draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-01.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-02.txt 
LAMPS WG Q. Dang LAMPS WG Q. Dang
Internet-Draft NIST Internet-Draft NIST
Intended status: Standards Track P. Kampanakis Intended status: Standards Track P. Kampanakis
Expires: December 31, 2018 Cisco Systems Expires: April 25, 2019 Cisco Systems
June 29, 2018 October 22, 2018
Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-01 draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-02
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
skipping to change at page 1, line 33 skipping to change at page 1, line 33
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Change Log 1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ] [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-02:
* Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim.
* Started ASN.1 module.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01: o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01:
* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the * Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS. introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS.
* Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcodes hash, salt and * Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcodes hash, salt and
MFG, according the WG consensus. MGF, according the WG consensus.
* Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and * Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and
clarify the algorithm identifier usage. clarify the algorithm identifier usage.
* Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1. * Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-00: o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-00:
* Various updates to title and section names. * Various updates to title and section names.
skipping to change at page 3, line 18 skipping to change at page 3, line 24
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally
sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents. sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.
This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS. In addition, it specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS. In addition, it
describes the use of these functions with the RSASSA-PSS signature describes the use of these functions with the RSASSA-PSS signature
algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type. Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type.
The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3]. The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3].
In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions, called SHAKE128 In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs):
and SHAKE256 are defined. Four hash functions, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function
SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also defined but are out of scope for this instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also
document. A SHAKE is a variable length hash function. The output defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a
lengths, in bits, of the SHAKE hash functions are defined by the d variable length hash function. The output length, in bits, of a
parameter. The corresponding collision and preimage resistance SHAKE is defined by the d parameter. The corresponding collision and
security levels for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are respectively second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2,128)
min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) and min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits. and min(d,128) bits respectively. And, the corresponding collision
and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE256 are
min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively.
A SHAKE can be used in CMS as a message digest, message A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash
authentication code or a mask generation function (in RSASSA-PSS). the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and deterministic ECDSA,
In this document we define six new OIDs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 message authentication code and as the mask generating function in
in CMS. RSASSA-PSS. In Section 3 of this document we define six new OIDs
using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS.
2.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Identifiers 3. Identifiers
The object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are The object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are
defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for
convenience. convenience.
id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 17 } country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 17 }
id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 18 } country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 18 }
In this specification, when using the id-shake128-len or id- In this specification, when using the id-shake128-len or id-
shake256-len algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent. shake256-len algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent.
That is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the That is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the
OID. OID.
The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below. The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ] [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are
below. below.
id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD } country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD }
id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD } country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST. ] [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST. ]
The same RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with SHAKEs algorithm identifiers are The same RSASSA-PSS and deterministric ECDSA with SHAKEs algorithm
used for identifying public keys and signatures. identifiers are used for identifying public keys and signatures.
The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and deterministic ECDSA
absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one identifiers MUST be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a
component, the OID. SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
The new object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are The new object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are
below. below.
id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD } country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD }
id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD } country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD }
EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST. EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST.
The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 MUST The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 MUST
be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
component, the OID. component, the OID.
Section 4.1, Section 4.2.1, Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.4 specify the
required output length for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in
message digests, RSASSA-PSS, determinstic ECDSA and KMAC.
4. Use in CMS 4. Use in CMS
4.1. Message Digests 4.1. Message Digests
The id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len OIDs (Section 3) can be used The id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len OIDs (Section 3) can be used
as the digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData, as the digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData,
SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm
fields in CMS [RFC5652]. The encoding MUST omit the parameters field fields in CMS [RFC5652]. The encoding MUST omit the parameters field
and the output size, d, for the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 message digest and the output size, d, for the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 message digest
MUST be 256 or 512 bits respectively. MUST be 256 or 512 bits respectively.
skipping to change at page 5, line 17 skipping to change at page 5, line 46
signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest
values are input to signature algorithms. values are input to signature algorithms.
4.2. Signatures 4.2. Signatures
In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and
countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the
SignerInfo signature field of SignedData and countersignature. SignerInfo signature field of SignedData and countersignature.
Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and deterministic
SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the ECDSA with SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize
corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3. the corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures 4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA- The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA- AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
algorithm in the maskGenAlgorithm used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the algorithm as the mask generation function "MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1)"
same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of the [RFC8017] used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256
SHAKE which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. respectively. The output-length of the SHAKE which hashes the
message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
The maskGenAlgorithm is the MGF1 specified in Section B.2.1 of In RSASSA-PSS, a mask generation function takes an octet string of
[RFC8017]. A mask generation function in RSASSA-PSS takes an octet variable length and a desired output length as input, and outputs an
string of variable length and a desired output length as input, and octet string of the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKES, the
outputs an octet string of the desired length. The output length for SHAKEs MUST be used natively as the MGF, instead of the MGF1
SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 being used as the hash function in MGF1 is (n - algorithm that uses the hash function in multiple iterations as
264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where n is the RSA modulus specified in Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is
in bits. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output length defined as
for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in the maskGenAlgorithm will be 223 or 191
SHAKE128(mgfSeed, maskLen)
and
SHA256(mgfSeed, maskLen)
respectively for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
The mgfSeed is the seed from which mask is generated, an octet
string. The maskLen for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 being used as the MGF
is (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where n is the RSA
modulus in bits. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output
length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 223 or 191 bytes
when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used
respectively. respectively.
The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017]. field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].
4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures 4.2.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 [X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256
(specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective (specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
SHAKE function is used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the SHAKE function is used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the
parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a
SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id- SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-
ecdsa-with-SHAKE256. ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification, For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined. the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
256 or 512 bits respectively. The ECDSA message hash function is 256 or 512 bits respectively. The ECDSA message hash function is
SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively.
Conforming implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE signatures
in CMS MUST generate such signatures with a deterministicly
generated, non-random k in accordance with all the requirements
specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such signatures in
accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if
they have a stated policy that requires conformance to these
standards.
In Section 3.2 "Generation of k" of [RFC6979], HMAC is used to derive
the deterministic k. Conforming implementations that generate
deterministic ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in X.509 MUST use KMAC with
SHAKE128 or KMAC with SHAKE256 as specfied in [SP800-185] when
SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 is used as the message hashing algorithm,
respectively. In this situation, KMAC with SHAKE128 and KMAC with
SHAKE256 have 256-bit and 512-bit outputs respectively, and the
optional customization bit string S is an empty string.
4.3. Public Keys 4.3. Public Keys
In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in
the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute. the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute.
The conventions for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm Conforming implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly by
identifiers are as specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] , using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when encoding RSASSA-PSS and
but we include them below for convenience. ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in CMS messages. The conventions for
RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers are as
specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] , but we include them
below for convenience.
4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys 4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys
[RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in [RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in
the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters. the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters.
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1} rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1}
Additionally, when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use Additionally, when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use
of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifier of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifier
skipping to change at page 7, line 28 skipping to change at page 8, line 37
Section 2.1.1 and its syntax in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also Section 2.1.1 and its syntax in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also
include them here for convenience: include them here for convenience:
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
ECParameters ::= CHOICE { ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- implicitCurve NULL -- implicitCurve NULL
-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
} }
The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signers The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signers
certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature. certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.
4.4. Message Authentication Codes 4.4. Message Authentication Codes
KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185]. KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185].
In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the
AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in
the AuthenticatedData mac field. the AuthenticatedData mac field.
skipping to change at page 8, line 7 skipping to change at page 9, line 15
Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when
processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers. processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers.
When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is
an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output
length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or
KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively in this specification. KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively in this specification.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
This document uses several new registries [ EDNOTE: Update here. ] [ EDNOTE: Update here only if there are OID allocations by IANA. ]
This document has no IANA actions.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are one-way extensible-output functions. Their SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are one-way extensible-output functions. Their
output length depends on a required length of the consuming output length depends on a required length of the consuming
application. application.
The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic
functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times
will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect
unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times. excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times. The
shorter one of any 2 outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same
input is a prefix of the longer one. It is a similar situation as
truncating a 512-bit output of SHA-512 by taking its 256 left-most
bits. These 256 left-most bits are a prefix of the 512-bit output.
Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of
the signer's private key permits masquerade. the signer's private key permits masquerade.
When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key, When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the
message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
content could originate from any one of the parties. content could originate from any one of the parties.
Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys
skipping to change at page 9, line 9 skipping to change at page 10, line 24
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
This document is based on Russ Housley's draft This document is based on Russ Housley's draft
[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash] It replaces SHA3 hash functions by [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash] It replaces SHA3 hash functions by
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as the LAMPS WG agreed. SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as the LAMPS WG agreed.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk, [RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009, Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
skipping to change at page 10, line 16 skipping to change at page 11, line 35
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>. 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[shake-nist-oids] [shake-nist-oids]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
Security Objects Register", October 2017, Security Objects Register", October 2017,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects- <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
Register/Algorithm-Registration>. Register/Algorithm-Registration>.
[SP800-90A] [SP800-90A]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using "Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A", Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A",
skipping to change at page 10, line 37 skipping to change at page 12, line 20
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>. NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.
[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI), [X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
"X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial "X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005. Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
[EDNOTE: Update] [EDNOTE: Update. TBD. ]
PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2018 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-cms-shakes-2018(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
-- FROM [RFC6268]
--
-- One-Way Hash Functions
-- SHAKE128
mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.
}
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 11 }
-- SHAKE-256
mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.
}
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 12 }
--
-- KMAC Functions
-- KMAC with SHAKE128
KMACwithSHAKE128 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE128
PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE128-params ARE required
}
id-KMACWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 19 }
KMACwithSHAKE128-params ::= SEQUENCE {
KMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 256, -- Output length in bits
customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''
}
-- KMAC with SHAKE256
KMACwithSHAKE256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE256
PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE256-params ARE required
}
id-KMACWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 20 }
KMACwithSHAKE256-params ::= SEQUENCE {
KMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 512, -- Output length in bits
customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''
}
END
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Quynh Dang Quynh Dang
NIST NIST
100 Bureau Drive 100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Gaithersburg, MD 20899
Email: quynh.Dang@nist.gov Email: quynh.Dang@nist.gov
Panos Kampanakis Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Email: pkampana@cisco.com Email: pkampana@cisco.com
 End of changes. 35 change blocks. 
75 lines changed or deleted 219 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/