draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-10.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-11.txt 
LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Updates: RFC3279 (if approved) Q. Dang Updates: 3279 (if approved) Q. Dang
Intended status: Standards Track NIST Intended status: Standards Track NIST
Expires: October 27, 2019 April 25, 2019 Expires: December 11, 2019 June 9, 2019
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm
Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs
draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-10 draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-11
Abstract Abstract
Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and
CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). This document describes the CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). This document describes the
conventions for using the SHAKE function family in Internet X.509 conventions for using the SHAKE function family in Internet X.509
certificates and CRLs as one-way hash functions with the RSA certificates and CRLs as one-way hash functions with the RSA
Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature algorithms. The Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature algorithms. The
conventions for the associated subject public keys are also conventions for the associated subject public keys are also
described. described.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 27, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 11, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Change Log 1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ] [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-11:
* Nits identified by Roman in AD Review.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-10: o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-10:
* Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID * Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID
assignments. assignments.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-09: o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-09:
* Fixed minor text nits. * Fixed minor text nits.
* Added text name allocation for SHAKEs in IANA considerations. * Added text name allocation for SHAKEs in IANA considerations.
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SHAKE functions introduced in [SHA3] which can be used with the SHAKE functions introduced in [SHA3] which can be used with the
Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL profile [RFC5280]. Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL profile [RFC5280].
In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs), In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs),
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function
instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also
defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a
variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output
is a d-bits long digest of message M. The corresponding collision is a d-bits long digest of message M. The corresponding collision
and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are
min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits respectively. And, the min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits respectively (Appendix A.1 [SHA3]).
corresponding collision and second preimage resistance strengths for And, the corresponding collision and second preimage resistance
SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively. strengths for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits
respectively.
A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash the A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash the
message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA and as the hash in the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] and ECDSA [X9.62] and
mask generating function in RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes as the hash in the mask generation function (MGF) in RSASSA-PSS.
the identifiers for SHAKEs to be used in X.509 and their meaning. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs to be used in
X.509 and their meaning.
3. Terminology 3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
4. Identifiers 4. Identifiers
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summary, when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of summary, when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits respectively. When the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits respectively. When the
SHAKEs are used as mask generation functions RSASSA-PSS, their output SHAKEs are used as mask generation functions RSASSA-PSS, their output
length is (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n is the length is (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n is the
RSA modulus size in bits. RSA modulus size in bits.
5. Use in PKIX 5. Use in PKIX
5.1. Signatures 5.1. Signatures
Signatures are used in a number of different ASN.1 structures. In an Signatures are used in a number of different ASN.1 structures. As
X.509 certificate a signature is encoded with an algorithm identifier shown in the ASN.1 representation from [RFC5280] below, an X.509
in the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a signatureValue that certificate a signature is encoded with an algorithm identifier in
the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a signatureValue attribute that
contains the actual signature. contains the actual signature.
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING } signatureValue BIT STRING }
The identifiers defined in Section 4 can be used as the The identifiers defined in Section 4 can be used as the
AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence
Certificate and the signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate in Certificate and the signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate in
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5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures 5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA- The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 4 is PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 4 is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA- AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA- PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-
PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the
algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the
hash and mask generating algorithm and trailer and salt are embedded hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer and salt are embedded in the
in the OID definition. OID definition.
The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be
the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of
the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes
respectively. respectively.
The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be
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the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined. the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
The output length, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be The output length, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
256 or 512 bits respectively. 256 or 512 bits respectively.
It is RECOMMENDED that conforming CA implementations that generate It is RECOMMENDED that conforming CA implementations that generate
ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates or CRLs generate such ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates or CRLs generate such
signatures with a deterministically generated, non-random k in signatures with a deterministically generated, non-random k in
accordance with all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They accordance with all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They
MAY also generate such signatures in accordance with all other MAY also generate such signatures in accordance with all other
recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy
that requires conformance to these standards. These standards may that requires conformance to these standards. These standards have
have not specified SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. not specified SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options.
However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64
octets respectively are substitutions for 256 and 512-bit output hash octets respectively can be used instead of 256 and 512-bit output
algorithms such as SHA256 and SHA512 used in the standards. hash algorithms such as SHA256 and SHA512 used in the standards.
5.2. Public Keys 5.2. Public Keys
Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any
public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the public key public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the public key
algorithm through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier algorithm through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier
is an OID and optionally associated parameters. The conventions and is an OID and optionally associated parameters. The conventions and
encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers
are as specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of are as specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of
[RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480]. [RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480].
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RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE public keys when processing certificates and RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE public keys when processing certificates and
CRLs MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs. CRLs MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs.
Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the X.509 public key Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the X.509 public key
algorithm explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when algorithm explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when
encoding ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs. encoding ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs.
Conforming client implementations that process ECDSA with SHAKE Conforming client implementations that process ECDSA with SHAKE
public keys when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the public keys when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the
corresponding OIDs. corresponding OIDs.
The identifier parameters, as explained in section Section 4, MUST be The identifier parameters, as explained in Section 4, MUST be absent.
absent.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A is requested One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A is requested
for the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) for the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0)
registry: registry:
+---------+--------------------------+--------------------+ +---------+--------------------------+--------------------+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+---------+--------------------------+--------------------+ +---------+--------------------------+--------------------+
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