draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-05.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-06.txt 
Network Working Group R. Housley Network Working Group R. Housley
Internet-Draft Vigil Security Internet-Draft Vigil Security
Updates: 4211 (if approved) 30 March 2021 Updates: 4211 (if approved) 6 April 2021
Intended status: Standards Track Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: 1 October 2021 Expires: 8 October 2021
Algorithm Requirements Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key Algorithm Requirements Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-05 draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-06
Abstract Abstract
This document updates the cryptographic algorithm requirements for This document updates the cryptographic algorithm requirements for
the Password-Based Message Authentication Code in the Internet X.509 the Password-Based Message Authentication Code in the Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
specified in RFC 4211. specified in RFC 4211.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Signature Key POP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Signature Key POP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Password-Based Message Authentication Code . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Password-Based Message Authentication Code . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Introduction Paragraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4.1. Introduction Paragraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.2. One-Way Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.2. One-Way Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.3. Iteration Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.3. Iteration Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.4. MAC Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.4. MAC Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document updates the cryptographic algorithm requirements for This document updates the cryptographic algorithm requirements for
the Password-Based Message Authentication Code (MAC) in the Internet the Password-Based Message Authentication Code (MAC) in the Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format
(CRMF) [RFC4211]. The algorithms specified in [RFC4211] were (CRMF) [RFC4211]. The algorithms specified in [RFC4211] were
appropriate in 2005; however, these algorithms are no longer appropriate in 2005; however, these algorithms are no longer
considered the best choices: considered the best choices:
* HMAC-SHA1 [HMAC][SHS] is not boken yet, but there are much * HMAC-SHA1 [HMAC][SHS] is not broken yet, but there are much
stronger alternatives [RFC6194]. stronger alternatives [RFC6194].
* DES-MAC [PKCS11] provides 56 bits of security, which is no longer * DES-MAC [PKCS11] provides 56 bits of security, which is no longer
considered secure [WITHDRAW]. considered secure [WITHDRAW].
* Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11] provides 112 bits of security, which is * Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11] provides 112 bits of security, which is
now deprecated [TRANSIT]. now deprecated [TRANSIT].
This update specifies algorithms that are more appropriate today. This update specifies algorithms that are more appropriate today.
CRMF is defined using Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [X680].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. Signature Key POP 3. Signature Key POP
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NEW: NEW:
mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC
function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA256 function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA256
[HMAC]. All implementations SHOULD support AES-GMAC AES [GMAC] [HMAC]. All implementations SHOULD support AES-GMAC AES [GMAC]
with a 128 bit key. with a 128 bit key.
For convenience, the identifiers for these two algorithms are For convenience, the identifiers for these two algorithms are
repeated here. repeated here.
The algorithm identifier for HMAC-SHA256 is defined in [RFC4231]: The ASN.1 algorithm identifier for HMAC-SHA256 is defined in
[RFC4231]:
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
When this algorithm identifier is used, the parameters SHOULD be When this object identifier is used in the ASN.1 algorithm
present. When present, the parameters MUST contain a type of NULL. identifier, the parameters SHOULD be present. When present, the
parameters MUST contain a type of NULL.
The algorithm identifier for AES-GMAC [AES][GMAC] with a 128-bit key The ASN.1 algorithm identifier for AES-GMAC [AES][GMAC] with a
is defined in [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg]: 128-bit key is defined in [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg]:
id-aes128-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-aes128-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 9 } nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 9 }
When this algorithm identifier is used, the parameters MUST be When this object identifier is used in the ASN.1 algorithm
present, and the parameters MUST contain the GMACParameters structure identifier, the parameters MUST be present, and the parameters MUST
as follows: contain the GMACParameters structure as follows:
GMACParameters ::= SEQUENCE { GMACParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
nonce OCTET STRING, nonce OCTET STRING,
length MACLength DEFAULT 12 } length MACLength DEFAULT 12 }
MACLength ::= INTEGER (12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16) MACLength ::= INTEGER (12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16)
The GMACParameters nonce parameter is the GMAC initialization vector. The GMACParameters nonce parameter is the GMAC initialization vector.
The nonce may have any number of bits between 8 and (2^64)-1, but it The nonce may have any number of bits between 8 and (2^64)-1, but it
MUST be a multiple of 8 bits. Within the scope of any GMAC key, the MUST be a multiple of 8 bits. Within the scope of any GMAC key, the
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the hash function is applied as well as the entropy of the shared the hash function is applied as well as the entropy of the shared
secret (the password). Hardware support for hash calculation is secret (the password). Hardware support for hash calculation is
available at very low cost [PHS], which reduces the protection available at very low cost [PHS], which reduces the protection
provided by a high iterationCount value. Therefore, the entropy of provided by a high iterationCount value. Therefore, the entropy of
the password is crucial for the security of the password-based MAC the password is crucial for the security of the password-based MAC
function. In 2010, researchers showed that about half of the real- function. In 2010, researchers showed that about half of the real-
world passwords can be broken with less than 150 million trials, world passwords can be broken with less than 150 million trials,
indicating a median entropy of only 27 bits [DMR]. Higher entropy indicating a median entropy of only 27 bits [DMR]. Higher entropy
can be achieved by using randomly generated strings. For example, can be achieved by using randomly generated strings. For example,
assuming an alphabet of 60 characters a randomly chosen password with assuming an alphabet of 60 characters a randomly chosen password with
10 characters offers 59 bits a entropy, and 20 characters offers 118 10 characters offers 59 bits of entropy, and 20 characters offers 118
bits of entropy. Using a one-time password also increases the bits of entropy. Using a one-time password also increases the
security of the MAC, assuming that the integrity-protected security of the MAC, assuming that the integrity-protected
transaction will complete before the attacker is able to learn the transaction will complete before the attacker is able to learn the
password with an offline attack. password with an offline attack.
Please see [RFC8018] for security considerations related to PBMAC1. Please see [RFC8018] for security considerations related to PBMAC1.
Please see [HMAC] and [SHS] for security considerations related to Please see [HMAC] and [SHS] for security considerations related to
HMAC-SHA256. HMAC-SHA256.
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updated by this specification. updated by this specification.
When a Password-Based MAC is used, implementations must protect the When a Password-Based MAC is used, implementations must protect the
password and the MAC key. Compromise of either the password or the password and the MAC key. Compromise of either the password or the
MAC key may result in the ability of an attacker to undermine MAC key may result in the ability of an attacker to undermine
authentication. authentication.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Hans Aschauer, Hendrik Brockhaus, Quynh Dang, Roman Many thanks to Hans Aschauer, Hendrik Brockhaus, Quynh Dang, Roman
Danyliw, Tomas Gustavsson, Jonathan Hammell, Tim Hollebeek, Lijun Danyliw, Lars Eggert, Tomas Gustavsson, Jonathan Hammell, Tim
Liao, Mike Ounsworth, Tim Polk, Ines Robles, Mike StJohns, and Sean Hollebeek, Erik Kline, Lijun Liao, Mike Ounsworth, Francesca
Turner for their careful review and improvements. Palombini, Tim Polk, Ines Robles, Mike StJohns, and Sean Turner for
their careful review and improvements.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced [AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
encryption standard (AES)", DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.197, encryption standard (AES)", DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.197,
November 2001, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.197>. November 2001, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.197>.
[GMAC] National Institute of Standards and Technology, [GMAC] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
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<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8018>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8018>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure [SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.180-4, July 2015, Hash Standard", DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.180-4, July 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.180-4>. <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.180-4>.
[X680] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation",
Recommendation X.680, 2015.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[DIGALM] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital [DIGALM] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
identity guidelines: authentication and lifecycle identity guidelines: authentication and lifecycle
management", DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-63b, June 2017, management", DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-63b, June 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-63b>. <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-63b>.
[DMR] Dell'Amico, M., Michiardi, P., and Y. Roudier, "Password [DMR] Dell'Amico, M., Michiardi, P., and Y. Roudier, "Password
Strength: An Empirical Analysis", Strength: An Empirical Analysis",
DOI 10.1109/INFCOM.2010.5461951, March 2010, DOI 10.1109/INFCOM.2010.5461951, March 2010,
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