LAMPS WG                                                         Q. Dang
Internet-Draft                                                      NIST
Intended status: Standards Track                           P. Kampanakis
Expires: August 19, December 31, 2018                                 Cisco Systems
                                                       February 15,
                                                           June 29, 2018

  Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
                              Syntax (CMS)
                     draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-00
                     draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-01

Abstract

   This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
   hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 19, December 31, 2018.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2   3
   3.  Message Digest Algorithms  Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  One-way Extensible-Output-Function SHAKEs
   4.  Use in CMS  . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Mask Generation SHAKEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Signature Algorithms   4
     4.1.  Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs
     4.2.  Signatures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  ECDSA with SHAKEs . . . . .   5
       4.2.1.  RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Message Authentication Codes with SHAKEs
       4.2.2.  ECDSA Signatures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Acknowledgement
     4.3.  Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.3.1.  RSASSA-PSS Public Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.3.2.  ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.
     4.4.  Message Authentication Codes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.   8
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.1.   9
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.2.   9
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8   9
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9  10

1.  Change Log

   [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]

   o  draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01:

      *  Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
         introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS.

      *  Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcodes hash, salt and
         MFG, according the WG consensus.

      *  Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and
         clarify the algorithm identifier usage.

      *  Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.

   o  draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-00:

      *  Various updates to title and section names.

      *  Content changes filling in text and references.

   o  draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash-00:

      *  Initial version

2.  Introduction

   The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally
   sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.
   This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
   specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS.  In addition, this
   specification it
   describes the use of these one-way hash functions with the RSASSA-PSS signature
   algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
   Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type.

3.  Message Digest Algorithms

3.1.  One-way Extensible-Output-Function SHAKEs

   The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3].
   In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions, called SHAKE128
   and SHAKE256 are defined.  Four hash functions, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
   SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also defined but are out of scope for this
   document.

   In CMS, Digest algorithm identifiers are located  A SHAKE is a variable length hash function.  The output
   lengths, in bits, of the SignedData
   digestAlgorithms field, the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field, SHAKE hash functions are defined by the
   DigestedData digestAlgorithm field, and the AuthenticatedData
   digestAlgorithm field.

   Digest values are located in the DigestedData digest field and the
   Message Digest authenticated attribute.  In addition, digest values
   are input to signature algorithms.

   SHAKE is a variable length hash function.  The output lengths, in
   bits, of the SHAKE hash functions is defined by the parameter d.  The
   corresponding collision d
   parameter.  The corresponding collision and preimage resistance
   security levels for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are respectively
   min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) and min(d/2,256) and min(d,256).  The Object min(d,256) bits.

   A SHAKE can be used in CMS as a message digest, message
   authentication code or a mask generation function (in RSASSA-PSS).
   In this document we define six new OIDs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
   in CMS.

3.  Identifiers (OIDs)

   The object identifiers for
   these two SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are
   defined in [shake-nist-oids] and are
   included we include them here for convenience:
   convenience.

  id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
                     nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 17 }

    id-shake128-len

  id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
                     nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 18 }

    ShakeOutputLen ::= INTEGER -- Output length in octets

   When

   In this specification, when using the id-shake128-len id-shake256-len or id-
   shake256-len algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be present, and they MUST employ absent.
   That is, the
   ShakeOutputLen syntax that contains an encoded positive integer value
   at least 32 or 64 respectively.

3.2.  Mask Generation SHAKEs

   The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm uses a mask generation function.
   A mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
   and identifier SHALL be a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string SEQUENCE of one component, the desired length.
   OID.

   The mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS
   is defined in [RFC8017], but we include it here as well new identifiers for
   convenience:

       id-mgf1 RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.

     id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { pkcs-1 8 TBD }

   The parameters field associated with id-mgf1 MUST have a
   hashAlgorithm value that identifies the hash used with MGF1.  To use
   SHAKE as this hash, this parameter MUST
     id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { TBD }

     [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be id-shake128-len or id-
   shake256-len as specified in Section 3.1 above.

4.  Signature Algorithms

   This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
   implementations that support 2 SHAKE one-way hash functions with the
   RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm [RFC8017] NIST later. ]

   The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are
   below.

  id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
      us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3  TBD }

  id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
      us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3  TBD }

  [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST. ]

   The same RSASSA-PSS and the Elliptic Curve
   Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] ECDSA with SHAKEs algorithm identifiers are
   used for identifying public keys and signatures.

   The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be
   absent.  That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
   component, the OID.

   The new object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are
   below.

   id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD }

   id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD }

   EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST.

   The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 MUST
   be absent.  That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
   component, the OID.

4.  Use in CMS signed-data
   content type.

4.1.  Message Digests

   The id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len OIDs (Section 3) can be used
   as the digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData,
   SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm
   fields in CMS [RFC5652].  The encoding MUST omit the parameters field
   and the output size, d, for the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 message digest
   MUST be 256 or 512 bits respectively.

   The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the
   Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the
   signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo.  In addition, digest
   values are input to signature algorithms.

4.2.  Signatures

   In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
   signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and
   countersignature
   attributes. attribute.  Signature values are located in the
   SignerInfo signature field of SignedData and countersignature attributes.

4.1. countersignature.

   Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with SHAKEs
   SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the
   corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.

4.2.1.  RSASSA-PSS Signatures

   The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm identifier and its parameters are
   specifed is defined in [RFC4055]:

       id-RSASSA-PSS  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { pkcs-1 10 }

       RSASSA-PSS-params  ::= [RFC8017].  When id-RSASSA-
   PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is
   used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field.  That is, the
   AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE  {
            hashAlgorithm      HashAlgorithm,
            maskGenAlgorithm   MaskGenAlgorithm,
            saltLength         INTEGER,
            trailerField       INTEGER }

   This document adds two new of one component, id-RSASSA-
   PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.

   The hash algorithm choices to hash a message being signed and two new choices
   for mask generation functions.  These are the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash
   algorithm identifiers specified in Section 3.1.

   When SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 is used as the hashAlgorithm, it maskGenAlgorithm used in RSASSA-PSS MUST also be used as the maskGenAlgorithm.

   When used as the hashAlgorithm, the
   same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output-
   length must respectively.  The output-length of the
   SHAKE which hashes the message SHALL be either 32 or 64 bytes respectively.  In these cases,

   The maskGenAlgorithm is the parameters MUST be present, MGF1 specified in Section B.2.1 of
   [RFC8017].  A mask generation function in RSASSA-PSS takes an octet
   string of variable length and they MUST employ the
   ShakeOutputLen syntax that contains a desired output length as input, and
   outputs an encoded positive integer value octet string of 32 or 64 the desired length.  The output length for id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len algorithm
   identifier respectively.

   When id-shake128-len
   SHAKE128 or id-shake256-len algorithm identifier is SHAKE256 being used as the id-mfg1 maskGenAlgorithm parameter, the ShakeOutputLen
   parameter must be hash function in MGF1 is (n -
   264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 respectively for
   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, bytes respectively, where n is the RSA modulus
   in bits.  For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, ShakeOutputLen must the output length
   for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in the maskGenAlgorithm will be 223 or 191
   when id-shake128-len id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-shake256-len id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used
   respectively.

   The parameter RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively for respectively.
   Finally, the
   SHAKE128 trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
   field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].

4.2.2.  ECDSA Signatures

   The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
   [X9.62].  When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256
   (specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
   SHAKE function is used as the hash.  The encoding MUST omit the
   parameters field.  That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a
   SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-
   ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.

   For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
   the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
   The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
   256 or 512 bits respectively.  The ECDSA message hash function is
   SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 OIDs. respectively.

4.3.  Public Keys

   In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in
   the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute.

   The conventions for RSA RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm
   identifiers are as specified in [RFC3279] [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and
   [RFC4055]. [RFC5480] ,
   but we include them below for convenience.

4.3.1.  RSASSA-PSS Public Keys

   [RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in
   the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters.

     rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { pkcs-1 1}

   Additionally, [RFC4055] adds when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use
   of the RSASSA-PSS OID and parameters shown
   above as a public key identifier.  The parameters may be either
   absent or present when exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifier
   for RSASSA-PSS OID is defined in Section 3 can be used as subject public key
   information.  If id-RSASSA-PSS is used the algorithm
   attribute in the public key OriginatorPublicKey sequence.  The identifier
   with
   parameters, as explained in Section 3.3 of [RFC4055] describes that the
   signature algorithm parameters 3, MUST match be absent.  The RSASSA-
   PSS algorithm functions and output lengths are the parameters same as defined in the
   Section 4.2.1.

   Regardless of what public key
   structure algorithm identifier except the saltLength field.  The
   saltLength field in is used, the signature parameters RSA
   public key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent,
   MUST be greater or equal
   to that in the key parameters field.  If encoded using the id-RSASSA-PSS parameters
   are NULL no further parameter validation is necessary.

4.2.  ECDSA with SHAKEs RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055].  The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
   [X9.62].  When ECDSA output of
   this encoding is used carried in conjunction with one of the SHAKE
   one-way hash functions, the object identifiers are:

     id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
         us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3  x}

     id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER CMS publicKey bit string.

     RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
         us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3  y}

   EDNOTE: x and y will be specified by NIST.
           modulus INTEGER, -- n
           publicExponent INTEGER  -- e
     }

4.3.2.  ECDSA Public Keys

   When using the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256
   algorithm identifier, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL
   but absent.

   For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification, id-ecdsa-with-shake256 are used as the output size of
   algorithm identitifier in the hash function must be explicitly determined.
   The ShakeOutputLen parameter of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 MUST be 32 or 64
   bytes respectively when it is used public key, the parameters, as
   explained in ECDSA Section 3, MUST be absent.  The conventions for ECDSA public keys hash function and its
   output-length are the same as in Section 4.2.2.

   Additionally, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is specified defined in [RFC5480] as
   Section 2.1.1 and its syntax in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480].  We also
   include them here for convenience:

      id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }

      ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
          namedCurve         OBJECT IDENTIFIER
          -- implicitCurve   NULL
          -- specifiedCurve  SpecifiedECDomain
              }

   The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signers
   certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.

5.

4.4.  Message Authentication Codes with SHAKEs

   This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
   implementations that support the

   KMAC specified in [SP800-185] as message authentication code (MAC). (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185].
   In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the
   AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field.  MAC  The KMAC values are located in
   the AuthenticatedData mac field.

   The object identifiers for KMACs with SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are:

   id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 z }

   id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 w }

   EDNOTE: z and w will be specified by NIST.

   When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 algorithm
   identifier is used, used as the KMAC algorithm identifier, the parameters
   field MUST be absent; not NULL but absent.

   Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when
   processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers.

   When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is
   an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output
   length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or
   KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively in this specification.

6.  Acknowledgement

   This document is based on Russ Housley's draft
   [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash] It replaces SHA3 hash functions by
   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as the LAMPS WG agreed.

7.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document uses several new registries that were originally created in
   [shake-nist-oids].  No further registries are required. [ EDNOTE: Update here. ]

8.

6.  Security Considerations

   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are one-way extensible-output functions.  Their
   output length depends on a required length of the consuming
   application.

   The SHAKEs are deterministic functions.  Like any other deterministic
   functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times
   will produce the same output.  Therefore, users should not expect
   unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
   excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times.

   Implementations must protect the signer's private key.  Compromise of
   the signer's private key permits masquerade.

   When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
   data origin authentication is not provided.  Any party that knows the
   message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
   content could originate from any one of the parties.

   Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys
   and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA
   signature.  In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs
   relies on random numbers.  The use of inadequate pseudo-random number
   generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can result
   in little or no security.  The generation of quality random numbers
   is difficult.  [RFC4086] offers important guidance in this area, and
   [SP800-90A] series provide acceptable PRNGs.

   Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
   weaker with time.  As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
   computing performance improves, power increases, the work factor or time required to break
   a particular cryptographic algorithm will reduce. may decrease.  Therefore,
   cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing
   new algorithms to be readily inserted.  That is, implementers should
   be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their
   implementations.

9.

7.  Acknowledgements

   This document is based on Russ Housley's draft
   [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash] It replaces SHA3 hash functions by
   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as the LAMPS WG agreed.

8.  References

9.1.

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC3279]  Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
              Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
              2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.

   [RFC4055]  Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
              Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
              the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.

   [RFC5480]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC8017]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
              "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
              RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.

   [SHA3]     National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
              Department of Commerce, "SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-
              Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202,
              August 2015.

   [SP800-185]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
              Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and
              ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185", December 2016,
              <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
              NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.

9.2.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]
              Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in
              the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-
              lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.

   [RFC3279]  Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
              Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
              2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

   [shake-nist-oids]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
              Security Objects Register", October 2017,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
              Register/Algorithm-Registration>.

   [SP800-90A]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
              Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A",
              June 2015,
              <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
              NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.

   [X9.62]    American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
              "X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
              Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
              Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.

Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

   [EDNOTE: Update]

Authors' Addresses

   Quynh Dang
   NIST
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899

   Email: quynh.Dang@nist.gov

   Panos Kampanakis
   Cisco Systems

   Email: pkampana@cisco.com