draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-15.txt		rfc8692.txt
	LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis		Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Kampanakis
	Internet-Draft Cisco Systems		Request for Comments: 8692 Cisco Systems
	Updates: 3279 (if approved) Q. Dang		Updates: 3279 Q. Dang
	Intended status: Standards Track NIST		Category: Standards Track NIST
	Expires: January 22, 2020 July 21, 2019		ISSN: 2070-1721 December 2019
	Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm		Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm
	Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs		Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA Using SHAKEs
	draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-15
	Abstract		Abstract
	Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and		Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates, and
	CRLs. This document updates the "Algorithms and Identifiers for the		Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). This document updates the
	Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate		"Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
	Revocation List Profile" (RFC3279) and describes the conventions for		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
	using the SHAKE function family in Internet X.509 certificates and		Profile" (RFC 3279) and describes the conventions for using the SHAKE
	revocation lists as one-way hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic		function family in Internet X.509 certificates and revocation lists
	signature and ECDSA signature algorithms. The conventions for the		as one-way hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and
	associated subject public keys are also described.		Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature
			algorithms. The conventions for the associated subject public keys
			are also described.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This is an Internet Standards Track document.
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		received public review and has been approved for publication by the
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
			Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
	This Internet-Draft will expire on January 22, 2020.		Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
			and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
			https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8692.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction
	2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2. Terminology
	3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. Identifiers
	4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Use in PKIX
	5. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4.1. Signatures
	5.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
	5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.1.2. ECDSA Signatures
	5.1.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.2. Public Keys
	5.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5. IANA Considerations
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		6. Security Considerations
	7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		7. References
	8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		7.1. Normative References
	9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		7.2. Informative References
	9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
	9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		Acknowledgements
	Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		Authors' Addresses
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	1. Change Log
	[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-15:
	* Minor editorial nits.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-14:
	* Fixing error with incorrect preimage resistance bits for SHA128
	and SHA256.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-13:
	* Addressing one applicable comment from Dan M. about sec levels
	while in secdir review of draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes.
	* Addressing comment from Scott B.'s opsdir review about
	references in the abstract.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-12:
	* Nits identified by Roman, Eric V. Ben K., Barry L. in ballot
	position review.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-11:
	* Nits identified by Roman in AD Review.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-10:
	* Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID
	assignments.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-09:
	* Fixed minor text nits.
	* Added text name allocation for SHAKEs in IANA considerations.
	* Updates in Sec Considerations section.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-08:
	* Small nits from Russ while in WGLC.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-07:
	* Incorporated Eric's suggestion from WGLC.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-06:
	* Added informative references.
	* Updated ASN.1 so it compiles.
	* Updated IANA considerations.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-05:
	* Added RFC8174 reference and text.
	* Explicitly explained why RSASSA-PSS-params are omitted in
	section 5.1.1.
	* Simplified Public Keys section by removing redundant info from
	RFCs.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-04:
	* Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in
	Deterministic ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis.
	* Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about
	randomness of k because we are using deterministic ECDSA.
	* Various ASN.1 fixes.
	* Text fixes.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-03:
	* Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim.
	* Added ASN.1.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-02:
	* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
	introduction, the new OIDs and their use in PKIX.
	* Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcode hash, salt and MGF,
	according the WG consensus.
	* Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and
	clarify the algorithm identifier usage.
	* Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.
	* Consolidated subsection for message digest algorithms.
	* Text fixes.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-01:
	* Changed titles and section names.
	* Removed DSA after WG discussions.
	* Updated shake OID names and parameters, added MGF1 section.
	* Updated RSASSA-PSS section.
	* Added Public key algorithm OIDs.
	* Populated Introduction and IANA sections.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-00:
	* Initial version
	2. Introduction		1. Introduction
	[RFC3279] defines cryptographic algorithm identifiers for the		[RFC3279] defines cryptographic algorithm identifiers for the
	Internet X.509 Certificate and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL)		"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
	profile [RFC5280]. This document updates RFC3279 and defines		Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280]. This document updates RFC
	identifiers for several cryptographic algorithms that use variable		3279 and defines identifiers for several cryptographic algorithms
	length output SHAKE functions introduced in [SHA3] which can be used		that use variable-length output SHAKE functions introduced in [SHA3]
	with .		which can be used with RFC 5280.
	In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs),		In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs) are
	SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function		defined: SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. Four other hash function instances,
	instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, are also		SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, are also defined but are
	defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a		out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a variable-length hash
	variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output		function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output is a d-bits-long
	is a d-bits-long digest of message M. The corresponding collision		digest of message M. The corresponding collision and second-
	and second-preimage-resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are		preimage-resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2, 128) and
	min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits, respectively (Appendix A.1 [SHA3]).		min(d, 128) bits, respectively (see Appendix A.1 of [SHA3]). And the
	And the corresponding collision and second-preimage-resistance		corresponding collision and second-preimage-resistance strengths for
	strengths for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits,		SHAKE256 are min(d/2, 256) and min(d, 256) bits, respectively.
	respectively.
	A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash the		A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash the
	message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] and ECDSA [X9.62] and		message to be signed) in RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-
	as the hash in the mask generation function (MGF) in RSASSA-PSS.		PSS) [RFC8017] and ECDSA [X9.62] and as the hash in the mask
			generation function (MGF) in RSASSA-PSS.
	3. Terminology		2. Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
	14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all		BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.		capitals, as shown here.
	4. Identifiers		3. Identifiers
	This section defines four new object identifiers (OIDs), for RSASSA-		This section defines four new object identifiers (OIDs), for RSASSA-
	PSS and ECDSA with each of SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. The same algorithm		PSS and ECDSA with each of SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. The same algorithm
	identifiers can be used for identifying a public key in RSASSA-PSS.		identifiers can be used for identifying a public key in RSASSA-PSS.
	The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.		The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.
	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)		id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD1 }		30 }
	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)		id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD2 }		31 }
	The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are		The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are
	below.		below.
	id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)		id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD3 }		32 }
	id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)		id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD4 }		33 }
	The parameters for the four identifiers above MUST be absent. That		The parameters for the four identifiers above MUST be absent. That
	is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.		is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: the OID.
	Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2 specify the required output length		Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 specify the required output length for each
	for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. In		use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. In summary,
	summary, when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of		when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of SHAKE128 and
	SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits respectively. When the		SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits, respectively. When the SHAKEs are
	SHAKEs are used as mask generation functions RSASSA-PSS, their output		used as MGFs in RSASSA-PSS, their output length is (8*ceil((n-1)/8) -
	length is (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) or (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520) bits,		264) or (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520) bits, respectively, where n is the
	respectively, where n is the RSA modulus size in bits.		RSA modulus size in bits.
	5. Use in PKIX		4. Use in PKIX
	5.1. Signatures		4.1. Signatures
	Signatures are used in a number of different ASN.1 structures. As		Signatures are used in a number of different ASN.1 structures. As
	shown in the ASN.1 representation from [RFC5280] below, in an X.509		shown in the ASN.1 representation from [RFC5280] below, in an X.509
	certificate, a signature is encoded with an algorithm identifier in		certificate, a signature is encoded with an algorithm identifier in
	the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a signatureValue attribute that		the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a signatureValue attribute that
	contains the actual signature.		contains the actual signature.
	Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {		Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
	tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,		tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
	signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,		signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
	signatureValue BIT STRING }		signatureValue BIT STRING }
	The identifiers defined in Section 4 can be used as the		The identifiers defined in Section 3 can be used as the
	AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence		AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence
	Certificate and the signature field in the sequence TBSCertificate in		Certificate and the signature field in the sequence TBSCertificate in
	X.509 [RFC5280]. The parameters of these signature algorithms are		X.509 [RFC5280]. The parameters of these signature algorithms are
	absent as explained in Section 4.		absent, as explained in Section 3.
	Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly		Conforming Certification Authority (CA) implementations MUST specify
	by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSA-PSS or		the algorithms explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 3
	ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs. Conforming		when encoding RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in
	client implementations that process certificates and CRLs using		certificates and CRLs. Conforming client implementations that
	RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs.		process certificates and CRLs using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE
	Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA signature values are		MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs. Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS
	specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480], respectively.		and ECDSA signature values are specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480],
			respectively.
	When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA		When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA
	curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length.		curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length.
	Refer to Section 7 for more details.		Refer to Section 6 for more details.
	5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures		4.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
	The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-		The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
	PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 4 is		PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 (specified in Section 3) is
	used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the		used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
	AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-		AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: id-RSASSA-
	PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-		PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-
	PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the		PSS-params that is used to define the algorithms and inputs to the
	algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the		algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the
	hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer and salt are embedded in the		hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer, and salt are embedded in
	OID definition.		the OID definition.
	The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash		The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
	algorithm used as the mask generation function in RSASSA-PSS MUST be		algorithm used as the MGF in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the same: both
	the same: both SHAKE128 or both SHAKE256. The output length of the		SHAKE128 or both SHAKE256. The output length of the hash algorithm
	hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 (for SHAKE128) or		that hashes the message SHALL be 32 bytes (for SHAKE128) or 64 bytes
	64 bytes (for SHAKE256).		(for SHAKE256).
	The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length		The MGF takes an octet string of variable length and a desired output
	and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of		length as input and outputs an octet string of the desired length.
	the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be		In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be used natively as the
	used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that		MGF, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that uses the hash function in
	uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in		multiple iterations, as specified in Appendix B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In
	Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as		other words, the MGF is defined as the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of
	the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-		the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256,
	SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively. The mgfSeed is		respectively. The mgfSeed is the seed from which the mask is
	the seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As		generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As explained in Step 9 of
	explained in Step 9 of section 9.1.1 of [RFC8017], the output length		Section 9.1.1 of [RFC8017], the output length of the MGF is emLen -
	of the MGF is emLen - hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maximum message		hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maximum message length ceil((n-1)/8),
	length ceil((n-1)/8), where n is the RSA modulus in bits. hLen is 32		where n is the RSA modulus in bits. hLen is 32 and 64 bytes for id-
	and 64-bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256,		RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively. Thus,
	respectively. Thus when SHAKE is used as the MGF, the SHAKE output		when SHAKE is used as the MGF, the SHAKE output length maskLen is
	length maskLen is (8*emLen - 264) or (8*emLen - 520) bits,		(8*emLen - 264) or (8*emLen - 520) bits, respectively. For example,
	respectively. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output		when RSA modulus n is 2048 bits, the output length of SHAKE128 or
	length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or 1528-bits		SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or 1528 bits when id-RSASSA-PSS-
	when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used,		SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used, respectively.
	respectively.
	The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128		The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
	or 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. Finally, the trailerField		or 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. Finally, the trailerField
	MUST be 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value		MUST be 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value
	0xBC [RFC8017].		0xBC [RFC8017].
	5.1.2. ECDSA Signatures		4.1.2. ECDSA Signatures
	The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in		The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
	[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256		[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256
	(specified in Section 4) algorithm identifier appears, the respective		(specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
	SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The		SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The
	encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the		encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
	AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-		AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: the OID id-
	ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256.		ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256.
	For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,		For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification
	the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined.		[X9.62], the output length of the hash function must be explicitly
	The output length, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be		determined. The output length, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in
	256 or 512 bits, respectively.		ECDSA MUST be 256 or 512 bits, respectively.
	Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE		Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE
	signatures in certificates or CRLs SHOULD generate such signatures		signatures in certificates or CRLs SHOULD generate such signatures
	with a deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with		with a deterministically generated, nonrandom k in accordance with
	all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate		all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate
	such signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in		such signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in
	[X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires		[X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires
	conformance to those standards. Those standards have not specified		conformance to those standards. Those standards have not specified
	SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128		SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128
	and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets, respectively,		and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets, respectively,
	can be used instead of 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as		can be used instead of 256- and 512-bit output hash algorithms such
	SHA256 and SHA512.		as SHA256 and SHA512.
	5.2. Public Keys		4.2. Public Keys
	Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any		Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any
	public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the public key		public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the public key
	algorithm through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier		algorithm through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier
	is an OID and optionally associated parameters. The conventions and		is an OID with optionally associated parameters. The conventions and
	encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers		encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public key algorithm identifiers
	are as specified in Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.5 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1		are as specified in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.5 of [RFC3279],
	of [RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480].		Section 3.1 of [RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480].
	Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to		Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to
	identify RSA public keys. The rsaEncryption object identifier		identify RSA public keys. The rsaEncryption object identifier
	continues to identify the subject public key when the RSA private key		continues to identify the subject public key when the RSA private key
	owner does not wish to limit the use of the public key exclusively to		owner does not wish to limit the use of the public key exclusively to
	RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs. When the RSA private key owner wishes to		RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs. When the RSA private key owner wishes to
	limit the use of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS with		limit the use of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS with
	SHAKEs, the AlgorithmIdentifiers for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 4		SHAKEs, the AlgorithmIdentifiers for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 3
	SHOULD be used as the algorithm field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo		SHOULD be used as the algorithm field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
	sequence [RFC5280]. Conforming client implementations that process		sequence [RFC5280]. Conforming client implementations that process
	RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE public keys when processing certificates and		RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE public keys when processing certificates and
	CRLs MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs.		CRLs MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs.
	Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the X.509 public key		Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the X.509 public key
	algorithm explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when		algorithm explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when
	encoding ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs.		encoding ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs.
	Conforming client implementations that process ECDSA with SHAKE		Conforming client implementations that process ECDSA with SHAKE
	public keys when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the		public keys when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the
	corresponding OIDs.		corresponding OIDs.
	The identifier parameters, as explained in Section 4, MUST be absent.		The identifier parameters, as explained in Section 3, MUST be absent.
	6. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A is requested		One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A has been
	for the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0)		assigned in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier"
	registry:		(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) registry:
	+---------+--------------------------+--------------------+		+---------+--------------------------+------------+
	| Decimal | Description | References |		| Decimal | Description | References |
	+---------+--------------------------+--------------------+		+=========+==========================+============+
	| TBD | id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |		| 94 | id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019 | RFC 8692 |
	+---------+--------------------------+--------------------+		+---------+--------------------------+------------+
	IANA is requested to update the SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms		Table 1
	[SMI-PKIX] (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry with four additional entries:
	+---------+------------------------+--------------------+		IANA has updated the "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms"
	| Decimal | Description | References |		(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry [SMI-PKIX] with four additional entries:
	+---------+------------------------+--------------------+
	| TBD1 | id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
	| TBD2 | id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
	| TBD3 | id-ecdsa-with-shake128 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
	| TBD4 | id-ecdsa-with-shake256 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
	+---------+------------------------+--------------------+
	IANA is also requested to update the Hash Function Textual Names		+---------+------------------------+------------+
	Registry [Hash-Texts] with two additional entries for SHAKE128 and		| Decimal | Description | References |
	SHAKE256:		+=========+========================+============+
			| 30 | id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 | RFC 8692 |
			+---------+------------------------+------------+
			| 31 | id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 | RFC 8692 |
			+---------+------------------------+------------+
			| 32 | id-ecdsa-with-shake128 | RFC 8692 |
			+---------+------------------------+------------+
			| 33 | id-ecdsa-with-shake256 | RFC 8692 |
			+---------+------------------------+------------+
	+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------------+		Table 2
	| Hash Function Name | OID | Reference |
	+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------------+
	| shake128 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.11 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
	| shake256 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.12 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
	+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------------+
	7. Security Considerations		IANA has updated the "Hash Function Textual Names" registry
			[Hash-Texts] with two additional entries for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256:
	This document updates [RFC3279]. The security considerations section		+--------------------+-------------------------+-----------+
			| Hash Function Name | OID | Reference |
			+====================+=========================+===========+
			| shake128 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.11 | RFC 8692 |
			+--------------------+-------------------------+-----------+
			| shake256 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.12 | RFC 8692 |
			+--------------------+-------------------------+-----------+
			Table 3
			6. Security Considerations
			This document updates [RFC3279]. The Security Considerations section
	of that document applies to this specification as well.		of that document applies to this specification as well.
	NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of		NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of
	the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in		the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in
	Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These		Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These
	documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for		documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for
	various security scenarios.		various security scenarios.
	SHAKE128 with output length of 256-bits offers 128-bits of collision		SHAKE128 with output length of 256 bits offers 128 bits of collision
	and preimage resistance. Thus, SHAKE128 OIDs in this specification		and preimage resistance. Thus, SHAKE128 OIDs in this specification
	are RECOMMENDED with 2048 (112-bit security) or 3072-bit (128-bit		are RECOMMENDED with 2048- (112-bit security) or 3072-bit (128-bit
	security) RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits (128-bit		security) RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256 bits (128-bit
	security). SHAKE256 with 512-bits output length offers 256-bits of		security). SHAKE256 with a 512-bit output length offers 256 bits of
	collision and preimage resistance. Thus, the SHAKE256 OIDs in this		collision and preimage resistance. Thus, the SHAKE256 OIDs in this
	specification are RECOMMENDED with 4096-bit RSA modulus or higher or		specification are RECOMMENDED with 4096-bit RSA modulus or higher or
	curves with group order of at least 521-bits (256-bit security).		curves with a group order of at least 512 bits, such as the NIST
	Note that we recommended 4096-bit RSA because we would need 15360-bit		Curve P-521 (256-bit security). Note that we recommended a 4096-bit
	modulus for 256-bits of security which is impractical for today's		RSA because we would need a 15360-bit modulus for 256 bits of
	technology.		security, which is impractical for today's technology.
	8. Acknowledgements
	We would like to thank Sean Turner, Jim Schaad and Eric Rescorla for
	their valuable contributions to this document.
	The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and
	very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module.
	9. References		7. References
	9.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and		[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
	Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key		Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April		(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
	skipping to change at page 12, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at line 390 ¶
	[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,		[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
	"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",		"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
	RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,		RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),		[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
	"SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-		Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
	Output Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015,		Functions", DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202, FIPS PUB 202,
	<https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard-		August 2015, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202>.
	permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions>.
	9.2. Informative References		7.2. Informative References
	[Hash-Texts]		[Hash-Texts]
	IANA, "Hash Function Textual Names", July 2017,		IANA, "Hash Function Textual Names",
	<https://www.iana.org/assignments/hash-function-text-		<https://www.iana.org/assignments/hash-function-text-
	names/hash-function-text-names.xhtml>.		names/>.
	[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the		[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
	Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,		Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,		DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
	[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature		[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
	Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature		Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
	Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August		Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
	2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.		2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
	[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:		[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
	Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,		Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
	<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.		<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
	[SMI-PKIX]		[SMI-PKIX] IANA, "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms",
	IANA, "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms", March 2019,		<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers>.
	<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/
	smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6>.
	[SP800-107]		[SP800-107]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),		National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
	"SP800-107: Recommendation for Applications Using Approved		"Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash
	Hash Algorithms", May 2014,		Algorithms", DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-107r1, Revision 1,
	<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-107/		NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-107, August 2012,
	rev-1/final/documents/draft_revised_sp800-107.pdf>.		<http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-107r1>.
	[SP800-78-4]		[SP800-78-4]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),		National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
	"SP800-78-4: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for		"Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal
	Personal Identity Verification", May 2014,		Identity Verification", DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-78-4, NIST
	<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-		Special Publication (SP) 800-78-4, May 2015,
	78/4/final/documents/sp800_78-4_revised_draft.pdf>.		<http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-78-4>.
	[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),		[X9.62] ANSI, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
	"X9.62-2005: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial		Industry: the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
	Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature		(ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62, 2005.
	Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.
	Appendix A. ASN.1 module		Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
	This appendix includes the ASN.1 module for SHAKEs in X.509. This		This appendix includes the ASN.1 module for SHAKEs in X.509. This
	module does not come from any existing RFC.		module does not come from any previously existing RFC. This module
			references [RFC5912].
	PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)		PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
	internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)		internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
	id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019(TBD) }		id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019(94) }
	DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=		DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
	BEGIN		BEGIN
	-- EXPORTS ALL;		-- EXPORTS ALL;
	IMPORTS		IMPORTS
	-- FROM [RFC5912]		-- FROM RFC 5912
	PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS		PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS
	FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009		FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)		{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
	mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)		mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
	id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }		id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
	-- FROM [RFC5912]		-- FROM RFC 5912
	RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, pk-rsa, pk-ec,		RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, pk-rsa, pk-ec,
	CURVE, id-ecPublicKey, ECPoint, ECParameters, ECDSA-Sig-Value		CURVE, id-ecPublicKey, ECPoint, ECParameters, ECDSA-Sig-Value
	FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)		FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
	internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)		internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
	id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }		id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
	;		;
	--		--
	-- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-)		-- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-)
	--		--
	DigestAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {		DigestAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
	-- This expands DigestAlgorithms from [RFC5912]		-- This expands DigestAlgorithms from RFC 5912
	mda-shake128 |		mda-shake128 |
	mda-shake256,		mda-shake256,
	...		...
	}		}
	--
	-- One-Way Hash Functions
	--
	-- SHAKE128		--
	mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {		-- One-Way Hash Functions
	IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.		--
	}
	id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
	us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
	csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
	hashAlgs(2) 11 }
	-- SHAKE256		-- SHAKE128
	mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {		mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
	IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.		IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.
	}		}
	id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)		id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
	us(840) organization(1) gov(101)		us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
	csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)		csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
	hashAlgs(2) 12 }		hashAlgs(2) 11 }
	--		-- SHAKE256
	-- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms		mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
	--		IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.
	PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= {		}
	-- This expands PublicKeys from [RFC5912]		id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
	pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 |		us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
	pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256,		csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
	...		hashAlgs(2) 12 }
	}
	-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128		--
	-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128		-- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms
	-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length		--
	-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA		PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
	-- modulus in bits.		-- This expands PublicKeys from RFC 5912
	-- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1.		pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 |
	pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {		pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256,
	IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128		...
	KEY RSAPublicKey		}
	PARAMS ARE absent
	-- Private key format not in this module --
	CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
	keyCertSign, cRLSign }
	}
	-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256		-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
	-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256		-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128
	-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length		-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
	-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the RSA		-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA
	-- modulus in bits.		-- modulus in bits.
	-- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1.		-- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1.
	pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {		pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
	IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256		IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
	KEY RSAPublicKey		KEY RSAPublicKey
	PARAMS ARE absent		PARAMS ARE absent
	-- Private key format not in this module --		-- Private key format not in this module --
	CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,		CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
	keyCertSign, cRLSign }		keyCertSign, cRLSign }
	}		}
	--		-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
	-- Signature Algorithms (sa-)		-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256
	--		-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
	SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {		-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the RSA
	-- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from [RFC5912]		-- modulus in bits.
	sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 |		-- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1.
	sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 |		pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
	sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 |		IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
	sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256,		KEY RSAPublicKey
	...		PARAMS ARE absent
	}		-- Private key format not in this module --
			CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
			keyCertSign, cRLSign }
			}
	--		--
	-- SMIME Capabilities (sa-)		-- Signature Algorithms (sa-)
	--		--
	SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {		SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
	-- The expands SMimeCaps from [RFC5912]		-- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from RFC 5912
	sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |		sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 |
	sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps |		sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 |
	sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |		sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 |
	sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps,		sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256,
	...		...
	}		}
	-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE128		--
	sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {		-- SMIME Capabilities (sa-)
	IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128		--
	PARAMS ARE absent		SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {
	-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128		-- The expands SMimeCaps from RFC 5912
	-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128		sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
	-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length		sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps |
	-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA		sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
	-- modulus in bits.		sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps,
	-- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1		...
			}
	HASHES { mda-shake128 }		-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE128
	PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }		sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
	SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }		IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
	}		PARAMS ARE absent
	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)		-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)		-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
	TBD1 }		-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA
			-- modulus in bits.
			-- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1
			HASHES { mda-shake128 }
			PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
			SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
			}
			id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
			identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
			security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
			30 }
	-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256		-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256
	sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {		sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
	IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256		IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
	PARAMS ARE absent		PARAMS ARE absent
	-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256		-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
	-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256		-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256
	-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length		-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
	-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the		-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the
	-- RSA modulus in bits.		-- RSA modulus in bits.
	-- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1.		-- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1.
			HASHES { mda-shake256 }
			PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
			SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
			}
			id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
			identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
			security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
			31 }
			-- ECDSA with SHAKE128
			sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
			IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake128
			VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
			PARAMS ARE absent
			HASHES { mda-shake128 }
			PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
			SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake128 }
			}
			id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
			identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
			security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
			32 }
			-- ECDSA with SHAKE256
			sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
			IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake256
			VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
			PARAMS ARE absent
	HASHES { mda-shake256 }		HASHES { mda-shake256 }
	PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }		PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
	SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }		SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake256 }
	}		}
	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)		id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD2 }		33 }
	-- ECDSA with SHAKE128		END
	sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
	IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake128
	VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
	PARAMS ARE absent
	HASHES { mda-shake128 }
	PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
	SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake128 }
	}
	id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD3 }
	-- ECDSA with SHAKE256		Acknowledgements
	sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
	IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake256
	VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
	PARAMS ARE absent
	HASHES { mda-shake256 }
	PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
	SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake256 }
	}
	id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD4 }
	END		We would like to thank Sean Turner, Jim Schaad, and Eric Rescorla for
			their valuable contributions to this document.
			The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and
			very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Panos Kampanakis		Panos Kampanakis
	Cisco Systems		Cisco Systems
	Email: pkampana@cisco.com		Email: pkampana@cisco.com
	Quynh Dang		Quynh Dang
	NIST		NIST
	100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930		100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930
	Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930		Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
	USA		United States of America
	Email: quynh.dang@nist.gov		Email: quynh.dang@nist.gov
End of changes. 93 change blocks.
	504 lines changed or deleted		385 lines changed or added
This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/