draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-06.txt		draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-07.txt
	Network Working Group R. Housley		Network Working Group R. Housley
	Internet-Draft Vigil Security		Internet-Draft Vigil Security
	Updates: 4211 (if approved) 6 April 2021		Updates: 4211 (if approved) 8 April 2021
	Intended status: Standards Track		Intended status: Standards Track
	Expires: 8 October 2021		Expires: 10 October 2021
	Algorithm Requirements Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key		Algorithm Requirements Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)		Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
	draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-06		draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-07
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document updates the cryptographic algorithm requirements for		This document updates the cryptographic algorithm requirements for
	the Password-Based Message Authentication Code in the Internet X.509		the Password-Based Message Authentication Code in the Internet X.509
	Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)		Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
	specified in RFC 4211.		specified in RFC 4211.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	skipping to change at page 1, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 35 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 October 2021.		This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 October 2021.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
	license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.		license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights		Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
	skipping to change at page 3, line 34 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 34 ¶
	algId identifies the algorithm used to compute the MAC value. All		algId identifies the algorithm used to compute the MAC value. All
	implementations MUST support id-PasswordBasedMAC. The details on		implementations MUST support id-PasswordBasedMAC. The details on
	this algorithm are presented in section 4.4		this algorithm are presented in section 4.4
	NEW:		NEW:
	algId identifies the algorithm used to compute the MAC value. All		algId identifies the algorithm used to compute the MAC value. All
	implementations MUST support id-PasswordBasedMAC as presented in		implementations MUST support id-PasswordBasedMAC as presented in
	Section 4.4 of [RFC4211]. Implementations MAY also support PBMAC1		Section 4.4 of [RFC4211]. Implementations MAY also support PBMAC1
	presented in Section 7.1 of [RFC8018].		as presented in Section 7.1 of [RFC8018].
	4. Password-Based Message Authentication Code		4. Password-Based Message Authentication Code
	Section 4.4 of [RFC4211] specifies a Password-Based MAC that relies		Section 4.4 of [RFC4211] specifies a Password-Based MAC that relies
	on a one-way function to compute a symmetric key from the password		on a one-way function to compute a symmetric key from the password
	and a MAC algorithm. This section specifies algorithm requirements		and a MAC algorithm. This section specifies algorithm requirements
	for the one-way function and the MAC algorithm.		for the one-way function and the MAC algorithm.
	4.1. Introduction Paragraph		4.1. Introduction Paragraph
	skipping to change at page 5, line 32 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 32 ¶
	mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC		mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC
	function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA1		function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA1
	[HMAC]. All implementations SHOULD support DES-MAC and Triple-		[HMAC]. All implementations SHOULD support DES-MAC and Triple-
	DES-MAC [PKCS11].		DES-MAC [PKCS11].
	NEW:		NEW:
	mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC		mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC
	function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA256		function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA256
	[HMAC]. All implementations SHOULD support AES-GMAC AES [GMAC]		[HMAC]. All implementations SHOULD support AES-GMAC [AES][GMAC]
	with a 128 bit key.		with a 128-bit key.
	For convenience, the identifiers for these two algorithms are		For convenience, the identifiers for these two algorithms are
	repeated here.		repeated here.
	The ASN.1 algorithm identifier for HMAC-SHA256 is defined in		The ASN.1 algorithm identifier for HMAC-SHA256 is defined in
	[RFC4231]:		[RFC4231]:
	id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)		id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
	us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }		us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
	When this object identifier is used in the ASN.1 algorithm		When this object identifier is used in the ASN.1 algorithm
	identifier, the parameters SHOULD be present. When present, the		identifier, the parameters SHOULD be present. When present, the
	parameters MUST contain a type of NULL.		parameters MUST contain a type of NULL as specified in [RFC4231].
	The ASN.1 algorithm identifier for AES-GMAC [AES][GMAC] with a		The ASN.1 algorithm identifier for AES-GMAC [AES][GMAC] with a
	128-bit key is defined in [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg]:		128-bit key is defined in [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg]:
	id-aes128-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)		id-aes128-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)		country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
	nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 9 }		nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 9 }
	When this object identifier is used in the ASN.1 algorithm		When this object identifier is used in the ASN.1 algorithm
	identifier, the parameters MUST be present, and the parameters MUST		identifier, the parameters MUST be present, and the parameters MUST
	skipping to change at page 6, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 44 ¶
	6. Security Considerations		6. Security Considerations
	The security of the password-based MAC relies on the number of times		The security of the password-based MAC relies on the number of times
	the hash function is applied as well as the entropy of the shared		the hash function is applied as well as the entropy of the shared
	secret (the password). Hardware support for hash calculation is		secret (the password). Hardware support for hash calculation is
	available at very low cost [PHS], which reduces the protection		available at very low cost [PHS], which reduces the protection
	provided by a high iterationCount value. Therefore, the entropy of		provided by a high iterationCount value. Therefore, the entropy of
	the password is crucial for the security of the password-based MAC		the password is crucial for the security of the password-based MAC
	function. In 2010, researchers showed that about half of the real-		function. In 2010, researchers showed that about half of the real-
	world passwords can be broken with less than 150 million trials,		world passwords in a leaked corpus can be broken with less than 150
	indicating a median entropy of only 27 bits [DMR]. Higher entropy		million trials, indicating a median entropy of only 27 bits [DMR].
	can be achieved by using randomly generated strings. For example,		Higher entropy can be achieved by using randomly generated strings.
	assuming an alphabet of 60 characters a randomly chosen password with		For example, assuming an alphabet of 60 characters a randomly chosen
	10 characters offers 59 bits of entropy, and 20 characters offers 118		password with 10 characters offers 59 bits of entropy, and 20
	bits of entropy. Using a one-time password also increases the		characters offers 118 bits of entropy. Using a one-time password
	security of the MAC, assuming that the integrity-protected		also increases the security of the MAC, assuming that the integrity-
	transaction will complete before the attacker is able to learn the		protected transaction will complete before the attacker is able to
	password with an offline attack.		learn the password with an offline attack.
	Please see [RFC8018] for security considerations related to PBMAC1.		Please see [RFC8018] for security considerations related to PBMAC1.
	Please see [HMAC] and [SHS] for security considerations related to		Please see [HMAC] and [SHS] for security considerations related to
	HMAC-SHA256.		HMAC-SHA256.
	Please see [AES] and [GMAC] for security considerations related to		Please see [AES] and [GMAC] for security considerations related to
	AES-GMAC.		AES-GMAC.
	Cryptographic algorithms age; they become weaker with time. As new		Cryptographic algorithms age; they become weaker with time. As new
	skipping to change at page 7, line 32 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 32 ¶
	When a Password-Based MAC is used, implementations must protect the		When a Password-Based MAC is used, implementations must protect the
	password and the MAC key. Compromise of either the password or the		password and the MAC key. Compromise of either the password or the
	MAC key may result in the ability of an attacker to undermine		MAC key may result in the ability of an attacker to undermine
	authentication.		authentication.
	7. Acknowledgements		7. Acknowledgements
	Many thanks to Hans Aschauer, Hendrik Brockhaus, Quynh Dang, Roman		Many thanks to Hans Aschauer, Hendrik Brockhaus, Quynh Dang, Roman
	Danyliw, Lars Eggert, Tomas Gustavsson, Jonathan Hammell, Tim		Danyliw, Lars Eggert, Tomas Gustavsson, Jonathan Hammell, Tim
	Hollebeek, Erik Kline, Lijun Liao, Mike Ounsworth, Francesca		Hollebeek, Ben Kaduk, Erik Kline, Lijun Liao, Mike Ounsworth,
	Palombini, Tim Polk, Ines Robles, Mike StJohns, and Sean Turner for		Francesca Palombini, Tim Polk, Ines Robles, Mike StJohns, and Sean
	their careful review and improvements.		Turner for their careful review and improvements.
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced		[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
	encryption standard (AES)", DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.197,		encryption standard (AES)", DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.197,
	November 2001, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.197>.		November 2001, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.197>.
	[GMAC] National Institute of Standards and Technology,		[GMAC] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
	"Recommendation for block cipher modes of operation:		"Recommendation for block cipher modes of operation:
	Galois Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC",		Galois Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC",
	DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-38d, 2007,		DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-38d, 2007,
	<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-38d>.		<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-38d>.
	[HMAC] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-		[HMAC] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
	Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,		Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2104>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2104>.
			[I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg]
			Housley, R., "Using the AES-GMAC Algorithm with the
			Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Work in Progress,
			Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg-02, 30
			December 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
			ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg-02.txt>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure		[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
	Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,		Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,		DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
	skipping to change at page 9, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 10 ¶
	[DIGALM] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital		[DIGALM] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
	identity guidelines: authentication and lifecycle		identity guidelines: authentication and lifecycle
	management", DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-63b, June 2017,		management", DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-63b, June 2017,
	<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-63b>.		<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-63b>.
	[DMR] Dell'Amico, M., Michiardi, P., and Y. Roudier, "Password		[DMR] Dell'Amico, M., Michiardi, P., and Y. Roudier, "Password
	Strength: An Empirical Analysis",		Strength: An Empirical Analysis",
	DOI 10.1109/INFCOM.2010.5461951, March 2010,		DOI 10.1109/INFCOM.2010.5461951, March 2010,
	<https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2010.5461951>.		<https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2010.5461951>.
	[I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg]
	Housley, R., "Using the AES-GMAC Algorithm with the
	Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Work in Progress,
	Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg-02, 30
	December 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
	ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg-02.txt>.
	[PHS] Pathirana, A., Halgamuge, M., and A. Syed, "Energy		[PHS] Pathirana, A., Halgamuge, M., and A. Syed, "Energy
	efficient bitcoin mining to maximize the mining profit:		efficient bitcoin mining to maximize the mining profit:
	Using data from 119 bitcoin mining hardware setups",		Using data from 119 bitcoin mining hardware setups",
	International Conference on Advances in Business		International Conference on Advances in Business
	Management and Information Technology, pp 1-14, November		Management and Information Technology, pp 1-14, November
	2019.		2019.
	[PKCS11] RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards -		[PKCS11] RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards -
	PKCS #11 v2.11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard",		PKCS #11 v2.11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard",
	June 2001.		June 2001.
End of changes. 11 change blocks.
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