draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-10.txt		draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-11.txt
	LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis		LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis
	Internet-Draft Cisco Systems		Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
	Updates: RFC3370 (if approved) Q. Dang		Updates: 3370 (if approved) Q. Dang
	Intended status: Standards Track NIST		Intended status: Standards Track NIST
	Expires: October 27, 2019 April 25, 2019		Expires: December 19, 2019 June 17, 2019
	Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message		Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
	Syntax (CMS)		Syntax (CMS)
	draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-10		draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-11
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of		This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
	hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as one-way		hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as one-way
	hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA		hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA
	signature algorithms, as message digests and message authentication		signature algorithms, as message digests and message authentication
	codes. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in CMS		codes. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in CMS
	are also described.		are also described.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 37 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on October 27, 2019.		This Internet-Draft will expire on December 19, 2019.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 19 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 19 ¶
	1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	1. Change Log		1. Change Log
	[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]		[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
			o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-11:
			* Minor nits.
			* Nits identified by Roman in AD Review.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-10:		o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-10:
	* Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID		* Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID
	assignments.		assignments.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-09:		o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-09:
	* Fixed minor text nit.		* Fixed minor text nit.
	* Updates in Sec Considerations section.		* Updates in Sec Considerations section.
	skipping to change at page 4, line 45 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 49 ¶
	algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature		algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
	Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type.		Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type.
	In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs),		In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs),
	SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function		SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function
	instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also		instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also
	defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a		defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a
	variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output		variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output
	is a d-bits long digest of message M. The corresponding collision		is a d-bits long digest of message M. The corresponding collision
	and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are		and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are
	min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits respectively. And, the		min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits respectively (Appendix A.1 [SHA3]).
	corresponding collision and second preimage resistance strengths for		And, the corresponding collision and second preimage resistance
	SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively.		strengths for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits
			respectively.
	A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash		A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash
	the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA, message		the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA, message
	authentication code and as the mask generating function in RSASSA-		authentication code and as the mask generation function (MGF) in
	PSS. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs to be		RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs
	used in CMS and their meaning.		to be used in CMS and their meaning.
	2.1. Terminology		2.1. Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
	14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all		14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.		capitals, as shown here.
	3. Identifiers		3. Identifiers
	This section defines six new object identifiers (OIDs) for using		This section defines four new object identifiers (OIDs) for using
	SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS.		SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS.
	EDNOTE: If PKIX draft is standardized first maybe we should not say
	the identifiers are new for the RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA.
	Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are		Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are
	defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for		defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for
	convenience.		convenience.
	id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)		id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)		country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
	nistAlgorithm(4) 2 11 }		nistAlgorithm(4) 2 11 }
	id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)		id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)		country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
	nistAlgorithm(4) 2 12 }		nistAlgorithm(4) 2 12 }
	In this specification, when using the id-shake128 or id-shake256		In this specification, when using the id-shake128 or id-shake256
	algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent. That is, the		algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent. That is, the
	identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.		identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
	We define two identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs.		[I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake] [ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC
			when it is ready ] defines two identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures
			using SHAKEs which we include here for convenience.
	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)		id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD1 }		TBD1 }
	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)		id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD2 }		TBD2 }
	The same RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying		The same RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying
	public keys and signatures.		public keys and signatures.
	We define two algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs.		[I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake] [ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC
			when it is ready ] also defines two algorithm identifiers of ECDSA
			signatures using SHAKEs which we include here for convenience.
	id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)		id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD3 }		TBD3 }
	id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)		id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD4 }		TBD4 }
	The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be		The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be
	absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one		absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
	component, the OID.		component, the OID.
	Two object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are		Two object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as
	defined below.		defined in by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
			(NIST) in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for convenience.
	id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)		id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)		country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
	nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 }		nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 }
	id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)		id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)		country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
	nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 }		nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 }
	The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 are		The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 are
	skipping to change at page 7, line 16 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 18 ¶
	Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the		Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the
	signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest		signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest
	values are input to signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST		values are input to signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST
	be the same as the message hash algorithms used in signatures.		be the same as the message hash algorithms used in signatures.
	4.2. Signatures		4.2. Signatures
	In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo		In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
	signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and		signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and
	countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the		countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the
	SignerInfo signature field of SignedData and countersignature.		SignerInfo signature field of SignedData content type and
			countersignature attribute.
	Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with		Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with
	SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the		SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the
	corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.		corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.
	When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA		When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA
	curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length.		curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length.
	In the context of this document SHAKE128 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for		In the context of this document SHAKE128 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for
	2048 or 3072-bit RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits.		2048 or 3072-bit RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits.
	SHAKE256 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for 4096-bit RSA modulus and higher or		SHAKE256 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for 4096-bit RSA modulus and higher or
	skipping to change at page 7, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 41 ¶
	4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures		4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
	The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-		The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
	PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is		PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is
	used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the		used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
	AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-		AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
	PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-		PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-
	PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the		PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the
	algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the		algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the
	hash and mask generating algorithm and trailer and salt are embedded		hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer and salt are embedded in the
	in the OID definition.		OID definition.
	The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash and		The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
	the hash algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS		algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be
	MUST be the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-		the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of
	length of the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or		the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes
	64 bytes respectively.		respectively.
	The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length		The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
	and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of		and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
	the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be		the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be
	used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that		used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that
	uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in		uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in
	Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as		Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as
	the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-		the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-
	SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 respectively. The mgfSeed is the		SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 respectively. The mgfSeed is the
	seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As		seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As
	skipping to change at page 8, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 46 ¶
	the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.		the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
	The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be		The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
	256 or 512 bits respectively.		256 or 512 bits respectively.
	It is RECOMMENDED that conforming implementations that generate ECDSA		It is RECOMMENDED that conforming implementations that generate ECDSA
	with SHAKE signatures in CMS generate such signatures with a		with SHAKE signatures in CMS generate such signatures with a
	deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with all the		deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with all the
	requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such		requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such
	signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or		signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or
	[SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to		[SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to
	these standards.		these standards. These standards have not specified SHAKE128 and
			SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
			with output length being 32 and 64 octets respectively can be used
			instead of 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as SHA256 and
			SHA512 used in the standards.
	4.3. Public Keys		4.3. Public Keys
	In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in		In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in
	the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute. The conventions and		the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute. The conventions and
	encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers		encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers
	are as specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of		are as specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of
	[RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480].		[RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480].
	Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to		Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to
	skipping to change at page 10, line 11 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 17 ¶
	One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A was		One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A was
	requested for the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifiers		requested for the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifiers
	(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry:		(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry:
	+---------+----------------------+--------------------+		+---------+----------------------+--------------------+
	| Decimal | Description | References |		| Decimal | Description | References |
	+---------+----------------------+--------------------+		+---------+----------------------+--------------------+
	| TBD | CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |		| TBD | CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
	+---------+----------------------+--------------------+		+---------+----------------------+--------------------+
	IANA has assigned four OID identifiers in the SMI Security for PKIX
	Algorithms [SMI-PKIX] (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry
	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD1 }
	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD2 }
	id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD3 }
	id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD4 }
	6. Security Considerations		6. Security Considerations
	This document updates [RFC3370]. The security considerations section		This document updates [RFC3370]. The security considerations section
	of that document applies to this specification as well.		of that document applies to this specification as well.
	NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of		NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of
	the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in		the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in
	Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These		Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These
	documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for		documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for
	various security scenarios.		various security scenarios.
	skipping to change at page 12, line 19 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 5 ¶
	<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/		<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
	NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.		NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.
	8.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
	[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]		[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]
	Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in		Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in
	the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-		the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-
	lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.		lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.
			[I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake]
			Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Internet X.509 Public Key
			Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for
			RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs", draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-
			shake-11 (work in progress), June 2019.
	[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and		[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
	Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key		Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April		(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
	2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.		2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
	[RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve		[RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
	Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message		Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
	Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January		Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January
	2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5753>.		2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5753>.
	skipping to change at page 13, line 11 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 5 ¶
	[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:		[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
	Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,		Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
	<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.		<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
	[shake-nist-oids]		[shake-nist-oids]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer		National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
	Security Objects Register", October 2017,		Security Objects Register", October 2017,
	<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-		<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
	Register/Algorithm-Registration>.		Register/Algorithm-Registration>.
	[SMI-PKIX]
	IANA, "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms", March 2019,
	<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/
	smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6>.
	[SP800-107]		[SP800-107]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),		National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
	"SP800-107: Recommendation for Applications Using Approved		"SP800-107: Recommendation for Applications Using Approved
	Hash Algorithms", May 2014,		Hash Algorithms", May 2014,
	<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-107/		<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-107/
	rev-1/final/documents/draft_revised_sp800-107.pdf>.		rev-1/final/documents/draft_revised_sp800-107.pdf>.
	[SP800-78-4]		[SP800-78-4]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),		National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
	"SP800-78-4: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for		"SP800-78-4: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for
	skipping to change at page 15, line 25 ¶		skipping to change at page 15, line 14 ¶
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD1 }		TBD1 }
	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)		id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
	TBD2 }		TBD2 }
	-- When the id-RSASSA-PSS-* algorithm identifiers are used		-- When the id-RSASSA-PSS-* algorithm identifiers are used
	-- for a public key or signature in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier		-- for a public key or signature in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier
	-- parameters field MUST be absent. The message digest algorithm		-- parameters field MUST be absent. The message digest algorithm
	-- used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or		-- used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or
	-- 64 byte outout length respectively. The mask generating		-- 64 byte outout length respectively. The mask generation
	-- function MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with an output length		-- function MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with an output length
	-- of (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n		-- of (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n
	-- is the RSA modulus in bits. The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST		-- is the RSA modulus in bits. The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST
	-- be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. The trailerField MUST be 1,		-- be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. The trailerField MUST be 1,
	-- which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value		-- which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value
	-- 0xBC. Regardless of id-RSASSA-PSS-* or rsaEncryption being		-- 0xBC. Regardless of id-RSASSA-PSS-* or rsaEncryption being
	-- used as the AlgorithmIdentifier of the OriginatorPublicKey,		-- used as the AlgorithmIdentifier of the OriginatorPublicKey,
	-- the RSA public key MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey		-- the RSA public key MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey
	-- type.		-- type.
End of changes. 23 change blocks.
	58 lines changed or deleted		53 lines changed or added
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