--- 1/draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-10.txt 2019-06-17 21:13:11.077826568 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-11.txt 2019-06-17 21:13:11.117827580 -0700 @@ -1,20 +1,20 @@ LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis Internet-Draft Cisco Systems -Updates: RFC3370 (if approved) Q. Dang +Updates: 3370 (if approved) Q. Dang Intended status: Standards Track NIST -Expires: October 27, 2019 April 25, 2019 +Expires: December 19, 2019 June 17, 2019 Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) - draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-10 + draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-11 Abstract This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as one-way hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature algorithms, as message digests and message authentication codes. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in CMS are also described. @@ -26,21 +26,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on October 27, 2019. + This Internet-Draft will expire on December 19, 2019. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -54,35 +54,41 @@ 1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1. Change Log [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ] + o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-11: + + * Minor nits. + + * Nits identified by Roman in AD Review. + o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-10: * Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID assignments. o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-09: * Fixed minor text nit. * Updates in Sec Considerations section. @@ -174,95 +180,98 @@ algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type. In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs), SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output is a d-bits long digest of message M. The corresponding collision and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are - min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits respectively. And, the - corresponding collision and second preimage resistance strengths for - SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively. + min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits respectively (Appendix A.1 [SHA3]). + And, the corresponding collision and second preimage resistance + strengths for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits + respectively. A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA, message - authentication code and as the mask generating function in RSASSA- - PSS. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs to be - used in CMS and their meaning. + authentication code and as the mask generation function (MGF) in + RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs + to be used in CMS and their meaning. 2.1. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 3. Identifiers - This section defines six new object identifiers (OIDs) for using + This section defines four new object identifiers (OIDs) for using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS. - EDNOTE: If PKIX draft is standardized first maybe we should not say - the identifiers are new for the RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. - Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for convenience. id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 11 } id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 12 } In this specification, when using the id-shake128 or id-shake256 algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent. That is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID. - We define two identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs. + [I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake] [ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC + when it is ready ] defines two identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures + using SHAKEs which we include here for convenience. id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD1 } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD2 } The same RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying public keys and signatures. - We define two algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs. + [I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake] [ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC + when it is ready ] also defines two algorithm identifiers of ECDSA + signatures using SHAKEs which we include here for convenience. id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD3 } id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD4 } The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID. - Two object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are - defined below. + Two object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as + defined in by the National Institute of Standards and Technology + (NIST) in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for convenience. id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 } id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 } The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 are @@ -287,21 +296,22 @@ Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest values are input to signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST be the same as the message hash algorithms used in signatures. 4.2. Signatures In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the - SignerInfo signature field of SignedData and countersignature. + SignerInfo signature field of SignedData content type and + countersignature attribute. Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3. When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length. In the context of this document SHAKE128 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for 2048 or 3072-bit RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits. SHAKE256 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for 4096-bit RSA modulus and higher or @@ -309,28 +319,28 @@ 4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA- PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA- PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA- PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the - hash and mask generating algorithm and trailer and salt are embedded - in the OID definition. + hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer and salt are embedded in the + OID definition. - The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash and - the hash algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS - MUST be the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output- - length of the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or - 64 bytes respectively. + The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash + algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be + the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of + the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes + respectively. The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS- SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 respectively. The mgfSeed is the seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As @@ -362,21 +372,25 @@ the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined. The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be 256 or 512 bits respectively. It is RECOMMENDED that conforming implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in CMS generate such signatures with a deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to - these standards. + these standards. These standards have not specified SHAKE128 and + SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 + with output length being 32 and 64 octets respectively can be used + instead of 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as SHA256 and + SHA512 used in the standards. 4.3. Public Keys In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute. The conventions and encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers are as specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of [RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480]. Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to @@ -423,40 +437,20 @@ One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A was requested for the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifiers (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry: +---------+----------------------+--------------------+ | Decimal | Description | References | +---------+----------------------+--------------------+ | TBD | CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] | +---------+----------------------+--------------------+ - IANA has assigned four OID identifiers in the SMI Security for PKIX - Algorithms [SMI-PKIX] (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry - - id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) - identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) - security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) - TBD1 } - id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) - identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) - security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) - TBD2 } - id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) - identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) - security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) - TBD3 } - id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) - identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) - security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) - TBD4 } - 6. Security Considerations This document updates [RFC3370]. The security considerations section of that document applies to this specification as well. NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for various security scenarios. @@ -526,20 +520,26 @@ . 8.2. Informative References [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash] Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley- lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017. + [I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake] + Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Internet X.509 Public Key + Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for + RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs", draft-ietf-lamps-pkix- + shake-11 (work in progress), June 2019. + [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April 2002, . [RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January 2010, . @@ -563,25 +563,20 @@ [SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009, . [shake-nist-oids] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer Security Objects Register", October 2017, . - [SMI-PKIX] - IANA, "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms", March 2019, - . - [SP800-107] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "SP800-107: Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms", May 2014, . [SP800-78-4] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "SP800-78-4: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for @@ -674,21 +669,21 @@ security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD1 } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD2 } -- When the id-RSASSA-PSS-* algorithm identifiers are used -- for a public key or signature in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier -- parameters field MUST be absent. The message digest algorithm -- used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or - -- 64 byte outout length respectively. The mask generating + -- 64 byte outout length respectively. The mask generation -- function MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with an output length -- of (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n -- is the RSA modulus in bits. The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST -- be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. The trailerField MUST be 1, -- which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value -- 0xBC. Regardless of id-RSASSA-PSS-* or rsaEncryption being -- used as the AlgorithmIdentifier of the OriginatorPublicKey, -- the RSA public key MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey -- type.