draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-06.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-07.txt 
Network Working Group R. Housley Network Working Group R. Housley
Internet-Draft Vigil Security Internet-Draft Vigil Security
Updates: 4211 (if approved) 6 April 2021 Updates: 4211 (if approved) 8 April 2021
Intended status: Standards Track Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: 8 October 2021 Expires: 10 October 2021
Algorithm Requirements Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key Algorithm Requirements Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-06 draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-07
Abstract Abstract
This document updates the cryptographic algorithm requirements for This document updates the cryptographic algorithm requirements for
the Password-Based Message Authentication Code in the Internet X.509 the Password-Based Message Authentication Code in the Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
specified in RFC 4211. specified in RFC 4211.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 October 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 October 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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algId identifies the algorithm used to compute the MAC value. All algId identifies the algorithm used to compute the MAC value. All
implementations MUST support id-PasswordBasedMAC. The details on implementations MUST support id-PasswordBasedMAC. The details on
this algorithm are presented in section 4.4 this algorithm are presented in section 4.4
NEW: NEW:
algId identifies the algorithm used to compute the MAC value. All algId identifies the algorithm used to compute the MAC value. All
implementations MUST support id-PasswordBasedMAC as presented in implementations MUST support id-PasswordBasedMAC as presented in
Section 4.4 of [RFC4211]. Implementations MAY also support PBMAC1 Section 4.4 of [RFC4211]. Implementations MAY also support PBMAC1
presented in Section 7.1 of [RFC8018]. as presented in Section 7.1 of [RFC8018].
4. Password-Based Message Authentication Code 4. Password-Based Message Authentication Code
Section 4.4 of [RFC4211] specifies a Password-Based MAC that relies Section 4.4 of [RFC4211] specifies a Password-Based MAC that relies
on a one-way function to compute a symmetric key from the password on a one-way function to compute a symmetric key from the password
and a MAC algorithm. This section specifies algorithm requirements and a MAC algorithm. This section specifies algorithm requirements
for the one-way function and the MAC algorithm. for the one-way function and the MAC algorithm.
4.1. Introduction Paragraph 4.1. Introduction Paragraph
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mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC
function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA1 function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA1
[HMAC]. All implementations SHOULD support DES-MAC and Triple- [HMAC]. All implementations SHOULD support DES-MAC and Triple-
DES-MAC [PKCS11]. DES-MAC [PKCS11].
NEW: NEW:
mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC
function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA256 function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA256
[HMAC]. All implementations SHOULD support AES-GMAC AES [GMAC] [HMAC]. All implementations SHOULD support AES-GMAC [AES][GMAC]
with a 128 bit key. with a 128-bit key.
For convenience, the identifiers for these two algorithms are For convenience, the identifiers for these two algorithms are
repeated here. repeated here.
The ASN.1 algorithm identifier for HMAC-SHA256 is defined in The ASN.1 algorithm identifier for HMAC-SHA256 is defined in
[RFC4231]: [RFC4231]:
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
When this object identifier is used in the ASN.1 algorithm When this object identifier is used in the ASN.1 algorithm
identifier, the parameters SHOULD be present. When present, the identifier, the parameters SHOULD be present. When present, the
parameters MUST contain a type of NULL. parameters MUST contain a type of NULL as specified in [RFC4231].
The ASN.1 algorithm identifier for AES-GMAC [AES][GMAC] with a The ASN.1 algorithm identifier for AES-GMAC [AES][GMAC] with a
128-bit key is defined in [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg]: 128-bit key is defined in [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg]:
id-aes128-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-aes128-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 9 } nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 9 }
When this object identifier is used in the ASN.1 algorithm When this object identifier is used in the ASN.1 algorithm
identifier, the parameters MUST be present, and the parameters MUST identifier, the parameters MUST be present, and the parameters MUST
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6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
The security of the password-based MAC relies on the number of times The security of the password-based MAC relies on the number of times
the hash function is applied as well as the entropy of the shared the hash function is applied as well as the entropy of the shared
secret (the password). Hardware support for hash calculation is secret (the password). Hardware support for hash calculation is
available at very low cost [PHS], which reduces the protection available at very low cost [PHS], which reduces the protection
provided by a high iterationCount value. Therefore, the entropy of provided by a high iterationCount value. Therefore, the entropy of
the password is crucial for the security of the password-based MAC the password is crucial for the security of the password-based MAC
function. In 2010, researchers showed that about half of the real- function. In 2010, researchers showed that about half of the real-
world passwords can be broken with less than 150 million trials, world passwords in a leaked corpus can be broken with less than 150
indicating a median entropy of only 27 bits [DMR]. Higher entropy million trials, indicating a median entropy of only 27 bits [DMR].
can be achieved by using randomly generated strings. For example, Higher entropy can be achieved by using randomly generated strings.
assuming an alphabet of 60 characters a randomly chosen password with For example, assuming an alphabet of 60 characters a randomly chosen
10 characters offers 59 bits of entropy, and 20 characters offers 118 password with 10 characters offers 59 bits of entropy, and 20
bits of entropy. Using a one-time password also increases the characters offers 118 bits of entropy. Using a one-time password
security of the MAC, assuming that the integrity-protected also increases the security of the MAC, assuming that the integrity-
transaction will complete before the attacker is able to learn the protected transaction will complete before the attacker is able to
password with an offline attack. learn the password with an offline attack.
Please see [RFC8018] for security considerations related to PBMAC1. Please see [RFC8018] for security considerations related to PBMAC1.
Please see [HMAC] and [SHS] for security considerations related to Please see [HMAC] and [SHS] for security considerations related to
HMAC-SHA256. HMAC-SHA256.
Please see [AES] and [GMAC] for security considerations related to Please see [AES] and [GMAC] for security considerations related to
AES-GMAC. AES-GMAC.
Cryptographic algorithms age; they become weaker with time. As new Cryptographic algorithms age; they become weaker with time. As new
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When a Password-Based MAC is used, implementations must protect the When a Password-Based MAC is used, implementations must protect the
password and the MAC key. Compromise of either the password or the password and the MAC key. Compromise of either the password or the
MAC key may result in the ability of an attacker to undermine MAC key may result in the ability of an attacker to undermine
authentication. authentication.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Hans Aschauer, Hendrik Brockhaus, Quynh Dang, Roman Many thanks to Hans Aschauer, Hendrik Brockhaus, Quynh Dang, Roman
Danyliw, Lars Eggert, Tomas Gustavsson, Jonathan Hammell, Tim Danyliw, Lars Eggert, Tomas Gustavsson, Jonathan Hammell, Tim
Hollebeek, Erik Kline, Lijun Liao, Mike Ounsworth, Francesca Hollebeek, Ben Kaduk, Erik Kline, Lijun Liao, Mike Ounsworth,
Palombini, Tim Polk, Ines Robles, Mike StJohns, and Sean Turner for Francesca Palombini, Tim Polk, Ines Robles, Mike StJohns, and Sean
their careful review and improvements. Turner for their careful review and improvements.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced [AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
encryption standard (AES)", DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.197, encryption standard (AES)", DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.197,
November 2001, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.197>. November 2001, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.197>.
[GMAC] National Institute of Standards and Technology, [GMAC] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for block cipher modes of operation: "Recommendation for block cipher modes of operation:
Galois Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", Galois Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC",
DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-38d, 2007, DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-38d, 2007,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-38d>. <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-38d>.
[HMAC] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [HMAC] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2104>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2104>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg]
Housley, R., "Using the AES-GMAC Algorithm with the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg-02, 30
December 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg-02.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
skipping to change at page 9, line 5 skipping to change at page 9, line 10
[DIGALM] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital [DIGALM] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
identity guidelines: authentication and lifecycle identity guidelines: authentication and lifecycle
management", DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-63b, June 2017, management", DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-63b, June 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-63b>. <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-63b>.
[DMR] Dell'Amico, M., Michiardi, P., and Y. Roudier, "Password [DMR] Dell'Amico, M., Michiardi, P., and Y. Roudier, "Password
Strength: An Empirical Analysis", Strength: An Empirical Analysis",
DOI 10.1109/INFCOM.2010.5461951, March 2010, DOI 10.1109/INFCOM.2010.5461951, March 2010,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2010.5461951>. <https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2010.5461951>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg]
Housley, R., "Using the AES-GMAC Algorithm with the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg-02, 30
December 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg-02.txt>.
[PHS] Pathirana, A., Halgamuge, M., and A. Syed, "Energy [PHS] Pathirana, A., Halgamuge, M., and A. Syed, "Energy
efficient bitcoin mining to maximize the mining profit: efficient bitcoin mining to maximize the mining profit:
Using data from 119 bitcoin mining hardware setups", Using data from 119 bitcoin mining hardware setups",
International Conference on Advances in Business International Conference on Advances in Business
Management and Information Technology, pp 1-14, November Management and Information Technology, pp 1-14, November
2019. 2019.
[PKCS11] RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards - [PKCS11] RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards -
PKCS #11 v2.11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard", PKCS #11 v2.11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard",
June 2001. June 2001.
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