draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-15.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-16.txt 
LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Updates: 3370 (if approved) Q. Dang Updates: 3370 (if approved) Q. Dang
Intended status: Standards Track NIST Intended status: Standards Track NIST
Expires: January 22, 2020 July 21, 2019 Expires: February 8, 2020 August 7, 2019
Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-15 draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-16
Abstract Abstract
This document updates the "Cryptographic Message Syntax Algorithms" This document updates the "Cryptographic Message Syntax Algorithms"
(RFC3370) and describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of (RFC3370) and describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
hash functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax as one-way hash hash functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax as one-way hash
functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature
algorithms. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in algorithms. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in
CMS are also described. CMS are also described.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 22, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 8, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Change Log 1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ] [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-16:
* Minor nits.
* Using bytes instead of bits for consistency.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-15: o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-15:
* Minor editorial nits. * Minor editorial nits.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-14: o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-14:
* Fixing error with incorrect preimage resistance bits for SHA128 * Fixing error with incorrect preimage resistance bits for SHA128
and SHA256. and SHA256.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-13: o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-13:
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identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD4 } TBD4 }
The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be
absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
component, the OID. component, the OID.
Two object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as Two object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as
defined in by the National Institute of Standards and Technology defined in by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for convenience. (NIST) in [shake-nist-oids] [EDNOTE: Make sure NIST has published
these. ] and we include them here for convenience.
id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 }
id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 }
The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 are The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 are
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message digests, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA and KMAC. message digests, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA and KMAC.
4. Use in CMS 4. Use in CMS
4.1. Message Digests 4.1. Message Digests
The id-shake128 and id-shake256 OIDs (Section 3) can be used as the The id-shake128 and id-shake256 OIDs (Section 3) can be used as the
digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData, SignerInfo, digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData, SignerInfo,
DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm fields in CMS DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm fields in CMS
[RFC5652]. The OID encoding MUST omit the parameters field and the [RFC5652]. The OID encoding MUST omit the parameters field and the
output length of SHA256 or SHAKE256 as the message digest MUST be 256 output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the message digest MUST be
or 512 bits, respectively. 32 or 64 bytes, respectively.
The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the
Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the
signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest
values are input to signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST values are input to signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST
be the same as the message hash algorithms used in signatures. be the same as the message hash algorithms used in signatures.
4.2. Signatures 4.2. Signatures
In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
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The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256 [X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256
(specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective (specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
SHAKE function is used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the SHAKE function is used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the
parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a
SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id- SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-
ecdsa-with-shake256. ecdsa-with-shake256.
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification, For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined. the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
The output length for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be 256 The output length for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be 32
or 512 bits, respectively. or 64 bytes, respectively.
Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE
signatures in certificates or CRLs SHOULD generate such signatures signatures in certificates or CRLs SHOULD generate such signatures
with a deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with with a deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with
all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate
such signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in such signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in
[X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires [X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires
conformance to those standards. Those standards have not specified conformance to those standards. Those standards have not specified
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128
and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets, respectively and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets, respectively
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4.4. Message Authentication Codes 4.4. Message Authentication Codes
KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185]. KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185].
In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the
AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in
the AuthenticatedData mac field. the AuthenticatedData mac field.
When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OID is used as When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OID is used as
the MAC algorithm identifier, the parameters field is optional the MAC algorithm identifier, the parameters field is optional
(absent or present). If absent, the SHAKE256 output length used in (absent or present). If absent, the SHAKE256 output length used in
KMAC is 256 or 512 bits, respectively, and the customization string KMAC is 32 or 64 bytes, respectively, and the customization string is
is an empty string by default. an empty string by default.
Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when
processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers. processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers.
When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is
an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output
length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or
KmacWithSHAKE256, respectively, in this specification. KmacWithSHAKE256, respectively, in this specification.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
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This document updates [RFC3370]. The security considerations section This document updates [RFC3370]. The security considerations section
of that document applies to this specification as well. of that document applies to this specification as well.
NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of
the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in
Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These
documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for
various security scenarios. various security scenarios.
SHAKE128 with output length of 256-bits offers 128-bits of collision SHAKE128 with output length of 32 bytes offers 128-bits of collision
and preimage resistance. Thus, SHAKE128 OIDs in this specification and preimage resistance. Thus, SHAKE128 OIDs in this specification
are RECOMMENDED with 2048 (112-bit security) or 3072-bit (128-bit are RECOMMENDED with 2048 (112-bit security) or 3072-bit (128-bit
security) RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits (128-bit security) RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits (128-bit
security). SHAKE256 with 512-bits output length offers 256-bits of security). SHAKE256 with 64 bytes output length offers 256-bits of
collision and preimage resistance. Thus, the SHAKE256 OIDs in this collision and preimage resistance. Thus, the SHAKE256 OIDs in this
specification are RECOMMENDED with 4096-bit RSA modulus or higher or specification are RECOMMENDED with 4096-bit RSA modulus or higher or
curves with group order of at least 521-bits (256-bit security). curves with group order of at least 512 bits such as NIST Curve P-521
Note that we recommended 4096-bit RSA because we would need 15360-bit (256-bit security). Note that we recommended 4096-bit RSA because we
modulus for 256-bits of security which is impractical for today's would need 15360-bit modulus for 256-bits of security which is
technology. impractical for today's technology.
When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key, When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the
message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
content could originate from any one of the parties. content could originate from any one of the parties.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
This document is based on Russ Housley's draft This document is based on Russ Housley's draft
[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]. It replaces SHA3 hash functions [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]. It replaces SHA3 hash functions
skipping to change at page 13, line 9 skipping to change at page 13, line 23
[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash] [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]
Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley- the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-
lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017. lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake] [I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake]
Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Internet X.509 Public Key Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for
RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs", draft-ietf-lamps-pkix- RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs", draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-
shake-12 (work in progress), June 2019. shake-15 (work in progress), July 2019.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>. 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve [RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January
 End of changes. 16 change blocks. 
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