicolons.  It also allows hyphens in Property Tags.

   This document also clarifies processing of a CAA RRset that is not
   empty, but contains no issue or issuewild tags.

   This document removes the section titled "The CAA RR Type," merging
   it with "Mechanism" because the definitions were mainly duplicates.
   It moves the "Use of DNS Security" section into Security
   Considerations.  It renames "Certification Authority Processing" to
   "Relevant Resource Record Set," and emphasizes the use of that term
   to more clearly define which domains are affected by a given RRset.

8.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to add [[[ RFC Editor: Please replace with this RFC
   ]]] as a reference for the Certification Authority Restriction Flags
   and Certification Authority Restriction Properties registries.

9.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank the following people who contributed
   to the design and documentation of this work item: Corey Bonnell,
   Chris Evans, Stephen Farrell, Jeff Hodges, Paul Hoffman, Tim
   Hollebeek, Stephen Kent, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, James Manger,
   Chris Palmer, Scott Schmit, Sean Turner, and Ben Wilson.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC2181]  Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
              Specification", RFC 2181, DOI 10.17487/RFC2181, July 1997,

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
              Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,

   [RFC6546]  Trammell, B., "Transport of Real-time Inter-network
              Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS", RFC 6546,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6546, April 2012,

   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
              2012, <>.

   [RFC7970]  Danyliw, R., "The Incident Object Description Exchange
              Format Version 2", RFC 7970, DOI 10.17487/RFC7970,
              November 2016, <>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3647]  Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
              Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3647, November 2003,

Authors' Addresses

   Phillip Hallam-Baker


   Rob Stradling
   Sectigo Ltd.

   Jacob Hoffman-Andrews
   Let's Encrypt