draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-02.txt		draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-03.txt
	LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis		LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis
	Internet-Draft Cisco Systems		Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
	Intended status: Standards Track Q. Dang		Intended status: Standards Track Q. Dang
	Expires: December 31, 2018 NIST		Expires: April 22, 2019 NIST
	June 29, 2018		October 19, 2018
	Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm		Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm
	Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs as Hash Functions		Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs as Hash Functions
	draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-02		draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-03
	Abstract		Abstract
	Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and		Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and
	CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). This document describes the		CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). This document describes the
	conventions for using the SHAKE family of hash functions in the		conventions for using the SHAKE family of hash functions in the
	Internet X.509 as one-way hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic		Internet X.509 as one-way hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic
	Signature Scheme and ECDSA signature algorithms. The conventions for		Signature Scheme and ECDSA signature algorithms. The conventions for
	the associated subject public keys are also described.		the associated subject public keys are also described.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 37 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2018.		This Internet-Draft will expire on April 22, 2019.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
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	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		5. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		5.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.1.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5.1.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.2.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5.2.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	1. Change Log		1. Change Log
	[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]		[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
			o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-03:
			* Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim.
			* Added ASN.1.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-02:		o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-02:
	* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the		* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
	introduction, the new OIDs and their use in PKIX.		introduction, the new OIDs and their use in PKIX.
	* Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcode hash, salt and MFG,		* Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcode hash, salt and MGF,
	according the WG consensus.		according the WG consensus.
	* Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and		* Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and
	clarify the algorithm identifier usage.		clarify the algorithm identifier usage.
	* Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.		* Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.
	* Consolidated subsection for message digest algorithms.		* Consolidated subsection for message digest algorithms.
	* Text fixes.		* Text fixes.
	skipping to change at page 3, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 35 ¶
	* Initial version		* Initial version
	2. Introduction		2. Introduction
	This document describes several cryptographic algorithm identifiers		This document describes several cryptographic algorithm identifiers
	for several cryptographic algorithms which use variable length output		for several cryptographic algorithms which use variable length output
	SHAKE functions introduced in [SHA3] which can be used with the		SHAKE functions introduced in [SHA3] which can be used with the
	Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL profile [RFC5280].		Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL profile [RFC5280].
	The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3].		The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3].
	In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions, called SHAKE128		In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs):
	and SHAKE256 are defined. Four hash functions, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,		SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function
	SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also defined but are out of scope for this		instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also
	document. A SHAKE is a variable length hash function. The output		defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a
	lengths, in bits, of the SHAKE hash functions are defined by the d		variable length hash function. The output length, in bits, of a
	parameter. The corresponding collision and preimage resistance		SHAKE is defined by the d parameter. The corresponding collision and
	security levels for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are respectively		second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2,128)
	min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) and min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits.		and min(d,128) bits respectively. And, the corresponding collision
			and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE256 are
			min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively.
	SHAKEs can be used as the message digest function (to hash the		A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash the
	message to be signed) and as the hash function in the mask generating		message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA and as the hash in the
	functions in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. In this document, we define four		mask generating function in RSASSA-PSS. In Section 4, we define four
	new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA when SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are used		new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA when SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are
	as hash functions. The same algorithm identifiers are used for		used. The same algorithm identifiers are used for identifying a
	identifying a public key, and identifying a signature.		public key, and identifying a signature.
	3. Identifiers		3. Terminology
			The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
			"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
			document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
			4. Identifiers
	The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.		The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.
	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }		id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }		id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
	[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]		[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
	The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are		The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are
	below.		below.
	id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2)		id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4)		country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
	id-ecdsa-with-shake(3) TBD }		csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3)
			TBD }
	id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2)		id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4)		country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
	id-ecdsa-with-shake(3) TBD }		csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3)
			TBD }
	[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]		[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
	The parameters for these four identifiers above MUST be absent. That		The parameters for these four identifiers above MUST be absent. That
	is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.		is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
	4. Use in PKIX		Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2 specify the required output length
			for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. In
			summary, when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of
			SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits respectively. When the
			SHAKEs are used as mask generation functions, their output lengths
			are (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n is a RSA
			modulus size in bits.
	4.1. Signatures		5. Use in PKIX
			5.1. Signatures
	Signatures can be placed in a number of different ASN.1 structures.		Signatures can be placed in a number of different ASN.1 structures.
	The top level structure for an X.509 certificate, to illustrate how		The top level structure for an X.509 certificate, to illustrate how
	signatures are frequently encoded with an algorithm identifier and a		signatures are frequently encoded with an algorithm identifier and a
	location for the signature, is		location for the signature, is
	Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {		Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
	tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,		tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
	signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,		signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
	signatureValue BIT STRING }		signatureValue BIT STRING }
	The identifiers defined in Section 3 can be used as the		The identifiers defined in Section 4 can be used as the
	AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence		AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence
	Certificate and the signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate in		Certificate and the signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate in
	X.509 [RFC3280].		X.509 [RFC5280].
	Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly		Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly
	by using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when encoding RSASSA-PSS and		by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSA-PSS and
	ECDSA with SHAKE signatures, and public keys in certificates and		ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs. Encoding rules
	CRLs. Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA signature values are		for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA signature values are specified in [RFC4055]
	specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] respectively.		and [RFC5480] respectively.
	Conforming client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA		Conforming client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA
	with SHAKE signatures when processing certificates and CRLs MUST		with SHAKE signatures when processing certificates and CRLs MUST
	recognize the corresponding OIDs.		recognize the corresponding OIDs.
	4.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures		5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
	The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-		The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
	PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is		PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 4 is
	used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the		used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
	AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-		AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
	PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.		PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
	The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash		The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
	algorithm in the maskGenAlgorithm used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the		algorithm as the mask generation function "MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1)"
	same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of the		[RFC8017] used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256
	hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes		respectively. The output-length of the hash algorithm which hashes
	respectively.		the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
	The maskGenAlgorithm is the MGF1 specified in Section B.2.1 of		In RSASSA-PSS, a mask generation function takes an octet string of
	[RFC8017]. The output length for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 being used as		variable length and a desired output length as input, and outputs an
	the hash function in MGF1 is (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes		octet string of the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKES, the
	respectively, where n is the RSA modulus in bits. For example, when		SHAKEs MUST be used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1
	RSA modulus n is 2048, the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in		algorithm that uses the hash function in multiple iterations as
	the MGF1 will be 223 or 191 when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-		specified in Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is
	PSS-SHAKE256 is used respectively.		defined as
			SHAKE128(mgfSeed, maskLen)
			and
			SHAKE256(mgfSeed, maskLen)
			respectively for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
			The mgfSeed is the seed from which mask is generated, an octet
			string. The maskLen for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 being used as the MGF
			is (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where n is the RSA
			modulus in bits. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output
			length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 223 or 191 when id-
			RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used respectively.
	The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.		The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
	Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer		Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
	field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].		field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].
	4.1.2. ECDSA Signatures		5.1.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures
	The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in		The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
	[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256		[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256
	(specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective		(specified in Section 4) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
	SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The		SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The
	encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the		encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
	AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-		AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-
	ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.		ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.
	For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,		For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
	the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.		the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
	The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be		The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
	256 or 512 bits respectively.		256 or 512 bits respectively.
	Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE		Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE
	signatures in certificates or CRLs MUST generate such signatures in		signatures in certificates or CRLs MUST generate such signatures with
	accordance with all the requirements specified in Sections 7.2 and		a deterministicly generated, non-random k in accordance with all the
	7.3 of [X9.62] or with all the requirements specified in		requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such
	Section 4.1.3 of [SEC1]. They MAY also generate such signatures in		signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or
	accordance with all the recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if they		[SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to
	have a stated policy that requires conformance to these standards.		these standards. These standards may have not specified SHAKE128 and
	These standards may have not specified SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash		SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
	algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 with output length		with output length being 32 and 64 octets respectively are
	being 32 and 64 octets respectively are subtitutions for 256 and		subtitutions for 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as
	512-bit output hash algorithms such as SHA256 and SHA512 used in the		SHA256 and SHA512 used in the standards.
	standards.
	4.2. Public Keys		In Section 3.2 "Generation of k" of [RFC6979], HMAC is used to derive
			the deterministic k. Conforming implementations that generate
			deterministic ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in X.509 MUST use KMAC with
			SHAKE128 or KMAC with SHAKE256 as specfied in [SP800-185] when
			SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 is used as the message hashing algorithm,
			respectively. In this situation, KMAC with SHAKE128 and KMAC with
			SHAKE256 have 256-bit and 512-bit outputs respectively, and the
			optional customization bit string S is an empty string.
			5.2. Public Keys
	Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any		Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any
	public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the algorithm		public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the algorithm
	through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier is an OID		through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier is an OID
	and optionally associated parameters.		and optionally associated parameters.
	In the X.509 certificate, the subjectPublicKeyInfo field has the		In the X.509 certificate, the subjectPublicKeyInfo field has the
	SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, which has the following ASN.1 syntax:		SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, which has the following ASN.1 syntax:
	SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {		SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	skipping to change at page 6, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 38 ¶
	The fields in SubjectPublicKeyInfo have the following meanings:		The fields in SubjectPublicKeyInfo have the following meanings:
	o algorithm is the algorithm identifier and parameters for the		o algorithm is the algorithm identifier and parameters for the
	public key.		public key.
	o subjectPublicKey contains the byte stream of the public key. The		o subjectPublicKey contains the byte stream of the public key. The
	algorithms defined in this document always encode the public key		algorithms defined in this document always encode the public key
	as an exact multiple of 8-bits.		as an exact multiple of 8-bits.
	The conventions for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm		Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly
			by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSA-PSS and
			ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs. The
			conventions for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm
	identifiers are as specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] ,		identifiers are as specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] ,
	but we include them below for convenience.		but we include them below for convenience.
	4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys		5.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys
	[RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in		[RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in
	the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters.		the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters.
	rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1}		rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1}
	Additionally, when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use		Additionally, when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use
	of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifiers		of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifiers
	for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 3 can be used as the algorithm		for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 4 can be used as the algorithm
	field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo sequence [RFC3280]. The identifier		field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo sequence [RFC5280]. The identifier
	parameters, as explained in section Section 3, MUST be absent.		parameters, as explained in section Section 4, MUST be absent.
	Regardless of what public key algorithm identifier is used, the RSA		Regardless of what public key algorithm identifier is used, the RSA
	public key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent,		public key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent,
	MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055]. The output of		MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055]. The output of
	this encoding is carried in the certificate subjectPublicKey.		this encoding is carried in the certificate subjectPublicKey.
	RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {		RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
	modulus INTEGER, -- n		modulus INTEGER, -- n
	publicExponent INTEGER -- e		publicExponent INTEGER -- e
	}		}
	4.2.2. ECDSA Public Keys		5.2.2. ECDSA Public Keys
	For ECDSA, when id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256 is		For ECDSA, the public key identifier defined in [RFC5480] is
	used as the AlgorithmIdentifier in the algorithm field of
	SubjectPublicKeyInfo, the parameters, as explained in section		id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
	Section 3, MUST be absent.		iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
	Additionally, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in		Additionally, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in
	Section 2.1.1 and its syntax is in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also		Section 2.1.1 and its syntax is in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also
	include them here for convenience:		include them here for convenience:
	id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
	iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
	The id-ecPublicKey parameters MUST be present and are defined as		The id-ecPublicKey parameters MUST be present and are defined as
	ECParameters ::= CHOICE {		ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
	namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER		namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
	-- implicitCurve NULL		-- implicitCurve NULL
	-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain		-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
	}		}
	The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signer's		The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signer's
	certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.		certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.
	5. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	This document uses several new registries [ EDNOTE: Update here. ]		[ EDNOTE: Update here only if there are OID allocations by IANA. ]
	6. Security Considerations		This document has no IANA actions.
			7. Security Considerations
	The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic		The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic
	functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times		functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times
	will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect		will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect
	unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from		unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
	excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times.		excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times.The
			shorter one of any 2 outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same
			input is a prefix of the longer one. It is a similar situation as
			truncating a 512-bit output of SHA-512 by taking its 256 left-most
			bits. These 256 left-most bits are a prefix of the 512-bit output.
	Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of		Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of
	the signer's private key permits masquerade.		the signer's private key permits masquerade.
	Implementations must randomly generate one-time values, such as the k		Implementations must randomly generate one-time values, such as the k
	value when generating a ECDSA signature. In addition, the generation		value when generating a ECDSA signature. In addition, the generation
	of public/private key pairs relies on random numbers. The use of		of public/private key pairs relies on random numbers. The use of
	inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate such		inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate such
	cryptographic values can result in little or no security. The		cryptographic values can result in little or no security. The
	generation of quality random numbers is difficult. [RFC4086] offers		generation of quality random numbers is difficult. [RFC4086] offers
	skipping to change at page 8, line 28 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 38 ¶
	Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become		Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
	weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and		weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
	computing power increases, the work factor or time required to break		computing power increases, the work factor or time required to break
	a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore,		a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore,
	cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing		cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing
	new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should		new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should
	be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their		be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their
	implementations.		implementations.
	7. Acknowledgements		8. Acknowledgements
	We would like to thank Sean Turner for his valuable contributions to		We would like to thank Sean Turner and Jim Schaad for his valuable
	this document.		contributions to this document.
	8. References		9. References
	8.1. Normative References		9.1. Normative References
	[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC3280, April 2002,		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3280>.
	[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional		[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
	Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in		Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
	the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate		the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
	and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,		and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,		DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	skipping to change at page 9, line 27 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 34 ¶
	"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",		"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
	RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,		RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
	[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3		[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
	Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output		Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
	Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015,		Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015,
	<https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard-		<https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard-
	permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions>.		permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions>.
	8.2. Informative References		9.2. Informative References
	[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and		[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
	Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key		Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April		(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
	2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.		2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
	[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,		[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
	"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,		"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,		DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
			[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
			Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
			Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
			2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
	[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:		[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
	Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,		Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
	<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.		<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
			[SP800-185]
			National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
			Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and
			ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185", December 2016,
			<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
			NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.
	[SP800-90A]		[SP800-90A]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology,		National Institute of Standards and Technology,
	"Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using		"Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
	Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A",		Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A",
	June 2015,		June 2015,
	<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/		<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
	NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.		NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.
	[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),		[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
	"X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial		"X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
	Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature		Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
	Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.		Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.
	Appendix A. ASN.1 module		Appendix A. ASN.1 module
	[ EDNOTE: More here. ]		This appendix includes the ASN.1 modules for SHAKEs in X.509. This
			module does not come from any existing RFC.
			PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2018 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
			internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
			id-mod-pkix1-shake-2018(TBD) }
			DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
			BEGIN
			-- EXPORTS ALL;
			IMPORTS
			-- FROM [RFC5912]
			PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM,
			SMIME-CAPS
			FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
			{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
			mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
			id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
			-- FROM [RFC5912]
			id-RSASSA-PSS, RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, id-ecPublicKey,
			ECPoint, ECDSA-Sig-Value
			FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
			internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
			id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
			--
			-- One-Way Hash Functions
			-- SHAKE128
			mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
			IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.
			}
			id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
			us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
			csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
			hashAlgs(2) 11 }
			-- SHAKE-256
			mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
			IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.
			}
			id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
			us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
			csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
			hashAlgs(2) 12 }
			--
			-- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms
			--
			PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
			...,
			pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 |
			pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 |
			pk-ec,
			...
			}
			-- From [RFC5912] - Here so it compiles.
			pk-rsa PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
			IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
			KEY RSAPublicKey
			PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
			-- Private key format not in this module --
			CERT-KEY-USAGE {digitalSignature, nonRepudiation,
			keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyCertSign, cRLSign}
			}
			-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
			-- The maskGenAlgorithm is mda-shake128
			-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
			-- (n - 264)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
			-- the saltLength is 32
			-- the trailerField is 1
			pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
			IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
			KEY RSAPublicKey
			PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
			-- Private key format not in this module --
			CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
			keyCertSign, cRLSign }
			}
			-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
			-- The maskGenAlgorithm is mda-shake256
			-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
			-- (n - 520)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
			-- the saltLength is 64
			-- the trailerField is 1
			pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
			IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
			KEY RSAPublicKey
			PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
			-- Private key format not in this module --
			CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
			keyCertSign, cRLSign }
			}
			pk-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
			IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey
			KEY ECPoint
			PARAMS TYPE ECParameters ARE required
			-- Private key format not in this module --
			CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyAgreement,
			keyCertSign, cRLSign }
			}
			ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
			namedCurve CURVE.&id({NamedCurve})
			-- implicitCurve NULL
			-- implicitCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX
			-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedCurve
			-- specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX
			-- Details for specifiedCurve can be found in [X9.62]
			-- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated
			-- with ANSI X.9.
			}
			--
			-- Signature Algorithms (sa-)
			--
			SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
			...,
			-- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from [RFC5912]
			sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 |
			sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 |
			sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 |
			sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256
			}
			--
			-- SMIME Capabilities (sa-)
			--
			SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {
			...,
			-- The expands SMimeCaps from [RFC5912]
			sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
			sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps |
			sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
			sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps
			}
			-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE128
			sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
			IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
			PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
			-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
			-- The maskGenAlgorithm is mda-shake128
			-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
			-- (n - 264)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
			-- the saltLength is 32
			-- the trailerField is 1
			HASHES {mda-shake128} -- omitting mda-shake128-params
			PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
			SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
			}
			id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
			-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256
			sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
			IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
			PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
			-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
			-- The maskGenAlgorithm is mda-shake256
			-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
			-- (n - 520)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
			-- the saltLength is 64
			-- the trailerField is 1
			HASHES {mda-shake256} -- omitting mda-shake256-params
			PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
			SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
			}
			id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
			-- Determinstic ECDSA with SHAKE128
			-- Generating k by using KMAC with SHAKE128 as the hash
			-- [SP800-185] instead of HMAC with output length 256-bits
			-- that is equal to or slightly less than the elliptic
			-- curve group order. S is set to an empty string.
			sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
			IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake128
			VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
			PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
			HASHES { mda-shake128 }
			PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
			SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake128 }
			}
			id-ecdsa-with-shake128 ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
			us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
			csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
			sigAlgs(3) TBD }
			-- Determinstic ECDSA with SHAKE256
			-- Generating k by using KMAC with SHAKE256 as the hash
			-- [SP800-185] instead of HMAC with output length 512-bits
			-- truncated to equal to or slightly less than the elliptic
			-- curve group order. S is set to an empty string.
			sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
			IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake256
			VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
			PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
			HASHES { mda-shake256 }
			PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
			SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake256 }
			}
			id-ecdsa-with-shake256 ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
			us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
			csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
			sigAlgs(3) TBD }
			END
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Panos Kampanakis		Panos Kampanakis
	Cisco Systems		Cisco Systems
	Email: pkampana@cisco.com		Email: pkampana@cisco.com
	Quynh Dang		Quynh Dang
	NIST		NIST
End of changes. 45 change blocks.
	107 lines changed or deleted		387 lines changed or added
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