draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-03.txt		draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-04.txt
	LAMPS WG Q. Dang		LAMPS WG Q. Dang
	Internet-Draft NIST		Internet-Draft NIST
	Intended status: Standards Track P. Kampanakis		Intended status: Standards Track P. Kampanakis
	Expires: May 29, 2019 Cisco Systems		Expires: June 2, 2019 Cisco Systems
	November 25, 2018		November 29, 2018
	Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message		Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
	Syntax (CMS)		Syntax (CMS)
	draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-03		draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-04
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of		This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
	hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as one-way		hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as one-way
	hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA		hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA
	signature algorithms, as message digests and message authentication		signature algorithms, as message digests and message authentication
	codes. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in CMS		codes. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in CMS
	are also described.		are also described.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 37 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on May 29, 2019.		This Internet-Draft will expire on June 2, 2019.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 14 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 14 ¶
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.2.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.2.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	1. Change Log		1. Change Log
	[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]		[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
			o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-04:
			* Added RFC8174 reference and text.
			* Explicitly explained why RSASSA-PSS-params are omitted in
			section 4.2.1.
			* Simplified Public Keys section by removing redundand info from
			RFCs.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-03:		o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-03:
	* Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in		* Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in
	Deterministric ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis.		Deterministric ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis.
	* Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about		* Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about
	randomness of k because we are using deterministric ECDSA.		randomness of k because we are using deterministric ECDSA.
	* Completed ASN.1 module and fixed KMAC ASN.1 based on Jim's		* Completed ASN.1 module and fixed KMAC ASN.1 based on Jim's
	feedback.		feedback.
	skipping to change at page 4, line 11 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 20 ¶
	A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash		A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash
	the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and deterministic ECDSA,		the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and deterministic ECDSA,
	message authentication code and as the mask generating function in		message authentication code and as the mask generating function in
	RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs		RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs
	to be used in CMS and their meaning.		to be used in CMS and their meaning.
	2.1. Terminology		2.1. Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
			14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
			capitals, as shown here.
	3. Identifiers		3. Identifiers
	This section defines six new OIDs for using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in		This section defines six new OIDs for using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in
	CMS.		CMS.
	EDNOTE: If PKIX draft is standardized first maybe we should not say		EDNOTE: If PKIX draft is standardized first maybe we should not say
	the identifiers are new for the RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA.		the identifiers are new for the RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA.
	Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are		Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are
	skipping to change at page 6, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 39 ¶
	Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and deterministic		Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and deterministic
	ECDSA with SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize		ECDSA with SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize
	the corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.		the corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.
	4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures		4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
	The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-		The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
	PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is		PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is
	used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the		used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
	AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-		AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
	PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.		PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-
			PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the
			algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the
			hash and mask generating algorithsm and trailer and salt are embedded
			in the OID definition.
	The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash and		The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash and
	the hash algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS		the hash algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS
	MUST be the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-		MUST be the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-
	length of the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or		length of the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or
	64 bytes respectively.		64 bytes respectively.
	The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length		The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
	and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of		and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
	the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKES, the SHAKEs MUST be		the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKES, the SHAKEs MUST be
	skipping to change at page 7, line 34 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 50 ¶
	accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if		accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if
	they have a stated policy that requires conformance to these		they have a stated policy that requires conformance to these
	standards.		standards.
	4.3. Public Keys		4.3. Public Keys
	In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in		In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in
	the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute.		the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute.
	Conforming implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly by		Conforming implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly by
	using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when encoding RSASSA-PSS and		using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when encoding RSASSA-PSS with
	ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in CMS messages. The conventions for		SHAKE public keys in CMS messages. The conventions and encoding for
	RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers are as		RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers are as
	specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] , but we include them		specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of [RFC4055] and
	below for convenience.		Section 2.1 of [RFC5480].
	4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys
	[RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in
	the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters.
	rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1}
	Additionally, when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use		When the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use of the public
	of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifier		key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifier for RSASSA-PSS
	for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 3 can be used as the algorithm		defined in Section 3 can be used as the algorithm attribute in the
	attribute in the OriginatorPublicKey sequence. The identifier		OriginatorPublicKey sequence. The identifier parameters, as
	parameters, as explained in Section 3, MUST be absent. The RSASSA-		explained in Section 3, MUST be absent. The RSASSA-PSS algorithm
	PSS algorithm functions and output lengths are the same as defined in		functions and output lengths are the same as defined in
	Section 4.2.1.		Section 4.2.1.
	Regardless of what public key algorithm identifier is used, the RSA
	public key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent,
	MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055]. The output of
	this encoding is carried in the CMS publicKey bit string.
	RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
	modulus INTEGER, -- n
	publicExponent INTEGER -- e
	}
	4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys
	For ECDSA, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in
	Section 2.1.1 and its syntax in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also
	include them here for convenience:
	id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
	iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
	ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
	namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
	-- implicitCurve NULL
	-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
	}
	The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signers
	certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.
	4.4. Message Authentication Codes		4.4. Message Authentication Codes
	KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185].		KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185].
	In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the		In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the
	AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in		AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in
	the AuthenticatedData mac field.		the AuthenticatedData mac field.
	When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 algorithm		When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 algorithm
	identifier is used as the MAC algorithm identifier, the parameters		identifier is used as the MAC algorithm identifier, the parameters
	field is optional (absent or present). If absent, the SHAKE256		field is optional (absent or present). If absent, the SHAKE256
	skipping to change at page 10, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 14 ¶
	[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,		[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
	RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,		RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
	[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,		[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
	"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",		"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
	RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,		RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
			[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
			2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
			May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.		[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
	Department of Commerce, "SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-		Department of Commerce, "SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-
	Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202,		Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202,
	August 2015.		August 2015.
	[SP800-185]		[SP800-185]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3		National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
	Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and		Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and
	ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185", December 2016,		ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185", December 2016,
	<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/		<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
End of changes. 16 change blocks.
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