draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-08.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-09.txt 
LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track Q. Dang Updates: RFC3279 (if approved) Q. Dang
Expires: August 4, 2019 NIST Intended status: Standards Track NIST
January 31, 2019 Expires: October 13, 2019 April 11, 2019
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm
Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs
draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-08 draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-09
Abstract Abstract
Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and
CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). This document describes the CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). This document describes the
conventions for using the SHAKE function family in Internet X.509 conventions for using the SHAKE function family in Internet X.509
certificates and CRLs as one-way hash functions with the RSA certificates and CRLs as one-way hash functions with the RSA
Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature algorithms. The Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature algorithms. The
conventions for the associated subject public keys are also conventions for the associated subject public keys are also
described. described.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 4, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 13, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Change Log 1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ] [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-09:
* Fixed minor text nits.
* Added text name allocation for SHAKEs in IANA considerations.
* Updates in Sec Considerations section.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-08: o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-08:
* Small nits from Russ while in WGLC. * Small nits from Russ while in WGLC.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-07: o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-07:
* Incorporated Eric's suggestion from WGLC. * Incorporated Eric's suggestion from WGLC.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-06: o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-06:
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* Updated IANA considerations. * Updated IANA considerations.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-05: o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-05:
* Added RFC8174 reference and text. * Added RFC8174 reference and text.
* Explicitly explained why RSASSA-PSS-params are omitted in * Explicitly explained why RSASSA-PSS-params are omitted in
section 5.1.1. section 5.1.1.
* Simplified Public Keys section by removing redundand info from * Simplified Public Keys section by removing redundant info from
RFCs. RFCs.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-04: o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-04:
* Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in * Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in
Deterministric ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis. Deterministic ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis.
* Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about * Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about
randomness of k because we are using deterministric ECDSA. randomness of k because we are using deterministic ECDSA.
* Various ASN.1 fixes. * Various ASN.1 fixes.
* Text fixes. * Text fixes.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-03: o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-03:
* Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim. * Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim.
* Added ASN.1. * Added ASN.1.
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
4. Identifiers 4. Identifiers
This section defines four new object identifiers (OIDs), for RSASSA- This section defines four new object identifiers (OIDs), for RSASSA-
PSS and ECDSA with each of SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256. The same PSS and ECDSA with each of SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. The same algorithm
algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying a public key in identifiers can be used for identifying a public key in RSASSA-PSS.
RSASSA-PSS.
The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below. The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD1 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD2 }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ] [ EDNOTE: "TBD1", "TBD2" will be specified by NIST later. ]
The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are
below. below.
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3) csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3)
TBD } TBD3 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3) csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3)
TBD } TBD4 }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ] [ EDNOTE: "TBD3", "TBD4" will be specified by NIST later. ]
The parameters for the four identifiers above MUST be absent. That The parameters for the four identifiers above MUST be absent. That
is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID. is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2 specify the required output length Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2 specify the required output length
for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. In for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. In
summary, when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of summary, when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits respectively. When the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits respectively. When the
SHAKEs are used as mask generation functions RSASSA-PSS, their output SHAKEs are used as mask generation functions RSASSA-PSS, their output
length is (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n is the length is (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n is the
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Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly
by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSA-PSS or by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSA-PSS or
ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs. Conforming ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs. Conforming
client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE
signatures when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the signatures when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the
corresponding OIDs. Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA corresponding OIDs. Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA
signature values are specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] signature values are specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480]
respectively. respectively.
When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA
curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length.
In the context of this document SHAKE128 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for
2048 or 3072-bit RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits.
SHAKE256 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for 4096-bit RSA modulus and higher or
curves with group order of 384-bits and higher.
5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures 5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA- The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 4 is PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 4 is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA- AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA- PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-
PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the
algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the
hash and mask generating algorithsm and trailer and salt are embedded hash and mask generating algorithm and trailer and salt are embedded
in the OID definition. in the OID definition.
The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be
the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of
the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes
respectively. respectively.
The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKES, the SHAKEs MUST be the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be
used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that
uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in
Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as
the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS- the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-
SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 respectively. The mgfSeed is the SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 respectively. The mgfSeed is the
seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As
explained in Step 9 of section 9.1.1 of [RFC8017], the output length explained in Step 9 of section 9.1.1 of [RFC8017], the output length
of the MGF is emLen - hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maximum message of the MGF is emLen - hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maximum message
length ceil((n-1)/8), where n is the RSA modulus in bits. hLen is 32 length ceil((n-1)/8), where n is the RSA modulus in bits. hLen is 32
and 64-bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 and 64-bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
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SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or 1528-bits when id-RSASSA-PSS- SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or 1528-bits when id-RSASSA-PSS-
SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used respectively. SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used respectively.
The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017]. field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].
5.1.2. ECDSA Signatures 5.1.2. ECDSA Signatures
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 [X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256
(specified in Section 4) algorithm identifier appears, the respective (specified in Section 4) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The
encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id- AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-
ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256. ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256.
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification, For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined. the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
The output length, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be The output length, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
256 or 512 bits respectively. 256 or 512 bits respectively.
It is RECOMMENDED that conforming CA implementations that generate It is RECOMMENDED that conforming CA implementations that generate
ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates or CRLs generate such ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates or CRLs generate such
signatures with a deterministically generated, non-random k in signatures with a deterministically generated, non-random k in
accordance with all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They accordance with all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They
MAY also generate such signatures in accordance with all other MAY also generate such signatures in accordance with all other
recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy
that requires conformance to these standards. These standards may that requires conformance to these standards. These standards may
have not specified SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. have not specified SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options.
However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64
octets respectively are subtitutions for 256 and 512-bit output hash octets respectively are substitutions for 256 and 512-bit output hash
algorithms such as SHA256 and SHA512 used in the standards. algorithms such as SHA256 and SHA512 used in the standards.
5.2. Public Keys 5.2. Public Keys
Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any
public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the public key public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the public key
algorithm through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier algorithm through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier
is an OID and optionally associated parameters. The conventions and is an OID and optionally associated parameters. The conventions and
encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers
are as specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of are as specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of
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6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A was assigned One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A was assigned
in the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) in the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0)
registry: registry:
PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019(TBD) } id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019(TBD) }
IANA is also requested to update the Hash Function Textual Names
Registry [Hash-Texts] with two additional entries for SHAKE128 and
SHAKE256:
+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------+
| Hash Function Name | OID | Reference |
+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------+
| shake128 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.11 | [ THIS RFC ] |
| shake256 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.12 | [ THIS RFC ] |
+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------+
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic This document updates [RFC3279]. The security considerations section
function, executing multiple times with the same input will produce of that document applies to this specification as well.
the same output. Therefore, users should not expect unrelated
outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from running a
SHAKE function with the same input multiple times. The shorter of
any two outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same input is a prefix
of the longer one. It is a similar situation as truncating a 512-bit
output of SHA-512 by taking its 256 left-most bits. These 256 left-
most bits are a prefix of the 512-bit output.
When using ECDSA with SHAKEs, the ECDSA curve order SHOULD be chosen NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of
in line with the SHAKE output length. NIST has defined appropriate the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in
use of the hash functions in terms of the algorithm strengths and Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These
expected time frames for secure use in Special Publications (SPs) documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for
[SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These documents can be used as guides various security scenarios.
to choose appropriate key sizes for various security scenarios. In
the context of this document id-ecdsa-with-shake128 is RECOMMENDED
for curves with group order of 256-bits. id-ecdsa-with-shake256 is
RECOMMENDED for curves with group order of 384-bits or more.
8. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Sean Turner, Jim Schaad and Eric Rescorla for We would like to thank Sean Turner, Jim Schaad and Eric Rescorla for
their valuable contributions to this document. their valuable contributions to this document.
The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and
very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module. very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module.
9. References 9. References
9.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
skipping to change at page 10, line 22 skipping to change at page 10, line 40
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), [SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable- "SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-
Output Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015, Output Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015,
<https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard- <https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard-
permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions>. permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions>.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and [Hash-Texts]
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key IANA, "Hash Function Textual Names", July 2017,
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List <https://www.iana.org/assignments/hash-function-text-
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April names/hash-function-text-names.xhtml>.
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature [RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>. 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
skipping to change at page 12, line 25 skipping to change at page 12, line 41
-- SHAKE128 -- SHAKE128
mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes. IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.
} }
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 11 } hashAlgs(2) 11 }
-- SHAKE-256 -- SHAKE256
mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes. IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.
} }
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 12 } hashAlgs(2) 12 }
-- --
-- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms -- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms
skipping to change at page 14, line 16 skipping to change at page 14, line 33
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128 -- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128 -- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length -- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
-- (n - 264) bits, where n is the RSA modulus in bits. -- (n - 264) bits, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
-- the saltLength is 32 -- the saltLength is 32
-- the trailerField is 1 -- the trailerField is 1
HASHES { mda-shake128 } HASHES { mda-shake128 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
} }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD1 }
-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256 -- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
PARAMS ARE absent PARAMS ARE absent
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256 -- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256 -- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length -- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
-- (n - 520)-bits, where n is the RSA modulus in bits. -- (n - 520)-bits, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
-- the saltLength is 64 -- the saltLength is 64
-- the trailerField is 1 -- the trailerField is 1
HASHES { mda-shake256 } HASHES { mda-shake256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
} }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD2 }
-- Determinstic ECDSA with SHAKE128 -- Deterministic ECDSA with SHAKE128
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake128 IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake128
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake128 } HASHES { mda-shake128 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake128 } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake128 }
} }
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
sigAlgs(3) TBD } sigAlgs(3) TBD3 }
-- Determinstic ECDSA with SHAKE256 -- Deterministic ECDSA with SHAKE256
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake256 IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake256
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake256 } HASHES { mda-shake256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake256 } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake256 }
} }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
sigAlgs(3) TBD } sigAlgs(3) TBD4 }
END END
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Panos Kampanakis Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Email: pkampana@cisco.com Email: pkampana@cisco.com
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