draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis-08.txt		draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis-09.txt
	LAMPS J. Schaad		LAMPS J. Schaad
	Internet-Draft August Cellars		Internet-Draft August Cellars
	Obsoletes: 5751 (if approved) B. Ramsdell		Obsoletes: 5751 (if approved) B. Ramsdell
	Intended status: Standards Track Brute Squad Labs, Inc.		Intended status: Standards Track Brute Squad Labs, Inc.
	Expires: November 3, 2018 S. Turner		Expires: November 23, 2018 S. Turner
	sn3rd		sn3rd
	May 2, 2018		May 22, 2018
	Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0		Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0
	Message Specification		Message Specification
	draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis-08		draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis-09
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions		This document defines Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
	(S/MIME) version 4.0. S/MIME provides a consistent way to send and		(S/MIME) version 4.0. S/MIME provides a consistent way to send and
	receive secure MIME data. Digital signatures provide authentication,		receive secure MIME data. Digital signatures provide authentication,
	message integrity, and non-repudiation with proof of origin.		message integrity, and non-repudiation with proof of origin.
	Encryption provides data confidentiality. Compression can be used to		Encryption provides data confidentiality. Compression can be used to
	reduce data size. This document obsoletes RFC 5751.		reduce data size. This document obsoletes RFC 5751.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 47 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 47 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on November 3, 2018.		This Internet-Draft will expire on November 23, 2018.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 3, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 44 ¶
	4.1. Key Pair Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		4.1. Key Pair Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
	4.2. Signature Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		4.2. Signature Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
	4.3. Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		4.3. Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
	4.4. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38		4.4. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
	4.5. Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38		4.5. Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
	5.1. Media Type for application/pkcs7-mime . . . . . . . . . . 38		5.1. Media Type for application/pkcs7-mime . . . . . . . . . . 38
	5.2. Media Type for application/pkcs7-signature . . . . . . . 39		5.2. Media Type for application/pkcs7-signature . . . . . . . 39
	5.3. Register authEnveloped-data smime-type . . . . . . . . . 40		5.3. Register authEnveloped-data smime-type . . . . . . . . . 40
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44		7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44		7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48		7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
	Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52		Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
	Appendix B. Historic Mail Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 54		Appendix B. Historic Mail Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
	B.1. DigestAlgorithmIdentifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54		B.1. DigestAlgorithmIdentifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
	B.2. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54		B.2. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
	B.3. ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier . . . . . . . . . . 56		B.3. ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier . . . . . . . . . . 57
	B.4. KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier . . . . . . . . . . . . 56		B.4. KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
	Appendix C. Moving S/MIME v2 Message Specification to Historic		Appendix C. Moving S/MIME v2 Message Specification to Historic
	Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57		Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
	Appendix D. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57		Appendix D. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) provides a		S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) provides a
	consistent way to send and receive secure MIME data. Based on the		consistent way to send and receive secure MIME data. Based on the
	popular Internet MIME standard, S/MIME provides the following		popular Internet MIME standard, S/MIME provides the following
	cryptographic security services for electronic messaging		cryptographic security services for electronic messaging
	applications: authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation		applications: authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation
	of origin (using digital signatures), and data confidentiality (using		of origin (using digital signatures), and data confidentiality (using
	encryption). As a supplementary service, S/MIME provides message		encryption). As a supplementary service, S/MIME provides message
	skipping to change at page 44, line 28 ¶		skipping to change at page 44, line 28 ¶
	the message does not provide this information.		the message does not provide this information.
	When compression is used with encryption, it has the potential to add		When compression is used with encryption, it has the potential to add
	an additional layer of security. However, care needs to be taken		an additional layer of security. However, care needs to be taken
	when designing a protocol that relies on this not to create a		when designing a protocol that relies on this not to create a
	compression oracle. Compression oracle attacks require an adaptive		compression oracle. Compression oracle attacks require an adaptive
	input to the process and attack the unknown content of a message		input to the process and attack the unknown content of a message
	based on the length of the compressed output, this means that no		based on the length of the compressed output, this means that no
	attack on the encryption key is necessarily required.		attack on the encryption key is necessarily required.
			A recent paper on S/MIME and OpenPGP Email security [Efail] has
			pointed out a number of problems with the current S/MIME
			specifications and how people have implemented mail clients. Due to
			the nature of how CBC mode operates, the modes allow for malleability
			of plaintexts. This malleability allows for attackers to make
			changes in the cipher text and, if parts of the plain text are known,
			create arbitrary plaintexts blocks. These changes can be made
			without the weak integrity check in CBC mode being triggered. This
			type of attack can be prevented by the use of an AEAD algorithm with
			a more robust integrity check on the decryption process. It is
			therefore recommended that mail systems migrate to using AES-GCM as
			quickly as possible and that the decrypted content not be acted on
			prior to finishing the integrity check.
			The other attack that is highlighted in [Efail] is an error in how
			mail clients deal with HTML and multipart/mixed messages. Clients
			MUST require that a text/html content type is a complete HTML
			document (per [RFC1866]). Clients SHOULD treat each of the different
			pieces of the multipart/mixed construct as being of different
			origins. Clients MUST treat each encrypted or signed piece of a MIME
			message as being of different origins both from unprotected content
			and from each other.
	7. References		7. References
	7.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
	[ASN.1] "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation		[ASN.1] "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
	(ASN.1)".		(ASN.1)".
	ASN.1 syntax consists of the following references [X.680],		ASN.1 syntax consists of the following references [X.680],
	[X.681], [X.682], and [X.683].		[X.681], [X.682], and [X.683].
	skipping to change at page 45, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 45, line 49 ¶
	cms-ecdh-new-curves-10 (work in progress), August 2017.		cms-ecdh-new-curves-10 (work in progress), August 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures]		[I-D.ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures]
	Housley, R., "Use of EdDSA Signatures in the Cryptographic		Housley, R., "Use of EdDSA Signatures in the Cryptographic
	Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-		Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-
	signatures-08 (work in progress), October 2017.		signatures-08 (work in progress), October 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5750-bis]		[I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5750-bis]
	Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/		Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/
	Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/ MIME) Version		Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/ MIME) Version
	4.0 Certificate Handling", draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5750-bis-05		4.0 Certificate Handling", draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5750-bis-06
	(work in progress), April 2018.		(work in progress), May 2018.
	[MIME-SPEC]		[MIME-SPEC]
	"MIME Message Specifications".		"MIME Message Specifications".
	This is the set of documents that define how to use MIME.		This is the set of documents that define how to use MIME.
	This set of documents is [RFC2045], [RFC2046], [RFC2047],		This set of documents is [RFC2045], [RFC2046], [RFC2047],
	[RFC2049], [RFC6838], and [RFC4289].		[RFC2049], [RFC6838], and [RFC4289].
	[RFC1847] Galvin, J., Murphy, S., Crocker, S., and N. Freed,		[RFC1847] Galvin, J., Murphy, S., Crocker, S., and N. Freed,
	"Security Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and		"Security Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and
	skipping to change at page 48, line 32 ¶		skipping to change at page 49, line 12 ¶
	(ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications",		(ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications",
	ITU-T X.683, ISO/IEC 8824-4:2008, November 2008.		ITU-T X.683, ISO/IEC 8824-4:2008, November 2008.
	[X.690] "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:		[X.690] "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
	Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical		Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
	Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules		Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
	(DER).", ITU-T X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, July 2002.		(DER).", ITU-T X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, July 2002.
	7.2. Informative References		7.2. Informative References
			[Efail] Poddebniak, D., Muller, J., Dresen, C., Ising, F.,
			Schinzel, S., Friedberger, S., Somorovsky, J., and J.
			Schwenk, "Efail: Breaking S/MIME and OpenPGP Email
			Encryption using Exfiltration Channels", Work in
			Progress , May 2018.
	[FIPS186-2]		[FIPS186-2]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),		National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
	"Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [With Change Notice 1]",		"Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [With Change Notice 1]",
	Federal Information Processing Standards		Federal Information Processing Standards
	Publication 186-2, January 2000.		Publication 186-2, January 2000.
			[RFC1866] Berners-Lee, T. and D. Connolly, "Hypertext Markup
			Language - 2.0", RFC 1866, DOI 10.17487/RFC1866, November
			1995, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1866>.
	[RFC2268] Rivest, R., "A Description of the RC2(r) Encryption		[RFC2268] Rivest, R., "A Description of the RC2(r) Encryption
	Algorithm", RFC 2268, DOI 10.17487/RFC2268, March 1998,		Algorithm", RFC 2268, DOI 10.17487/RFC2268, March 1998,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2268>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2268>.
	[RFC2311] Dusse, S., Hoffman, P., Ramsdell, B., Lundblade, L., and		[RFC2311] Dusse, S., Hoffman, P., Ramsdell, B., Lundblade, L., and
	L. Repka, "S/MIME Version 2 Message Specification",		L. Repka, "S/MIME Version 2 Message Specification",
	RFC 2311, DOI 10.17487/RFC2311, March 1998,		RFC 2311, DOI 10.17487/RFC2311, March 1998,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2311>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2311>.
	[RFC2312] Dusse, S., Hoffman, P., Ramsdell, B., and J. Weinstein,		[RFC2312] Dusse, S., Hoffman, P., Ramsdell, B., and J. Weinstein,
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