draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-02.txt		draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-03.txt
	LAMPS WG Q. Dang		LAMPS WG Q. Dang
	Internet-Draft NIST		Internet-Draft NIST
	Intended status: Standards Track P. Kampanakis		Intended status: Standards Track P. Kampanakis
	Expires: April 25, 2019 Cisco Systems		Expires: May 29, 2019 Cisco Systems
	October 22, 2018		November 25, 2018
	Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message		Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
	Syntax (CMS)		Syntax (CMS)
	draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-02		draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-03
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of		This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
	hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).		hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as one-way
			hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA
			signature algorithms, as message digests and message authentication
			codes. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in CMS
			are also described.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019.		This Internet-Draft will expire on May 29, 2019.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.2.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4.2.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	1. Change Log		1. Change Log
	[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]		[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
			o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-03:
			* Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in
			Deterministric ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis.
			* Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about
			randomness of k because we are using deterministric ECDSA.
			* Completed ASN.1 module and fixed KMAC ASN.1 based on Jim's
			feedback.
			* Text fixes.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-02:		o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-02:
	* Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim.		* Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim.
	* Started ASN.1 module.		* Started ASN.1 module.
	o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01:		o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01:
	* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the		* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
	introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS.		introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS.
	skipping to change at page 3, line 23 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 40 ¶
	2. Introduction		2. Introduction
	The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally		The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally
	sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.		sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.
	This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256		This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
	specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS. In addition, it		specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS. In addition, it
	describes the use of these functions with the RSASSA-PSS signature		describes the use of these functions with the RSASSA-PSS signature
	algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature		algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
	Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type.		Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type.
	The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3].		In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs),
	In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs):
	SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function		SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function
	instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also		instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also
	defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a		defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a
	variable length hash function. The output length, in bits, of a		variable length hash function. The output length, in bits, of a
	SHAKE is defined by the d parameter. The corresponding collision and		SHAKE is defined by the d parameter. The corresponding collision and
	second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2,128)		second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2,128)
	and min(d,128) bits respectively. And, the corresponding collision		and min(d,128) bits respectively. And, the corresponding collision
	and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE256 are		and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE256 are
	min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively.		min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively.
	A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash		A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash
	the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and deterministic ECDSA,		the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and deterministic ECDSA,
	message authentication code and as the mask generating function in		message authentication code and as the mask generating function in
	RSASSA-PSS. In Section 3 of this document we define six new OIDs		RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs
	using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS.		to be used in CMS and their meaning.
	2.1. Terminology		2.1. Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	3. Identifiers		3. Identifiers
	The object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are		This section defines six new OIDs for using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in
			CMS.
			EDNOTE: If PKIX draft is standardized first maybe we should not say
			the identifiers are new for the RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA.
			Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are
	defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for		defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for
	convenience.		convenience.
	id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)		id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)		country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
	nistAlgorithm(4) 2 17 }		nistAlgorithm(4) 2 17 }
	id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)		id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)		country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
	nistAlgorithm(4) 2 18 }		nistAlgorithm(4) 2 18 }
	In this specification, when using the id-shake128-len or id-		In this specification, when using the id-shake128-len or id-
	shake256-len algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent.		shake256-len algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent.
	That is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the		That is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the
	OID.		OID.
	The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.		We define two new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs.
	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }		id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }		id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
	[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]		[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
	The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are		The same RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying
	below.		public keys and signatures.
			We define two new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using
			SHAKEs.
	id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)		id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)		country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
	nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD }		nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD }
	id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)		id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)		country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
	nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD }		nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD }
	[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST. ]		[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST. ]
	The same RSASSA-PSS and deterministric ECDSA with SHAKEs algorithm
	identifiers are used for identifying public keys and signatures.
	The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and deterministic ECDSA		The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and deterministic ECDSA
	identifiers MUST be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a		identifiers MUST be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a
	SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.		SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
	The new object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are		Two new object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are
	below.		define elow.
	id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)		id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)		country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
	nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD }		nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 }
	id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)		id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)		country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
	nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD }		nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 }
	EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST.
	The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 MUST		The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 MUST
	be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one		be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
	component, the OID.		component, the OID.
	Section 4.1, Section 4.2.1, Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.4 specify the		Section 4.1, Section 4.2.1, Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.4 specify the
	required output length for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in		required output length for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in
	message digests, RSASSA-PSS, determinstic ECDSA and KMAC.		message digests, RSASSA-PSS, determinstic ECDSA and KMAC.
	4. Use in CMS		4. Use in CMS
	skipping to change at page 5, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 4 ¶
	The id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len OIDs (Section 3) can be used		The id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len OIDs (Section 3) can be used
	as the digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData,		as the digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData,
	SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm		SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm
	fields in CMS [RFC5652]. The encoding MUST omit the parameters field		fields in CMS [RFC5652]. The encoding MUST omit the parameters field
	and the output size, d, for the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 message digest		and the output size, d, for the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 message digest
	MUST be 256 or 512 bits respectively.		MUST be 256 or 512 bits respectively.
	The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the		The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the
	Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the		Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the
	signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest		signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest
	values are input to signature algorithms.		values are input to signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST
			be the same as the message hash algorithms used in signatures.
	4.2. Signatures		4.2. Signatures
	In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo		In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
	signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and		signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and
	countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the		countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the
	SignerInfo signature field of SignedData and countersignature.		SignerInfo signature field of SignedData and countersignature.
	Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and deterministic		Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and deterministic
	ECDSA with SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize		ECDSA with SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize
	the corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.		the corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.
	4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures		4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
	The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-		The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
	PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is		PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is
	used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the		used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
	AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-		AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
	PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.		PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
	The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash		The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash and
	algorithm as the mask generation function "MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1)"		the hash algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS
	[RFC8017] used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256		MUST be the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-
	respectively. The output-length of the SHAKE which hashes the		length of the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or
	message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.		64 bytes respectively.
	In RSASSA-PSS, a mask generation function takes an octet string of
	variable length and a desired output length as input, and outputs an
	octet string of the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKES, the
	SHAKEs MUST be used natively as the MGF, instead of the MGF1
	algorithm that uses the hash function in multiple iterations as
	specified in Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is
	defined as
	SHAKE128(mgfSeed, maskLen)
	and
	SHA256(mgfSeed, maskLen)
	respectively for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.		The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
	The mgfSeed is the seed from which mask is generated, an octet		and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
	string. The maskLen for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 being used as the MGF		the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKES, the SHAKEs MUST be
	is (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where n is the RSA		used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that
	modulus in bits. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output		uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in
	length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 223 or 191 bytes		Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as
	when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used		the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-
	respectively.		SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 respectively. The mgfSeed is the
			seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. The
			output length is (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where
			n is the RSA modulus in bits. For example, when RSA modulus n is
			2048, the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be
			223 or 191-bits when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
			is used respectively.
	The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.		The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
	Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer		Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
	field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].		field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].
	4.2.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures		4.2.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures
	The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in		The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
	[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256		[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256
	(specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective		(specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
	SHAKE function is used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the		SHAKE function is used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the
	parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a		parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a
	SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-		SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-
	ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.		ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.
	For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,		For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
	the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.		the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
	The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be		The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
	256 or 512 bits respectively. The ECDSA message hash function is		256 or 512 bits respectively.
	SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively.
	Conforming implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE signatures		Conforming implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE signatures
	in CMS MUST generate such signatures with a deterministicly		in CMS MUST generate such signatures with a deterministicly
	generated, non-random k in accordance with all the requirements		generated, non-random k in accordance with all the requirements
	specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such signatures in		specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such signatures in
	accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if		accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if
	they have a stated policy that requires conformance to these		they have a stated policy that requires conformance to these
	standards.		standards.
	In Section 3.2 "Generation of k" of [RFC6979], HMAC is used to derive
	the deterministic k. Conforming implementations that generate
	deterministic ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in X.509 MUST use KMAC with
	SHAKE128 or KMAC with SHAKE256 as specfied in [SP800-185] when
	SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 is used as the message hashing algorithm,
	respectively. In this situation, KMAC with SHAKE128 and KMAC with
	SHAKE256 have 256-bit and 512-bit outputs respectively, and the
	optional customization bit string S is an empty string.
	4.3. Public Keys		4.3. Public Keys
	In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in		In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in
	the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute.		the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute.
	Conforming implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly by		Conforming implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly by
	using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when encoding RSASSA-PSS and		using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when encoding RSASSA-PSS and
	ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in CMS messages. The conventions for		ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in CMS messages. The conventions for
	RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers are as		RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers are as
	specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] , but we include them		specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] , but we include them
	skipping to change at page 8, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 19 ¶
	MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055]. The output of		MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055]. The output of
	this encoding is carried in the CMS publicKey bit string.		this encoding is carried in the CMS publicKey bit string.
	RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {		RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
	modulus INTEGER, -- n		modulus INTEGER, -- n
	publicExponent INTEGER -- e		publicExponent INTEGER -- e
	}		}
	4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys		4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys
	When id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256 are used as the		For ECDSA, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in
	algorithm identitifier in the public key, the parameters, as
	explained in Section 3, MUST be absent. The hash function and its
	output-length are the same as in Section 4.2.2.
	Additionally, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in
	Section 2.1.1 and its syntax in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also		Section 2.1.1 and its syntax in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also
	include them here for convenience:		include them here for convenience:
	id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {		id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
	iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }		iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
	ECParameters ::= CHOICE {		ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
	namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER		namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
	-- implicitCurve NULL		-- implicitCurve NULL
	-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain		-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
	skipping to change at page 8, line 50 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 43 ¶
	certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.		certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.
	4.4. Message Authentication Codes		4.4. Message Authentication Codes
	KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185].		KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185].
	In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the		In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the
	AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in		AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in
	the AuthenticatedData mac field.		the AuthenticatedData mac field.
	When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 algorithm		When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 algorithm
	identifier is used as the KMAC algorithm identifier, the parameters		identifier is used as the MAC algorithm identifier, the parameters
	field MUST be absent.		field is optional (absent or present). If absent, the SHAKE256
			output length used in KMAC is 256 or 512 bits respectively and the
			customization string is an empty string by default.
	Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when		Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when
	processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers.		processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers.
	When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is		When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is
	an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output		an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output
	length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or		length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or
	KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively in this specification.		KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively in this specification.
	5. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	[ EDNOTE: Update here only if there are OID allocations by IANA. ]		[ EDNOTE: Update here only if there are OID allocations by IANA. ]
	This document has no IANA actions.		This document has no IANA actions.
	6. Security Considerations		6. Security Considerations
	SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are one-way extensible-output functions. Their
	output length depends on a required length of the consuming
	application.
	The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic		The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic
	functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times		function, executing each function with the same input multiple times
	will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect		will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect
	unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from		unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
	excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times. The		excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times. The
	shorter one of any 2 outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same		shorter one of any 2 outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same
	input is a prefix of the longer one. It is a similar situation as		input is a prefix of the longer one. It is a similar situation as
	truncating a 512-bit output of SHA-512 by taking its 256 left-most		truncating a 512-bit output of SHA-512 by taking its 256 left-most
	bits. These 256 left-most bits are a prefix of the 512-bit output.		bits. These 256 left-most bits are a prefix of the 512-bit output.
	Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of		Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of
	the signer's private key permits masquerade.		the signer's private key permits masquerade.
	When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,		When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
	data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the		data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the
	message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the		message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
	content could originate from any one of the parties.		content could originate from any one of the parties.
	Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys
	and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA
	signature. In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs
	relies on random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number
	generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can result
	in little or no security. The generation of quality random numbers
	is difficult. [RFC4086] offers important guidance in this area, and
	[SP800-90A] series provide acceptable PRNGs.
	Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become		Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
	weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and		weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
	computing power increases, the work factor or time required to break		computing power increases, the work factor or time required to break
	a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore,		a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore,
	cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing		cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing
	new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should		new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should
	be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their		be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their
	implementations.		implementations.
	7. Acknowledgements		7. Acknowledgements
	skipping to change at page 11, line 30 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 11 ¶
	Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in		Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in
	the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-		the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-
	lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.		lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.
	[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and		[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
	Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key		Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April		(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
	2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.		2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
	[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
	"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
	[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature		[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
	Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature		Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
	Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August		Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
	2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.		2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
	[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:		[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
	Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,		Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
	<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.		<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
	[shake-nist-oids]		[shake-nist-oids]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer		National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
	Security Objects Register", October 2017,		Security Objects Register", October 2017,
	<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-		<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
	Register/Algorithm-Registration>.		Register/Algorithm-Registration>.
	[SP800-90A]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology,
	"Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
	Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A",
	June 2015,
	<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
	NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.
	[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),		[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
	"X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial		"X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
	Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature		Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
	Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.		Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.
	Appendix A. ASN.1 Module		Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
	[EDNOTE: Update. TBD. ]		This appendix includes the ASN.1 modules for SHAKEs in CMS. This
			module includes some ASN.1 from other standards for reference.
	PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2018 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)		CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2018 { { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
	internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)		rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
	id-mod-cms-shakes-2018(TBD) }		id-mod-cms-shakes(TBD) }
	DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=		DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
	BEGIN		BEGIN
	-- EXPORTS ALL;		-- EXPORTS ALL;
	IMPORTS		IMPORTS
	-- FROM [RFC6268]		DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS
			FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
			{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
			mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
			id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
			RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, id-ecPublicKey
			FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
			internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
			id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
			--
			-- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-)
			-- used in SignedData, SignerInfo, DigestedData,
			-- and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm
			-- fields in CMS
			--
			digestAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
			...
			-- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652]
			-- and MessageDigestAlgs in [RFC5753]
			mda-shake128 |
			mda-shake256,
			...
			}
	--		--
	-- One-Way Hash Functions		-- One-Way Hash Functions
	-- SHAKE128		-- SHAKE128
	mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {		mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
	IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.		IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.
	}		}
	id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)		id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
	us(840) organization(1) gov(101)		us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
	csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)		csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
	hashAlgs(2) 11 }		hashAlgs(2) 11 }
	-- SHAKE-256		-- SHAKE-256
	mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {		mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
	IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.		IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.
	}		}
	id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)		id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
	us(840) organization(1) gov(101)		us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
	csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)		csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
	hashAlgs(2) 12 }		hashAlgs(2) 12 }
			--
			-- Public key algorithm identifiers located in the
			-- OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute in CMS.
			-- And Signature identifiers used in SignerInfo
			-- signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content
			-- type and countersignature attribute in CMS.
			--
			-- From RFC5280, for reference.
			-- rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }
			-- When the rsaEncryption algorithm identifier is used
			-- for a public key, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters
			-- field MUST contain NULL.
			--
			id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
			id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
			-- When the id-RSASSA-PSS-* algorithm identifiers are used
			-- for a public key or a signature in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier
			-- parameters field MUST be absent. The message digest algorithm
			-- used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or
			-- 64 byte outout length respectively. The mask generating
			-- function MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with an output length
			-- of (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where n
			-- is the RSA modulus in bits. The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST
			-- be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. In both cases, the RSA
			-- public key, MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type.
			-- From RFC4055, for reference.
			-- RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
			-- modulus INTEGER, -- n
			-- publicExponent INTEGER } -- e
			id-ecdsa-with-shake128 ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
			us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
			csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
			sigAlgs(3) TBD }
			id-ecdsa-with-shake256 ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
			us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
			csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
			sigAlgs(3) TBD }
			-- When the id-ecdsa-with-shake* algorithm identifiers are
			-- used in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field
			-- MUST be absent and the signature algorithm should
			-- Deterministric ECDSA [RFC6979]. The message digest MUST
			-- be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or 64 byte outout
			-- length respectively. In both cases, the ECDSA public key,
			-- MUST be encoded using the id-ecPublicKey type.
			-- From RFC5480, for reference.
			-- id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
			-- iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
			-- The id-ecPublicKey parameters must be absent or present
			-- and are defined as
			-- ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
			-- namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
			-- -- implicitCurve NULL
			-- -- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
			-- }
			--
			-- Message Authentication (maca-) Algorithms
			-- used in AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm in CMS
			--
			MessageAuthAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
			...
			-- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652] and [RFC6268]
			maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 |
			maca-KMACwithSHAKE256
			}
			SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {
			...
			-- The expands SMimeCaps from [RFC5911]
			maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 |
			maca-KMACwithSHAKE256
			}
	--		--
	-- KMAC Functions
	-- KMAC with SHAKE128		-- KMAC with SHAKE128
	KMACwithSHAKE128 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {		maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
	IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE128		IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE128
	PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE128-params ARE required		PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE128-params ARE optional
			-- If KMACwithSHAKE128-params parameters are absent
			-- the SHAKE128 output length used in KMAC is 256 bits
			-- and the customization string is an empty string.
			SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE128}
	}		}
	id-KMACWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)		id-KMACWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1)		country(16) us(840) organization(1)
	gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)		gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
	hashAlgs(2) 19 }		hashAlgs(2) 19 }
	KMACwithSHAKE128-params ::= SEQUENCE {		KMACwithSHAKE128-params ::= SEQUENCE {
	KMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 256, -- Output length in bits		KMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 256, -- Output length in bits
	customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''		customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H
	}		}
	-- KMAC with SHAKE256		-- KMAC with SHAKE256
	KMACwithSHAKE256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {		maca-KMACwithSHAKE256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
	IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE256		IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE256
	PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE256-params ARE required		PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE256-params ARE optional
			-- If KMACwithSHAKE256-params parameters are absent
			-- the SHAKE256 output length used in KMAC is 512 bits
			-- and the customization string is an empty string.
			SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE256}
	}		}
	id-KMACWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)		id-KMACWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
	country(16) us(840) organization(1)		country(16) us(840) organization(1)
	gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)		gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
	hashAlgs(2) 20 }		hashAlgs(2) 20 }
	KMACwithSHAKE256-params ::= SEQUENCE {		KMACwithSHAKE256-params ::= SEQUENCE {
	KMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 512, -- Output length in bits		KMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 512, -- Output length in bits
	customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''		customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H
	}		}
	END		END
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Quynh Dang		Quynh Dang
	NIST		NIST
	100 Bureau Drive		100 Bureau Drive
	Gaithersburg, MD 20899		Gaithersburg, MD 20899
End of changes. 42 change blocks.
	116 lines changed or deleted		197 lines changed or added
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