wdiff draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-00.txt draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-01.txt

Network
LAMPS Working Group B. Hoeneisen
Internet-Draft pEp Foundation
Intended status: Informational A. Melnikov Standards Track D. Gillmor
Expires: January 14, May 6, 2021 American Civil Liberties Union
A. Melnikov
Isode Ltd
July 13,
November 02, 2020

Header Protection for S/MIME
draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-00
draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-01

Abstract

Privacy and security

S/MIME version 3.1 has introduced a feasible standardized option to
accomplish Header Protection. However, implementations of Header
Protection can cause rendering issues on the receiving side. Clearer
specifications regarding message processing, particularly with email
respect to header protection sections, are needed in S/MIME
have been identified for some time. However, the desire order to fix resolve these
issues has only recently been expressed in the IETF LAMPS Working
Group. The existing S/MIME specification is
rendering issues.

In order to be updated regarding
header protection.

This document describes the problem statement, generic use cases, help implementers to correctly compose and
the render email
messages with Header Protection, this document updates S/MIME specification for header protection. Header
Protection specifications with additional guidance on MIME format,
sender and receiver processing.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, May 6, 2021.

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described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Other Protocols to Protect Email Headers . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.
1.3. Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5
2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7
2.1. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7
2.2. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8
2.3. Usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8
2.4. Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8
3. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8
3.1. Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8
3.1.1. Main Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8
3.1.2. Backward Compatibility Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . 7 8
3.2. Protection Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Specification . . . . 10
3.2.1. In-Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Main Use Case . . 10
3.2.2. Out-of-Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1.1. MIME Format . . . . . .
4. Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1.2. Inner Message Header Fields . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Main Use Case . . . . 15
4.1.3. Wrapper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.1. MIME Format . . . . . 16
4.1.4. Outer Message Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1.5. Receiving User Facing Message Header Fields . . . 11
4.1.2. Sending Side . . 18
4.1.6. Header Field Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1.7. Sending 14
4.1.3. Receiving Side Message Processing . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1.8. Receiving Side Message Processing . . . . . . . . . . 21 18
4.2. Backward Compatibility Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 18
4.2.1. Receiving Side MIME-Conformant . . . . . . . . . . . 21 18
4.2.2. Receiving Side Not MIME-Conformant . . . . . . . . . 22 19
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 19
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 19
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 19
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 19
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 20
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 20
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 21
Appendix A. Additional information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 22
A.1. Stored Variants of Messages with Bcc . . . . . . . . . . 25 22
Appendix B. Document Changelog Text Moved from Above . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.1. MIME Format . . 26
Appendix C. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . 23
B.1.1. S/MIME Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Appendix C. Document Changelog . . . . . . 27

1. Introduction

A range of protocols for the protection of electronic mail (email)
exists, which allows to assess the authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix D. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

1. Introduction

Privacy and integrity of the security issues regarding email headers section or selected header fields (HF) from the domain-
level perspective, specifically DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
[RFC6376] and Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [RFC7208], and Domain-
based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)
[RFC7489]. These protocols, while essential to responding to a range Header Protection in
S/MIME have been identified for some time. Most current
implementations of attacks on email, do not offer (full) end-to-end protection to cryptographically-protected electronic mail
protect only the
header section and are not capable body of providing privacy for the
information contained therein.

The need message, which leaves significant room
for means attacks against otherwise-protected messages. For example, lack
of Data Minimization, which includes data
sparseness and hiding all technically concealable information
whenever possible, has grown in importance over header protection allows an attacker to substitute the past several
years. message
subject and/or author.

A standard for way to provide end-to-end protection of for the Header Section of an
email header section
exists message has been standardized for S/MIME version 3.1 and later. later
(cf. [RFC8551]):

In order to protect outer, non-content-related message header
fields (for instance, the "Subject", "To", "From", and "Cc"
fields), the sending client MAY wrap a full MIME message in a
message/RFC822 wrapper in order to apply S/MIME security services
to these header fields.

No mechanism for header protection (HP) has been standardized for
PGP/MIME (Pretty Good Privacy) [RFC3156] yet.

Several varying

Unfortunately, implementations of end-to-end protections for email
header sections exist, though the total number of such
implementations appears to be rather low.

Some LAMPS WG participants expressed Header Protection can cause
rendering issues on the opinion that regardless of receiving side. In some cases, the mechanism chosen, it user sees
an attachment suggesting a forwarded email message, which - in fact -
contains the protected email message that should not be limited rendered
directly. For these cases, the user can click on the attachment to S/MIME, but
view the protected message. However, there have also been reports of
email clients displaying garbled text, or sometimes nothing at all.
In those cases the email clients on the receiving side are (most
likely) not fully MIME-capable.

The following shortcomings have been identified to cause these
issues:

o Broken or incomplete implementations

o Lack of a simple means to distinguish "forwarded message" and
"wrapped message" (for the sake of Header Protection)

o Not enough guidance with respect to handling of Header Fields on
both the sending and the receiving side

Furthermore, the need (technical) Data Minimization, which includes
data sparseness and hiding all technically concealable information,
has grown in importance over the past several years. In addition,
backwards compatibility must be considered when it is possible to do
so without compromising privacy and security.

No mechanism for Header Protection has been standardized for PGP/MIME
(Pretty Good Privacy) [RFC3156] yet. PGP/MIME developers have
implemented ad-hoc header-protection, and would like to see a
specification that is applicable to both S/MIME and PGP/MIME.

This document describes the problem statement (Section 2), generic
use cases (Section 3) and the specification for Header Protection
(Section 4). 4) with guidance on MIME format, sender and receiver
processing .

[I-D.ietf-lamps-header-protection-requirements] defines the
requirements that this specification is based on.

This document is in an early draft state and contains a proposal on
which to base future discussions of this topic. In any case, the
final mechanism is to be determined by the IETF LAMPS WG.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are Other Protocols to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2. Terms

The following terms are defined Protect Email Headers

A range of protocols for the scope of this document:

o Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack: cf. [RFC4949], which states: "A
form protection of active wiretapping attack in electronic mail (email)
exists, which allows one to assess the attacker intercepts authenticity and selectively modifies communicated data to masquerade as one or
more integrity of
the entities email headers section or selected Header Fields from the domain-
level perspective, specifically DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
[RFC6376], as used by Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting,
and Conformance (DMARC) [RFC7489]. These protocols provide a domain-
based reputation mechanism that can be used to mitigate some forms of
unsolicited email (spam). At the same time, these protocols can
provide a level of cryptographic integrity and authenticity for some
headers, depending on how they are used.
However, integrity protection and proof of authenticity are both tied
to the domain name of the sending e-mail address, not the sending
address itself, so these protocols do not provide end-to-end
protection, and are incapable of providing any form of
confidentiality.

1.2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.3. Terms

The following terms are defined for the scope of this document:

o Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack: cf. [RFC4949], which states: "A
form of active wiretapping attack in which the attacker intercepts
and selectively modifies communicated data to masquerade as one or
more of the entities involved in a communication association."

Note: Historically, MITM has stood for '_Man_-in-the-middle'.
However, to indicate that the entity in the middle is not always a
human attacker, MITM can also stand for 'Machine-in-the-middle' or
'Meddler-in-the-middle'.

o S/MIME: Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (cf.
[RFC8551])

o PGP/MIME: MIME Security with OpenPGP (cf. [RFC3156])

o Message: An Email Message consisting of Header Fields
(collectively called "the Header Section of the message")
followed, optionally, by a Body; cf. [RFC5322].

Note: To avoid ambiguity, this document does not use the terms
"Header" or "Headers" in isolation, but instead always uses
"Header Field" to refer to the individual field and "Header
Section" to refer to the entire collection; cf. [RFC5322].

o Header Field (HF): cf. [RFC5322] Header Fields are lines beginning
with a field name, followed by a colon (":"), followed by a field
body (value), and terminated by CRLF; cf. [RFC5322]. CRLF.

o Header Section (HS): The Header Section is a sequence of lines of
characters with special syntax as defined in [RFC5322]. It is the
(top) section of a Message containing the Header Fields.

o Body: The Body is simply a sequence of characters bytes that follows the
Header Section and is separated from the Header Section by an
empty line (i.e., a line with nothing preceding the CRLF); cf
[RFC5322]. It is the (bottom) section of Message containing the
payload of a Message. Typically, the Body consists of a (possibly
multipart) MIME [RFC2045] construct.

o MIME Header Fields: Header Fields describing content of a MIME
entity [RFC2045], in particular the MIME structure. Each MIME
Header Field name starts with "Content-" prefix.

o MIME Header Section (part): The collection of MIME Header Fields.
"MIME Header Section" refers to a Header Sections that contains
only MIME Header Fields, whereas "MIME Header Section part" refers
to the MIME Header Fields of a Header Section that - in addition
to MIME Header Fields - also contains non-MIME Header Fields.

o Essential Header Fields (EHF): The minimum set of Header Fields an
Outer Message Header Section SHOULD contain; cf. Section 4.1.4. 4.1.2.4.

o Header Protection (HP): cryptographic protection of email Header
Sections (or parts of it) for signatures and/or encryption

o Protection Levels (PL): One The level of protection applied to a
Message, e.g. 'signature and encryption',
'signature only' encryption' or 'encryption 'signature only' (cf.
Section 3.2) 3.2).

o Protected: Protected refers to the parts Portions of a Message where
protection measures of message that have had any Protection Level have been applied to.
Levels applied.

o Protected Message: A Message that protection measures of has had any Protection Levels have been applied to.
applied.

o Unprotected: Unprotected refers to the parts Portions of a Message where that has had no
protection measures of any Protection
Levels have been applied to. applied.

o Unprotected Message: A Message that has had no protection measures of any Protection Levels have been applied to.
applied.

o Submission Entity: The entity taking care of which executes further processing of
the Message (incl. transport towards the receiver), after
protection measures have been applied to. to the Message.

Note: The Submission Entity varies among implementations, mainly
depending on the stage, stage where protection measures are applied to:
It could be e.g. applied: E.g.
a Message Submission Agent (MSA) [RFC6409] or another
(proprietary) solution. The latter is particularly relevant, if
protection is implemented as a plugin solution. Some
implementations may determine the destination recipients by
reading the To, Cc and Bcc Header Fields of the Outer Message.

o Original Message (OrigM): The message Message to be protected before any
protection related
protection-related processing has been applied on the sending
side. If the source is not a "message/rfc822" Message, OrigM is
defined as the "virtual" Message that would be constructed for
sending it as unprotected email.

o Inner Message (InnerM): The message Message to be protected, i.e. protected which has had
wrapping and protection measures are applied to aapplied on the sending side or OR
the result of resulting Message once decryption and unwrapping on the
receiving side respectively. has been performed. Typically, the Inner Message
is in clear text. The Inner Message is a subset of (or the same
as) the Original Message (cf. Section 4.1.2). 4.1.2.1). The Inner
Message must be the same on the sending and the receiving side.

o Outer Message (OuterM): The Message as handed over provided to the Submission
Entity or received from the last hop respectively. The Outer
Message normally differs on the sending and the receiving side
(e.g. new Header Fields are added by intermediary nodes).

o Receiving User Facing Message (RUFM): The message Message used for
rendering at the receiving side. Typically this is the same as
the Inner Message.

o Data Minimization: Data sparseness and hiding of all technically
concealable information whenever possible.

o Cryptographic Layer, Cryptographic Payload, and Cryptographic
Envelope are all used as defined in
[I-D.dkg-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance]

2. Problem Statement

The LAMPS charter contains the following Work Item:

Update the specification for the cryptographic protection of email
headers - both for signatures and encryption - to improve the
implementation situation with respect to privacy, security,
usability and interoperability in cryptographically-protected
electronic mail. Most current implementations of
cryptographically-protected electronic mail protect only the body
of the message, which leaves significant room for attacks against
otherwise-protected messages.

In the following a set of challenges to be addressed:

[[ TODO: Enhance this section, add more items to the following. ]]

2.1. Privacy

o (Technical) Data Minimization, which includes data sparseness and
hiding all technically concealable information whenever possible

2.2. Security

o Prevent MITM attacks (cf. [RFC4949])

2.3. Usability

o Improved User interaction / User experience experience, in particular at the
receiving side

2.4. Interoperability

o Interoperability with [RFC8551] implementations

3. Use Cases

In the following, the reader can find a list of the generic use cases
that need to be addressed for Messages with Header Protection (HP).
These use cases apply regardless of technology (S/MIME, PGP/MIME,
etc.) used to achieve HP.

3.1. Interactions

The following use cases assume that at least the sending side
supports Header Protection as specified in this document. Receiving
sides that support this specification are expected to be able to
distinguish between Messages that use Header Protection - as specified
in this document - has been applied to document, and (legacy) Mail User Agents (MUAs) which do not implementing
implement this specification.

[[ TODO: Verify once solution is stable and update last sentence. ]]

3.1.1. Main Use Case

Both the sending and receiving side (fully) support Header Protection
as specified in this document.

The main use case is specified in Section 4.1.

3.1.2. Backward Compatibility Use Cases

Regarding backward compatibility, the main distinction is based on
whether or not the receiving side conforms to MIME according to
[RFC2046], ff., which in particular also includes Section 2 of
[RFC2049] on "MIME Conformance". In the The following an excerpt of
paragraphs relevant in this context: is
contextually relevant:

A mail user agent that is MIME-conformant MUST:

[...]

-- Recognize and display at least the RFC822 message
encapsulation (message/rfc822) in such a way as to
preserve any recursive structure, that is, displaying
or offering to display the encapsulated data in
accordance with its media type.

-- Treat any unrecognized subtypes as if they were
"application/octet-stream".

[...]

A user agent

An MUA that meets the above conditions is said to be MIME-
conformant. The meaning of this phrase is that it A MIME-conformant MUA is assumed to be "safe" to send
virtually any kind of properly-marked data to users of such mail
systems, because such these systems will are, at least be able to
treat a minimum, capable of treating
the data as undifferentiated binary, and will not simply
splash it onto the screen of unsuspecting users.

[[ TODO: The compatibility of legacy HP systems with this new
solution, and how to handle issues surrounding future maintenance for
these legacy systems, will be decided by the LAMPS WG. ]]

3.1.2.1. Receiving Side MIME-Conformant

The sending side (fully) supports Header Protection as specified in
this document, while the receiving side does not support this
specification. However, the receiving side is MIME-conformant
according to [RFC2045], ff. (cf. Section 3.1.2), 3.1.2).

This use case is specified in Section 4.2.1.

Note: This case should perform as expected if the sending side
applies this specification as outlined in Section 4.1.

[[ TODO: Verify once solution is stable and update last sentence. ]]

3.1.2.2. Receiving Side Not MIME-Conformant

The sending side (fully) supports Header Protection as specified in
this document, while the receiving side does not support this
specification. Furthermore, the receiving side is *not* MIME-
conformant according to [RFC2045], ff. (cf. Section 3.1.2).

This use case is specified in Section 4.2.2.

3.2. Protection Levels

3.2.1. In-Scope

The following Protection Levels need to be considered: are in scope for this document:

a) Signature and encryption

Messages containing a cryptographic signature, which are also
encrypted.

b) Signature only

Messages containing a cryptographic signature, but which are not
encrypted.

c) Encryption only

Messages that are encrypted, but do

3.2.2. Out-of-Scope

Legacy implementations, implementations not contain a cryptographic
signature.

[[ TODO: There are (fully) compliant with
this document or corner-cases may lead to further "Protection Levels" Protection Levels
to describe for appear on the receiving side, e.g. encrypted such as (list not exhaustive):

o Triple wrap

o Encryption only

o Encryption before signature

o Signature and signed (only after encryption),
etc. ]] encryption, but:

* Signature fails to validate

* Signature validates but the signing certificate revoked

o Signature only, but:

* with multiple valid signatures, layered atop each other

These Protection Levels, as well as any further Protection Levels not
listed in Section 3.2.1 are beyond the scope of this document.

4. Specification

This section contains the specification for Header Protection in
S/MIME to update and clarify Section 3.1 of [RFC8551] (S/MIME 4.0).

Note: It is likely that PGP/MIME [RFC3156] will also incorporate this
specification or parts of it.

This specification applies to the Protection Levels "signature &
encryption" and "signature only" (cf. Section 3.2):

Sending and receiving sides MUST implement the "signature and
encryption" Protection Level", Level, which SHOULD be used as default on the
sending side.

Certain implementations may decide to send "signature only" messages, Messages,
depending on the circumstances and customer requirements. Sending
sides MAY and receiving sides MUST implement "signature only"
Protection Level.

It generally is NOT RECOMMENDED to send a message Message with any other
Protection
Level "encryption only". Level. On the other hand, messages with Protection
Level "encryption only" might arrive at the receiving side. While
not targeted side must be
prepared to receive Messages with other Protection Level "encryption only", this
specification Levels.

[[ TODO: Further study is assumed to also function for "encryption only".
Receiving sides SHOULD implement "encryption only".

[[ TODO: Further study is necessary necessary to determine whether - and if yes
to what extent - additional guidance for handling messages with other
Protection Levels, e.g. "encryption only" protection (as well as other variations) at the receiving side
should be included in this document. ]]

4.1. Main Use Case

This section applies to the main use case, where the sending and
receiving side (fully) support Header Protection as specified herein
(cf. Section 3.1.1).

Note: The sending side specification of the main use case is also
applicable to the cases where the sending side (fully) supports
Header Protection as specified herein, while the receiving side does
not, but is MIME-conformant according to [RFC2045], ff. (cf.
Section 3.1.2) 3.1.2 and Section 3.1.2.1) 3.1.2.1).

Further backward compatibility cases are defined in Section 4.2.

4.1.1. MIME Format

Currently there are two options in discussion:

1. The option according to the current S/MIME specification (cf.
[RFC8551])

2. An alternative option that is based on the former "memory hole"
approach (cf. [I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers])

4.1.1.1. S/MIME Specification Introduction

As per S/MIME version 3.1 and later (cf. [RFC8551]), the sending
client MAY wrap a full MIME message in a message/RFC822 wrapper in
order to apply S/MIME security services to these header fields.

To help the receiving side to distinguish between a forwarded and a
wrapped message, the Content-Type header field parameter "forwarded"
is added as defined in [I-D.melnikov-iana-reg-forwarded]. Certain
mailing applications might display the Inner Message as an attachment
otherwise.

The simplified (cryptographic overhead not shown) MIME structure of
such an Email message Message looks as follows:

The following example demonstrates how an Original Message might be
protected, i.e., the Original Message is contained as Inner Message
in the Protected Body of an Outer Message. It illustrates the first
Body part (of the Outer Message) as a "multipart/signed"
(application/pkcs7-signature) media type:

Lines are prepended as follows:

o "O: " Outer Message Header Section

o "I: " Message Header Section

o "W: " Wrapper (MIME Header Section)
O: Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 17:31:42 +0100 (GMT Daylight Time)
O: Message-ID: <e4a483cb-1dfb-481d-903b-298c92c21f5e@m.example.net>
O: Subject: Meeting at my place
O: From: "Alexey Melnikov" <alexey.melnikov@example.net>
O: To: somebody@example.net
O: MIME-Version: 1.0
O: Content-Type: multipart/signed; charset=us-ascii; micalg=sha1;
O: protocol="application/pkcs7-signature";
O: boundary=boundary-AM

This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--boundary-AM
W: Content-Type: message/RFC822; forwarded=no
W:
I: Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 17:31:42 +0100 (GMT Daylight Time)
I: From: "Alexey Melnikov" <alexey.melnikov@example.net>
I: Message-ID: <e4a483cb-1dfb-481d-903b-298c92c21f5e@m.example.net>
I: MIME-Version: 1.0
I: MMHS-Primary-Precedence: 3
I: Subject: Meeting at my place
I: To: somebody@example.net
I: X-Mailer: Isode Harrier Web Server
I: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii

This is an important message that I don't want to be modified.

--boundary-AM
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature

[[base-64 encoded signature]]

--boundary-AM--

The Outer Message Header Section is unprotected, while the remainder
(Outer Message Body) is protected. The Outer Message Body consists
of the wrapper (MIME Header Section) and the Inner Message (Header
Section and Body).

The wrapper is a simple MIME Header Section with media type "message/
RFC822"
rfc822" containing a Content-Type header field parameter
"forwarded=no" followed by an empty line.

The

If the source is an Original (message/rfc822) Message, the Inner
Message Header Section is typically the same as (or a subset of) the
Original Message Header Section (cf. Section 4.1.2).

The 4.1.2.1), and the Inner
Message Body is typically the same as the Original Message Body.

The Original Inner Message itself may contain any MIME structure.

4.1.1.2. Alternative Option Autocrypt "Protected Headers" (Ex-"Memory
Hole")

An alternative option (based on the former autocrypt "Memory Hole"
approach)

Note: It is still to be considered, is described in
[I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers].

Unlike decided by the option LAMPS WG whether or not to
recommend an alternative MIME format as described in Section 4.1.1.1, Appendix B.1.1.1
(instead of the currently standardized and above defined format).

4.1.2. Sending Side

To ease explanation, the following describes the case where an
Original (message/rfc822) Message to be protected is present. If
this option does is not
use a "message/RFC822" wrapper to unambiguously delimit the case, Original Message means the (virtual) Message
that would be constructed for sending it as unprotected email.

4.1.2.1. Inner
Message.

Before choosing this option, Message Header Fields

It is RECOMMENDED that the Inner Message contains all Header Fields
of the Original Message with the exception of the following two issues must be
assessed to ensure no interoperability issues result from it:

1. How current MIME parser implementations treat non-MIME Header
Fields,
Field, which are not part of MUST NOT be included within the outermost MIME entity and not Inner Message nor within
any other protected part of a message wrapped into a MIME entity of media type
"message/rfc822", and how such messages are rendered to the user.

[I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers] provides some examples
for testing this.

2. MIME-conformance, i.e. whether or not this option is (fully)
MIME-conformant [RFC2045] ff., in particular Message:

o Bcc

[[ TODO: Bcc handling needs to be further specified (see also
Appendix A.1). Certain MUAs cannot properly decrypt Messages with
Bcc recipients. ]]

4.1.2.2. Wrapper

The wrapper is a simple MIME Header Section 5.1. of
[RFC2046] on "Multipart Media Type). In the following followed by an excerpt empty line
preceding the Inner Message (inside the Outer Message Body). The
media type of paragraphs that may the wrapper MUST be relevant in this context:

The only "message/RFC822" and MUST contain
the Content-Type header fields that have field parameter "forwarded=no" as defined meaning for body parts
are those in
[I-D.melnikov-iana-reg-forwarded]. The wrapper unambiguously
delimits the names Inner Message from the rest of which begin with "Content-". All other
header fields may be ignored in body parts. Although they
should generally be retained if at all possible, they may be
discarded by gateways if necessary. Such other fields are
permitted the Message.

4.1.2.3. Cryptographic Layers / Envelope

[[ TODO: Basically refer to appear in body parts but must not be depended on.
"X-" fields may be created for experimental or private
purposes, with S/MIME standards ]]

4.1.2.4. Outer Message Header Fields

4.1.2.4.1. Encrypted Messages

To maximize Privacy, it is strongly RECOMMENDED to follow the recognition that
principle of Data Minimization (cf. Section 2.1).

However, the information they Outer Message Header Section SHOULD contain may be lost at some gateways.

NOTE: The distinction between an RFC 822 message and a body
part is subtle, but important. A gateway between Internet and
X.400 mail, for example, must be able to tell the difference
between a body part that contains an image and a body part
that contains an encapsulated message,
Essential Header Fields and, in addition, MUST contain the body Header
Fields of which is a
JPEG image. In order to represent the latter, the body MIME Header Section part
must have "Content-Type: message/rfc822", and its body (after
the blank line) must be the encapsulated message, with its own
"Content-Type: image/jpeg" header field. The use of similar
syntax facilitates the conversion of messages to body parts,
and vice versa, but the distinction between the two must be
understood by implementors. (For describe Cryptographic
Layer of the special case in which
parts actually are messages, a "digest" subtype is also
defined.)

The protected MIME structure of an Email message looks subtree as follows:

<Inner Message Body> per [RFC8551].

The following example demonstrates how an Original Message might be
protected, i.e., the Original Message is contained Header Fields are defined as Inner Message
in the Protected Body of an Outer Message. It illustrates Essential Header
Fields:

o From

o To (if present in the first
Body part (of Original Message)

o Cc (if present in the Outer Original Message) as a "multipart/signed"
(application/pkcs7-signature) media type:

Lines are prepended as follows:

o "O: " Outer Message Header Bcc (if present in the Original Message, see also Section 4.1.2.1
and Appendix A.1)

o "I: " Message Date

o Message-ID

o Subject

Further processing by the Submission Entity normally depends on part
of these Header Section
O: Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 17:31:42 +0100 (GMT Daylight Time)
O: Message-ID: <e4a483cb-1dfb-481d-903b-298c92c21f5e@m.example.net>
O: Subject: Meeting at my place
O: From: "Alexey Melnikov" <alexey.melnikov@example.net>
O: MIME-Version: 1.0
O: Content-Type: multipart/signed; charset=us-ascii; micalg=sha1;
O: protocol="application/pkcs7-signature";
O: boundary=boundary-AM

This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--boundary-AM
I: Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 17:31:42 +0100 (GMT Daylight Time)
I: From: "Alexey Melnikov" <alexey.melnikov@example.net>
I: Message-ID: <e4a483cb-1dfb-481d-903b-298c92c21f5e@m.example.net>
I: MIME-Version: 1.0
I: MMHS-Primary-Precedence: 3
I: Subject: Meeting at my place
I: To: somebody@example.net
I: X-Mailer: Isode Harrier Web Server
I: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii

This is an important message that I don't want to be modified.

--boundary-AM
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature

[[base-64 encoded signature]]

--boundary-AM--

The Outer Message Fields, e.g. From and Date HFs are required by
[RFC5322]. Furthermore, not including certain Header Section is unprotected, while Fields may
trigger spam detection to flag the remainder
(Outer Message Body) is protected. The Outer Message Body consists Message, and/or lead to user
experience (UX) issues.

For further Data Minimization, the value of the Inner Message (Header Section and Body).

The Inner Message Subject Header Section Field
SHOULD be obfuscated as follows:

* Subject: [...]

and it is RECOMMENDED to replace the same as (or Message-ID by a subset of) new randomly
generated Message-ID.

In addition, the
Original value of other Essential Header Fields MAY be
obfuscated.

Non-Essential Header Fields SHOULD be omitted from the Outer Message
Header Section (cf. Section 4.1.2).

The Inner where possible. If Non-essential Header Fields are
included in the Outer Message Body is Header Section, those MAY be obfuscated
too.

Header Fields that are not obfuscated should contain the same values
as in the Original Message Body.

The Original Message itself may contain any MIME structure.

4.1.2. Inner Message Header Fields

It is RECOMMENDED that Message.

If an implementation obfuscates the Inner Message contains all From, To, and/or Cc Header Fields
of the Original Message with
Fields, it may need to provide access to the exception clear text content of the following
these Header
Field, which MUST NOT be included within the Inner Message nor within
any other protected part of the message:

o Bcc

[[ TODO: Bcc handling needs Fields to be further specified (see also
Appendix A.1). Certain MUAs cannot properly decrypt messages with
Bcc recipients. ]]

4.1.3. Wrapper

The wrapper is a simple MIME Header Section followed by an empty line
preceding the Inner Message (inside the Outer Message Body). The
media type Submission Entity for processing purposes.
This is particularly relevant, if proprietary Submission Entities are
used. Obfuscation of the wrapper MUST be "message/RFC822" and MUST contain
the Content-Type header field parameter "forwarded=no" as defined in
[I-D.melnikov-iana-reg-forwarded]. The wrapper unambiguously
delimits the Inner Message from the rest Header Fields may adversely impact spam
filtering.

(A use case for obfuscation of the message.

4.1.4. all Outer Message Header Fields

To maximize Privacy, it is strongly RECOMMENDED to follow
routing email through the
principle use of Data Minimization (cf. Section 2.1).

However, the Outer Message onion routing or mix networks, e.g.
[pEp.mixnet].)

The MIME Header Section SHOULD contain the
Essential Header Fields and, in addition, MUST contain part is the collection of MIME Header Fields of
describing the following MIME structure as defined in [RFC2045]. A
MIME Header Section part to describe typically includes the encryption or
signature as per [RFC8551].

The following Header Fields are defined as the Essential Header
Fields:

o From Content-Type

o To (if present in the Original Message)

o Cc (if present in the Original Message)

o Bcc (if present in the Original Message, see also Section 4.1.2
and Appendix A.1)

o Date

o Message-ID

o Subject

Further processing by the Submission Entity normally depends on part
of these Header Fields, e.g. From and Date HFs are required by

[RFC5322]. Furthermore, not including certain Header Fields may
trigger spam detection to flag the message and/or lead to user
experience (UX) issues.

For further Data Minimization, the value of the Subject Header Field
SHOULD be obfuscated. In addition, the value of other Essential
Header Fields MAY be obfuscated. Further Header Fields MAY be
obfuscated, though simply not adding those to the Outer Message
Header Section SHOULD be preferred over obfuscation. Header Field
obfuscation is further specified in Section 4.1.4.1. Header Fields
not obfuscated should contain the same values as in the Original
Message.

The MIME Header Section part is the collection of MIME Header Fields
describing the following MIME structure as defined in [RFC2045]. A
MIME Header Section part typically includes the following Header
Fields:

o Content-Type

o Content-Transfer-Encoding Content-Transfer-Encoding

o Content-Disposition

The following example shows the MIME Header Section part of an S/MIME
signed message Message (using application/pkcs7-mime with SignedData):

MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=signed-data;
name=smime.p7m
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7m

Depending on the scenario, further Header Fields MAY be exposed in
the Outer Message Header Section, which is NOT RECOMMENDED unless
justified. Such Header Fields may include e.g.:

o References

o Reply-To

o In-Reply-To

4.1.4.1. Obfuscation of

4.1.2.4.2. Unencrypted Messages

The Outer Message Header Fields

If the values Section of unencrypted Messages SHOULD
contain at least the following Outer Message Essential Header Fields are
obfuscated, those SHOULD assume and, in addition, MUST
contain the following values:

* Subject: ...
* Message-ID: <new randomly generated Message-ID>
* Date: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 +0000 (UTC)

[[ TODO: Consider alternatives for Date e.g. set to Monday 9am Header Fields of the
same week. The Impact of obfuscated Date HF content MIME Header Section part to certificate
validation is for describe
Cryptographic Layer of the protected MIME subtree as per [RFC8551].
It may contain further study, Header Fields, in particular regarding legacy
clients. ]]

In certain implementations those also
present in the From, To, and/or Cc Inner Message Header Field
MAY be obfuscated. Those may be replaced by e.g.

o To: Obfuscated <anonymous@anonymous.invalid>

Such implementations may need Section.

4.1.2.5. Sending Side Message Processing

For a protected Message the following steps are applied before a
Message is handed over to ensure that the Submission Entity
has access Entity:

4.1.2.5.1. Step 1: Decide on Protection Level and Information
Disclosure

The implementation which applies protection to a Message must decide:

o Which Protection Level (signature and/or encryption) shall be
applied to the content Message? This depends on user request and/or local
policy as well as availability of these cryptographic keys.

o Which Header Fields in clear text and is
capable of processing those. the Original Message shall be part of the
Outer Message Header Section? This is particularly relevant, if
proprietary Submission Entities typically depends on local
policy. By default, the Essential Header Fields are used.

A use case for obfuscation part of all the
Outer Message Header Section; cf. Section 4.1.2.4.

o Which of these Header Fields is
routing email using onion routing or mix networks (e.g.
[pEp.mixnet]).

Note: It is for further study are to what extent be obfuscated? This depends
on local policy and/or specific Privacy requirements of the user.
By default only the Subject Header Field obfuscation
adversely impacts spam filtering.

4.1.5. Receiving User Facing is obfuscated; cf.
Section 4.1.2.4.

4.1.2.5.2. Step 2: Compose the Outer Message Header Fields

The Receiving User Facing Section

Depending on the decision in Section 4.1.2.5.1, the implementation
shall compose the Outer Message SHOULD be a verbatim copy of Header Section. (Note that this also
includes the
Inner Message.

4.1.6. necessary MIME Header Field Flow

The Following figure depicts Section part for the different message representations
(OrigM, InnerM, OuterM, RUFM) and which parts those following
protection layer.)

Outer Header Fields that are constructed
from:

OrigM InnerM Outer(S) OuterM(R) RUFM

<Trace-HF>
From (OrigM) = From
To (OrigM) = To
Cc (OrigM) = Cc
Bcc (OrigM) = Bcc*
Date (OrigM) = Date
Message-ID (OrigM)= Message-ID
Subject (new) = Subject
<MIME-HSp> (new) = <MIME-HSp>

PROTECTED: PROTECTED:
<Wrapper> (new) = <Wrapper>
From > From > From = From > From
To > To > To = To > To
Cc* > Cc > Cc = Cc > Cc
Bcc*
Date > Date > Date = Date > Date
Message-ID > Message-ID > Message-ID = Message-ID > Message-ID
Subject > Subject > Subject = Subject > Subject
<More HF> > <More HF> > <More HF> = <More HF> > <More-HF>
<MIME-HSp> > <MIME-HSp> > <MIME-HSp> = <MIME-HSp> > <MIME-HSp>
<Body> > <Body> > <Body> = <Body> > <Body>
<Signature>* (new)= <Signature>

Legend:

o OuterM(S): Outer Message (OuterM) at sending side (before handing
it over to the Submission Entity)

o OuterM(R): Outer Message at receiving side (as received by not obfuscated should contain the
last hop, before decryption and/or signature verification is
applied to)

o InnerM: Inner Message (that protection is applied to)

o RUFM: Receiving User Facing Message

o More-HF: Additional Header Fields (HF) same
values as in the Original Message
(OrigM)

o Wrapper: (except for MIME Header Section; with media type (message/RFC822) to
unambiguously delimit
Section part, which depends on the inner message from Protection Level selected in
Section 4.1.2.5.1).

4.1.2.5.3. Step 3: Apply Protection to the rest of Original Message

Depending on the
message.

o MIME-HSp: MIME Header Protection Level selected in Section part to describe 4.1.2.5.1, the encryption or
implementation applies signature as and/or encryption to the Original
Message, including the wrapper (as per [RFC8551]

o Trace-HF: Header Fields added in Transit (between sending [RFC8551]), and
receiving side) sets the
resulting package as per [RFC5322]

o >: taken over / copied from last column

o =: propagates unchanged, unless something unusual (e.g. attack)
happens

o *: HF that is often not present (also further HFs, e.g. To, may
not be present). If a HF the Outer Message Body.

The resulting (Outer) Message is not present, naturally it can neither
be taken then typically handed over nor propagated.

o (new) / (OrigM): HF or MIME-HSp is generated depending on to the
decision in Section 4.1.7.1, while '(new)' / '(OrigM)' designate
Submission Entity.

[[ TODO: Example ]]

4.1.3. Receiving Side

4.1.3.1. Receiving User Facing Message Header Fields

The Receiving User Facing Message SHOULD be a verbatim copy of the default.

4.1.7. Sending
Inner Message.

4.1.3.2. Receiving Side Message Processing

For

When a protected message Message is received, the following steps are applied before a
message is handed over to the Submission Entity:

4.1.7.1.
applied:

4.1.3.2.1. Step 1: Decide on Protection Level and Information Disclosure

The entity applying protection to a message must decide:

o Which Protection Level (signature and/or encryption) is applied to
the message? This depends on user request and/or local policy as
well as availability of cryptographic keys.

o Which Header Fields of the Original Message shall be part of the
Outer Decrypt Message Header Section? This typically depends and/or check signature

Depending on local
policy. By default the Essential Header Fields are part of Protection Level, the
Outer received Message Header Section; cf. Section 4.1.4.

o Which of these Header Fields are to be obfuscated? This depends
on local policy is decrypted
and/or specific Privacy requirements of the user.
By default only the Subject Header Field its signature is obfuscated; cf.
Section 4.1.4.1.

4.1.7.2. checked as per [RFC8551].

4.1.3.2.2. Step 2: Compose Construct the Outer Receiving User Facing Message Header Section

Depending on the decision in Section 4.1.7.1, compose the Outer

The Receiving User Facing Message Header Section. (Note that this also includes the necessary
MIME Header is constructed according to
Section part for the following protection layer.)
Outer Header Fields that are not obfuscated should contain the same
values as in the Original 4.1.3.1.

The resulting Message (except is handed over for MIME Header
Section part, further processing, which depends on
typically involves rendering it for the Protection Level selected in
Section 4.1.7.1).

4.1.7.3. user.

4.1.3.3. Step 3: Apply Protection Prepare Information Cyptographic Verification

[[ TODO: Signature valid, etc. ]]

4.2. Backward Compatibility Use Cases

4.2.1. Receiving Side MIME-Conformant

This section applies to the Original Message

Depending on case where the sending side (fully)
supports Header Protection Level selected as specified in Section 4.1.7.1, apply
signature and/or encryption to the Original Message, including the
wrapper (as per [RFC8551]), and set the result to the message as
Outer Message Body.

The resulting (Outer) Message is then typically handed over to the
Submission Entity.

[[ TODO: Example ]]

4.1.8. Receiving Side Message Processing

When a protected message is received, the following steps are
applied:

4.1.8.1. Step 1: Decrypt message and/or check signature

Depending on the Protection Level, the received message is decrypted
and/or its signature is checked as per [RFC8551].

4.1.8.2. Step 2: Construct the Receiving User Facing Message

The Receiving User Facing Message is constructed according to
Section 4.1.5.

The resulting message is handed over for further processing, which
typically involves rendering it for the user.

Note: Further study is needed to determine whether or not the Outer
Message Header Section, as received from the last hop, is preserved
for the user, and if so, how this is to be achieved.

4.2. Backward Compatibility Use Cases

4.2.1. Receiving Side MIME-Conformant

This section applies to the case where the sending side (fully)
supports Header Protection as specified in this document, while this document, while the
receiving side does not support this specification, but is MIME-
conformant according to [RFC2045], ff. (cf. Section 3.1.2) 3.1.2 and
Section 3.1.2.1)

The sending side specification of the main use case (cf.
Section 4.1) MUST ensure that receiving sides can still recognize and
display or offer to display the encapsulated data in accordance with
its media type (cf. [RFC2049], Section 2). In particular, receiving
sides that do not support this specification, but are MIME-conformant
according to [RFC2045], ff. can still recognize and display the
Message intended for the user.

[[ TODO: Verify once solution is stable and update last sentence. ]]

4.2.2. Receiving Side Not MIME-Conformant

This section applies to the case cases where the sending side (fully) supports
Header Protection as specified in this document, while the receiving
side neither supports this specification *nor* is MIME-
conformant MIME-conformant
according to [RFC2045], ff. (cf. Section 3.1.2 and Section 3.1.2.2).

[I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers] describes a possible way to
achieve backward compatibility with existing S/MIME (and PGP/MIME)
implementations that predate this specification and are not MIME-
conformant (Legacy Display) either. It mainly focuses on email
clients that do not render emails using which utilize header protection (in in
a user friendly manner) and manner, which may confuse the user. While this has
been observed occasionally in PGP/MIME (cf. [RFC3156]), the extent
of this problem with S/MIME implementations is still unclear. (Note:
At this time, none of the samples in
[I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers] apply header protection as
specified in Section 3.1 of [RFC8551], which is wrapping as Media
Type "message/RFC822".)

Should serious backward compatibility issues with rendering at the
receiver
receiving side be discovered, the Legacy Display format described in
[I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers] may serve as a basis to
mitigate those issues (cf. Section 4.2).

Another variant of backward compatibility has been implemented by pEp
[I-D.pep-email], i.e. pEp Email Format 1.0. At this time pEp has
implemented this for PGP/MIME, but not yet S/MIME.

5. Security Considerations

[[ TODO ]]

6. Privacy Considerations

[[ TODO ]]

7. IANA Considerations

This document requests no action from IANA.

[[ RFC Editor: This section may be removed before publication. ]]

8. Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the following people who have
provided helpful comments and suggestions for this document: Berna
Alp, Claudio Luck, Daniel Kahn Gillmor, David Wilson, Hernani Marques, juga, Krista
Bennett, Kelly Bristol, Lars Rohwedder, Robert Williams, Russ
Housley, Sofia Balicka, Steve Kille, Volker Birk, and Wei Chuang.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

[I-D.dkg-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance]
Gillmor, D., "Guidance on End-to-End E-mail Security",
draft-dkg-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance-00 (work in progress),
October 2020.

[I-D.ietf-lamps-header-protection-requirements]
Melnikov, A. and B. Hoeneisen, "Problem Statement and
Requirements for Header Protection", draft-ietf-lamps-
header-protection-requirements-01 (work in progress),
October 2019.

[RFC2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
Bodies", RFC 2045, DOI 10.17487/RFC2045, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2045>.

[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.

[RFC2049] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Five: Conformance Criteria and
Examples", RFC 2049, DOI 10.17487/RFC2049, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2049>.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC5322] Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322>.

[RFC8551] Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0
Message Specification", RFC 8551, DOI 10.17487/RFC8551,
April 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8551>.

9.2. Informative References

[I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers]
Einarsson, B., juga, j., and D. Gillmor, "Protected
Headers for Cryptographic E-mail", draft-autocrypt-lamps-
protected-headers-02 (work in progress), December 2019.

[I-D.melnikov-iana-reg-forwarded]
Melnikov, A. and B. Hoeneisen, "IANA Registration of
Content-Type Header Field Parameter 'forwarded'", draft-
melnikov-iana-reg-forwarded-00 (work in progress),
November 2019.

[I-D.pep-email]
Marques, H., "pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Email Formats and
Protocols", draft-pep-email-00 (work in progress), July
2020.

[pEp.mixnet]
pEp Foundation, "Mixnet", June 2020,
<https://dev.pep.foundation/Mixnet>.

[RFC3156] Elkins, M., Del Torto, D., Levien, R., and T. Roessler,
"MIME Security with OpenPGP", RFC 3156,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3156, August 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3156>.

[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

[RFC6376] Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed.,
"DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76,
RFC 6376, DOI 10.17487/RFC6376, September 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6376>.

[RFC6409] Gellens, R. and J. Klensin, "Message Submission for Mail",
STD 72, RFC 6409, DOI 10.17487/RFC6409, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6409>.

[RFC7208] Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for
Authorizing Use of Domains in Email, Version 1", RFC 7208,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7208, April 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7208>.

[RFC7489] Kucherawy, M., Ed. and E. Zwicky, Ed., "Domain-based
Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
(DMARC)", RFC 7489, DOI 10.17487/RFC7489, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7489>.

Appendix A. Additional information

A.1. Stored Variants of Messages with Bcc

Messages containing at least one recipient address containing at least one recipient address in the Bcc header
field may appear in up to three different variants:

1. The Message for the recipient addresses listed in To or Cc header
fields, which must not include the Bcc header field neither for
signature calculation nor for encryption.

2. The Message(s) sent to the recipient addresses in the Bcc header
field, which depends on the implementation:

a) One Message for each recipient in the Bcc header field
separately, with a Bcc header field containing only the address
of the recipient it is sent to.

b) The same Message for each recipient in the Bcc header field
with a Bcc header field containing an indication such as
"Undisclosed recipients", but no addresses.

c) The same Message for each recipient in the Bcc header field
which does not include a Bcc header field (this Message is
identical to 1. / cf. above).

3. The Message stored in the 'Sent'-Folder of the sender, which
usually contains the Bcc unchanged from the original Message,
i.e., with all recipient addresses.

The most privacy preserving method of the alternatives (2a, 2b, and
2c) is to standardize 2a, as in the other cases (2b and 2c),
information about hidden recipients is revealed via keys. In any
case, the Message has to be cloned and adjusted depending on the
recipient.

Appendix B. Text Moved from Above

Note: Per an explicit request by the chair of the LAMPS WG to only
present one option for the specification, the following text has been
stripped from the main body of the draft. It is preserved in an
Appendix for the time being and may be moved back to the main body or
deleted, depending on the decision of the LAMPS WG.

B.1. MIME Format

Currently there are two options in discussion:

1. The option according to the current S/MIME specification (cf.
[RFC8551])

2. An alternative option that is based on the former "memory hole"
approach (cf. [I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers])

B.1.1. S/MIME Specification

Note: This is currently described in the main part of this document.

B.1.1.1. Alternative Option Autocrypt "Protected Headers" (Ex-"Memory
Hole")

An alternative option (based on the former autocrypt "Memory Hole"
approach) to be considered, is described in
[I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers].

Unlike the option described in Appendix B.1.1, this option does not
use a "message/RFC822" wrapper to unambiguously delimit the Inner
Message.

Before choosing this option, the following two issues must be
assessed to ensure no interoperability issues result from it:

1. How current MIME parser implementations treat non-MIME Header
Fields, which are not part of the outermost MIME entity and not
part of a Message wrapped into a MIME entity of media type
"message/rfc822", and how such Messages are rendered to the user.

[I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers] provides some examples
for testing this.

2. MIME-conformance, i.e. whether or not this option is (fully)
MIME-conformant [RFC2045] ff., in particular also Section 5.1. of
[RFC2046] on "Multipart Media Type). In the Bcc header
field following an excerpt
of paragraphs that may appear be relevant in up to three different variants:

1. this context:

The message only header fields that have defined meaning for body parts
are those the recipient addresses listed in To or Cc header
fields, names of which begin with "Content-". All other
header fields may be ignored in body parts. Although they
should generally be retained if at all possible, they may be
discarded by gateways if necessary. Such other fields are
permitted to appear in body parts but must not include the Bcc header field neither for
signature calculation nor be depended on.
"X-" fields may be created for encryption.

2. experimental or private
purposes, with the recognition that the information they
contain may be lost at some gateways.

NOTE: The message(s) sent distinction between an RFC 822 Message and a body
part is subtle, but important. A gateway between Internet and
X.400 mail, for example, must be able to tell the recipient addresses in difference
between a body part that contains an image and a body part
that contains an encapsulated Message, the Bcc header
field, body of which depends on is a
JPEG image. In order to represent the implementation:

a) One message for each recipient in latter, the body part
must have "Content-Type: message/rfc822", and its body (after
the blank line) must be the Bcc header field
separately, encapsulated Message, with a Bcc its own
"Content-Type: image/jpeg" header field containing only field. The use of similar
syntax facilitates the address conversion of Messages to body parts,
and vice versa, but the recipient it is sent to.

b) The same message for each recipient in distinction between the Bcc header field
with two must be
understood by implementors. (For the special case in which
parts actually are Messages, a Bcc header field containing "digest" subtype is also
defined.)

The MIME structure of an indication such Email Message looks as
"Undisclosed recipients", but no addresses.

c) follows:

The same message for each recipient following example demonstrates how an Original Message might be
protected, i.e., the Original Message is contained as Inner Message
in the Bcc header field
which does not include Protected Body of an Outer Message. It illustrates the first
Body part (of the Outer Message) as a Bcc header field (this "multipart/signed"
(application/pkcs7-signature) media type:

Lines are prepended as follows:

o "O: " Outer Message Header Section

o "I: " Message Header Section
O: Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 17:31:42 +0100 (GMT Daylight Time)
O: Message-ID: <e4a483cb-1dfb-481d-903b-298c92c21f5e@m.example.net>
O: Subject: Meeting at my place
O: From: "Alexey Melnikov" <alexey.melnikov@example.net>
O: MIME-Version: 1.0
O: Content-Type: multipart/signed; charset=us-ascii; micalg=sha1;
O: protocol="application/pkcs7-signature";
O: boundary=boundary-AM

This is
identical an important message that I don't want to 1. / cf. above).

3. be modified.

--boundary-AM
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature

[[base-64 encoded signature]]

--boundary-AM--

The message stored in the 'Sent'-Folder of the sender, which
usually contains the Bcc unchanged from Outer Message Header Section is unprotected, while the original message,
i.e., with all recipient addresses. remainder
(Outer Message Body) is protected. The most privacy preserving method Outer Message Body consists
of the alternatives (2a, 2b, Inner Message (Header Section and
2c) Body).

The Inner Message Header Section is to standardize 2a, the same as in (or a subset of) the other cases (2b and 2c),
information about hidden recipients
Original Message Header Section (cf. Section 4.1.2.1).

The Inner Message Body is revealed via keys. In any
case, the message has to be cloned and adjusted depending on same as the
recipient. Original Message Body.

The Original Message itself may contain any MIME structure.

Appendix B. C. Document Changelog

[[ RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication ]]

o draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-01
* Add DKG as co-author

* Partial Rewrite of Abstract and Introduction [HB/AM/DKG]

* Adding definiations for Cryptographic Layer, Cryptographic
Payload, and Cryptographic Envelope (reference to
[I-D.dkg-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance]) [DKG]

* Enhanced MITM Definition to include Machine- / Meddler-in-the-
middle [HB]

* Relaxed definition of Original message, which may not be of
type "message/rfc822" [HB]

* Move "memory hole" option to the Appendix (on request by Chair
to only maintain one option in the specification) [HB]

* Updated Scope of Protection Levels according to WG discussion
during IETF-108 [HB]

* Obfuscation recommendation only for Subject and Message-Id and
distinguish between Encrypted and Unencrypted Messages [HB]

* Removed (commented out) Header Field Flow Figure (it appeared
to be confusing as is was) [HB]

o draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-00

* Initial version (text partially taken over from
[I-D.ietf-lamps-header-protection-requirements]

Appendix C. D. Open Issues

[[ RFC Editor: This section should be empty and is to be removed
before publication. ]]

o Ensure "protected header" (Ex-Memory-Hole) option is (fully)
compliant with the MIME standard, in particular also [RFC2046],
Section 5.1. (Multipart Media Type) Section 4.1.1.2.

o Decide on format of obfuscated HFs, in particular Date HF
(Section 4.1.4.1)

o Impact on spam filtering, if HFs are obfuscated (Section 4.1.4.1) Appendix B.1.1.1.

o More examples (e.g. in Section 4.1.7) 4.1.2.5)

o Should Outer Message Header Section (as received) be preserved for
the user? (Section 4.1.8.2) 4.1.3.2.2)

o Decide on whether or not merge requirements from
[I-D.ietf-lamps-header-protection-requirements] into this
document.

o Decide what parts of [I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers] to
merge into this document.

o Enhance Introduction Section 1 and Problem Statement (Section 2).

o Decide on whether or not specification for more legacy HP
requirements should be added to this document (Section 3.1.2).

o Verify simple backward compatibility case (Receiving Side MIME-
Conformant) is working; once solution is stable and update
paragraphs in Section 4.1, Section 3.1.2.1 and Section 4.2.1
accordingly.

o Verify ability to distinguish between Messages with Header
Protection as specified in this document and legacy clients and
update Section 3.1 accordingly.

o Improve definitions of Protection Levels and enhance list of
Protection Levels (Section 3.2, Section 4).

o Privacy Considerations Section 6

o Security Considerations Section 5

Authors' Addresses

Bernie Hoeneisen
pEp Foundation
Oberer Graben 4
CH-8400 Winterthur
Switzerland

Email: bernie.hoeneisen@pep.foundation
URI: https://pep.foundation/

Daniel Kahn Gillmor
American Civil Liberties Union
125 Broad St.
New York, NY 10004
USA

Email: dkg@fifthhorseman.net
Alexey Melnikov
Isode Ltd
14 Castle Mews
Hampton, Middlesex TW12 2NP
UK

Email: alexey.melnikov@isode.com